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Abstract 
The question of what agenda drives NGO peacebuilding in post-conflict setting 
has been raised in a number of literatures which make generalized conclusions 
that NGOs tend to respond to the liberal peace agenda, and in the process co-
opt local peacebuilding initiatives. Liberal peace agenda refers to the post-
conflict peacebuilding approach based on the promotion of democracy, 
economic liberalization, human rights and the rule of law.  As such, NGOs are 
seen as privatizing peacebuilding, marginalizing local initiatives and applying 
unsustainable approaches to peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts.  
 
Provoked by these assertions, I conducted field research in northern Uganda, 
which up to 2006 had experienced 22 years of conflict between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and Government of Uganda (GOU). I contend in my 
findings that while to some extent the generalized observations made by liberal 
peace critics are true, they fail to fully engage with the micro aspects of post-
conflict peacebuilding. The macro-analytic assertions of the liberal peace critics 
ignore the plurality of the NGO peacebuilding practice, the diverse internal 
organizational culture, and the complexities and diversities of the contextual 
dynamics of post-conflict settings.  
 
My research was based on a micro level analysis and demonstrated that the 
peacebuilding process in northern Uganda was interactive, and, as such, 
engendered diverse encounters of sense-making, relationship building and co-
construction of peacebuilding discourse and practice between NGOs, donors 
and local community.  The study shows that peacebuilding was essentially 
relational and developed through a process of relational constructionism, which 
denotes social processes of reality construction based on relational encounters. 
ii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. i 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... vi 
List of Abbreviations....................................................................................................... vii 
Chapter One: Research Design and Methodology ............................................................ 1 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
Research Location: Northern Uganda ..................................................................... 9 
Map of Uganda .......................................................................................................... 13 
Definitions of terms ................................................................................................... 14 
Peacebuilding ........................................................................................................ 14 
Post-conflict and Post-conflict reconstruction ................................................... 17 
Peacebuilding NGOs ............................................................................................ 19 
Distinguishing Between Local and International NGOs .................................. 21 
Local Community and Tradition .......................................................................... 25 
Research Methodology ............................................................................................ 25 
Research Design ................................................................................................... 27 
Grounded Theory .................................................................................................. 29 
A Methodological Approach to Research Design ............................................ 32 
Entering the Field of Research ........................................................................... 38 
Research Methods in Data Collection and Analysis ........................................ 50 
Research Limitations and Methodological Challenges ................................... 59 
Thesis Structure ........................................................................................................ 65 
Chapter Two: Conceptualization of NGO Peacebuilding ............................................... 69 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 69 
Part I: Post-Cold War Period and Emergence of NGOs in Peacebuilding ...... 70 
Part II: Operational Context of NGO Peacebuilding and Liberal Peace Agenda
 ..................................................................................................................................... 73 
Part III: Critique of Liberal Peace ........................................................................... 82 
Part IV: NGO Peacebuilding and ‘Liberal Peace’ ................................................ 92 
iii 
 
Part V: Beyond the Liberal Peace Critique: Identifying the Gaps in the 
Literature .................................................................................................................... 98 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 115 
Chapter Three: Relational Constructionism in NGO Peacebuilding ............................ 118 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 118 
Part I: Relational Constructionism: An Introduction ........................................... 121 
Part II: Social Constructionism.............................................................................. 124 
Different Aspects of Social Constructionism ................................................... 127 
Part III: From Social Constructionism to Relational Constructionism ............. 136 
Bridging Differences in Communities of Practice ........................................... 144 
Part IV: Relational Constructionism and Peacebuilding ................................... 146 
Partnership and Networking .............................................................................. 148 
Relational Practice .............................................................................................. 150 
Communities of Practice (CoP) as Peacebuilding Communities ................. 152 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 155 
Chapter Four: The Northern Uganda Conflict .............................................................. 158 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 158 
Part I: The Colonial Government: Maintaining peace through divide and rule
 ................................................................................................................................... 161 
Colonial Legacy of Divide and Rule ................................................................. 164 
The Buganda Factor in the Struggle for Nationalism .................................... 167 
Economic and Political Policies: North –South Divide ................................... 171 
Part II: Post-Independence Uganda: Nation building and militarization of 
conflicts ..................................................................................................................... 173 
Militarization of Conflict ...................................................................................... 177 
The LRA Insurgency ........................................................................................... 179 
Part III: Peacebuilding attempts in response to protracted conflicts ............... 187 
Government initiatives in Peacebuilding ......................................................... 188 
Constitution Making Process ............................................................................. 189 
Peace Negotiation Mechanisms ....................................................................... 192 
Government’s Institutional Reforms ................................................................. 203 
Post-conflict Reconstruction Aid to Uganda: A liberal peace perspective?207 
iv 
 
NGO Peacebuilding Interventions .................................................................... 210 
The ICC Intervention: International Mechanisms of Peacebuilding ............ 212 
Culturally-based Approaches to Reconciliation.............................................. 215 
Chapter Five: NGO Peacebuilding Approaches in Northern Uganda .......................... 226 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 226 
Approach to the Analysis of the Findings ............................................................ 228 
Approaches to Peacebuilding ............................................................................... 231 
Perceptions of Peacebuilding ............................................................................ 231 
Part I: Third Party Mediation in Land Dispute Resolution................................. 234 
Land dispute resolution ...................................................................................... 235 
Part II: Human Rights Advocacy........................................................................... 243 
Part III: Reconciliation and Transitional Justice ................................................. 252 
The ICC Debate ................................................................................................... 253 
Cultural Approaches to Forgiveness and Reconciliation .............................. 257 
Reintegration of formerly abducted persons and Ex-Combatants .............. 267 
Peace Education and Reintegration of the Youth .......................................... 278 
Part IV: Theories of Change: Impact Assessment ............................................. 283 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 298 
Chapter Six: Relational Constructionism in NGO Peacebuilding ................................ 304 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 304 
Approach to the Analysis of the Findings ............................................................ 307 
The Pyramid Framework ....................................................................................... 312 
Part I: Top Level Leadership: Liberal Peace Dynamics in NGO Peacebuilding
 ................................................................................................................................... 316 
Relational Constructionism in NGO-Donor-Community Relationship ........ 316 
Constrained dialogue in NGO-Donor Relationship ........................................ 319 
Negotiated Agreement ....................................................................................... 326 
Dialogical Partnership ........................................................................................ 326 
Part II: Middle Range Leadership: Networking and Social Action................... 330 
Part III: Grassroots Leadership Level .................................................................. 339 
Peacebuilding Communities and Relationship Building for Social Change
 ............................................................................................................................... 339 
v 
 
Relationship Building .......................................................................................... 340 
Inter-subjective and Group Encounters in Peacebuilding ............................. 343 
Community Mobilization and Networking ........................................................ 346 
Relational Leadership ......................................................................................... 349 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 355 
Chapter Seven: General Conclusion ............................................................................. 359 
Future Research ..................................................................................................... 387 
Appendix ....................................................................................................................... 390 
Table 1: List of insurgencies in Uganda since independence ......................... 390 
Box 1 Juba Peace Talks ........................................................................................ 393 
Box 2 Gulu Peace Talks ........................................................................................ 393 
Data Collection Instruments .................................................................................. 394 
Research Information Sheet .............................................................................. 394 
Consent Form ...................................................................................................... 397 
Interpreter and Translator Confidentiality Agreement ................................... 398 
Declaration of the Review of the Interview Transcript ................................... 399 
Interview Schedule .............................................................................................. 399 
Samples of Categories and Themes ................................................................... 408 
Table 17 Interviewee Codes ................................................................................. 411 
 
vi 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The writing of this thesis has been a long journey of three years. I would like to 
thank many friends and colleagues that have journeyed with me during these 
years of arduous academic work.  My thinking and content of this work has been 
influenced by my previous experience in peacebuilding, the different individual 
and group networks that have provided me with a space for exchange of ideas 
and perspectives, and my academic training at both the department of peace 
studies at University of Bradford, U.K. and J.B. Kroc Institute at University of 
Notre Dame, USA.  I am particularly grateful to my supervisor, Professor Donna 
Pankhurst for her encouragement, patience and support. Her critical review of 
my work gave me new insights and challenged me to consider different 
perspectives in the thesis. I owe much of this work to many friends and 
colleagues out there with whom I have worked and shared my passion for 
peace over the years. These friends, too many to mention here, have shaped 
my approach to conflict transformation and encouraged me to always go an 
extra mile to change our world. I also owe so much to my family, for their love, 
care, presence and encouragement. I would like to thank my fellow PhD 
students with whom I have journeyed during these years. Special thanks to 
Sarah Njeri Deall, Job Akuni, Kazuyo Mitsuhashi, Julia Ruppel, Teresa Wamuyu 
Wachira, Laura O’Connor, Benita Sumita, Marysia Ambrozy, Jacqueline 
Therkelsen, Zuhair Bashar, Chika Charles, Mohamed Ahmed and many others. 
The PhD research room, because of these friends, has been a second home for 
me, a place of intensive work but also of exchange of useful ideas and opinions. 
I am indebted to my fellow Jesuits here in Britain, Eastern Africa and elsewhere 
in the world for their constant support and love without which I would not have 
completed this work. I am also grateful to Loyola Hall community near Liverpool 
for their hospitality and friendship that gave me the much needed break from 
academic work. 
vii 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ADF   Allied Democratic Forces 
AI   Amnesty International 
ARLPI   Acholi Religious Leaders for Peace  
CAMP   Citizens’ Army for Multi-party Politics 
CAR   Central African Republic 
CBOs   community based organizations 
CHMT   Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team  
CNDLS   Centre for New Design in Learning and Scholarship 
CoP   communities of practice 
CRPs   community resource persons 
CRS   Catholic Relief Services 
CRS   Catholic Relief Services  
DAC   Development Assistance Committee 
DDR   demobilization, demilitarization and integration 
DP   Democratic Party 
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo 
DRTs   Demobilization and Resettlement Teams 
ESO   External Security Organization 
FEDEMU   Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda 
FOBA   Force Obote Back Again 
FRONASA   Front for National Salvation 
FUNA   Former Uganda National Army 
FUNA   Former Uganda National Army 
GANAL Gulu Archdiocese-Nebbi Diocese-Arua Diocese-Lira Diocese. Also 
means Grow All New Alive in Love               
GOU   Government of Uganda 
HRW   Human Rights Watch 
HSM   Holy Spirit Movement 
viii 
 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
IDPs   internally displaced persons 
IFS   International Financial Institutions 
IGA   income generating activities 
IMM   Implementation and Management Mechanisms 
INEE   Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies 
ISO   Internal Security Organization 
JLG  Joint Liaison Group 
JRP   Justice and Reconciliation Project 
KY   Kabaka Yekka 
LFA   log-frame approach 
LRA   Lord’s Resistance Army 
MCC   Mennonite Central Committee 
MDG   Millennium Development Goals 
NALU   National Army for Liberation of Uganda 
NCC   National Consultative Council 
NGO   non-governmental organization 
NOM   Ninth October Movement 
NRC   Norwegian Refugee Council  
NRM   National Resistance Movement  
OTP   Office of the Prosecutor 
PCIA   peace and conflict impact assessment 
PRA   People’s Redemption Army 
PRA   Popular Revolutionary Army  
PRDP   Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 
PSWs   problem solving workshops 
SPLA   Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement 
TPDF   Tanzanian People’s Defence Forces 
UCC   Uganda Constitutional Commission 
UDCM/A   United Democratic Christian Movement /Army 
ix 
 
UFM   Uganda Freedom Movement  
UHRC   Uganda Human Rights Commission 
UHSA   United Holy Salvation Army 
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNLA   Uganda National Liberation Army  
UNLF/A   Uganda National Liberation Front / Army 
UNOCHA   United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
UNRF   Uganda National Rescue Front 
UNRF   Uganda National Rescue Front 
UPC   Uganda People’s Congress 
UPDA/M   Uganda People’s Democratic Army/Movement 
UPDF   Uganda People’s Democratic Force 
UPM   Uganda Patriotic Movement 
WNBF   West Nile Bank Front
1 
 
 
Chapter One: Research Design and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
This study is motivated by the quest to fill the gap in knowledge of the 
interactive processes between NGO peacebuilding, local reality, and external 
influences on peacebuilding practices in post-conflict settings. The research 
examines the relationship between NGOs, donors and local community in 
peacebuilding, and the ensuing tensions between external liberal peace 
influences and local peacebuilding approaches in northern Uganda. This study 
was mainly prompted by my past experiences of conducting peacebuilding 
activities in collaboration with NGOs and academic institutions in post-conflict 
settings in Africa. My peacebuilding work entailed carrying out workshops, 
academic classes, seminars, mediation and reconciliation training.   
 
One of the major challenges that I faced in the course of my work was 
determining the extent to which these peacebuilding interventions were 
relevant, sustainable and consistent with the local needs and approaches to 
peacebuilding.  In most cases, the peacebuilding interventions were limited by 
lack of sufficient funding and qualified personnel, as well as tensions between 
programme objectives and local needs.  These tensions also played a role in 
the relationship between donor agencies and NGOs on the ground.  
 
The question of what agenda drives NGO peacebuilding in post-conflict settings 
has been raised by several authors who make generalized conclusions that 
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NGO peacebuilding is externally influence and tends to respond to the liberal 
peace agenda, and in the process co-opt the local peacebuilding initiatives to 
the same agenda. Liberal peace critics assert that liberal peace is based on a 
western political agenda that propagates democracy, economic liberalization, 
human rights and the rule of law (Mac Ginty, 2010; Newman, 2009; Richmond, 
2008; Richmond, 2010b). The critics further claim that liberal peace agenda has 
privatized peacebuilding, marginalized local initiatives and rendered 
peacebuilding activities unsustainable.  
 
Hence, provoked by the above assertions of liberal peace critics, and my own 
peacebuilding experience, I conducted field research on NGO peacebuilding in 
northern Uganda while guided by this principle research question: To what 
extent is the NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda informed by the local 
reality and/or external conceptualizations of peacebuilding? I sought to 
understand the processes of peacebuilding on the ground and whether NGO 
peacebuilding in post-conflict settings was simply a western agenda, as claimed 
by the liberal peace critics, or there were other factors impacting peacebuilding 
that needed to be taken into account.  
 
Northern Uganda experienced 22 years of conflict between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and Government of Uganda (GOU). This context had 
both liberal peace characteristics and specific conflict dynamics that were 
particular to northern Uganda. The conflict was part of a continuum of different 
conflicts that Uganda had experienced over many years. The conflict was also 
highly militarized and the Government of Uganda was often funded by western 
nations to fight the LRA who were perceived as a terrorist group with a potential 
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to destabilize the region (Allen, 2006:74; Finnström, 2008:112). The western 
financial and political support fell under the categorization of the liberal peace 
agenda. Such included financial and military support to fight the LRA as a 
‘terrorist’ group, hence extending the western nations’ ‘War on Terror’ agenda; 
institutionalization and liberalization processes through constitutional review, 
democratic elections, promotion of human rights and liberalization of economy. 
Another liberal peace characterization was the fact that western nations 
supported the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of the LRA leaders 
in 2005. The ICC intervention opened up debate on retributive and restorative 
justice; internal and external mechanisms of conflict intervention; the role of 
western nations on Uganda conflict; and repercussions on the peace 
negotiations between the LRA and GOU.  Another characteristic of the northern 
Uganda conflict was that it had diverse peacebuilding agents: NGOs, both local 
and international; cultural leaders; government officials; religious groups and 
their leaders; and the general community. There were also intricate layers of 
conflict which highlighted the complexity of the protracted nature of conflict.  
 
I noted that the critique of liberal peace mainly focused on post-conflict settings 
which had heavy military machinery and were characterized by the political 
agenda of institutional, social and political reforms in countries such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, etc. The analysis made generalized critique of 
NGO peacebuilding in reference to post-conflict contexts without much 
acknowledgement of respective contextual and historical diversities.  The liberal 
peace critics thus, situated their critiques on the macro perspectives and 
ignored the micro aspects of contextual analysis.  
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As I have noted above, I was prompted to question these assertions by 
researching the microcosm of NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda. I 
conducted field research for a period of six months. My research sample 
comprised of 49 respondents (see Table 1a below) from local and international 
NGOs, funding agencies, government institutions of peacebuilding, local 
government officials, cultural leaders, and community members.  This was in 
addition to 19 informal interviews (see Table 1b below). I used both individual 
and focus group interviews, observations and the study of secondary material. 
These interviews were semi-structured. I wanted to find out how different 
peacebuilding agents, at the NGO, donor and local community levels, interacted 
with each other in constructing a peacebuilding discourse and practice, and how 
the tensions between the local and external liberal peace approaches to 
peacebuilding contributed to this process.  
 
To decipher the interactive processes in peacebuilding, I applied relational 
constructionism as a theoretical framework. Analysis of participants’ perceptions 
on peacebuilding activities showed that peacebuilding processes were 
essentially relational and, as such, engendered diverse encounters of 
interactive sense-making, relationship building, networking, relational social 
capital and co-construction of peacebuilding discourse and practice.  ‘Relational’ 
characteristics denote relational constructionism, which entails social processes 
of reality construction based on relational encounters (Bouwen, 2010).  
‘Relational’ aspects of peacebuilding are central to sense-making processes 
and co-construction of a desired future (Hosking and McNamee, 2006, Hosking, 
2010b, Bouwen, 2010, Lederach, 2003). I will elaborate in more detail the 
concept of relational constructionism in Chapter Three.  
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NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda was a continuous process of relational 
constructionism. Hence, within the diverse relationships, interactions, joint 
practices, relational tensions and encounters between NGOs, communities and 
donor agencies, there were constant constructions of new meanings, 
perspectives, practices, aspirations, tensions, frustrations and social inquiries 
that contributed to the peacebuilding discourse and practice. These interactions 
enriched the peacebuilding approaches in the post-conflict setting of northern 
Uganda. What was important was therefore not the question of who, between 
the NGOs, donors and local community held the upper hand, but rather the 
discovery of the processes of peacebuilding discourse and practices that 
emerged from mutual and diverse encounters.  
 
The findings of the study demonstrate that while to some extent the generalized 
observations made by the liberal peace critics are true, they fail to fully engage 
with the micro aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding. The macro-analytic 
assertions of the liberal peace critics ignore the plurality of the NGO 
peacebuilding practice, the diverse internal organizational culture, values, 
policies, leadership agencies, as well as the complexities and diversities of the 
contextual dynamics of post-conflict settings. Besides, the liberal peace 
literature is often based on theoretical abstractions of observable anecdotal 
evidence rather than in-depth empirical research.  
 
The experiences of the local community have often been described as being 
parallel to the liberal peace agenda. Liberal peace critics assert that the local 
(meaning the local community) has been romanticized as weak, lacking in 
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capacity, and homogeneous (Richmond, 2007). The local has also been 
perceived as pristine and better placed to understand the complexities on the 
ground and subsequently, develop better solutions (Mac Ginty, 2010). From a 
different perspective, the local has been seen as co-opting the liberal peace 
agenda and derailing the objectives of the latter (Mac Ginty, 2010, Franks and 
Richmond, 2008).  These perspectives have resulted in a dichotomy between 
the local community and external interventions in post-conflict settings. The 
liberal peace approach also ignores the fact that there exists within the local 
settings a plurality of peace discourses and capacities for conflict 
transformation.  My research findings, as I shall demonstrate in Chapters Five 
and Six, reveal that different levels of NGO interaction with the local 
communities engendered new perspectives in peacebuilding that had not been 
explored by either the critics or the exponents of liberal peace.  
 
In this process of the relational construction of the social reality of peace, NGOs, 
donors and local community influenced the narratives of peace within the 
framework of their interactions, hence impacting the peacebuilding discourse 
and practice. Further, the existence of these various dimensions of interaction 
between the NGOs (in relation with the donors), institutional leadership and 
local community was a clear indication that NGOs were perceived by the local 
people as active agents of change. While there were international and local 
NGOs, the interactive dynamics between them characterized by shared 
activities, funding and collaborative initiatives meant that the differences 
between them were rather minimal. Besides, nearly all of the NGO staff 
interviewed were originally from northern Uganda, and thus had a closer affinity 
to the context with a better understanding of the conflict dynamics. This 
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observation does not of course overlook some of the external influences to NGO 
peacebuilding. Rather it brings in a new dimension (layers of identities amongst 
NGO staff) that bridges the dichotomization of NGOs and local community into a 
relational constructionism in peacebuilding. I will explain this in detail in 
Chapters Five and Six.  
 
Richmond (2009a) and Mac Ginty (2010) propose a hybrid approach that takes 
both the local and liberal peace perspectives into account. While this makes 
sense, it is not, according to my findings, a practical solution. Peacebuilding can 
be designed with a clear structure of implementation, but it cannot be made to 
happen within a peace design. Such a conceptualization ignores the social 
construction of meaning that develops when different agents of peacebuilding 
interact. The concern in my research was not how the NGO peacebuilding and 
local community can meet in the middle through a hybrid system, but how their 
interaction produces new processes of social change at different levels of 
peacebuilding discourse and practice.   
 
The research findings, as explained in Chapters Five and Six, show that 
opinions were divided on the extent to which the ICC intervention impacted the 
peace negotiations between the LRA and GOU; and the implications of the 
tension between retributive justice based on the ICC legal mechanism against 
impunity, and the restorative justice founded on culturally-based mechanisms of 
forgiveness and reconciliation.  
 
This study makes a significant contribution to the practice of peacebuilding in 
post-conflict and low intensity conflicts, and the discourse on the analysis of the 
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validity of the arguments of the liberal peace critiques in relation to NGO 
peacebuilding in post-conflict settings. There is limited (or no) literature on 
northern Uganda that has this focus. The existing literature offers a general 
description of the historical background of the various conflicts that Uganda has 
known, impacts on the populations, peace processes and socio-political 
challenges (Kabwegyere, 1972, Mamdani, 1984, Atkinson, 1994, Behrend, 1998, 
Kasozi et al., 1994, Amone-P'Olak, 2007). The study thus makes a contribution 
to the Uganda literature on peacebuilding, which is very limited.   
 
The theoretical framework of relational constructionism that I have used is 
relatively new. This research will therefore make a contribution to the 
development of this concept particularly in understanding the diverse processes 
of peacebuilding and the interaction between peacebuilding agents.  
 
The study also furthers the debate on the current literature on NGO 
peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts. There is still limited literature analyzing 
NGO theoretical and practical approaches to peacebuilding in relation to the 
post-conflict dynamics, and the extent to which such peacebuilding interventions 
are informed by the local reality and/or external conceptualizations of 
peacebuilding. 
 
This study makes an analysis of culturally-based mechanisms of peacebuilding, 
and the extent to which they contribute to peacebuilding interventions. Whereas 
most literature has given a positive appraisal to the culturally-based 
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mechanisms of reconciliation in northern Uganda (Acirokop, 2010; Oketch, 2008; 
Afako, 2002; Collaborative Transitions Africa, 2009), my findings reveal that 
these mechanisms are not as commonly practised as purported by this body of 
literature. This is a significant finding and one that contributes to the larger 
debate on the role of culturally-based mechanisms of reconciliation in post-
conflict reconstruction. 
 
The broader ambition of this research was to develop an in-depth understanding 
of post-conflict peacebuilding practices in northern Uganda, and their relevance 
in comprehending post-conflict situations. The findings cannot be generalized, 
but they however contribute to a better understanding of the interaction between 
the NGOs, donors and local participants as active agents in processes of 
peacebuilding in post-conflict settings. Both of these agents contribute to the 
relational construction of the discourse and practice of peacebuilding.  
 
Research Location: Northern Uganda 
Uganda is located in East Africa and is bordered by Kenya to the east, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the west, Sudan to the north, Tanzania 
to the south and Rwanda to the southwest.  As I shall elaborate in Chapter Four, 
northern Uganda has known many conflicts over the years. The most protracted 
of these has been the 22 year conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and Government of Uganda (GOU) that has cost close to 300,000 lives; 
led to mass abduction of an estimated 60,000 children; and increased poverty 
and insecurity in the region (Kisekka-Ntale, 2007:422). More than 1.5 million 
people were displaced, most of whom had to live in internally displaced camps 
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for more than 20 years under very poor conditions (Mwenda, 2010:55). The LRA 
seeks to overthrow the government and institute a system of governance based 
on the Biblical Ten Commandments (Oola, 2008:67).  
 
There have been several peace negotiation attempts, with the most recent 
peace talks in 2006 leading to relative peace but achieving minimum results, 
hence rendering the situation unpredictable (Oola, 2008:68). Despite the 
progress made in the LRA-GOU negotiations, the agreement was never signed 
by the LRA and the Government of Uganda (GOU) (Berkeley-Tulane Initiative 
on Vulnerable Population, 2007:16, Lucima, 2002). The LRA has spread from 
Uganda into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and 
Central African Republic (CAR) (Rice, 2010). The local people are still afraid 
that the LRA could still return to disturb the current peace.  
 
In recent years large numbers of people have returned to their villages further 
posing the challenge of re-integration of the formerly abducted persons; land 
dispute resolution; provision of basic needs; forgiveness and reconciliation; and 
the use of culturally-based mechanisms of reconciliation (Amone-P'Olak, 2007; 
Bayne, 2007; Anderson et al., 2004; Blattman and Annan, 2010; Finnstrom, 
2010).  Reintegration has further been complicated by the arrest warrants 
issued on the LRA’s leadership by the International Criminal Court Intervention 
(ICC), thereby provoking a debate between proponents of retributive and 
restorative justice, respectively (Apuuli, 2008; Branch, 2004). 
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The above situation has created humanitarian crises over the years leading to a 
large influx of NGOs. There are international NGOs such as the UN, UNICEF, 
Catholic Relief Services, Norwegian Refugee Council, as well as local NGOs 
and community based organizations (CBOs) (UNOCHA, 2010). Most of these 
organizations started off as humanitarian organizations and are now engaged in 
peace activities.  As such they fall under the continuum of humanitarianism-
development and peacebuilding perspectives.  These NGOs have mainly 
concentrated their work in Gulu and Kitgum. 
 
My interest in studying northern Uganda was influenced by its post-conflict 
nature; the peacebuilding engagement by NGOs, both local and international; 
the contextual liberal peace characteristics that I have describe above; the role 
of liberal peace in shaping the peacebuilding discourse and practice; and the 
recourse to culturally-based approaches to peacebuilding and their relation to 
mainstream peacebuilding.  
 
I conducted my research in Gulu district, northern Uganda, which is one of the 
four districts largely inhabited by the Acholi people. The other three are Amuru, 
Kitgum and Pader. Gulu is 332 kilometres from Kampala, the capital city. Gulu 
consists of four counties; Kilak, Achwa, Omoro and Nwoya. However, in recent 
years Kilak and Nwoya counties have been merged to form Amuru District. 
According to a 2002 population census, Gulu had a population of 479,496 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002).1 I focused my interviews in Unyama, 
                                                 
1
 No further census data are available.   
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Kanyagoga, Barabili, Fogod and Lacor villages. I chose these villages because 
they had a high presence of NGO peacebuilding activities. Most of them were 
populated with returnees who had re-settled following the signing of the 
ceasefire agreement between LRA and GOU in 2006.  
 
My second location for research was in the control population of Atiak, which is 
70 kilometres north of Gulu, in Kilak County, Amuru district.  The reason I chose 
this location was mainly because of its obvious lack of NGO presence, and 
particularly given that it had known many conflicts over the years and 
experienced forced conscription into the LRA (Apuuli, 2004), like many regions 
in northern Uganda. 
 
The Atiak region was rendered vulnerable by the fact that it was the main 
entrance and exit route for the LRA who often attacked from neighbouring South 
Sudan, which is just 50 kilometres away (Justice and Reconciliation Project 
(JRP), 2007a).  
  
On April 20th 1995 the LRA massacred more than 200 people in Atiak, the 
largest single LRA attack (Otunnu, 1998, Justice and Reconciliation Project 
(JRP), 2007b).  Atiak is the birth place of the late Vincent Otti, the second in 
command in the LRA and the one who was in command during the Atiak 
massacres (Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), 2007b). Due to this history 
of violence and massive displacements, Atiak has been neglected for years, and 
NGOs have avoided operating here for the fear of insecurity. The community 
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has, however, been conducting peacebuilding activities despite these many 
challenges. 
Map of Uganda 
 
Source: Infoplease (2010) 
 
My interest in the control population of Atiak was to investigate the extent to 
which lack of NGO presence was a factor in determining community 
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participation in peacebuilding and the resultant peacebuilding discourse and 
practice.  This was important in understanding the different interpretations of the 
diverse peacebuilding variables between Gulu (main location of the research) 
and Atiak (control population). Such peacebuilding variables included: individual 
and group motivation, community values, individual and communal commitment, 
theories of change, sustainability of peace programmes and community 
participation. 
 
Definitions of terms 
Peacebuilding 
The term "peacebuilding" came to be in common use after Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, then United Nations Secretary-General, pronounced his Agenda for 
Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) in 1992. Since then the term has been used rather 
ambiguously to include all activities that address post-conflict reconstruction. 
Boutros Ghali (1992) defined peacebuilding as "sustained, co-operative work to 
deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems ..."2  
Peacebuilding also entails “action to identify and support structures which tend 
to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid relapse into conflict” (Ghali, 1992: no. 
27). However, the Secretary General’s explanation of the term was so broad 
that it included demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR), 
decommissioning of weapons, election monitoring, promotion of political 
participation, human rights protection and reconstruction of institutions of 
governance.2  
                                                 
2
 In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace peacebuilding was further expanded beyond post-
conflict settings to include activities before (conflict prevention), during (conflict management) 
and after (post-conflict reconstruction) the conflict (Hanggi, 2005). Thus, peacebuilding came to 
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The challenge is that the term ‘peacebuilding’ in post-conflict contexts has been 
applied as a potpourri of all conflict intervention mechanisms further making it 
difficult to define its boundaries and dimensions (Paris, 1997:55; Barakat and 
Zyck, 2009). The ambiguities in the definition of peacebuilding are 
acknowledged by Paris (1997:55), who asserts that "scholars have devoted 
relatively little attention to analysing the concept of peace-building itself, 
including its underlying assumptions." Subsequently, the term ‘peacebuilding’ 
has remained fluid.  
 
Among the first peace scholars to wrestle with the meaning of the term 
peacebuilding is Johan Galtung. He asserts that peacebuilding focuses on 
elimination of root causes of conflicts and promotion of dialogue, understanding, 
mutual trust and basic needs provision (Galtung, 1976). Thus, rather than aim at 
dissociative approach (peacekeeping) that keeps the conflicting parties apart, 
peacebuilding should be associative addressing multiple factors of conflict and 
bridging the differences between the parties in conflict. Galtung (1976) 
distinguishes between negative and positive peace: Positive peace entails 
situations where there is physical peace and fulfilment of basic needs (Galtung, 
                                                                                                                                               
be perceived as a proactive strategy that tackles the root causes of conflict, manages conflicts 
as they escalate and promotes development and democracy in countries that have not 
experienced conflicts.  Peacebuilding has, since Agenda for Peace, been conceptualized and 
implemented within the armed conflict framework under the articulation of human security 
concept (Chandler, 2008b; Pauline, 2007; Cockell, 2001). HÄNGGI, H. 2005. Security 
Governance in Post Conflict Peacebuilding. In: BRYDENM, A. & HÄNGGI, H. (eds.) Security 
governance in post-conflict peacebuilding. Münster: LIT.; CHANDLER, D. 2008b. Human 
Security: The Dog that Didn't Back. Security Dialogue, 38, 427-438; PAULINE, E. 2007. 
Deepening the Human Security Debate: Beyond the Politics of Conceptual Clarification. Politics, 
27, 182-189; COCKELL, J. G. 2001. Human Security and Preventive Action Strategies. In: 
NEWMAN, E. & RICHMOND., O. P. (eds.) The United Nations and human security. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave.  
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1996). Negative peace refers to situations where, even though there is absence 
of war, conditions of marginalization, poverty, discrimination, and lack of 
employment and housing are rampant. It thus implies unequal opportunities to 
resources such as political power, education, shelter, health care, trade, etc.  
Such situations would perpetuate structural violence on the wellbeing of the 
population. Structural violence is a relatively new term in peace studies, and 
was made prominent by Galtung (1985). He defines structural violence as “harm 
done to human beings, as a process, working slowly as the way misery in 
general, and hunger in particular, erode and finally kill human beings” 
(1985:145).3 Galtung (1976) further expounds that peacebuilding should entail 
attainment of peace through peaceful means enshrined in socio-economic 
development. Such processes should address the root causes of conflict in 
order to guarantee the sustainability of peace (Galtung, 1996:112).   
 
Ramsbotham et al (2011:231) support this view when they assert that 
“peacebuilding should reflect and be a product of a negotiated discursive 
practice and not the outcome of a technically defined and externally imposed 
blueprint.” Pugh (2000:2) underscores that peacebuilding, at its simplest, “can 
be construed as activities intended to strengthen structures and processes with 
the aim of preventing a return to violent conflict.” Further, Barakat (2010b:262) 
in defining the primary task of post-conflict reconstruction holds the view that the 
focus should be on “restoring and developing the capacity of a nation to function 
and manage all aspects of its collective life.” This perspective advocates for the 
strengthening of the institutional capacity of the state. Lederach (1997:73-75) 
                                                 
3
 The victims often fail to see the systematic choreography of economic, political and social 
structures that marginalize them. Structural violence is different from direct violence that is much 
more noticeable and can easily produce counteractive reactions. 
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proposes an integrated approach to peacebuilding that takes into account the 
processes of preventing, managing and ending the conflict on the one hand, 
and on the other, innovative initiatives that can sustain conditions for peace at 
grassroots, middle and top levels.   
 
My interest lies in a definition of peacebuilding that takes into account NGO 
peacebuilding in post-conflict settings.  The literature above demonstrates that 
NGO peacebuilding can be defined as: multi-dimensional approaches to conflict 
resolution that aims at restoring broken relationships, instituting just societal 
structures and achieving provision of basic needs. The core of the 
peacebuilding initiatives is the promotion and protection of human dignity, at 
both localized and international levels. These actions are also linked to the 
ecological concerns over the care of environment and fare distribution of natural 
resources. 
      
Post-conflict and Post-conflict reconstruction 
The context of northern Uganda, as I shall explain in Chapter Four, is very 
complex. Despite the fact that no peace agreement has been signed, the region 
has experienced peace since 2006, hence its categorization into ‘post-conflict’ 
setting. Nevertheless, northern Uganda still borders between conflict and post-
conflict, as the conflict is over, but not quite. The protracted nature of conflicts in 
different parts of Uganda has meant that the country has simultaneously 
experienced war and peace, conflict and post-conflict. Shaw and Mbabazi 
(2009:78) describe Uganda to be in a state of “war with peace”, mainly refering 
to the situation of war in the North and peace in the South. However, politically 
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Uganda has been in a ‘post-conflict’ state since 1986 when the current 
President Museveni’s government came to power. But the ‘post’ nature of the 
many pockets of conflicts has not been a reality in regions such as northern 
Uganda.   
 
According to Collier et al (2008:461) “nearly half of all civil wars are due to post-
conflict relapses.” Hence, post-conflict societies are often faced with two main 
challenges: “economic recovery and reduction of the risk of a recurring conflict” 
(Collier et al., 2008:461). This is primarily because the post-conflict settings are 
frequently marked by new conflicts or unresolved historical issues, hindsight in 
peace agreements, new grievances from peace agreements and a myriad of 
many other challenges (Barakat and Zyck, 2009:1071-1072; Barakat, 2005:10-
11; Collier et al., 2008; MacGinty, 2010:43-45). MacGinty (2010:45-48) 
highlights the blind spots in peace processes such as: high public expectations 
for the peace dividend; spoiler violence and insecurity; lack of a good strategy 
for disarmament; and failure of the political elite to connect with the concerns of 
the people. Barakat and Zyck (2009:1071) underscore a similar point when they 
note that “post-conflict countries have come to embody too many and frequently 
contradictory political and economic agendas” which in most cases tend to 
undermine countries recovering from conflict. These perspectives highlight the 
normative complexity of what ‘post-conflict’ entails. Northern Uganda fits the 
fragility and complexity of most post-conflict societies as I shall later explain in 
Chapter Four. Thus, like many ‘post-conflict’ situations the normative definition 
of what constitutes ‘post’ is a matter of endless debate (Collier et al., 2008:11; 
Barakat, 2010a). 
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‘Post-conflict reconstruction’, like peacebuilding, has diverse definitional 
connotations. Barakat (2005:11) opines that the challenge of reaching an 
agreeable definition of post-conflict reconstruction lies in the fact that different 
disciplines and sectors hold diverse definitions: 
“Political theories of reconstruction tend to emphasize the importance of 
institution for physical security and stability; economic theories with their belief 
in the importance of financial security take a more developmental approach; 
religious or humanitarian theories of reconstruction focus more on people and 
their capacity to survive, reconcile and forgive.” 
 
In recent years transitional justice mechanisms have been incorporated as part 
of post-conflict reconstruction. This approach includes forgiveness, 
reconciliation and reparation through truth and reconciliation commissions 
(TRCs) that subsequently affect political, economic and social reorganization 
(Olsen et al., 2010; Hayner, 2002).  Transitional justice has been reinforced by 
international legal regimes, the most recent of which is the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).  
 
Peacebuilding NGOs 
Developing a normative definition of peacebuilding NGOs is a daunting task 
given the diversity in characterizations of what entails NGOs. An operational 
definition has to be integrated into the general understanding of what constitutes 
NGOs. Generally, NGOs are different in sizes, operations and mandates. They 
are involved in very diverse activities ranging from education, human rights 
advocacy, development, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance. Further, 
they have complex interactions between themselves, as well as with 
governments, inter-governmental organizations, international global networks 
and different development agencies. These factors have made it difficult to find 
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a comprehensive definition of NGOs.  My focus will however be on developing a 
working definition of peacebuilding NGOs operating in post-conflict settings.  
 
Johnson and Prakash (2007:222) are emphatic that “the NGO literature tends 
not to employ generalizable theories to study NGOs. Instead, it relies on 
descriptive typologies that are developed to study small subsets of the NGO 
population.” As such, the literature ignores the fundamental question about the 
origins of NGOs, their internal organization (agency and accountability) and 
organizational strategies in social action (Johnson and Prakash, 2007:222).   
 
The literature on NGOs says more about what NGOs are not than what they are 
by describing them simply as non-governmental or non-profit organizations 
(Brown and Korten, 1991:91). The imprecise definitions of what NGOs are have 
been attributed to the lack of a social science discipline that primarily focuses on 
NGO studies (Brown and Korten, 1991:91). This implies that NGOs have been 
incorporated into different mainstream academic disciplines that adapt their own 
viewpoint of NGOs. This has limited the contextual and organizational analysis 
of NGOs beyond the respective disciplines.  
 
In relation to the post-conflict settings I would define the peacebuilding NGOs as 
social entities that exist independently from or in relationship with governments, 
and are part of social change processes aimed at transforming situations of 
conflict into more peaceful, just and sustainable societies. The emphasis is on 
the fact that peacebuilding NGOs do not operate alone, and are part of a 
network of actors working towards the attainment of peace and social change. 
This networked peacebuilding is a process and not a onetime event. NGOs 
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create a vital link between the grassroots, middle and top level leadership, even 
though their impact is often strongly experienced at the grassroots level.  
 
Distinguishing Between Local and International NGOs 
My initial expectation before going to the field was that there was a clear 
difference between the local and international NGOs. Surprisingly this was not 
the case, and I realized that they were closely similar in their approaches to 
peacebuilding. Five key factors demonstrate that there were no major 
distinctions in terms of peacebuilding approaches, between international and 
local NGOs. First, there was evidence of collaboration and networking between 
international and local NGOs, which led to relational construction of mutually 
conceptualized approaches to peacebuilding. The two exchanged expertise in 
the implementation of the peacebuilding programmes.  This task-oriented 
collaboration minimized the apparent institutional differences between the local 
and international NGOs. Second, both focused their peacebuilding activities on 
closely similar areas of concern. Hence, the two categories addressed the post-
conflict needs of resettlement; reintegration of the formerly abducted persons; 
forgiveness and reconciliation; and provision of basic needs. The common 
choice of these activities indicated a convergence in the analysis and 
interpretation of the contextual needs on the ground. Third, both categories had 
a close collaboration with the local community and emphasized local 
participation in peacebuilding activities as an important component of the 
sustainability of peace. This approach was further enhanced by the fact that the 
majority of staff from both categories of NGOs came from northern Uganda. The 
mutual emphasis on partnership, participation and networking contributed to the 
building of a common community of NGO peacebuilding. Fourth, all the NGOs 
22 
 
faced funding constraints and thus, felt the need to consolidate their resources. 
This prompted closer collaboration between the two categories of NGOs. Fifth, 
the international discourse on the choice between the ICC and culturally-based 
approaches to reconciliation, coupled with the internal complexities of the 
northern Uganda conflict, resulted in both categories of NGOs integrating 
cultural approaches to peacebuilding in their activities.  
 
However, there were subtle differences between international and local NGOs. 
The differences lay in the institutional characteristics based on the principles of 
their respective foundations. There were three categories of international NGOs: 
first were the funding NGOs which were governmental. One was supported by 
an influential western country, another by an association of Christian churches 
and the last one was a major Catholic humanitarian organization. These 
institutions conducted their activities by subcontracting smaller NGOs, both local 
and international. Second were the inter-governmental NGOs that had 
traditionally provided humanitarian assistance, but in the last six years have 
been involved in peacebuilding activities. The end of overt conflict has led a 
number of these NGOs to change their activities from relief to peacebuilding and 
development. This category of NGOs traditionally received funding from western 
governments and did not face severe funding challenges as smaller NGOs. 
Third were smaller international NGOs that were affiliated to their country of 
origin, mostly from Europe, and operated in a few countries.  
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The local offices of both funding and inter-governmental NGOs in Gulu were 
headed by local staff, except for one funding agency that was headed by 
someone from a western country. However, the regional offices were in most 
cases headed by someone from a western country. The diversity in staff 
composition and funding availability influenced the way peacebuilding was 
carried out, albeit in subtle ways. I have elaborated this in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
 
Among the local NGOs there were three categories. First were the religious 
NGOs that were affiliated to particular religious institutions. Such NGOs had 
strong coverage locally and nationally, and in some cases had connections 
abroad for funding. The second category included NGOs that were founded by 
an individual or group to respond to a particular social need and had over the 
years institutionalized and become an NGO. Such organizations would strictly 
fall under community based organizations (CBOs). The third category referred 
to NGOs that were founded locally but maintained relationship with bigger 
international organizations and foreign donors. In some cases, these NGOs had 
more resources locally than average international NGOs.  
 
Locally established NGOs generally emerged in response to the urgent needs of 
the population, often related to experiences of violence by the LRA and Uganda 
government as I shall elaborate in both Chapters Five and Six. Funding 
however distinguished the local from international NGOs. While funding was a 
major issue of concern for both categories of NGOs, the concern was much 
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more pronounced among local NGOs. International NGOs had an extensive 
networking for funding than the local NGOs. I will discuss this in detail in 
Chapter Six.  In the emergency period both categories of NGOs enjoyed 
sustained funding. However, in the post-conflict period there were considerable 
cuts in funding which brought new challenges.   
 
The above explanation illustrates that there were strong similarities in 
peacebuilding approaches between local and international NGOs. The 
differences were subtle and were mainly based on institutional characteristics 
between the two categories as well capacities in funding resources. On the 
other hand, the two categories of NGOs cannot be taken to be homogeneous. 
There were internal structural differences between them. 4 
 
The closely related characteristics of the two categories of NGOs meant that 
peacebuilding discourse and practice could not be singularly attributed to the 
international or local NGOs nor could it be singularly identified with the 
community.  Peacebuilding emerged as an interactive process.5 I will therefore 
use the term ‘NGO’ to refer to both local and international NGOs, unless 
otherwise specified.  
                                                 
4
 For example, international NGOs with wider international presence were managed differently 
in comparison to international organizations that were limited to fewer countries. Similarly, local 
NGOs that were well established with diverse local and international partners had different 
structures and better opportunities for funding. However, these structural and institutional 
differences marginally affected the common characteristics of NGO peacebuilding approaches.  
5
 The resultant peacebuilding approaches developed from a continuous process of interaction, 
exchange and learning between NGOs and local community in response to the changing 
dynamics of conflict and post-conflict recovery. 
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Local Community and Tradition 
The term local community refers to the population in northern Uganda, 
specifically to the people in Gulu and Atiak where the research took place. The 
term tradition is often used to refer to people’s way of life based on certain 
historical, social, political and cultural values. However, this term has normative 
contradictions given the divergent interpretations of what entails inherited and 
invented traditions. I prefer to use the term ‘culturally-based’ mechanisms to 
denote social practices based on cultural values. Discussions on the research 
findings will further clarify the diversity and fluidity in the comprehension of the 
culturally-based practices. 
 
Research Methodology 
Research methodology refers to the approach one chooses to study a particular 
phenomenon; the logic behind the choice of the approach that weaves the 
research together; the justification for the choice of specific methods of data 
collection and analysis; and, a clear road map for how the research will be 
conducted (Silverman, 2005a:99; Kumar, 2008:5; Kothari, 2004:8). Hence, 
research methodology incorporates research methods such as the choice of 
case study, sampling, and methods of data gathering and analysis within a 
qualitative or quantitative framework. Research methodology is therefore larger 
than research methods in that the latter is a component of research 
methodology (Kothari, 2004:8).   
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In social research, methodology can be broadly defined in terms of ‘quantitative’ 
and ‘qualitative’ methods, but also more specifically  in reference to specific 
approaches such as ‘grounded theory’ or ‘conversation’ analysis (Silverman, 
2005a:99). Quantitative research refers to the collection of numerical data with 
the aim of deductively demonstrating the relationship between theory and 
research (Bryman, 2008:140). This process is based on the objective 
conceptualization of the social reality. Qualitative research, on the other hand, 
refers to scientific methods of inquiry that study a phenomenon within its natural 
setting and aims at making sense of it based on the meanings that people 
attach to it (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005:3). Qualitative research can be 
undertaken through the following processes: description of a phenomenon, 
context, problem or event; gathering of required information through observation, 
interviews, visual methods, and analysis by use of variables that can be 
measured on nominal or ordinal scales (Kumar, 2005:12). Silverman (2008:105-
106) suggests that through qualitative research one can theorize about the data. 
A qualitative approach is therefore useful in connecting data to the social 
context, human behaviour and the changes they experience.  
 
In this study I chose to use a qualitative approach but with the specific 
application of grounded theory. My application of grounded theory, as I shall 
explain below, facilitated the understanding of different factors in NGO 
peacebuilding within the context of research. This meant engaging with the data 
as it unfolded and undertaking analysis during and after the data collection. I 
appreciated the fact that qualitative research mainly focuses on asking the how 
and what questions in order to decipher the contextual behaviour and the social 
consequences of human actions. In my interview schedule (see Appendix, 
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Tables 2-6) most of my questions focused on finding out the how and what 
aspects of NGO peacebuilding. My other reasons for choosing qualitative 
approach is that it undertakes a closer examination of the chronology of events 
in order to identify historical patterns of events; uses comparative methods 
through triangulation; examines diverse social process (Silverman, 2008:106); 
and identifies implications of the findings to the broader picture of the issue of 
research.  I found these elements to be relevant to my research. I will now 
elaborate on my research methodology and the logic behind the approach that I 
took for this research.  
 
Research Design 
Research design provides a compass for the research through a process of 
clarification of the purpose of the research, the guiding theory for the research, 
the research questions, methods of research, and sampling strategy (Robson, 
2002: 81).  A clear research design facilitates a more purposeful and holistic 
approach to deciphering the reality of research. It provides a framework that 
clarifies the understanding of what the participants say and how they interpret 
their reality rather than how the researcher would like to perceive that reality.     
 
I chose to use a case study design by studying the northern Uganda context as 
a location of NGO peacebuilding activities. This was informed by the application 
of grounded theory that I will explain below. Creswell (1998:61) defines a case 
study as an exploration of a case (or multiple cases) through detailed, in-depth 
data collection involving multiple sources of information. This means that a case 
has to be precise, focusing on a specific location, group, entity or organization 
(Robson, 2002:89). The aim is to conceptually understand this reality in a 
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theoretical analysis (Bryman, 2008:57). This approach provides a holistic 
understanding of the case and exposes the challenge of developing data 
analysis towards theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989:539).6 
 
While to some extent the northern Uganda case can be considered to be 
representative of post-conflict settings, it is nevertheless unique. The 
uniqueness lay in the dynamics of conflict, historical patterns and NGO 
approaches to peacebuilding. In other words, while post-conflict contexts may 
share similar characteristics, it is important to conduct a field study in order to 
understand the contextual complexities of the conflict and peacebuilding 
responses. My objective was not to establish how the case findings can be 
generalized, but rather to understand what conclusions can be drawn from the 
data and how these conclusions shade light on the evaluation of the liberal 
peace critiques and post-conflict peacebuilding. In order to achieve this I had to 
work out a methodological approach and strategy that would effectively capture 
the flow of the unfolding findings from the data. I chose to use grounded theory 
as a methodological strategy in my qualitative data collection and analysis. 
 
                                                 
6
 The reasons behind the choice of a particular location highlight the uniqueness of the research 
and its contribution to the field of study. Creswell (2007) distinguishes three types of case 
studies: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. Intrinsic case study refers to a unique situation 
related to a single case and is limited in the extent to which it can be generalized. Instrumental 
case study is a study of a single case with the potential to be generalized to other social 
contexts. Collective case study uses multiple case studies in order to represent a particular 
issue or social concern. Yin (2003:41) adds a representative case and states that the objective 
in this case is to “capture the circumstances and conditions of an everyday or commonplace 
situation”, which eventually determine the generalizable aspects of the case. 1. CRESWELL, J. 
(2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches London: 
Sage; 2. YIN, R. K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods.   Sage Publications: 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
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Grounded Theory 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998:12) grounded theory is defined as a 
systematic process of generating theory (conclusions) from data. This process 
closely links the stages of data collection, analysis, and development of theory.  
It is therefore iterative, which means that the data collection and analysis are 
operated in tandem and as an interchangeable process. 
  
The ‘discovery’ of grounded theory is attributed to Glaser and Strauss (1967b) 
who during their studies of death and dying in hospitals, designed a 
methodological process of qualitative research which they describe in their 
seminal work, The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Glaser & Strauss (1967:3) 
define grounded theory as a theory that will:  
“fit the situation being researched and work when put into use. By fit we mean 
that the categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by 
the data under study; by work we mean that they must be meaningfully 
relevant and be able to explain the behaviour under study.” 
 
Grounded theory provided me with a tool that facilitated theory development 
through interactions between codes, concepts, categories and sub-categories. 
As a result the meanings behind the data emerged and I analyzed them to 
further make sense of the findings.  
 
The interactive levels between NGOs, donors and community led to exploration 
of different ways in which the community could respond to the challenge of post-
conflict reconstruction. Understanding how narratives and practice of 
peacebuilding were co-constructed within these interactions was important in 
establishing the sense-making process. Grounded theory therefore not only 
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describes the reality of research, it also explains it in order to make meaningful 
conclusions. In this process, grounded theory, in line with relational 
constructionism, enables the researcher to discover the processes of meaning-
making and construction of social reality by posing the questions: What is 
happening here? How are the people telling their stories? How are they dealing 
with what is happening?  
 
One of the limitations of grounded theory, according to Miller and Fredericks 
(1999) is that it does not offer a methodological process of theory testing for 
empirical adequacy and predictability. Besides, one can explain a phenomenon 
inductively without necessarily developing a theory from the research.  On the 
other hand, the question of what exactly contains a theory in grounded theory is 
debatable.   
 
However, theory should not be understood in generalizable terms as is done in 
experimental research.  Grounded theory generates substantive theory that 
explains the situation in detail, with a capability for contextual referencing. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998:267) explain this point by underscoring that “the real 
merit of a substantive theory lies in its ability to speak specifically for the 
populations from which it was derived and to apply back to them.”7   In my field 
research, insights from different participants enriched the quality of the data; 
                                                 
7
 The emergent substantive theory is a result of iterative and integrative processes within data 
collection, analysis and theorizing. The generated theory (major conclusion) explains the 
different variations in the data (Benton, 2000). This process of analysis is referred to as 
‘constant comparison method’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which is an iterative process 
between categories to the point where one core category subsumes the major categories, hence 
explaining variations in the data. BENTON, D. 2000. Grounded theory In: CORMACK, D. (ed.) 
The Research Process in Nursing 4th ed. Oxford: Blackwell Science; GLASER, B. & STRAUSS, 
A. 1967a. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, London, 
Weiderfeld and Nicolson. 
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influenced the questions to be asked in the subsequent interviews; and 
broadened perspectives on issues under discussion. This meant that 
conclusions or theoretical explanations were drawn from the data and not from a 
preconceived conceptualization of the phenomenon of study.  
 
Grounded theory has also been criticized as less rigorous, descriptive and 
explorative, subsequently offering limited information to the population (Fisher 
and Ziviani, 2004:185).  In my research I noted that the rigour of grounded 
theory lay in an in-depth understanding of what is occurring in the data and how 
the participants express these occurrences. As a method grounded theory 
complements the standard expectations in social research, such as ethical 
consideration, which ensures that the population is sufficiently informed about 
the research, objectives and expectations, and that there is no harm to the 
participants. It would therefore be inaccurate to state that grounded theory is not 
rigorous and does not offer adequate information to the participants.   
 
Another criticism is that while grounded theory has a clear systematic approach 
to the coding and development of categories, “it provides no such systematic or 
transparent way for gaining insight into the conceptual relationships between 
emergent concepts” (Wasserman et al., 2009:356). In my use of grounded 
theory I noted that the process of coding and development of concepts and 
categories is iterative and requires creating links between concepts and 
categories throughout the process. Dichotomizing the process, as Wasserman 
et al (2009) seem to suggest, limits the full potential of the grounded theory.   
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Creativity is fundamental in grounded theory (Cutcliffe, 2000:335) and ought to 
be balanced with the inductive process of developing theory or major 
conclusions. Equally important is the identification of data occurrences as 
sequential processes of interactional events and not simply as instances or 
single events (Silverman, 2005b). In other words, data occurs within a story of 
life and does not stand in isolation. It exists within the continuum of the 
generation of events in the social place of investigation.  
 
A Methodological Approach to Research Design 
I employed a systematic approach of engaging with the data through the case 
study research design, mostly influenced by the grounded theory approach.  
This meant first, being clear on what my research problem was; second, 
formulating the research questions I needed to ask in order to obtain the 
information from the participants. This also meant working out an interview 
schedule; third understanding what concepts I needed to study in order to 
unpack the problem;  fourth, establishing a theoretical framework that would 
drive the research forward; fifth, identifying data collection methods that would 
facilitate the process of getting information from the participants; sixth, 
highlighting the ethical issues of concern that I had to address before, during 
and after the research; and seventh, having a clear understanding of the data 
analysis process, validity and reliability of the data.  
 
Statement of the Problem 
The primary interest of this research is to find out to what extent NGO 
peacebuilding in northern Uganda was informed by the local reality and/or 
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external conceptualizations of peacebuilding. As I have already stated above, 
the idea was to establish how the interaction between NGOs, donors and local 
community influenced the discourse and practice of peacebuilding in northern 
Uganda. This research explored these issues by studying both international and 
local NGOs, donors and the perceptions of the local population in Gulu and 
Atiak.  
 
Research Questions 
In order to have a clear focus for the research, I formulated the following 
research questions:  
Major Question: 
To what extent is the NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda informed by the 
local reality and/or external conceptualizations of peacebuilding? 
Specific Questions    
1. What are the implications of the historical conflict dynamics and diverse 
peacebuilding attempts for NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda? 
2. What are the NGO approaches to peacebuilding in northern Uganda? 
3. What values and theories inform NGO peacebuilding approaches? 
4. What are the local peacebuilding practices in northern Uganda? 
5. What are the community perceptions and attitudes regarding NGO 
peacebuilding? 
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6. What are the external factors that influence conceptualization, definition and 
implementation of NGO peacebuilding? 
7. How does the interaction between NGOs, community and donor agencies 
engender relational constructionism in peacebuilding?  
 
Concepts and their Operationalization 
I developed key concepts to be researched and operationalized them as follow:  
Conflict background and Peacebuilding in northern Uganda:  The initial task was 
to obtain secondary data through documented material that would give me a 
broader view of peacebuilding in northern Uganda. The secondary data came 
from documented literature on northern Uganda conflict, organizational reports 
of different NGOs, government reports, and independent documentations. I 
have explained this in the section on data collection below.   
 
NGO approaches and strategies to peacebuilding: I needed to understand the 
peacebuilding activities conducted by the NGOs on the ground. This meant that 
I had to ask questions about NGO involvement in peace activities, their target 
group, approaches to selection of peace agents and how they (NGOs) assess 
and sustain their activities.  Further interrogations focused on the levels of 
collaboration between the NGOs, donors and local community in peacebuilding 
activities.  Other questions related to the strategies used by NGOs in 
peacebuilding, such as community mobilization, application of culturally-based 
mechanisms, training and workshops. 
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Values and theories that inform NGO peacebuilding: Understanding the internal 
driving force behind NGO peacebuilding activities was important in gaining 
insight to these activities. Hence, questions about the values and theories that 
inform NGO actions and relevance to the northern Uganda context shed more 
light on NGO approaches to peacebuilding. I was also interested in 
understanding the social change theories that NGOs applied to their 
peacebuilding work. I asked questions regarding changes that NGOs have 
experienced following their intervention, the anticipated outcomes and 
challenges faced. These questions revealed the key assumptions, and to some 
extent, the social change theories that inform NGO peacebuilding.   
 
Local population’s perception of NGO peacebuilding: Given that part of my 
interest was to understand whether NGO peacebuilding is informed by the local 
reality, I interviewed members of the local population regarding how they 
perceived NGO peacebuilding activities.  I was conscious of the fact that 
perceptions would vary from individual to individual, group to group or village to 
village. In Gulu, I focused on understanding the local appreciation of the 
changes experienced through NGO interventions; the changes they would like 
to see in future; their assessment of NGO approaches to peacebuilding; and the 
frequency of their (local population) participation in NGO peacebuilding 
activities. In Atiak, my objective was to find out the people’s perception on the 
potential value that NGO presence would bring to the existing community 
peacebuilding initiatives. 
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Local peacebuilding approaches to peacebuilding: My interest here was to 
understand the existing local approaches to peacebuilding in both Gulu and 
Atiak, and establish if they were different from the NGO peacebuilding approach. 
As previously noted, the distinction between the local and international NGOs 
was not as distinct as I expected. My investigation focused on the initiatives that 
were generated locally, their primary objectives, theories and values, target 
population, source of funding and sustainability.  These were important in 
understanding the drive behind local community participation in peacebuilding, 
both in Gulu and Atiak. This perspective revealed how the NGO presence or 
lack of it played into the discourse and practice of peacebuilding. 
 
External factors influencing conceptualization, definition and implementation of 
NGO peacebuilding: As I have already indicated in the statement of the problem, 
one of my major concerns was to understand the external driving forces behind 
NGO peacebuilding. I wanted to know whether the assertion that NGO 
peacebuilding serves liberal peace and hence, western agendas, is based on 
evidence from the ground.  I therefore examined the external factors that 
influence NGO peacebuilding such as donor conditions, international aid to 
Government of Uganda and International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants of 
arrests on the LRA leaders. I examined the extent to which donors influenced 
NGO peacebuilding activities.  The idea was to understand any tensions in 
points of convergence and divergence between the relevance of NGO peace 
activities to the local context, on the one hand, and the interest of the donor 
agencies, on the other. I probed the perceptions of NGOs and local community 
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on the role of International Criminal Court (ICC) and the implications of the 
ICC’s intervention on peacebuilding activities. 
 
Relational constructionism in the interaction between NGOs, local community 
and donor agencies: My aim was to investigate the dialogical processes that 
emerge from relational constructionism between NGOs, donors and local 
community. From the secondary literature I realized that there was a gap in 
knowledge on the kind of peacebuilding experiences that emerged from such 
interactions. The research aimed at examining the interactions between the 
three parties (NGOs, donors and local community) and the extent to which I 
could establish that NGO peacebuilding was informed by the local reality and/or 
external conceptualizations of peacebuilding. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology 
In order to comprehend the ontological and epistemological aspects of the 
phenomenon of NGO peacebuilding, I chose to use relational constructionism 
as a theoretical framework. I have expounded this in Chapter Three. Relational 
constructionism is founded on social constructionism which studies how human 
beings co-construct meanings in search for truths that are culturally and 
historically situated (Burr, 1995:4).  
 
I found the relational aspects of social constructionism to be vital in explicating 
my research methodology. While my interviews relied on contacts with 
individuals and groups, data analysis focused on the interactions between 
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stories, events, perceptions and attitudes of NGOs, donors and community 
participants. The emphasis was on processes of relationships in reality 
construction. In fact, relational constructionism emerges from social 
relationships within historical and cultural settings (Gergen and Gergen, 
2007:462). Data therefore unfolds within an interactive system of relationships 
and is articulated in relational constructionism of the social reality under 
investigation.  
 
Entering the Field of Research 
Entering into the world of the participants is not an easy task. My previous work 
experience had familiarized me with the context of northern Uganda.8 However, 
my knowledge of this place was based on generalized understanding of the 
dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding initiative without any backing from field 
research findings. Hence, as Charmaz (2006:14) proposes, I had to change my 
lenses from a peace practitioner to a researcher in order “to bring scenes closer 
and closer into view.”  This meant that I had to approach the participants as a 
researcher who was open to learning from them. 9 In line with the relational 
constructionism, I asked myself: How are the participants constructing their 
social world? How do knowledge, culture and relationships construct the various 
meanings and social value for the community?  As Denzin and Lincoln (2008:8) 
observe, “Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of 
                                                 
8
 I carried out consultancy work for Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). I conducted peacebuilding 
workshops for both the refugee and local community leaders in northern Uganda.  This was in 
late 1990s and the situation has since changed. Most of Sudanese refugees have gone back to 
their country. 
9
 This study helped me to deepen my knowledge on the dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding 
initiatives; see the bigger picture of the context of conflict; and understand the participants’ 
views, interpretations and aspirations for peace in northern Uganda. 
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reality…They seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is 
created and given meaning.” This approach to research prepared me to 
strategically plan my field research.  
 
Planning the Field Research  
I worked out a systematic procedure of entering into the field. First, I identified 
my research sample based on the research questions that I had developed.  I 
initiated contact with some organizations before going to the field, but only a few 
responded by email. When I arrived in Kampala I was able to get a list of all the 
NGOs in Gulu from the United Nations Office of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). This facilitated the process of directly 
contacting the NGOs. Second, I had to make arrangements for accommodation 
during my six months of research. I was fortunate to find accommodation at the 
Jesuit Fathers’10 residence, 7 kilometres from Gulu town. I commuted between 
different locations using the local means of public transport referred to as ‘boda 
boda’, which means motorbikes.  These were very handy in getting me to my 
participants, whether down the slope or up the hill, in villages and in town 
centres.   
 
Third, once in Gulu I had to identify the community gatekeepers in order to 
facilitate my data collection. Gatekeepers are defined as “those who are in a 
position to ‘permit’ access to others for the purpose of interviewing” (Miller and 
Bell, 2002:53). I made appointments with the local government authorities, 
particularly local council officials, such as local council 3 (LC3) who are 
                                                 
10
 Jesuit Fathers refers to a religious order of Catholic Priests which I belong to. 
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government representatives charged with the public administration of specific 
locations.11  The local councils supervise and implement government policies in 
the areas under their jurisdiction. I also gained access through religious leaders 
and NGO officials. These contacts were important because they facilitated the 
opening of other doors for the research. I discovered “several layers of 
gatekeepers” (Bryman, 2004: 519), which proved helpful in accessing more data. 
I generally preferred to access the communities independently from the NGOs 
in order not to bias my data on the local perception of NGOs. Fourth, I had to 
revise the ethical considerations that I had prepared before going to the field in 
order to increase my self-awareness during the data collection process. 
 
Sampling Strategy and Selection of Participants 
The primary data was drawn from four different samples: the first was the NGO 
data that focused on the NGO approaches to peacebuilding. I targeted both 
international and local NGOs, mainly focusing on peace coordinators, 
programme officers and administrative personnel. I reviewed the list of all the 
NGOs working in Gulu and embarked on identifying NGOs that were actively 
involved in peacebuilding activities like mediation, leadership training, youth 
initiatives for peace, culturally-based peacebuilding and training in conflict 
intervention mechanisms. Among these NGOs were three donor agencies. 
 
                                                 
11
 I have explained the different levels of local councils in Chapter Four. Suffice it to mention 
here that the decentralized system of governance in Uganda is managed at the local level 
through the leadership of the elected council leaders referred to as ‘local council’ (LC). Local 
Government Act 1997 instituted the local councils. The lowest rank is LC1 at the village level; 
then LC2 who is in-charge of several villages referred to as ‘parishes’; LC3 takes care of a sub-
county; LC4 is in-charge of a county; and LC5 is responsible for the whole district.  
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The second sample was the local community where NGOs were present. 
Research participants included local peace coordinators, local community 
participants who have directly participated in NGO peacebuilding activities and 
those that have not, community leaders, and direct beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries of NGO peacebuilding. Initial interview contacts had a snow-ball 
effect in identifying potential research participants.  
 
The third was a control sample in Atiak where NGOs are absent. I mainly 
focused on local leaders (community and government) and community 
members (individual and groups) engaged in peacebuilding activities. My 
interactions with participants in Gulu facilitated the process of accessing the 
research participants in Atiak. I also met a local politician from Atiak who had 
worked with different humanitarian NGOs in the past. He was helpful in 
suggesting some of the names. I got more contacts from a local church minister 
who carried out social activities in the community.  
 
The fourth was the focus group sample from both Gulu and Atiak. Focus group 
interview refers to group interviews aimed at discussing a specific issue 
(Robson, 2002: 285). The accent is placed on building discussions around a 
topic and facilitating a joint construction of meaning on the focus areas of the 
research (Bryman, 2008:474). I identified individuals of mixed age groups who 
had experienced or taken part in community peacebuilding. In my sampling of 
the focus group, I was informed by Kumar (2005: 124) who maintains that the 
composition of the group ought to be people who shared a common experience 
of a situation or the social phenomenon of study. I sampled a group of 
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participants, 8 from Gulu and 7 from Atiak. The participants were selected 
through consultation with the gatekeepers and community leaders.  About 40 
per cent of the participants in the focus group were elders between the ages of 
60-80 years, and the rest ranged between 18-50 years. The reason for this mix 
was to get a general experiential perception of the NGO peacebuilding but also 
an understanding of the culturally-based mechanisms of peacebuilding. The 
diversity in perspectives between the older and younger participants enriched 
the discussions.  
 
I carried out a total of 49 formal interviews (see Table 1a below): For the NGO 
data, I conducted individual interviews with 14 participants from 9 international 
NGOs and 13 participants from 11 local NGOs. In some NGO samples I had 
more than one participant. I interviewed 9 key informants in the local 
communities where NGOs were active (Gulu); and 6 key informants where 
NGOs were absent (Atiak). I also interviewed 3 government institutions of 
peacebuilding; and 2 local government leaders (LC3), one from Gulu and the 
other from Atiak.  
Table 1a Samples for Formal Interview  
Interview Sector Number of participants  
International NGOs – 9 14 
Local NGOs – 11 13 
Community participants – Gulu  9 
Community participants - control 
population in Atiak 
6 
Focus group discussions - Gulu   1 (8 participants)  
Focus group discussions - control 
population in Atiak 
1 (7 participants)  
Government institutions of peacebuilding – 
Gulu 
3 
Local government leaders (LC3) – one in 
Gulu and one in Atiak 
2 
Total number of interviews   49 
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I also had 19 informal interviews with community leaders, NGO personnel, 
formerly abducted persons, government officials, religious leaders and 
community members from both Gulu and Atiak (see Table 1b below). I used 
informal interviews to clarify issues as they emerged from the formal interviews. 
 
Table 1b – Samples for Informal Interviews 
Interview sector Number of participants 
Community leaders 3 (two in Gulu and one in Atiak) 
NGO personnel 2  
Formerly abducted persons 4 (three in Gulu and one in Atiak) 
Goverment officials 3 (two in Gulu and one in Atiak) 
Religious leaders 3 (two in Gulu and one in Atiak) 
Community members 4 (two in Gulu and two in Atiak) 
Total number of interviews 19 
 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Obtaining Informed Consent  
Upon engaging the gate-keepers I undertook the process of gaining voluntary 
and informed consent from potential participants. What actually constitutes 
adequate consent is debatable because in most cases it depends on how the 
“definition of consent is operationalized” (Sin, 2005:281).  Besides, the 
“complexity of the research demands different forms of consent” (Sin, 2005: 
281). I had to figure out a more appropriate social-cultural approach to gaining 
voluntary and informed consent of the participants. 
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The idea of seeking participant consent was foreign to many. Some participants, 
for personal reasons, were not comfortable with signing the consent form. The 
majority, particularly from the local community, confirmed their willingness to 
participate in the interview through an oral consent. Creed-Kanashiro et al 
(2005:925) raise awareness of the fact that “verbal rather than written consent is 
appropriate in some populations.”   
 
The participants were first provided with the research information sheet (see 
Appendix: data collection instrument no. 1), which detailed: the aims and 
objectives of the research; the expectations on the participants; the methods of 
data collection; and the role of participants in the interpretation and publication 
of the collected data.12 For the focus group discussions, I made it clear that 
while a participant could withdraw from the interview, he or she could not retract 
the information already given. This is because focus group discussions entail a 
common process of construction of meaning through interactive discussion. 
Hence, individual contributions become part of the group discourse. The 
potential participants for both individual and focus group interviews were given 
three days to decide if they were willing to participate under these conditions. 
Participants were informed that individual interviews would last between 1-2 
hours and focus group discussions for 2-4 hours. 
 
                                                 
12
 This information indicated that full confidentiality and anonymity would be observed during 
and after the interview; the collected data would be securely preserved; and the participant 
would have the freedom to abandon the interview at any time without explanation. 
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At the beginning of each interview I also asked the participants whether they 
consented to the recording of the interview, and in most cases I got a positive 
response. A few participants declined due to their position in the organization or 
for other personal reasons. On two occasions I was asked to first obtain an 
official permission from a higher authority within the organization before I could 
gain participant consent. In both of these occasions permission was granted. 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
To safeguard the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, I assured 
them that the information given would only be used for the PhD research and 
later for publication. Where there were attributes that could make the identity of 
the interviewee obvious, I coded them and they remained known only to me 
(see Appendix Table 17). I had to use translators in two interviews, and in both 
cases they had to sign confidentiality agreements prior to the interviews.  For 
the focus group discussions, I explained to the participants that even though 
they were aware of the contributions made by each individual, they were to 
observe anonymity and confidentiality as far as the identity and contributions of 
the participants were concerned.    
     
Validation 
I gave the participants the option of reading through the interview transcripts in 
order for them to edit, comment, correct, add or subtract their comments, and 
then return them to me with comments, after four days. I clarified that I would 
take their feedback into account. Only one of the participants took up the offer, a 
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few requested a summary report, and the rest were not interested in receiving 
any documentation after the interview. A few NGO participants were interested 
in getting some feedback (a summary of the general findings) whereas the 
majority of the community participants did not request any documentation, 
probably because of lack of a reading culture.  
 
 
Reflexivity  
Reflexivity, according to Robson (2002: 22), is the self-awareness about how 
the researcher’s social identity and background impacts the research process. 
From a social constructivist perspective reflexivity implies being aware of 
individual presuppositions and how these affect the research (Charmaz 
2006:130-1). Such consciousness neither invalidates nor validates the 
outcomes of the research but simply raises one’s self-awareness in the data 
construction process (Gergen and Gergen 2007: 467). 
 
I had to be cognizant of the fact that researching in a somewhat familiar terrain 
demands a high level of self-awareness and humility to be open to learning and 
discovering new information. While familiarity with the context was an 
advantage in making initial contacts, it did not render me indifferent to the data 
collection process. Hermann (2001:78) observes that such a familiarity will 
always have the baggage of “preconceived values and specific identity.”   I had 
to resist the temptation to anticipate answers from the participants. I gradually 
learned to let the participant develop their stories from their own perspectives.  
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In so doing, I borrowed from Enosh and Buckbinder (2005:589) who ascertain 
that letting a participant give an account of a “fully developed narrative on his or 
her own terms” is fundamental to collecting authentic data.   
 
I was conscious of the fact that interviewing is an interactive process of power 
relations. I engaged my participants as a PhD student, a man, a Jesuit Catholic 
priest, a Kenyan and peace practitioner. These identity traits created an 
imbalance in power relations between the participants and myself.  Being male 
in a patriarchal society meant that I carried with me the social perception of the 
characteristic representation of the dominant male in the community. This 
perception did not, however, manifest itself in a manner that was obvious to me 
during the research. As a Kenyan, I was viewed as coming from a dominant 
neighbour, especially because of Kenya’s domination of the regional economy 
and politics. In most cases, this did not emerge as a hindrance. Occasionally 
participants were interested in discussing Kenyan politics with me, thus easily 
breaking the ice for further interview conversations. 
 
I was also conscious of the fact that I was a Catholic priest and the participants 
could be inclined to see me as a minister and not a researcher. I clarified at the 
beginning of every interview that I was conducting the research as a PhD 
candidate and not as a priest. This did not prevent occasional requests, 
especially in the villages, for a blessing, counselling or prayer sessions. It 
proved to be difficult, but I insisted on saying ‘no’ to such requests in order not to 
mix up roles and bias the data. In some cases the participants could have given 
a more positive view to responding to conflict because they expected me to 
disagree with a ‘non-peaceful’ approach to conflict resolution. However, these 
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instances were rather rare. I undertook a daily review of self-comportment and 
participant reaction in order to increase my self-awareness about any potential 
negative interference with the research.   
 
My role as a PhD candidate created expectations among a few participants, 
especially the young ones who hoped I could help them find academic 
scholarships abroad. I recommended   some resources and websites that could 
be helpful for the interested persons but provided no commitment to financial 
assistance. 
 
Being a Luo from Kenya was an added advantage because the Acholi belong to 
the larger Luo community, albeit from a different dialect. The Kenyan Luo 
people are said to have migrated from Sudan where they were once together 
with the rest of the Luo communities (Shaw and Mbabazi, 2009). I could follow, 
to some extent, the conversations in Acholi but nearly all my participants could 
understand and speak English.   
 
Security and Safety 
Northern Uganda has enjoyed relative peace since the signing of the Cessation 
of Hostilities Agreement in 2006.  However, as in many post-conflict situations, I 
had to take the necessary precautions to ensure my safety and security. Even in 
post-conflict settings apparent peace can easily be lost, particularly given that 
“conflicts are often characterized by dynamic and mutating patterns of violence” 
(Goodhand, 2000:12).  I therefore shared my daily itinerary with the Jesuit 
colleagues with whom I was living; I had a cell phone with me at all times and I 
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conducted my interviews between 8:30am and 5:00pm.   These cautionary 
measures allowed me to be vigilant throughout the data collection period.  
Through some of my previous contacts I obtained credible information about the 
general status of security in the areas where I intended to conduct data 
collection. 
 
I also ensured that the participants felt safe by asking them in advance their 
preferred location for the interview. I was conscious of the fact that participants 
should not be harmed by any circumstances of the interview. Bryman (2008:120) 
however, warns that the researcher is limited in what he/she can do since not all 
circumstances can be anticipated. For the local community most interviews 
were done in a shaded area outside their houses, in a school or a church, 
whereas for the NGOs it was mostly in offices, and in a few cases, in a 
restaurant.  There were no incidents of insecurity or harm to the participants. 
 
Self-care 
I had anticipated that some of my participants could have had horrific 
experiences of the war which left them traumatised. I was therefore cautious not 
to further aggravate their condition. I relied on my previous experience of 
working in the field to detect potential cases of trauma. I had three cases of 
obvious trauma, and I chose not to interview them. To detect cases of trauma, I 
carried out pre-interview conversations to better understand the participant’s 
current emotional state. I posed questions such as: How long have you lived 
here? Where else have you lived before? Where were you during the conflict? 
These questions evoked discussions on personal experiences of war. Five out 
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of nine community participants in Gulu pointed out that 22 years of conflict had 
traumatised the whole community in one way or another to varying degrees. I 
was amazed by the level of community resilience in dealing with these difficult 
situations.  
 
I also took caution not to fall victim of vicarious trauma. In most cases vicarious 
trauma occurs as a result of being empathetically involved with the traumatic 
experiences of the participant (Vrklevski and Franklin, 2008). This could affect 
the psychosocial health of the researcher.  To counter such an occurrence, I 
had regular debriefings with my Jesuit colleagues who were much more 
experienced in working in the area. Regular discussions on my daily 
experiences helped me to be aware of the diverse social issues within the 
community, particularly those that I was confronted with. 
 
Research Methods in Data Collection and Analysis 
Research methods mainly refer to instruments used to collect data. Due to the 
qualitative nature of this research, I used formal and informal interviews, as well 
as observation to collect the primary data. I also reviewed existing 
documentation for the secondary data. These methods were important in 
deciphering NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda. I was informed by Groat 
and Wang (2002:395) who assert that in case studies, data collection holds the 
“potential to uncover the multiple, complex, and sometimes overlapping factors 
that eventually lead to particular outcomes.”  Data collection methods help in 
uncovering the complexity behind the phenomenon of study.  
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Secondary Data Collection and Analysis 
The study of NGO peacebuilding in a post-conflict setting raises the challenge of 
understanding the underlying factors of conflict and existing literature on NGO 
peacebuilding in northern Uganda. Hence, my initial task was to establish the 
secondary data that could serve as a background to understanding the 22 year 
conflict in northern Uganda. Archival data was mainly obtained from published 
and unpublished sources such as books, journals, newspaper articles, 
conference proceedings, organizational and government reports and documents.  
 
Secondary data is limited on the extent to which it can be relied upon for its 
accuracy and reliability. Long-Sutehall et al (2010:3) explain that “the purpose of 
the secondary data analysis should be transparent, detailing methodological 
and ethical considerations and explaining any decisions made regarding 
missing data so that the interpretative process of knowledge production is 
transparent.” However, Bryman (2009:561) raises the concern that secondary 
data may lack full disclosure of whether ethical issues from data collection were 
addressed. Hence, secondary data alone is not sufficient. 13 
 
I divided the secondary data analysis into three categories. First was the 
historical background of the conflict in northern Uganda: the analysis focused on 
the political history of Uganda and diverse peacebuilding efforts by different 
actors. This exercise was important in identifying the root causes of the northern 
                                                 
13
 My use of the secondary data was complementary to the in-depth analysis of the primary data. 
The secondary data was critical in guiding the process of theoretical sampling, particularly 
because I analyzed most of the secondary data before and during the field research. This 
process was helpful in identifying the emerging data and cues for the next data to be collected.   
The literature clarified the theoretical underpinnings that would shed some light on the different 
perspectives of my research. 
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Uganda conflict. The second was on NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda. 
The data analysis highlighted the diverse categories of NGOs and their roles 
and challenges in humanitarian assistance, human rights, advocacy and 
peacebuilding. The third category was the secondary data from government 
officials. These were minimal, mostly limited to government policies and annual 
reports. The data shed some light on what the government was doing for peace 
and human rights advocacy and their areas of collaboration with the NGOs.  
 
Primary Data Collection and Analysis  
Interviewing     
I used semi-structured interviews as my principal instrument of data collection. I 
prepared an interview schedule (see Appendix, Tables 2-6) which was 
important in maintaining the focus on the key concepts to be explored. The 
flexibility in the semi-structured interviewing allowed for a more conversational 
approach to the interviews.  
 
All my interviews were conducted face to face. The advantage with this 
approach was that I was able to pick up social cues such as gestures, facial 
expressions, intonations and body language which by themselves 
complemented what was being said. However, as a researcher I had to be 
conscious of the fact that these physical expressions could interfere with the 
process of data collection. I also had to make sure that I maintained the theme 
and objective of the research. On one occasion while interviewing a renown 
religious leader I realized that I was getting so absorbed by stories about his 
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personal experience that we gradually drifted away from the main issues of 
discussion. I had to interrupt the story and re-direct the discussion using more 
focused questions. Wengraf (2001:194) maintains that it is important for the 
researcher to observe “double attention”, which means listening to the 
participant while maintaining the focus of the research, depth of the inquiry and 
allocated time.  
 
The focus group interviews were interactive and brought together different ideas 
in a process of common sense-making. For effective moderation of the 
discussions I was guided by Puchta and Potter (2004:25-38) who highlight the 
key characteristics of a good moderation.14 I emphasized at the beginning of the 
interview that every opinion was important and that each participant ought to be 
aware that there could be differences in opinions in the course of the discussion.  
 
Observation 
I used observation on some occasions as a means of collecting data. However, 
this was peripheral among the methods used.  Kumar (2005) defines 
observation as “a purposeful, systematic and selective way of watching and 
listening to an interaction or phenomenon as it takes place.”  I visited the 
villages to witness the resettlement and reintegration of formerly abducted 
persons. I also saw some remnants of the displacement camps. Informal 
conversations with the people helped me to understand their desire for peace 
                                                 
14
 These are: have a clear objective of the discussion; encourage informal conversations for 
interaction to happen; read the mood or general psychology of the participants to keep in pace 
with the discussion; be aware of word choices, intonations; pose the right questions; and ensure 
that the seating arrangement is favourable for the discussion. 
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and participation in peace activities. These gave me a general picture of how 
the conflict had affected the area. It also helped me understand the contextual 
references made by the participants.  
 
I used observation in an NGO peacebuilding workshop in order to understand 
the peacebuilding approaches applied by the NGO.  I was able to interact with 
the workshop participants and learn their perceptions of NGO peacebuilding 
approaches. As Walsh (2001:67) asserts, the aim of observation is to 
understand the motives and meanings that people attach to their actions and 
perceptions as well as “gain a deeper insight into the real way of life, beliefs and 
activities of the group in their ‘natural setting’.” The interaction with participants 
gave me new leads into issues that I could delve into in my next interviews. I 
was also able to get new contacts for more interviews.   
 
Primary Data Analysis 
I carried out primary data analysis in four stages, all of which were mainly 
influenced by grounded theory: coding in the course of the data collection; 
transcription and further coding; use of Nvivo15 software for organization and 
coding of the data; and analysis of the emerging themes and categories.  
 
In the first stage, I undertook the coding process while carrying out data 
collection. Since I was using grounded theory as a qualitative methodology for 
the research, I had clear criteria for coding of themes, concepts and categories 
                                                 
15
 Nvivo is computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) that is useful in 
organizing data. 
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as they developed. I made notes of these themes, concepts and categories in 
my transcripts and revised them at the end of the day.  Later, I was able to focus 
and refocus my interviews according to the progression of the emerging 
information. I began by using open coding which is the first step towards 
understanding the data with a more open mind, letting it unfold as much as 
possible. During open coding I had to revisit my research question to see that I 
was within the focus of the research. I made as many notes and memos as 
possible in the course of the interviews.  Scribbling notes in columns next to the 
interview texts was important in generating ideas for initial coding, possible 
themes and categories, as they emerged.16  
 
In the second stage, having collected all the primary data I needed, I began the 
process of transcribing the recorded interviews and typing my handwritten notes.  
This process allowed me to have a broad overview of the information I had 
collected. It also gave me the insight to follow up on gaps in information 
provided by the interviewed participants as well as to request additional 
documentation that could be helpful in filling the information gap.  I listened to 
the interview recordings, and re-read the interview transcripts in order to 
familiarize myself with what had been said. In the process of listening and 
reading I continued the “substantive” coding process which, according to Glaser 
                                                 
16
 I realized that I needed to keep on organizing my interview data as it unfolded. I referred to the 
prompt questions suggested by Lofland and Lofland (1995 cited Bryman, 2008:550): “Of what 
general category is this item of data an instance? What does this item of data represent?...What 
sort of answer to a question about a topic does this item of data imply? What is happening 
here?” I further examined other questions like: What are the people saying? What is their 
understanding of what is happening? These prompt questions were helpful in understanding the 
data sets within a wider perspective and generating further focused interrogation in subsequent 
interviews: LOFLAND, J. & LOFLAND, L. H. 1995. Analyzing social settings : a guide to 
qualitative observation and analysis, Belmont, Calif. Wadsworth; BRYMAN, A. 2008. Social 
Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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(2004:12), conceptualizes the “empirical substance of the area of research.” As 
previously stated, I had begun this process during the interviews. 17 
 
The process of note taking and coding spawned many ideas about possible 
interpretation of the data. I began thinking about broader theoretical concepts in 
relation to the different texts of the scripts, subsequently generating theoretical 
codes that conceptualize the empirical data. Glaser (2004:12) asserts that the 
“essential relationship between data and theory is a conceptual code. The code 
conceptualizes the underlying pattern of a set of empirical indicators within the 
data.” For example, responses on the use of cultural rituals of reconciliation 
prompted me to investigate the diverse aspects of rituals of reconciliation.18 
Thus, the process of coding meant that a single text from the interview could be 
coded in many different ways. 
 
At some point I realized that I had very many codes and that I needed to 
organize them further. I started by examining how the codes were related and 
the extent to which they reflected people’s experiences on the ground. This was 
an arduous task because in order to relate the codes to people’s lived 
experiences I had to re-contextualize them and see how they fitted in the 
different narratives of the participants. At the same time this process revealed 
the links in the participants’ narratives. I began to see how different stories, 
                                                 
17
 I found out that in this iterative process, new insights emerged every time I engaged with the 
transcribed data, driving me to look at the interview transcripts again and again.  The question at 
the back of my mind was whether I was accurately capturing the articulation and essence of the 
lived experiences of the participants. 
18
 Such aspects included: the historical background of the use of the rituals; the significance of 
rituals in reconciliation processes; and the role of culture in sense-making and co-construction of 
social reality within the framework of relational constructionism. 
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events and interpretations were related or different. This prompted me to identify 
common themes and categories.  
 
In the third stage I proceeded to a systematic organization of different codes 
that had emerged. In order to do this I decided to do a line numbering of the 
transcript in a Microsoft Word document. This helped me establish an easy 
reference to the codes and categories created. I looked at the emerging themes 
and manually jotted them down as categories and sub-categories alongside 
their properties (see Appendix, Tables 7-16).  This had to be done meticulously, 
and was cumbersome and time-consuming, but it had the added benefit of 
increasing my familiarity with the interview transcript. The exercise of data 
analysis prepared me conceptually for the treatment of the transcript with Nvivo, 
even though I had not anticipated such a progression.   
 
The use of Nvivo was important in further organizing and analyzing the data. I 
started off by separately importing into Nvivo each interview transcript of 
individual participant or focus group discussions. This made it easier for the 
referencing of the coding since the retrieved sections of the interview was 
recorded with the name and affiliation of the interviewee.   
 
I used categories and sub-categories that I had identified to create tree nodes in 
Nvivo. I had to revise my tree-nodes several times, arrange, and re-arrange 
them in order to establish some coherence in the flow of the data.  Each tree-
node represented different categories and each ‘child-node’ denoted a sub-
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category. These categories had textual reference from the interview transcripts 
making it easier to interact with the texts and identify emerging trends. Locating 
the truncated texts in the original interview transcript was a straight forward 
activity since the Nvivo software gave me the exact reference and location of 
the coded text.19  
 
However, Nvivo has been criticized for mutilating texts and breaking the 
continuity of the interview transcript with the result that, “the narrative flow of 
interview transcripts and events recorded in field notes may be lost” (Bryman, 
2008:566).  Yet another criticism is that it does not account for omitted texts 
which might just be as important for the process of analysis (Fieldling and Lee, 
1998:74). The programme has also been criticized for quantifying data and 
missing out on the richness of the data (Richards, 1999); it is also perceived to 
limit qualitative research to a rigid process of automated analysis (Kelle, 1995). 
 
These criticisms seem to consider Nvivo to be the sole locus for analysing and 
understanding the interview transcript whereas in actual fact, Nvivo should be 
one of the many ways of organizing and analyzing the transcripts. For example, 
in my case I started by manually coding the text during the interviews and 
continued this after transcribing. I then performed a hand written categorization 
of the data.  This meant that by the time I got to Nvivo I had already interacted 
with the transcript at different levels.  
                                                 
19
 The process of coding through tree-nodes, child-nodes and sibling nodes generated many 
ideas from the transcript. It also increased familiarity with the text and brought in different 
perspectives of understanding the views of the participants.  Nvivo was thus a useful tool for 
coding and retrieval of texts from the interviews, which is in line with grounded theory technique.  
This provided a major advantage over the use of manual techniques of organizing data and 
identifying possible logical flows. 
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The major challenge in the use of Nvivo is that it leaves one with many tree 
nodes, which if not carefully synthesized can be overwhelming. It is therefore 
important to maintain patience and consistency. Glaser (2002) emphasizes that 
the key to understanding the interview transcripts is to persistently maintain the 
patience of journeying with the findings.    
 
The fourth stage involved drawing together the various themes and categories 
into four main headings: relational context of conflict; NGO approaches to 
peacebuilding; local perceptions of NGO peacebuilding; and relational 
constructionism in NGO peacebuilding. The emergent categories and sub-
categories in each title also had properties associated with them as contextual 
manifestations (see Appendix, Tables 7-16). This process of analysis influenced 
the structuring of my chapters and the logical flow of the thesis.    
 
Research Limitations and Methodological Challenges 
There were several challenges that emerged as limitations of the research. I will 
highlight the key ones and explain how I responded to them: 
Reliability and Triangulation 
One of the challenges of using qualitative research is that it studies “partial 
views of reality that are obtainable” (Oakley 1990:25).  This means that the data 
gathering could be limited in scope and perspective, hence raising questions 
about reliability. In order to address the challenge of reliability I used 
triangulation. Since its introduction into research by Denzin (1970), triangulation 
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has become a common lingua in social research.20 Morallis et al (2006:47) 
define triangulation as “an epistemological claim concerning what more can be 
known about a phenomenon when the findings from data generated by two or 
more methods are brought together.” In other words, the emphasis lies in the 
process of collecting more accurate data set in order to establish reliable 
findings from the research. The analysis of the secondary data facilitated the 
emergence of a bigger picture of the contextual situation of NGO peacebuilding 
in northern Uganda. I compared the NGO data with the community perception, 
and then went back to the community for further interrogation, and vice-versa.  
 
Another challenge in reliability was about translation. As I have stated above, on 
two occasions I had to use a translator. I was conscious of the fact that 
meanings can sometimes be lost through translation. I occasionally had to rely 
on my first language, Luo, to decipher the exact meaning behind the words. This 
was helpful in differentiating between textual and contextual meaning of words. 
Textual meaning refers to word by word translation, whereas contextual 
translation places the words within their significance in the context. In other 
words, “each language represents a separate reality" (Bassnett, 1996:19).  The 
various meanings in the two translations became clearer as I applied 
triangulations. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Denzin (2006) identifies four types of triangulations: Data triangulation which involves time, 
space, and persons; Investigator triangulation which implies the use of multiple researchers in 
an investigation; Theory triangulation which entails the use of multiple theoretical schemes as a 
means of interpreting the phenomenon; and Methodological triangulation, which involves the 
use of different methods of data collection such as interviews, observations, documents and 
questionnaires. DENZIN, N. 2006. Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook Chicago, Aldine 
Transaction. 
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Focus Group Discussions 
One of the challenges I faced in focus group discussions was the lack of 
spontaneity among the participants. Following cultural norms, the younger 
participants often waited for the older ones to speak before they could give their 
opinions. On the other hand, the older participants spoke more, with authority 
and experience, making it difficult for the younger ones to present a different 
opinion. I became aware of this early in the interview and encouraged different 
people to speak in order to increase individual participation. In some cases I had 
to direct prompt questions to a specific individual by referring to him or her by 
name. For example, ‘How would you assess this particular issue, Miss Acayo or 
Mr. Okello?’ This approach was helpful in eliciting responses from participants 
who were reluctant to speak out. I drew on my previous experience of group 
moderation to facilitate the group. This was largely successful, but the additional 
challenge was that as a young researcher, the expectation from the elders was 
that I had to observe the same cultural norms. At the end of both focus group 
interviews I was satisfied with the way the discussions went.   
 
Challenges in NGO Research 
One of the challenges of researching NGOs in northern Uganda is the diversity, 
commonality and uniqueness of the NGOs’ identities and cultures. NGOs had 
diverse histories that shaped their approaches to peacebuilding; held different 
funding capacities; possessed diverse levels of integration into the local 
community; and maintained varied priorities in their agenda. I found out that 
there was a thin line between an individual’s perspective and the organizational 
stance.  I used triangulation to check the information between participants, and 
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also consulted secondary materials in form of publications and documentations 
whenever necessary.  
 
I applied the theoretical framework of relational constructionism and took note of 
how individuals within the community and NGO sector were constructing 
meanings of their work, and how this was interacting with the perceptions of the 
local community.  Hence, my concern shifted from naively seeking a common 
cultural approach by the NGOs to learning from the divergent and convergent 
experiences.  This meant that individuals were part of the meaning construction 
of the organization through a relational process of construction of social reality. 
Soin and Scheytt (2006:56) assert that “the means by which individuals ascribe 
meanings to specific events and circumstances in and around the organization” 
have a major contribution to the uniqueness of organizations.  
 
Another challenge was accessing archival data. On two occasions I had 
difficulties in accessing some NGO archival data because the participants felt 
that the documents were too sensitive for public consumption. I respected their 
decision, and supplemented the information gap by further probing the 
participants within the two organizations. There were also participants who had 
promised to send the documents by email, but did not honour their promises 
despite several requests. Additionally, some of the activity reports were 
outdated and did not reflect the current situation on the ground. Likewise, some 
NGO websites were not up to date. I was also confronted with the challenge of 
determining reliability and validity of some of the documented information. In 
some cases the authors of the NGO reports were no longer working with the 
organization. As I have noted above I applied triangulation to address most of 
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the above challenges. The above challenges were common to those that are 
often associated with organizational research.21 
 
Transcription of Recorded Interviews 
Transcription is today questioned as lacking in objectivity. In other words, we 
can no longer “assume the transparency of language” (Riessman, 1993:12). 
Transcription is itself “an interpretive act" (Tilley and Powick, 2002:292) that 
reveals both the perspective of the transcriber as well as the transcribed. In the 
course of transcribing I had to reconstruct the scene of the interview, and revisit 
the social cues like facial expressions and gestures. I began to recognise the 
deeper meaning after reading the transcripts several times and conducting 
analysis based on the grounded theory. I compared my initial coding during the 
interview, and after. It was evident to me that the act of transcribing is indeed an 
interactive process that adds clarity into the text.  
 
Researching in Post-conflict Settings 
Researching post-conflict settings poses different kinds of challenges that call 
for self-awareness. These could range from security, provision of basic needs, 
                                                 
21
 In discussing challenges in organizational research, Buchanan and Bryman (2007:486) 
maintain that organizational research “today reflects the paradigm diversity of the social 
sciences in general.” They identify three issues that render organizational research challenging 
and fluid: First, the widening boundaries of the issues that can be researched, such as 
organizational behaviour, culture and history or issues on feminism, masculinity and the role of 
organizations in social change.  Second, there are many paradigms that can be applied in the 
field research: from the traditional positivist approach in the study of organizations to 
interpretivist, critical theorist and other social science approaches. The third issue is 
methodological inventiveness which has led to the inclusion of a myriad of research methods in 
organizational research.  These issues make it difficult to develop a research approach that 
integrates the different factors in organizational research. BUCHANAN, D. A. & BRYMAN, A. 
2007. Contextualizing Methods Choice in Organizational Research. Organizational Research 
Methods, 10, 483-501. 
 
64 
 
trauma and the need for reconciliation. I was faced with the challenge of 
addressing three main issues: First was the concern of giving a voice to the 
research participants, particularly in situations of human rights abuse. One of 
the major ethical challenges of researching in situations of post-conflict and 
vulnerability is the researcher’s urge to take action against witnessed situations 
of human rights abuse. This can bring about dilemmas of confidentiality. 
Robson (2002: 71) cautions that while a researcher has specific ethical 
responsibilities, this does not give her/him “a privileged voice on what 
constitutes ethical behaviour in others.”22  I was careful not to address the 
human rights abuse personally, but conducted discreet inquiries to see if any 
action was being taken on the ground. I learned that some civil society groups 
were addressing these kinds of issues through media campaigns and other 
means of advocacy. With the consent of the concerned participants, I referred 
the two cases of abuse to a human rights organization.   
 
Second was how to deal with different expectations from the participants. On a 
few occasions the participants asked me to recompense them in return for the 
interviews. I told them that I did not have anything to give and that I hoped the 
research would contribute to the future of peacebuilding practice in northern 
Uganda.   
 
Third was how to address the multiple voicing. Conflict provokes diverse 
emotions and perceptions about peace and conflict. I had to find ways of dealing 
                                                 
22
 Goodhand (2000:14) is however of the opinion that the researcher can have a positive impact 
by “countering myths and stereotypes, identifying information blockages and giving voice to the 
oppressed.” GOODHAND, J. 2000. Research in Conflict Zones: Ethics and Accountability. 
Forced Migration Review, 8,12-15. 
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with the diversities in ideas, understandings and emotions among the 
participants. While in the early stages of the research this seemed challenging, 
it later emerged that the data was being enriched by these varieties of coherent 
and incoherent perspectives. Gergen and Gergen (20007: 468) assert that 
multiple voicing allows for the removal of the dominant voice of the researcher 
by bringing in different perspectives over the same issue, acknowledging the 
convergences and divergences in opinions, valid conclusions and lack of 
coherence within the data.  
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters.  The First Chapter is the introduction 
to the thesis. In this section I highlight key arguments of the study; definition of 
terms; research methodology and research instruments of data collection; and 
the key research question that orients the focus and scope of the study. Having 
described the chosen locations and justification for their selection, I elaborate on 
the data collection methods, which are mainly, semi-structured interviews; focus 
groups, observation and secondary data. I also explain the sampled research 
population and the reasons for their selection. I end this section by looking at 
data analysis approaches, limitations and methodological challenges of the 
research.  
 
In Chapter Two I examine the conceptualization of NGO peacebuilding. I 
analyse the various periods, conceptualization and events that have defined 
NGOs’ role in relief, development and peacebuilding in post-conflict settings. 
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This shades light on the values and theories that inform NGO peacebuilding. In 
a further discussion, I review the extent of validity of the generalizations made 
by liberal peace critics that peacebuilding NGOs are subjects of the liberal 
peace agenda.  My analysis of the external influences on NGOs, particularly by 
the donor agencies and their governments, accentuates discussions on the 
sustainability and relevance of NGO peacebuilding.  
 
In Chapter Three I discuss the conceptual framework of relational 
constructionism, which provides the guiding lens for the thesis. I explain why 
relational constructionism has been applied as a theoretical framework, and 
how it weaves together the arguments of the thesis. I further examine the 
relevance of relational constructionism in responding to the research question. I 
articulate this by looking at the link between relational constructionism and NGO 
peacebuilding.  
 
In Chapter Four I analyse the contextual background to NGO peacebuilding by 
examining the historical and current aspects of the northern Uganda conflict and 
subsequent implications on NGO peacebuilding. This includes analysis of the 
legacy of violence and armed resistance over many years, with a more detailed 
investigation into the 22 year conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
and Government of Uganda (GOU). Having laid this foundation, I focus the 
discussion on the different peacebuilding efforts which include: conflict 
mediation initiatives; constitution making processes; reforms on structures of 
governance; nation building mechanisms; culturally-based approaches to 
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conflict intervention; social, political and economic interventions; international 
mechanisms of conflict intervention through the ICC legal apparatus; and 
militarized interventions.   
  
Chapters Five and Six focus on data analysis. In Chapter Five I analyze the 
collected data on NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda. In the light of 
relational constructionism, the analysis seeks to establish specific areas of 
priority in the NGO peacebuilding; the approaches used in addressing the post-
conflict challenges to peace; and the interactive processes between NGOs, 
donors and community, and how these relationships contribute to the 
peacebuilding discourse and practice.   
 
In Chapter Six I explain the different levels of relational constructionism between 
the NGOs, donors and community, based on the research findings. I revisit the 
concept of relational constructionism in connection to the data. My aim is to 
demonstrate the levels of relational constructionism between NGOs, donors and 
community, while relying on Lederach’s (1997) pyramid framework that depicts 
multi-level interactions. The pyramid conceptualization expounds the complex 
interaction between NGO peacebuilding at the grassroots level leadership; 
middle level leadership under the influence of NGOs and civil society; and top 
level leadership represented by donor agencies and governments. I conclude by 
asserting that NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda is a process of relational 
constructionism that engages NGOs, donors and the local community in peace 
and conflict transformation processes.  
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In Chapter Seven I draw together the major conclusions of the thesis and revisit 
the main research question in order to establish the extent to which the question 
has been answered.  
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Chapter Two: Conceptualization of NGO Peacebuilding 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is focused on analyzing the NGO literature in post-conflict 
peacebuilding in order to situate NGO peacebuilding in the broader 
peacebuilding discourse, and identify the gaps in the literature. These 
perspectives will shed light on the extent to which NGO peacebuilding is co-
opted by the liberal peace agenda and/or whether it is a social dynamic 
phenomenon based on complex interactive processes of relational 
constructionism.  
 
The discussion in this chapter examines five different but interrelated aspects in 
NGO peacebuilding that explain the development of NGO engagement in 
peacebuilding and implications of the conceptualization of the peace discourse 
in post-conflict reconstruction. The first aspect is the Post-Cold War period that 
was marked by the increased participation of NGOs as active agents in 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution following increased internal conflicts that 
prompted humanitarian emergencies. The second dimension discusses 
operational context of NGO peacebuilding and the liberal peace agenda. In the 
post Cold War period internal conflicts led to large numbers of civilian deaths 
prompting global consciousness on sovereignty as responsibility to protect 
citizens from harm (Hunt and Bellamy, 2011; Bellamy, 2009). The process of 
stabilization of conflict affected states has led to the liberalized approach to 
peacebuilding. The third aspect is the critique of the liberal peace. In this phase, 
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there have been calls for the revision of peacebuilding practices that are heavily 
dependent on military machinery and donor funding (Rogers, 2008a; Pugh, 
2004). The liberal peace critics assert that liberal peace operates within the 
framework of human security, mainly focusing on countering conflict impact by 
advancing democracy, human rights, liberalized economy and the rule of law 
(Mac Ginty, 2010; Newman, 2009; Richmond, 2008; Richmond, 2010b). The 
fourth dimension discusses NGO peacebuilding and its relationship to liberal 
peace. The critics of liberal peace accentuate that NGO peacebuilding has been 
co-opted into the framework of liberal peace agenda (Reimann, 2005; 
Richmond, 2009a; Richmond, 2005a). The fifth aspect opens discussions 
beyond the critique of liberal peace in order to identify the gaps in the literature 
and explore alternative interpretations and understandings of NGO 
peacebuilding. 
 
Part I: Post-Cold War Period and Emergence of NGOs in Peacebuilding 
NGOs emerged in the post-Cold War era as active players in efforts to mitigate 
and end conflicts. The post-Cold War period, to some extent, ended the 
ideological partisan approach to international relations and aid delivery. The 
emphasis shifted from political partisanship to promotion of principles of 
democracy and global peace. Goodhand (2006) asserts that the end of the Cold 
War, the subsequent increased promotion of liberal democracy and 
conditionality of aid in the 1990s by western donors have promoted the 
reciprocal conditionality of peace. Thus, states that adhered to principles of 
democracy were seen as allies of the western nations.  
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In the post-Cold War period NGOs became an alternative channel of 
development and human rights advocacy. In the 1990s there was a fundamental 
shift on the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction. The traditional 
involvement of NGOs in humanitarian relief broadened to include peacebuilding. 
Minear (2002:156) holds that although “humanitarian action has always had an 
uncomfortable association with the trajectory of conflicts, only in the 1990s have 
the specific linkages become a policy issue of ongoing debate.”  Besides efforts 
towards conflict prevention, humanitarian interventions in situations of human 
rights abuse and post-conflict peacebuilding became part of international policy 
of global management in the post-Cold War period (Tschirgi, 2003:4).  
 
The transition from relief-development trajectory to peacebuilding has been 
intertwined as an alternating process, and not necessarily chronological in 
nature. This means that there are NGOs that have been providing relief and 
development assistance while still engaged in peacebuilding activities. Lewis 
(2202:373) identifies three factors that have led to increased NGO participation 
in peacebuilding: the realization by international donors that governments did 
not have the capacity to undertake development programmes; recognition of 
NGOs as alternative implementers of the structural adjustment programmes 
imposed by the western nations on their southern counterparts; and 
appreciation of civil society’s capacity to resist dictatorial governments in both 
Eastern Europe and Latin America.  
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The renewed consciousness of globalization and increased role of civil society 
in national and international politics has further brought NGOs into the limelight. 
Civil society is a broader term that includes NGOs and can generally be defined 
as an interactive group of organizations and institutions that are loosely 
networked for a common social purpose.23   Howell and Pearce (2002:4) hold 
that civil society was viewed in 1980s and 1990s from a neo-liberalists 
perspective by western donor countries as a positive channel to democratic and 
developmental change in governments in the global South. This means that 
NGOs as part of the larger civil society can be seen to be “mediators between 
particularistic norms and global governance/globalization” (Richmond, 
2010a:28). NGOs thus create a space for resistance to authoritative and 
hegemonic powers, and have been at the forefront of human rights advocacy, 
development and social change.  However, the donors’ reification of NGOs as 
key agents of democracy and development can subvert the power of the state 
(Howell and Pearce, 2002:3) and undermine processes of change. 
 
The literature on the role of NGOs in peacebuilding generally identifies several 
broad areas of potential NGO intervention. These include: human rights 
advocacy especially for the marginalized populations affected by conflict; 
capacity building in increasing the participation of the affected population for 
change; conflict mediation and resolution especially at community level; 
advocacy for integrated approaches to conflict intervention; development 
                                                 
23
 A more elaborate definition is given in the Global Civil Society Year Book as the “sphere of 
ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, 
the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and 
economies” (Anheier et al., 2001:17). ANHEIER, H., GLASIUS, M. & KALDOR, M. 2001. 
Introducing Global Civil Society. In: ANHEIER, H., GLASIUS, M. & KALDOR, M. (eds.) Global 
Civil Society 2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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activities and provision of basic needs that help in attaining post-conflict 
recovery; supporting institutionalization of democracy, governance and just 
structures (Carey, 2010; Fitzduff and Church, 2004; Richmond and Carey, 2005; 
Aall, 1996; Anderson, 1996; Opongo, 2006; Goodhand, 2002).  To some extent, 
NGOs’ involvement in peacebuilding has been attributed to the failure of the 
states in resolving conflicts (Richmond, 2010a:25) and creating sustainable 
environments for security, development and harmonious co-existence.  
 
There are a number of challenges that face NGO peacebuilding in post-conflict 
context. These could include the complex nature of the post-conflict contexts, 
multiple actors in the conflict terrain, lack of NGO experience in peacebuilding 
and limited resources. NGO peacebuilding is constrained by  the challenge of 
maintaining neutrality in the face of evil; prolonging war by providing aid both to 
those in need, and the militias who might use it to foster a war agenda; 
engaging in short-term peacebuilding activities that could exacerbate conflict; 
co-opting NGOs into the liberal peace agenda which may not ensure a 
sustainable peace; compromising the NGO identity by the diverse nature of the 
NGO category, which has included illiberal organizations that have been known 
to promote violence (Carey, 2010:240-256; Goodhand, 2006; Anderson, 1999). 
 
Part II: Operational Context of NGO Peacebuilding and Liberal Peace Agenda 
The operational context of NGO peacebuilding has mostly been defined within 
the perspectives of post-conflict reconstruction. This operational context has 
been characterized by the global concerns over how to deal with insurgencies, 
warlords, terrorist groups, transitions to democracy and international response 
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to global threats on peace (Davies, 2003; Kennedy, 2004; Paris, 2004a). 
Subsequently, global security, democracy and protection of human rights have 
been prioritized as key components of peacebuilding. This approach to 
peacebuilding, mainly fronted by western nations, has been criticized as 
promoting liberal peace (Cooper et al, 2011; Heathershaw, 2008). 
 
Liberal peace is viewed as a political and military process of promoting human 
rights, liberalized economies, the rule of law and democracy (Duffield, 2010; 
Richmond, 2009b; Heathershaw, 2008; Chandler, 2004). It is however important 
to note that the proponents of liberal peace do not refer to the practice of post-
conflict peacebuilding as liberal peace. In essence the term liberal peace is 
more of a conceptual description than a normative consensus by the 
practitioners of post-conflict peacebuilding.  The term captures the liberal 
perspectives of the post-conflict peace activities as promoting neo-liberal ideals 
of democracy, human rights, liberalized economies and the rule of law.   
 
Richmond and Franks (2007:29) assert that the primary objective of liberal 
peace is to ensure “a self-sustaining peace within domestic, regional and 
international settings, in which both overt and structural violence are removed” 
while social, economic and political models are eschewed to conform to 
international liberalism. In this perspective, liberal peace aims at promoting four 
kinds of peace (Richmond and Franks, 2007): victor’s peace based on a realist 
viewpoint that peace is achieved through military victory; institutional peace 
which commits states to multilateral legal norms that bind their actions and 
behaviour. This view is mostly held by idealists, liberal internationalist and 
liberal institutionalists; constitutional peace developed from liberal Kantian 
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argument that peace is achieved through democracy, free trade and a 
composite of cosmopolitan values enshrined in the notion that individuals ought 
to be seen as an end in the themselves, and not a means to an end (Doyle, 
1983)24; civil peace which focuses on the defence of human rights, advocacy, 
mobilization and participation of civil society in global governance.  
 
Liberal peace, according to Richmond and Franks (2007:30), portrays three 
models of peacebuilding: first, the conservative model that takes a top-down 
approach to peacebuilding and development, which is often seen to be external, 
coercive and hegemonic. Second, the orthodox model in which international 
actors tend to be sensitive to local situations and hence engage into dialogical 
and consensual processes with the local community in order to find a middle 
ground. This approach is adopted by the UN, and “equates to a balanced 
multilateral and still state-centric peace” (Richmond and Franks, 2007:30). Third, 
the emancipatory model which is a bottom-up approach that seeks local consent 
with full ownership of the peacebuilding process while critical of external 
international impositions, conditionalities and dependencies expressed in the 
conservative and orthodox models.  These models demonstrate that liberal 
peace is externally driven with the intention of ‘stabilizing’ states towards 
democracy and local participation. 
 
The above liberal peace perspectives have had an impact on the role of NGOs 
in peacebuilding. NGOs have been seen as one of the key agents of change in 
post-conflict reconstruction leading to concerns over the risk of them losing their 
                                                 
24
 Doyle is referenced by Richmond and Frank (2007) as holding the idea that ‘constitutional 
peace’ promotes cosmopolitan values. 
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independence and being co-opted into the western agenda of securitization of 
conflict zones (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2005a; Goodhand, 2006). I will 
elaborate these aspects in more detail in the next sections.  
 
I will now discuss the human security concept that defines operational 
conceptual framework of the liberal peace approach. The critics of liberal peace 
assert that liberal peace is founded on the conceptual framework of human 
security which is characterized by the humanitarian responsibility to intervene in 
conflicts, particularly in situation of grave human rights abuse and threat to 
global security; post-conflict reconstruction through statebuilding; and promotion 
of development (Duffield, 2007; Paris, 2002; Pugh and Cooper, 2004a; 
Richmond, 2005b). I have already explained in the First Chapter the normative 
background to the post-conflict peacebuilding approach that was elaborated in 
the UN’s Agenda for peace.    
 
The concept of human security, though not new, has been emphasized in a 
different way from the post-Cold War perception of the security of state against 
aggression and safeguarding of state interest in foreign policy. In the 1990s the 
emphasis in post-conflict reconstruction was placed on economic and social 
reconstruction leaving out sensitive political issues of building up a self-
sustaining local state capacity that could provide security for citizens and states 
(Hänggi, 2005:4). The new approach to human security emphasizes the security 
of individuals in a manner that defends human rights and promotes sustainable 
development. 25 
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 The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report made a broader elaboration on human security 
beyond the security of states and individuals to include “economic, food, health, environmental, 
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The 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, dictatorial 
regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Cote d’Ivoire, to cite but a 
few, have all raised questions about the global responsibility to protect civilians 
from armed conflict. Global criticisms of inaction by the international community 
to end genocide, and the subsequent admission by the world nations of their 
complacency have shifted the debate from whether there were sufficient moral 
and legitimate justifications for intervention against the above cases to debates 
on whether interventions should be carried out in extreme cases of human rights 
violations (Seybolt, 2007:50). These situations have introduced the agenda of 
human security as central to post-conflict reconstruction activities.  
 
The above historical atrocities of human rights abuses have led to the 
prioritization of individual and group rights against state sovereignty. 
Sovereignty has been defined as responsibility to protect citizens from harm 
(Hunt and Bellamy, 2011; Bellamy, 2009). Restriction on sovereignty implies its 
transformation and affirms its non-absoluteness (Forsythe, 2000:188), 
subsequently paving way to the moral imperative of defending human dignity.  
This responsibility to protect human lives has also been extended to the global 
community under the auspices of the UN, which I discuss below. The UN 
adopted the resolution of Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 UN World 
Summit (Bellamy, 2009:2). This concept underlines the UN responsibility to 
prevent conflicts, intervene in conflict and rebuild nations coming out of conflict 
                                                                                                                                               
personal, community and political security” (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005:456).   This 
perspective has led to securitization of the processes of peacebuilding under the broader 
framework of liberal peace. KRAUSE, K. & JÜTERSONKE, O. 2005. Peace, Security and 
Development in Post-Conflict Environments. Security Dialogue, 36, 447-462.   
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(Bellamy, 2009:3). This is more or less in line with the UN Agenda for Peace. 
Hoffman (1996) argues that the empirical revolution of interdependence and 
globalization that subjects states to the global order, on the one hand, and the 
normative revolution that checks on sovereignty and restricts a state’s right of 
independent internal operation, on the other, have brought sovereignty to 
accountability. Thus, the acknowledged moral good of sovereignty must yield to 
superior imperatives of global peace. 
 
The post September 11th era has brought in a new dimension of state security, 
conceptualization of peace and its implementation.  The emphasis has been put 
on achieving global security through eradication of terrorist networks and 
conditions that favour their development. However, this approach of maintaining 
global order through militarized and liberalized peace has had serious 
shortcomings on the conceptualization of peace and its implementation.26 
 
Within this UN framework distinctions have been made between peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.  Peacekeeping has 
mainly been used to refer to military interventions to keep armed groups apart 
and safeguard the peace negotiation process. Barakat et al (2002:3) term this 
approach to intervention as armed and pacific, meaning that the UN forces are 
                                                 
26
 The anti-terror campaigns have compromised rights of individuals and states suspected to be 
part of the terrorist networks. Ken Roth (2002), the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) observes that “for too many countries, the anti-terror mantra has provided a new reason 
to ignore human rights.” The HRW (2002) in its 2002 World Report raises serious concerns over 
the violations of the rights of alleged suspects of terrorism.  These situations threaten to water 
down the historical gains that have been achieved so far by fostering human rights principles. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2002. 2002 World Report. New York: Human Rights Watch. Available 
at:  http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/ (Accessed on 5 Sept. 2010); ROTH, K. 2002. New Global Survey 
finds Crackdown on Civil Liberties. New York: Human Rights Watch. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/01/wr2002.htm (Accessed 4 Sept. 2010). 
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armed but do not apply military force, and instead monitor peace processes.  
Peacemaking puts focus on the content of conflict and emphasizes the 
resolution of conflict through third party negotiation, persuasive use of power by 
force and the rule of law. Peace enforcement is more or less in line with 
peacemaking, but gives a clear mandate to the UN led military to use force for 
self-defence. Barakat et al (2002:3) identify this last one as armed and coercive 
approach based on the use of “force against one of the parties in favour of the 
other or in favour of part of the population.”  This is part of conflict management 
processes that seek to end conflicts.  
 
Post-conflict peacebuilding in liberal peace conceptualization has been linked to 
the promotion of democracy through popular participation in governance system; 
securitisation of development and developmentalization of security (Willett, 
2005:570) under the thesis that poverty and underdevelopment create 
conditions of insecurity that can lead to organized crimes and terrorist activities. 
Hence, aid is tied to securitization of unstable countries. Economic development 
has also been linked to liberalization of economies that opens markets to 
investors as part of state reconstruction (Newman, 2009; Duffield, 2010). The 
liberal peace conceptualization is partially inspired by modernization theory that 
expects states in conflict to evolve into full-fledged economic, political and social 
stability. 
 
A different perspective to peacebuilding and maintenance of global order has 
been advanced by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a means of 
addressing post-conflict crimes and ending impunity. The ICC has the mandate 
of ending impunity, reinstating the rule of law and protecting civilian rights. The 
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institution of the Nuremberg criminal court after the Second World War, 
International Humanitarian Law, the Genocide Convention of 1948, the Torture 
Convention of 1984, and Responsibility to Protect of 2005, among other human 
rights laws and conventions, have made a strong point that there should be no 
impunity over crimes committed. Though marked with imperfection of the 
‘justice of the victors’, the Nuremberg initiative was a worthwhile attempt to set 
standards for accountability and responsibility for the maintenance of global 
order and peace.27  The Nuremberg Court prosecuted crimes against peace, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
 
The preamble of the ICC (1999) Rome Statute sets the tone for its objective; it 
calls for “an end to impunity” and emphasizes the state duty to “exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes." Article 5 of 
the ICC Statute identifies four classes of crimes, namely, the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.  
 
The Rome Statute has however, not defined the crime of aggression, which at 
Nuremberg was referred to as a crime against peace. The ICC does not have 
jurisdiction over such crimes until a definition is agreed upon by the international 
community.28  The ICC initiative, though still at its embryonic stages, is certainly 
                                                 
27
 Unfortunately, the post-Nuremberg period took more than fifty years before an International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was instituted in Rome 1998.  This was largely due to the Cold War and its 
repercussions on the world order. The end of the Cold War in 1990 marked a new era of 
accountability following the institution of International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.  
28
 It is important to recall the fact that it took twenty years for the United Nations to agree on the 
definition of the term “aggression”. 
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a noble effort towards a more effective international justice and global order 
despite the current technical shortcomings. Given that in most cases “political 
calculation precedes reference to legal rules” (Forsythe, 2000:85) the 
effectiveness of this Court will depend on the states’ deliberate choice between 
human destiny on the one hand, and political sovereignty and interests, on the 
other.   
 
The development of human rights into a normative fundamental principle has 
been limited by various factors ranging from conditional sovereignty to the 
differentiations in cultural and political emphasis by different countries.  One 
cannot dismiss the ‘eternal’ debate on the universalism of these rights, the 
westernization baggage, the international hypocrisy in the implementation 
process as well as the lack of what Falk (2000:155) refers to as “intercivilization 
participation.”  A “normative adjustment” would be an appropriate attempt to 
facilitate an intercivilizational inclusion of marginalized cultures (Falk, 2000:153).  
 
Combining Responsibility to Protect and ICC objectives in a liberal peace 
conceptualization would require “nimble and comprehensive peace process, 
focused protection initiatives, and clear and impartial multilateral punishment for 
perpetrating mass atrocities” (Prendergast and Rogoff, 2008:5). Finding a 
balance between liberal legal frameworks and realist interests that dominate 
global politics, remains an enormous challenge for sovereign states and 
international institutions. 
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Part III: Critique of Liberal Peace 
 
The above liberal peace approaches to human security as a conceptual 
framework for peacebuilding and maintenance of the global order have been 
criticized by a number of authors (Paris, 2004a; Richmond, 2010b; Mac Ginty, 
2010; Pugh and Cooper, 2004; Pugh et al., 2008; Duffield, 2007). As I noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, the primary objective of my analysis is to establish 
the extent to which NGO peacebuilding serves the liberal peace agenda. In this 
section I will focus on the various critiques that have been advanced against 
liberal peace while incorporating the implications on NGO peacebuilding.  
 
The main points of contention by the above critics of liberal peace have been 
that liberal peace approach to peacebuilding reflects an extension of the 
western hegemonic powers over developing nations; executes a top-down 
approach that does not take into consideration local processes of peace; co-
opts NGOs into the agenda of western nations; limits peacebuilding processes 
to state-building by promoting democracy, liberalized economies and the rule of 
law; subsumes the human security concept to the agenda of securitization of the 
human existence at development, peacebuilding and state-building levels. 
These elaborations point to the fact that liberal peace has become the defining 
framework for what should constitute post-conflict reconstruction (Richmond 
and Carey, 2005:29).   
 
There are major limitations in the application and implementation of liberal 
peace, and in most cases it is not as smooth as it is often presented (Richmond, 
2006). Chandler (2008b:431) has made three main critiques of the human 
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security approach to peacebuilding, which falls under the broader liberal peace 
definition: first is that there has been a general exaggeration of the security 
threat in the post cold war period, hence justifying the political interests rather 
than “ethical normative challenge” (Chandler, 2008b:431).  Duffield holds the 
view that perceived security threats by western countries have led to 
containment policies that confine post-conflict states within their borders by 
offering tokens in line of: “poverty reduction, conditional debt cancellation and 
selective funding”  (Duffield, 2005:157). 29   
 
Second, the agenda of human security is skewed to exercise power on the 
developing world as the place of political instability, and hence global security 
threat (Taylor, 2010; Willett, 2005). This has justified the implementation of the 
motivations of both realists and liberalists in enforcing liberal peace as a norm of 
governance for the problematized non-western states deemed as ‘failed states’. 
This subsequently re-creates an existential meaning to the western states which 
have “lost their sense of purpose and social connection” (Chandler, 2008: 468).  
 
Third, the emphasis on urgency for intervention justifies short term solutions to 
more complex problems. In order to address the root causes of conflict and 
develop mechanisms of conflict management and accountability in governance, 
                                                 
29
 The containment has been extended to the control of migration from southern to northern 
hemisphere (Duffield, 2010:62). This means that development of global South has been 
juxtaposed with the creation of anti-migration fortresses in the global North (Duffield, 2010:63). 
The expectation is that these policies would confine any security threats within the state; 
improve the economy and democratic participation; and limit any insurgencies that could be a 
threat to the region. This approach, Richmond (2009:57) argues, “tends to construct a form of 
peace bounded by territorial sovereignty, therefore re-creating states.”  DUFFIELD, M. 2010. 
The Liberal Way of Development and the Developmental - Security Impasse: Exploring the 
Global Life-Chance Divide. Security Dialogue, 41, 53-76; RICHMOND, O. P. 2009b. Beyond 
liberal peace? Responses to "backsliding". In: NEWMAN, E., PARIS, R. & RICHMOND, O. P. 
(eds.) New Perspectives in Liberal Peace. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
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one would have to make long term commitments. Most military interventions are 
expensive and therefore limited in resources and time. 
 
The conceptualization and practice of human security has been criticized as 
lacking in political strategy (Tadjbakhsh, 2010:118). This means that while the 
concepts of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the European Union doctrine for 
Human Security (2004) place ethical responsibility on international community 
to protect individuals where states have failed or are unwilling to protect them, 
they however ignore the importance of political deconstruction of the politics of 
securitization and militarized peacebuilding.  It is important that the moral 
discourse to protect vulnerable individuals should not be used to usurp the 
powers of the state. The focus should be geared towards internal moral 
responsibility to govern through just and participative structures, rather than 
focusing on conditions for intervention alone. 
 
The liberal peace approach is constructed within the framework of power 
relationships between states. From this viewpoint, liberal peace can be seen as 
promoting “hegemonic international liberalism” (Tadjbakhsh, 2010:118). The 
bottom-up guise turns peace into a “form of biopower, which involves 
interveners in conflict taking on the role of ‘administering life’” (Richmond, 2005: 
29).  The northern states have been analyzed as imposing their agenda on the 
states in the southern hemisphere.  Pugh et al (2008: 390) assert that: “The 
political economy of post-conflict peace and statebuilding in a liberal peace 
framework has involved simulacra of empowerment where peacebuilders 
transfer responsibility to societies without transferring power.”  This assertion 
implies that NGOs have sometimes subjected societies to constructed concepts 
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of peacebuilding along the lines of liberal peace without seeking ways of 
integrating these new concepts to existing systems of governance as well as 
cultural values. 
 
Chandler (2008b) describes human security as ‘a dog that did not bark’. His 
critique is based on the fact that the human security proponents never took into 
account the aspect of power relations rendering the concept susceptible to 
cooptation by the political elite.30 Subsequently, it is the “universalist interest of 
power rather than cosmopolitan ethics of empowerment that drive the discourse 
of human security” (Chandler, 2008a:468). In a similar line of argument, Rogers 
(2008b) makes the critique that the West has failed in its statebuilding efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan; the terrorist cells continue to spread; the population 
remains the highest casualty; and the US interests in oil and economic gains 
seem to dominate the war on terror agenda. Rogers (2008b) underscores that 
the West should instead focus on addressing global economic divisions and 
environmental concerns. 
 
However, Tadjbakhsh (2010:120-122) suggests that it is important not to 
maintain a narrow perspective on power and instead look at the bigger picture of 
ending human suffering and impunity. The primary focus ought to be on the 
moral imperative to save human lives and restore human dignity. This ought to 
be a universal approach, regardless of whether these violations are carried out 
in the developing or western countries.  Considering the problems of the South 
                                                 
30
 In making this elaboration I borrow a cue from Tadjbakhsh (2010:117). TADJBAKHSH, S. 
2010. Human Security and the Legitimation. In: RICHMOND, O. P. (ed.) Palgrave advances in 
peacebuilding. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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as easily solved by a liberal peace approach is to ignore the moral imperative 
and the universality of the concerns of human security, whether in the South or 
in the North. Besides, the North has also been victim of the liberal peace 
policies. For example, the recent economic crisis that led to recession in 
western countries and subsequent high inflation and loss of jobs have been 
attributed to uncontrolled liberal peace policies of economic liberalization.  
 
Liberal peace holds a flawed argument based on the principle of ‘democratic 
peace’ which asserts that democracies do not fight each other, sponsor terrorist 
acts or carry out ethnic cleansing (Diamond, 1995). This view ignores the fact 
that liberal democracies, in their effort to ‘democratize’ illiberal societies have 
often been violent themselves (Newman et al., 2009:11). Such has been the 
case in military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, among 
others (Rogers, 2008a, 2008b; Duffield, 2008; Pugh and Cooper, 2004b). 
 
Liberal peace is also critiqued to be a state-building project in the post-conflict 
context. This is attributed to the fact that the western policy makers “have 
difficulty imagining any other form of viable political community than the state as 
it is understood in the West” (Williams, 2010:60).  Paris (2009:101-102) refers to 
this as mission civilisatrice whereby “external actors have sought to refashion 
the domestic structures of weaker societies in accordance with prevailing 
notions of ‘good’ or ‘civilized governance...” For example, peacekeeping has 
taken a liberal peace dimension within state-building conceptualization: 
monitoring elections, policing, human rights monitoring and liberalized 
economies. This combination has become “the new imagery of peace in the 
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minds of many policy makers, peace and conflict researchers alike” (Richmond, 
2010a:22).   
 
Different aspects of state-building and political management have been 
controlled by external actors through the use of “consensual and punitive 
strategies” (Richmond, 2010a:22). This has led to the conceptualization of 
“peace-as-governance” (Richmond, 2010a:25). The UN, according to Doyle 
(1997:2), has reduced peacebuilding to state-building and “has become 
involved in renovating and rebuilding – or building for the first time - the basic 
structures of the state, while in yet other cases the UN has even substituted for 
the state.”31   Chandler (2006) in his description of an empire in denial, is 
emphatic that the western nations are in denial of the fact that they have 
skewed their hegemonic state-building agenda to ‘civilize’ and ‘tame’ the violent 
nations.  
 
The ICC is seen as one of the hegemonic agendas to ‘civilize’ conflict societies. 
As such, the ICC is an extension of the liberal peace agenda within the 
transitional justice framework that puts emphasis on the rule of law (Sriram, 
2009). In a similar perspective, Jackson (2009:320) holds the view that the ICC 
is “an expression of liberal views of universal human rights that seek to protect 
the individual from justice that is the sole preserve of the state. This expression 
of human rights is at the very core of liberal peace theories of post-conflict 
                                                 
31
 For example in the refugee camp settings, the camps have become extra-territorial space 
managed by humanitarian regimes such as the UN, creating what Slaughter and Crisp (2008) 
have referred to as ‘surrogate states’- that is, states within a state. SLAUGHTER, A. & CRISP, J. 
2008. A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations. In: 
LOESCHER, G., MILNER, J., NEWMAN, E. & TROELLER, G. (eds.) Protracted Refugee 
Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications. New York: UN University Press. 
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reconstruction.” Such externalized approaches could signal importation of 
governance values that may not be coherent to the local context.  
 
Liberal peace is also ontologically incoherent and does not seem to hold a 
common understanding on the kind of peace it aims to achieve (Richmond, 
2009b:61). This adds to the confusion about the lack of clear indicators on the 
kind of peace that liberal peace proponents aim to achieve. Hughes (2009:219) 
discusses the incongruence between liberal peace conceptualization of the 
society in contractual terms based on individualistic perception of state-society 
relationship, and the local understanding that is often communitarian. In post-
conflict settings “people quite frequently frame their political goals in terms of 
getting hold of resources that were previously denied to them; and frame their 
strategies in terms of collective action” (Hughes, 2009:219) founded on trust and 
loyalty rather than individual interests. The trust and confidence building based 
on human and social capital is vital for the attainment of “peace capital” as part 
of the peace sustainability agenda (MacGinty, 2010:40; Peirce and Stubbs, 
2000).  
 
Liberal peace can be susceptible to cooptation by the local community 
“particularly where one group can adopt the language of liberal peace and has 
strong support and credibility within, and from, the international community” 
(Richmond and Franks, 2007:81). This can lead to conflicts and tensions 
between different peacebuilding groups, hence undermining peace activities. 
Post-conflict peacebuilding under the framework of liberal peace is therefore not 
neutral: early demands for democratic elections can exacerbate conflicts in 
divided societies; economic liberalization and capitalism could marginalize the 
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poor and create new grievances; opening up to the influences of globalization 
could further render states more fragile (Snyder, 2000; Paris, 2004b).  Citizens 
in post-conflict settings often struggle to survive under high rates of poverty, 
poor living conditions, insecurity and unemployment while at the same time 
expected to participate in the liberal peace agenda of democracy and economic 
liberalization (Richmond, 2009b:67). 
 
Post-conflict peacebuilding is inherently complex and ought to be undertaken in 
consultation with the contextual imperatives (Hänggi, 2005:12).  Given these 
complexities peacebuilding has to be multi-dimensional bringing together 
security, political (governance) and socio-economic dimensions as 
demonstrated in Table 2 below (Hänggi, 2005:12). 
 
Table 2 Peacebuilding as a Multidimensional Process (Hänggi, 2005)  
Security dimension  DDR of Ex-Combattants 
 Mine Action 
 Control of Weapons (particularly SALW32) 
 SSR33 
Political Dimension  Support for Political and Administrative Authorities and 
structures 
 Good Governance, Democracy and Human Rights 
 Civil Society Empowerment 
 Reconciliation 
 Transitional Justice 
Socio-economic 
Dimension 
 Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees & Internally 
Displaced Persons 
 Reconstruction of Infrastructure and Important Public 
Functions 
 Development of Education and Health 
 Private Sector Development, Employment, Trade and 
Investment 
 
                                                 
32
 SALW refers to small arms and light weapons 
33
 SSR refers to Security Sector Reform 
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The above table demonstrates that in order to achieve sustainable socio-
economic development it is important to guarantee security of individuals and 
society; put in place accountable political institutions; facilitate political 
development through security and improved standards of living; and institute 
political and socio-economic development to attain long term security (Hänggi, 
2005:12).  Societies emerging out of conflict tend have high expectations on 
their governments, and in some cases the failure to meet these expectations 
can lead to a relapse to war. Paris (2004:187) cautions that rushing to political 
reforms without putting in place an institutionalization process that aims at 
stabilizing post-conflict countries, makes these countries vulnerable to further 
conflicts. In other words, institutionalization before liberalization is fundamental 
to the success of liberal peace. 
 
In a drastic twist against liberal peace critics, Paris (2010:340) underscores that 
the liberal peace critics ought to admit that there is currently no alternative to the 
liberal peace and that efforts should be geared towards improving its applied 
approaches rather than dismissing it entirely. He thus notes that:  
 
“While the turn to critical theory in this field has generated important 
insights over the past decade, nothing in the recent critical literature 
provides a convincing rationale for abandoning liberal peacebuilding or 
replacing it with a non-liberal or ‘post-liberal’ alternative. The literature 
does, however, reinforce the case for reforming current approaches to 
peacebuilding, without disavowing the broadly liberal orientation of these 
missions” 
 
This view has generated criticism notably by Cooper et al (2011) who observe 
that Paris’ confining position fails to note the common prescriptions of liberal 
peacebuilding, particularly in political economy. They assert that these 
prescriptions “neither take sufficient account of local needs and agency, nor 
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reflect on the role of global capitalism” (Cooper et al, 2011:6) and economic 
policies that create or sustain conflicts. Besides, there have been noted 
inconsistencies in the way in which human rights and democracy have been 
compromised for hegemonic interests. The authors cite as example, the pursuit 
of oil in the Middle East, central Asia and Africa that led to the partnering of the 
liberal peace proponents with autocratic governments (Cooper et al, 2011:3). As 
an alternative approach to liberal peace, Cooper et al (2011:11) suggest a 
welfare approach that incorporates the wellbeing of the individual and 
community within the political economy of peacebuilding.  In order to realize this 
objective it would be important to have government policies in place that can 
protect internal economies and reform global structures.   
 
Pugh (2000:5) proposes the broadening and redefinition of peacebuilding to 
include “associative engagement between internal and external actors.”  
Further, Pugh et al (2008:394) suggest a paradigm shift that adapts 
unsecuritized language, which takes into account the needs of the local people, 
“rejects universalism in favour of heterodoxy, reconceptualises the abstract 
individual as a social being and limits damage to planet life – in short, a ‘life-
welfare’ perspective.” This will subsequently lead to “two-fold paradigm shift: 
from the ‘liddism’34 of liberal peace to political economies of life welfare: and 
from universalist panaceas (which results in dysfunctional hybrid forms of 
political economy) to engaging with heterogeneity” (Pugh et al., 2008:394). In a 
similar view, Tadjbakhsh (2010:123) proposes an “emancipatory human security 
                                                 
34
 The ‘liddism’ concept is taken from Rogers (2010) who describes it as a strategy of putting lids 
on pressing issues by applying “intense effort to develop new tactics and technologies that can 
avert problems and suppress them should they arise.” ROGERS, P. 2010. Beyond "liddism": 
towards real global security. Open Democracy http://www.opendemocracy.net (Accessed 27 
July 2011). 
92 
 
approach” that makes a critical analysis of hegemony and ideology behind 
liberal peace, and gives legitimacy to human security.   
 
The shift here is towards a more integrative approach that takes into account 
the local dynamics, develops negotiations at different levels and aims at politics 
of emancipation that integrates human needs, sustainable political economies 
and harmonious co-existence with the environment (Salih, 2009:135; Pugh et 
al., 2008:395).  However, these suggested alternatives lack an operational 
framework that would be entirely detached from some of the liberal peace 
perspectives. It is important to analyse the local solutions within the bigger 
picture of the global dynamics. 
 
Part IV: NGO Peacebuilding and ‘Liberal Peace’ 
NGOs have been analyzed by the liberal peace critics as essential agents of the 
agenda of the western nations’ conceptualization of peacebuilding within the 
hegemonic framework of global securitization. The suggestion is that conceptual 
emphasis by liberal peace proponents on the mantra ‘peace-as-governance’ 
has co-opted NGOs into the liberal peace agenda (Richmond, 2005a:20). 
Allegedly, NGOs have become the frontline actors of what Duffield (2008) refers 
to as “modern imperialism.” The post Cold War agenda of the western nations to 
converge agendas for peace research, conflict resolution and conflict 
management approaches within the liberal peace framework has identified 
NGOs as one of the key implementing agents (Richmond, 2010a:21-22).  
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Goodhand (2006:78-79) argues that there have been two different 
interpretations of the NGO engagement in peacebuilding within new human 
security paradigm.  One interpretation held by the liberals is that NGOs can 
contribute to peacebuilding activities by the virtue of their grassroots 
involvement in humanitarian activities. The other is that western interventionism 
has mainly been geared towards the rogue states that have failed the 
democracy test (Duffield, 2007; Paris, 2002; Pugh and Cooper, 2004a). These 
are seen as attempts to quarantine war (Richads, 2005:3) while promoting 
liberal peace agenda. In this sense, NGOs are viewed in the same continuum 
as subjects of liberal peace because it is difficult to separate their humanitarian, 
development and peacebuilding activities from the new security regime of the 
western nations (Duffield, 2001:16).  
 
Liberal peace approach has led to a “peacebuilding consensus” which has been 
adapted by international actors, UN, International Financial Institutions (IFS) 
and NGOs (Richmond, 2010a:22). In a similar observation Goodhand (2006:84) 
asserts that NGOs have become primary agents of peace, leading to 
“privatization of peace building” (Goodhand, 2006 :84).  To privatize peace 
means confining its ontological conceptualization, interpretation and practice 
within a given framework, in this case, liberal peace. Thus, international NGOs 
have “colonized the ‘peacebuilding’ space without any convincing demonstration 
of their comparative advantage” (Peirce and Stubbs, 2000:173). Richmond 
(2008:5) cautions that the “camouflaging of the subjective nature of peace 
disguises ideology, hegemony, dividing practices and marginalization.” As a 
result NGOs have been co-opted to building “civil peace…along with parallel 
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construction of ‘constitutional’ peace (through democratization) and the 
institutional peace (associated with the UN system)” (Richmond, 2005a:18).  
 
The role that NGOs play in liberal peace is generally contested. On the one 
hand, the realist-positivist perception is that NGOs have a vital role to play in 
state-building but this is on condition that they be monitored by 
intergovernmental institutions (Richmond, 2005a:21). On the other hand there 
are those who argue that “a global civil society has now transcended state 
control and represents a cosmopolitan desire for human security” (Richmond, 
2005a:21). The influence of NGOs can however not be underestimated.  NGOs 
have contributed to the construction and conceptualization of the global 
governance, globalization perspectives, and international networks as a means 
for advocating for liberal reforms at different levels (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
 
The differentiation between the local and the state or international interventions 
is prevalent in the liberal peace literature (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2009a; 
Taylor, 2010). This literature examines diverse aspects such as: the extent to 
which the ‘local’ is marginalized by external peace interventions; the vital role of 
the ‘local’ in peace processes; and the possible cooption of the liberal peace by 
the ‘local’. The ‘local’ or community is often romanticized as naïve, lacking in 
knowledge and susceptible to externalized processes of change (Richmond, 
2011; Richmond, 2009a). These approaches ignore the everyday life of the local 
and at the same time deny the local agency leading to imposition of liberal 
peace (Richmond, 2011:95). The local is also viewed as pristine, original and 
genuine.  It is however important to develop welfare systems that do not 
romanticize the local as being perpetually on the margins of humanitarian 
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assistance, but as legitimate agents of social economic transformation in post-
conflict settings (Taylor, 2010:158). There are also dilemmas on how to 
approach the question of the local ownership of peace processes: the 
disintegration of the social, economic and political structures in the post-conflict 
situation may necessitate an external intervention; the ‘local’ can be 
manipulated by the local elite subsequently marginalizing the larger local 
community; the hybrid cooperation can lead to positive results (Narten, 
2009:256-257). These perspectives show that it is important to undertake a 
careful consideration on the interventions in order to achieve the maximum good. 
 
Allegedly, the governability by NGOs is controlled by the maintenance of 
differentiation between the local and the state/international in order to give 
relevance to the hegemonic power despite the fact that these powers undermine 
the consent of local people (Richmond, 2005:29). This process often implies the 
importation of ‘expert’ into the local context, hence producing a pre-designed 
governability. The ‘expertise’ is based on “institutional imperatives and pseudo-
scientific models of society and social change” (Krause and Jütersonke, 
2005:459) which ignore the local knowledge. This implies that NGOs have 
changed their activities to match the goals of the donors while ignoring the 
needs of the people on the ground (Reimann, 2005:43). In a further analysis, 
Hickey (2002:843) observes that even when NGOs claim to be closer to the 
people through participatory approaches, they still maintain a “clientelistic and 
exclusive” relationship rather than an “inclusive and empowering” participation. 
A similar perspective is held by Kaufman (2002: 202) who asserts that liberal 
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peacemaking in civil conflicts heavily relies on “rationalist paradigm” that often 
fails to capture the complexities of localized conflicts.   
 
In an attempt to harmonize the liberal peace approach (supported by NGOs and 
western nations) and indigenous (read ‘local’) peacebuilding, MacGinty 
(2011;2010;2008) proposes hybrid peacebuilding, which is a synthesis of the 
best out of the two approaches. He asserts that the ‘local’ has agency and 
hence “ability to hybridise the liberal peace by enforcing some change on it” 
(Mac Ginty, 2011:84). This hybrid approach has also been proposed by different 
authors (Richmond, 2010b; Ishkanian, 2006; Pugh et al., 2008).  For example, 
in their critique of the approach to state-building held by the liberal peace 
proponents, Brown et al (2010:100) propose “hybrid political orders” that 
combine governance strategies of governments and that of indigenous 
communities. They acknowledge the tensions at different levels of the hybrid 
combination but insist that sustainable peace lies in a multidimensional 
convergence, and not in the state-building approach, which misconstrues “key 
dimensions of the nature of political community” (Brown et al., 2010:100). If 
such a multi-dimensional view is not embraced, attempts for conflict intervention 
could be seen as geared towards pacification (John, 2005:12).  
 
The heavy dependence on donor funding by NGOs has been criticized by a 
number of authors as subjecting the latter to the agenda of the former (Carey, 
2010; Tvedt, 1998; Baitenmann, 1990). Tvedt (2006) underlines the importance 
of taking a broader perspective to analyzing the leverage and power relations 
discourse in NGO-donor interaction. He observes that international aid system 
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has created new power relations supported by the globalization forces, 
subsequently instituting “particular moral, cultural and conceptual power” that 
justifies itself globally (Tvedt, 2006: 682).  Within this framework, NGO 
international engagement continues to generate similar paradigms of power 
relations and create dominant world views.  
 
Hattori (2003) warns that “the institutionalization of giving can work to ethically 
legitimize a material order, recasting the material hierarchy between donor and 
recipient as moral order.”  For example, the international aid system promotes 
capital accumulation and perpetuates the capitalist agenda, subsequently 
“transnationalizing social relations of giving” (Hattori 2003: 164).   Neo-
Gramscian theorists, borrowing from Gramscian cultural hegemony concept, 
push the argument further to assert that such unreciprocated-gift-relationship 
lead to ethical hegemony (Augelli and Murphy, 1993) that circumvents the 
recipient’s consent. The recipient agencies are thus subjected to what Corrigan 
and Sayer (1985) call moral regulation,35 disciplining the recipient to conform to 
the prescribed conditionality of aid, such as accountability, good governance, 
democracy and marketization.  
 
The above literature criticizes NGOs as promoting liberal peacebuilding agenda. 
However, these assertions need contextual validation. Criticisms coupled with 
                                                 
35
 Corrigan and Sayer (1985:4) define moral regulation as "a project of normalising, rendering 
natural, taken for granted, in a word 'obvious', what are in fact ontological and epistemological 
premises of a particular and historical form of social order." They originally used this term as a 
critique on the16
th
 century social transformation of England which reconstituted the peasants as 
free labourers in the new capitalist order. CORRIGAN, P. & DEREK, S. 1985. The Great Arch: 
English State Formation As Cultural Revolution. New York: Basil Blackwell. 
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anecdotal evidences are not enough. The extent to which NGO peacebuilding is 
co-opted by the liberal peace ought to be verified by experiences of 
peacebuilding on the ground and the changes that the affected people have 
witnessed. 
 
Part V: Beyond the Liberal Peace Critique: Identifying the Gaps in the Literature 
The liberal peace literature has made normative generalization on NGOs, post-
conflict contexts, donor governments and local community without recognizing 
the divergences and convergences within these entitities. The archetypal 
assumptions have led to generalized critique without assessing the existing 
distinctions between them.  Borrowing a cue from Greenwood and Hinings 
(1993:1052) I would say that liberal peace critics have limited the understanding 
of the above entities to archetypal abstructions in two different perspectives: first 
by examining the organizational structures and systems of operation based on 
analysis of the general patterns rather than specifics. This is based on a 
“holistic” approach (Miller and Friesen, 1984) that studies NGOs as a single 
body with similar characteristics. The second is based on the analysis of ideas, 
ideologies and values that offer an "interpretive scheme" (Ranson et al., 1980).  
In other words, the liberal peace critics have based their critiques on systems, 
structures, and organizational values of international peacebuilding on a single 
interpretive scheme (liberal peace) without examining diverse contextual, 
organizational, governmental and other phenomenal manifestations. These two 
archetypal abstructions above expose limitations of the liberal peace critiques.  
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There are therefore a number of critiques that can be advanced against the 
liberal peace critics who assert that NGO peacebuilding is solely a component 
of the liberal peace agenda.   The first is that there are gaps in the NGO 
research that have limited the extent to which generalization made by the liberal 
peace critics are valid. The above literature of liberal peace critique lacks 
clarification on the identity boundaries of the NGOs. Thus, NGOs have been 
discussed as an amorphous entity without distinction of the variations in identity, 
origin, mandate, resources, leadership and contextual experiences. Different 
NGOs can be categorized under broader thematic issues like: human rights, 
advocacy, emergencies and relief, conflict resolution (both research-based and 
field-based), academic activists, resource mobilization and development. NGOs 
can also be said to be faith-based, intergovernmental, governmental or public-
funded, independent, local or international, etc. At the same time, within these 
categorizations there would be several other sub-categorizations. 
Acknowledging this broader diversity would limit simplistic analysis of the NGOs 
(Anderson, 1996; Aall, 1996) based on general assertions. 
 
Some of the terms used to refer to NGOs have also undergone various 
transformations that would be important to note. For example, in the 1990s the 
term ‘civil society’ strongly emerged to include NGOs as propagators of justice, 
peace, democracy and emancipation (Tvedt 2006:679). Thus, civil society was 
juxtaposed against the state, further creating unfavourable climate for any 
research on state-NGOs relations.  NGOs were also constantly referred to as 
‘third sector’ between the state and the market yet not much research had been 
undertaken to verify how this came about (Tvedt, 2006:679).  What had not 
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been stated clearly in the literature was that NGOs emerged as a result of the 
donor funding (Tvedt, 2006:679). 
 
Fisher (1997b:441) contends that much of the NGO literature “obscures its 
political stance in simple categories and generalizations.”  Thus, in an attempt to 
deconstruct this generalized approach, Fisher (1997:441-443) proposes an 
anthropological view point that examines:  
“(a)how discourses about NGOs create knowledge, define sets of 
appropriate practices, and facilitate and encourage NGO behaviour 
defined as appropriate; (b)how complex sets of relationships among 
various kinds of associations, the agencies and agents of the state, and 
individual and communities have had an impact in specific locales at 
specific times; and (c)how we can avoid reductionist views of NGOs as 
fixed and generalizable entities with essential characteristics and 
contextualize them within evolving processes of association.”   
 
Fisher thus calls attention to the way in which discourses shape perceptions and 
practices of NGO activities.  These discourses have influenced the 
understanding and interpretation of NGOs in post-conflict peacebuilding without 
contextual validation, further abstracting norms and practices of NGO 
peacebuilding.  
 
In criticizing the hegemonic approaches to liberal peace, the liberal peace critics 
have paradoxically taken a western-centric approach to interpreting NGO 
activities without bringing out the local voices of the affected populations. In 
other words, the critics have advocated for the importance of taking the local 
needs into account without letting the locals speak for themselves. 
 
The second is that liberal peace critics have tended to generalize on what 
NGOs do but fail to conduct an analysis of the internal organization of the NGOs, 
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their identity, and the reasons for which they choose to do the activities they 
undertake. Thus, in order to understand the extent to which conditionality of aid 
has led to conditionality of peace (hence ‘conforming’ NGOs to liberal peace), it 
is important to undertake an analysis based on institutional theorist perspective.  
 
Institutional theorists assert that there are different factors that lead to common 
identification and restructuring of organizations, such as organizational culture, 
personnel, resources, historical events and urgency of issues to be addressed 
(Kondra and Hinings, 1998). Organizational field refers to a community of 
organizations with similar objectives and frequent interactions. Hence, 
institutional theory asserts that in most cases “organizations are characterized 
by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organizations 
must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy…” (Scott and Meyer, 
1983).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discuss the process of homogenization and 
institutionalization that can lead to what they refer to as isomorphic institutional 
change.  They identify three mechanisms to this process: the first is coercive 
mechanisms from external agencies on which NGOs are dependent.  This 
implies pressures that “could be felt as force, persuasion or as invitation to join 
in a collusion” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150). In NGO peacebuilding this 
could be through standard expectation in proposal writing, programme 
implementation and report writing that have to meet particular standards, 
whether internally or externally induced. The second is normative mechanisms 
which emerge from professionalization of project management and adherence 
to specific norms such as work ethics, code of conduct and respect of the rule of 
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law; and the third, mimetic mechanisms which entail a process of imitating other 
organizations or approach to implementation of a particular project in order to 
achieve similar results or avoid appearing deviant.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
refer to the three mechanisms as ‘institutionally induced isomorphism’. In other 
words, the standard institutionalization emerges as a pressure to meet the 
expectations within a particular category of social agents. 
 
In a similar perspective, a group of international NGOs came up, in 1997, with 
an initiative to set minimum standards for humanitarian assistance and 
accountability in disaster response.  This came to be known as The Sphere 
Project 36 (2004), resulting in the institutionalization of the Sphere Humanitarian 
Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Another such initiative 
is the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) that sets 
minimum operational standards for education in humanitarian situations.  In 
other words, international organizations often seek to set particular norms for 
the organizational activities within specific contexts (Kean, 2003).  In the 
international aid system, agencies like Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) regulate aid standards among donor states, becoming what Le Goff 
(1984) terms moral book-keepers.  
 
                                                 
36
 The Sphere Project is an initiative of a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent movement.  The Project was launched in 1997 and it framed a Humanitarian 
Charter which stipulates Minimum Standards to be adhered to in disaster response and 
humanitarian assistance.  As a result the first Sphere handbook was published in 2000. The 
Charter is based on the principles stipulated in international humanitarian law, refugee law, 
international human rights law, and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement in Disaster Relief.   
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However, organizational change theorists would argue against a deterministic 
isomorphism and assert that organizations change when the environment 
changes. For example, Lant and Mezias (1992) assert that a routine 
organizational learning engenders inspirational levels that “mediate the 
interpretation of failure and success while simultaneously adapting to 
performance.” Hence, while isomorphism could denote convergence to common 
identity it nevertheless does not limit re-orientation to new experiences from 
organizational learning. In other words, “the same processes that lead to first-
order learning and convergence can provide the raw material for second-order 
learning and reorientation” (Lant and Mezias, 1992: 64).   
 
International NGOs with activities in different parts of the world often have to live 
with the tension between observing universalist standards that mark their 
identity and values, and the complexities of the contextual imperatives in the 
local settings (Ossewaarde et al., 2008).  The tension is further stretched by the 
fact that NGOs have to constantly justify their multi-level legitimacies, which a 
number of authors have identified as normative, regulatory, cognitive and output 
legitimacies (Lister, 2003; Ossewaarde et al. 2008; Attack, 1999). 
 
Normative legitimacy refers to the ideals and objectives of a given organization 
(Lister, 2003: 179). For example, International NGOs like Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) base their normative legitimacy on the 
defence of human rights and similarly, peace organizations on conflict mediation, 
restoration of broken relationships and credible presence.  The regulatory 
104 
 
legitimacy denotes the act of NGOs conforming to international law while 
undertaking their activities. Logically however, NGOs would be expected to 
comply with local regulations and expectations of the host governments. 
Besides normative and regulatory legitimacy, NGOs have to earn cognitive 
legitimacy by adhering to their mission and being seen to deliver the expected 
outcomes to the stakeholders, hence affirming output legitimacy. I would add 
beneficiary legitimacy evidenced by credible presence and acceptance by the 
local population, based on the value and relevance of the work being done. 
 
Ossewaarde et al (2008: 45) assert that differentiation in internal organizational 
approaches to issues can threaten NGO legitimacy particularly when “legitimacy 
sources contradict each other.” Hence, the challenge for most NGOs is to strike 
a balance between normative legitimacy and accommodation of plurality of 
voices and methods in responding to contextual demands.   Besides, different 
stakeholders make different demands on the various levels of NGO legitimacy. 
For example, donor agencies have specific conditions for the money they give, 
“whether for visibility, accountability, or a sense of engagement in the process” 
(Smillie and Minear, 2004). On the other hand, beneficiaries of the NGO 
activities equally have expectations that may not be met by the NGOs. 
Subsequently, NGOs may be forced to reconcile these competing demands by 
repackaging their activities in a manner that suits specific stakeholders (Oliver, 
1991; Smith, 1995; Hasenfeld, 1983).   
 
The third is that claims made by liberal peace critics that NGO peacebuilding is 
externally driven, mostly by western nations, are not well founded.  Such 
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assertions need an in-depth analysis of the interactive processes in play 
between different agents. Basing his assertions on empirical evidences of the 
analysis of three international religious organizations, namely, World Vision, 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), 
Gerstbauer (2009) demonstrates how NGO peacebuilding is not externally 
driven. 37  He is emphatic that a good number of organizations are influenced by 
their internal convictions based on the foundational values, the charisma of the 
organizational leaders, and historical events that mark a turning point for the 
organizations. Experiences of conflict in the Balkans and in Rwanda marked a 
turning point for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) leading the organization to 
adapt a stronger commitment to the work of justice through a ‘justice lens’.38 
This could be seen as a principled assertion that at the same time has a 
pragmatic impact on the way in which an organization responds to situations of 
conflict. Aall (1996:373) reinforces this point when she states that the criticism 
                                                 
37
 Gerstbauer (2009:846) gives elaborate examples on how NGOs have been effective on the 
ground in transforming situations of conflict: “In the Philippines, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
participated in a cooperative project with other organizations to develop training programs called 
Culture of Peace. The program, contextualized to the Muslim Christian conflict in Mindanao, was 
a community-based approach to examine things like shared history, identity issues, and 
stereotypes (CRS int. Quality and Support). CRS has also helped support or establish local 
Peace and Justice Commissions— which aid in mediating local conflicts—in many parts of the 
world, including Chad, E. Timor, Angola, Nicaragua, and South Africa (CRS int. Constituent 
Relations; CRS, 2000). A large percentage of Mennonite Central Committee’s peacebuilding 
work involves training and capacity building. In Central America, where Mennonite Central 
Committee (MCC) has a strong church constituency that shares its vision of peace, MCC’s main 
role is in programme support and training to encourage national peace workers (MCC int. Latin 
American/Caribbean Office). In Asia, where few Mennonite churches exist, MCC has various 
peace workers involved in community and university-level training (MCC int. Peace Office). 
Finally, organizations have been involved in dialogue promotion and mediation between 
disputants. For example, CRS supports the Centre for Social and Corporate Responsibility that 
facilitates dialogue between oil companies and communities in the Niger Delta in Nigeria (CRS, 
Peacebuilding, n.d.). MCC has been involved in some higher level negotiations through some of 
its well-known mediators like John Paul Lederach and Ronald Kraybill.” GERSTBAUER, L. C. 
2009. The Whole Story of NGO Mandate Change: The Peacebuilding Work of World Vision, 
Catholic Relief Services, and Mennonite Central Committee. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 39, 844-865. 
38
 Justice Lens refers to the vision that CRS designed as modus operandi in all its programmes 
(Appleby, 2000:52). CRS trains its professionals to adopt Church’s teaching on human rights 
and social justice through Catholic Social Teaching.  APPLEBY, R. S. 2000. The ambivalence of 
the sacred : religion, violence, and reconciliation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
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that NGO peacebuilding approaches are western-centric is often unfair and not 
contextualized. She asserts that “many NGOs work closely with local groups to 
build on indigenous methods of conflict resolution and to build up capacity for 
peacebuilding within the society in conflict” (Aall, 1996:373).  
 
NGOs participate in peacebuilding for different reasons. Figuring out the 
“potential effectiveness” (Gerstbauer, 2009:847) of the NGOs is important in 
broadening the understanding of NGO peacebuilding. This would entail making 
a distinction between NGO participation in peacebuilding work because there is 
funding for it, and NGOs doing the same because it is the “principled part of 
their organizational mission” (Gerstbauer, 2009:847).  This implies 
understanding the fundamental articles of faith that define the conviction behind 
the NGO mandate and their historical experience in holding on to their 
peacebuilding practice (Henry, 1999:116; Salm, 1999:101). 
 
The fourth is that post-conflict contexts vary and are complex. There are 
different levels and categories of post-conflit settings, and conflict intervention 
mechanisms. I would identify four categories of post-conflict settings: the first is 
militarized conflicts between two or more countries. This was common in the 
Cold War era.  The second is extreme cases of human rights violation by the 
state or a sector of the state, especially targetting one or several groups within a 
country; the third is internal conflict with a threat to national and regional peace; 
the fourth is low intensity conflicts which may still pose some level of threat to 
the civilians.  The UN  and international community have tended to intervene in 
the first three categories. However, even within these categories contextual 
experiences are very diverse. Most liberal peace critics have based their 
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arguments against militarized peacebuilding that is characterized by heavy 
military presence. Frequently cited examples have come from Afghanistan, Sri 
Lanka, Kosovo, Bosnia and Iraq (Richmond and Franks, 2007; Paris, 2004a; 
Coles, 2002).  Such a restricted approach ignores other post-conflict contexts 
such as northern Uganda which is a low intensity conflict that has not 
experienced heavy UN military operations.   
 
The fifth is that liberal peace critics have ignored the fact that peacebuilding is a 
complex interactive process that takes different contextual adaptations. It is 
important to take into account the complexity of the diverse interactions and how 
they produce new discourses and practices of peacebuilding.   
 
In explaining the adaptive systems39 in complex situations, Boisot and Child 
(1999:238) observe that generally organizations can choose complexity 
reduction or absorption. In complexity reduction organizations generate a 
generalized perspective and understanding of a phenomenon with a single 
representation, while ignoring the diverse components. The second option is to 
absorb the complexity “through the creation of options and risk-hedging 
strategies” (Boisot and Child, 1999:238). This could imply the holding of 
different, sometimes contradictory understandings of the same phenomeonon. 
In my analysis, the liberal peace critics have chosen the first option above by 
reducing to generalization the complexities of the divergences and 
                                                 
39
 Complex Adaptive Systems (CASs) have generally been defined as interactive networks of 
relationships that may be independent or interdependent within a complex system that is multi-
layered (Valente, 2010; Stacey 2001; Holland, 1995): VALENTE, M. 2010. Demystifying the 
Struggles of Private Sector Paradigmatic Change: Business as an Agent in a Complex Adaptive 
System. Business & Society, 49, 439-476; STACEY, R. D. 2001. Complex responsive 
processes in organizations: Learning and knowledge creation. London: Routledge; HOLLAND, J. 
H. 1995. Hidden order: How adaptation builds complexity. Reading: MA, Helix Books.    
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convergences of the normative definitions of the post-conflict contexts; failing to 
analyze the different levels of complex interactions between the NGOs and local 
community; local and international NGOs; local staff and international staff 
within international NGOs; donor relations with offices abroad and those in the 
field; the constant dynamism of NGO conflict impact assessment and the result 
from some of the lessons learned, and how these influence approaches to 
peacebuilding.  There is a gap in literature on how these interactions contribute 
to the peacebuilding practice.  
 
Complexity therefore lies in the autonomy of different entities and how they 
mutually interact with each within different patterns. This implies that the “simple 
rules that govern the interaction between agents tend to result in complex 
behaviours that are not natural extensions of these rules of interactions” 
(Valente, 2010:445).  It would therefore be imperative to develop a 
comprehensive “understanding of the nature and causes of local level 
challenges to peacebuilding, in order to formulate effective responses” 
(Manning, 2003:26). For example, the local actors often have their own reasons 
and motivations for the armed struggle (Kalyvas, 2003). The complexity within 
each conflict setting implies that any intervention is part of a wider system of 
interactions and relationships. Thus, acknowledging the underlying complexity 
would imply acknowledging the divergent cases that do not fit the liberal peace 
critique. Besides, these different entities are dynamic with internal 
differentiations within their own categories and may neither represent uniformity 
nor lineal progression.  
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The sixth is that the donor agencies or governments are not homogeneous. 
Besides there is not a general consensus among the donors as is often 
presumed (Goodhand, 2006:87). Uvin (2002 cited by Goodhand (2006:87)) 
discusses, in his analysis, the diverse approaches of donor agencies which can 
be multi-pronged: minimum adaptations that integrate development to peace 
activities within the contextual imperatives; full engagement in peacebuilding 
and inter-governmental advocacy at the field and international levels. These 
activities aim at improving the donor-policies. There have been efforts among 
various inter-governmental organizations to revise their approach to funding and 
integrate principles of “good donorship” (Graves and Wheeler, 2006), which aim 
at paying closer attention to the needs of the beneficiaries, balancing the 
international and donor-agency policies within the changing socio-political 
dynamics.  
 
The seventh is that related to the above point, liberal peace approach is neither 
homogeneous nor monolithic. The liberal peace critics have conglomerated 
different liberal approaches to peacebuilding into a liberal peace framework 
without developing distinctive contextual variations in its implementation.  Mac 
Ginty (2011:37-41) describes the different manifestations of liberal peace and 
observes that “Iraq and Afghanistan receive the full regime-change treatment, 
while Burma and North-Korea do not. Bosnia-Herzegovina is subject to a 
comprehensive statebuilding programme, while Somalia is largely allowed to 
fester in statelessness.” Similarly, in the recent uprisings in the Arab world 
western nations focused their interests in putting pressure on the oil-rich Libya 
and strategic Middle East player, Egypt. The rest of the regimes such as Algeria, 
Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia were ‘left’ to manage their own crises. Hence, an 
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elaboration on these variations in preferential treatments and implementation of 
liberal peace would put clarity on the definitional boundaries of what entails 
‘liberal peace’.  
 
The eighth is that while the hybridized approach (linking international 
interventions with the local initiatives) has been proposed by some of the liberal 
peace critics as a solution to countering the liberal peace approach, it does not 
fully address the differences in power and conceptualization of peace.  The 
NGOs and local community are in a de facto context of power imbalance. The 
focus should therefore not be in the balancing of powers and the hybridising of 
the two approaches to peacebuilding, but rather on the exploration of the 
emerging peace discourse and practice from different levels of interaction. 
MacGinty (2008:149) alludes to this when he stresses that: “intra and inter-
group negotiation and renegotiation of modes of social operation are embedded 
practices and provide sites for social innovation and exposure to new or 
externally inspired practices and ideas.” The emphasis ought to be put in the 
intergroup negotiations and re-negotiations of different positions, interests, 
understanding and perspectives. The implication is that peacebuilding is an 
interactive process in a search for a desirable future.  Within this interaction, the 
different agents of peace engage in a process of relational constructionism 
which I shall elaborate in the subsequent chapters. 
 
The hybridized approach tends to assume that the liberal peace and local 
peacebuilding practices run parallel to each other, or mutually co-opt each other.  
The failure to explore the emerging end of the relationship that develops out of 
the peacebuilding interventions leads to generalized abstractions by the liberal 
111 
 
peace critics. Any peacebuilding practice that engages with the community, 
even when hegemonic in its approach, would still experience the local agency.  
Peacebuilding is essentially a relational process. 
 
Richmond (2010b:32) acknowledges the potential impact of the local community 
when he states that international mediators, including NGOs, should act as 
“enablers for localised dynamics of peace rather than enablers of international 
architecture of peace.”  However, this statement is by itself condescending and 
assumes that the ‘locals’ need to be ‘enabled’ to build peace. I would prefer the 
term ‘engage or interact with’ in a relational constructionism process that builds 
a desired future. This is because even in the most difficult of circumstances the 
local community would always seek the kind of peace they would like to achieve.  
Hence, any post-conflict initiative should be founded on “the recognition of the 
resilience and impressive survival abilities of those who have come through the 
trauma and hardship of violent conflict” (Barakat, 2010b:262). In my field 
research I came across remarkable resilience among the conflict-affected 
population of northern Uganda, which I explain in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
On the other hand while the hybridized approach may sound innovative, many 
development NGOs working in humanitarian settings have over the years 
revised their approaches to be conscious of the local settings.  These have 
emerged through the emphasis on participatory approaches, empowerment and 
local capacity building in the 1980s and 1990s. While there is still so much to be 
done in terms of achieving the intended objectives of sustainable peace and 
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development, these earlier attempts demonstrate the beginning of a shift in 
conceptualization of peacebuilding practice. The emphasis should therefore not 
be on the hybrid approach but rather on the change processes and theories that 
develop from different levels of interactions. 
 
The nineth  is that cricism alone is not enough. It is important to explore different 
ways in which post-conflict reconstruction could be effective.  Gergen (2001:47) 
warns that critique can be problematic: a critique tends to acquire certain 
characteristics similar to those held by the proponents of the critique in question. 
Thus, by critiquing a given position one tends to essentialize the issue of 
discourse and construct discussions based on the same themes. For example, 
the liberal peace critics would base their discourse on the conceptualization of 
peacebuilding that is contrary to that of the proponents of liberal peace. This 
situation creates a binary by which “the critique renders support to the ontology 
implicit in the initial network of assertions, an ontology that might wither or 
dissolve without the critical impulse” (Gergen, 2001:47). 
 
This does not mean that liberal peace critics have not come up with any 
suggestions. In fact, the approach of liberal peace critics would fall under what 
Owen (2010:8-7) refers to as the ‘good peace research’ which has a critical 
edge because it challenges the “existing patterns and practices that reinforce or 
accept vulnerabilities, injustice or disempowerment.” What is however more 
important would be engagement into the the next step of dialogue and 
negotiations for policy change. Such policy changes even when minimal could 
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have a positive impact without necessarily changing the status quo of the world 
order (Green, 2010:7).   The liberal peace critics should therefore seek space 
for influencing the change of policies that sustain negative effects of liberal 
peace. This would mean scaling up efforts towards direct encounter with the 
decision making bodies. 
 
The tenth is that it is important to develop a discourse on the ethics of 
peacebuilding.  This would provide a framework for analysis of the 
peacebuilding practices.  A lot of the criticisms of the liberal peace demonstrate 
a search for a standard ethics of peacebuilding practice. MacGinty (2008:149) 
underlines this point when he asserts that “all peace-making techniques and 
assumptions should be exposed to rigorous tests of relevance and fitness for 
purpose.” This process has to be based on specific ethical principles which are 
rooted on the moral foundations of human rights, natural and international law, 
socio-cultural and religious values in respective contexts.   
 
Tadjbakhsh (2010:117) attests that engaging “with the ethics of peacebuilding 
means channelling the question from whether peacebuilding should be done to 
how to do it in a legitimate manner.” The challenging task is to define the kind of 
human security framework that could legitimate peacebuilding in the post 
intervention period within the “ethics of non-hegemonic engagement” 
(Tadjbakhsh, 2010:117).  
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Peacebuilding ethics is framed within power relations in social change. It is thus 
important to make a critique of the conceptualization of power. Implicit power 
dynamics can rapidly change the conflict landscape.  Intervening foreign groups, 
besides imposing their hegemonic military and economic power, could also 
empower particular sectors of the society against others. Such situations could 
lead to more conflicts rather that transforming the conflicts. 
 
Peacebuilding ethics similarly implies preconditions and conditions for the use 
of force. The use of force has been discussed since the Peace of Westphalia 
that put emphasis on sovereignty and principle of non-intervention. This was 
further revised by the United Nations that accentuated the institution of the 
legitimisation and control of the use of force, sovereignty of nations and 
responsibility to protect human lives through humanitarian intervention. 
Unilateral use of force has further heightened the debate on the legitimization of 
the use of force, as I have discussed above. The challenge therefore lies in 
developing a peacebuilding ethics that limits the monopoly of the use of force by 
the UN, on the one hand, and the unilateral use of force by the powerful nations 
of the West, on the other. From a legal perspective such a balance of power 
would imply “the transformation of all kinds of power into one generally accepted 
or at least acceptable legal order” (Lienemann, 2007:83).  
 
The discussion on the ethics of peace should also examine how peace is 
conceptualized and practiced. ‘Universal’ conceptualization of peace is 
dominantly western and often lacks contextual diversity of the ethics of peace. 
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This conceptualization, based on the balance of the use of force, has 
marginalized other diverse conceptualizations that are contextually based.   The 
call for the ethics of peace therefore demonstrates the need for a global 
dialogue on re-conceptualization of peace and its relevance within contextual 
imperatives.   
 
Conclusion 
 
NGO peacebuilding finds its articulation within the larger framework of 
international peacebuilding.  The discussions above have primarily focused on 
how NGOs fit within this broader framework that can either co-opt NGO 
peacebuilding, run parallel or in opposition to it. In my critique of the liberal 
peace critics I have underscored that the liberal peace critics have based their 
critiques against systems of international peacebuilding on a single interpretive 
scheme (liberal peace) without examining the contextual, organizational, social 
and political diversities.  Such an oversight limits the authenticity of liberal peace 
criticisms. Another important aspect is that NGOs are diverse and should not be 
analyzed as a single entity. Understanding this diversity is critical in making well 
founded and focused critiques. Ignoring an institutional theorist perspective in 
the analysis of the NGOs leads to generalized articulations that overlook the 
complex phenomenon of the NGO sector. Similar analysis ought to be 
undertaken when looking at the donor agencies and governments which equally 
have diverse characteristics, internal dynamics and counteractive power plays. 
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The claims made by liberal peace critics that NGO peacebuilding is externally 
driven by the western nations’ agenda need to be based on contextual evidence. 
The critics have relied on anecdotal evidences from situations of militarized 
peacebuilding that cannot be generalized to all post-conflict settings.  Besides, 
post-conflict contexts are often complex with diverse historical dynamics of 
conflict. It is also important to note that peacebuilding is a complex process that 
varies according to different actors, historical circumstances and diverse 
interactive processes.  
 
Understanding the interactive processes in peacebuilding is critical. This is 
because the different dimensions of interaction between NGOs, donors and 
community are often experienced at individual, group and institutional levels. 
These encounters lead to different constructions of peacebuilding discourse and 
practice.  My emphasis has been that while there is need to acknowledge the 
power dynamics within global and grassroots peacebuilding, more importantly it 
is vital to analyse the interactive dynamics of NGO peacebuilding at different 
levels and how this generate new peacebuilding discourse and practice.    
 
Relationships and interactions that develop in the process of building peace 
tend to generate processes of mutual influences, discoveries, explorations and 
dialogical resolutions of conflicts.  Most literature on liberal peace critique does 
not analyse the outcomes of this interaction. Despite imbalances in power 
relations between different actors, positive change can still be achieved within 
the same dynamism of relations. The ‘local’ has agency even in the most 
difficult circumstances of conflict. 
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In order to further understand the different levels of interactions in peacebuilding 
I have developed a theoretical framework of relational constructionism in the 
next chapter. This concept emphasises the process of reality construction 
through interactive encounters, relationship building, mutual sense-making, joint 
enterprises, conversations and relational empathy.   
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Chapter Three: Relational Constructionism in NGO Peacebuilding 
 
Introduction 
My interest in this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework that deciphers 
how heterogeneous groups such as NGOs, local community, donors, local 
government, traditional leaders and international community relationally interact, 
and engender peacebuilding practice and discourse. I have chosen to use 
relational constructionism as a theoretical framework. Relational 
constructionism puts emphasis on relationships, interactions and dialogical 
processes of social construction (Hosking, 2010a; Bouwen, 2010; Lambrechts 
et al., 2009). It examines the relational processes of social constructionism. 
‘Interaction’ refers to diverse actions of encounter (Hosking, 2006:58) whether 
meaningful or meaningless, formal or informal, such as: conversations, 
meetings, individual and group encounters as well as joint actions.   
 
The theoretical framework provides the lenses through which the main research 
question can be unpacked. The research question is: To what extent is NGO 
peacebuilding informed by the local reality, and/or external conceptualizations of 
peacebuilding?  The question is mainly concerned with the processes of 
peacebuilding and the interactive agents and factors in place. I therefore seek to 
understand the existing levels of interaction and emerging processes of social 
reality construction at the micro-levels of peacebuilding.  
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Relational constructionism examines the micro level interactions of 
peacebuilding processes and deciphers dialogical relationships and how these 
influence the construction of social reality at both micro and macro levels. It also 
underscores both the process and outcome of relationships. The process is 
mainly articulated by inter-subjectivity, conversations, language and dialogical 
processes of meaning-making at micro levels (Cunliffe, 2008; Shotter, 1997). 
This brings into focus how the sense-making processes and mutual influences 
develop, in egalitarian situations as well as in power imbalances; recognition 
and mis-recognition; leadership and subject; and convergence and divergences.  
‘Outcomes’ refer to the end result of peacebuilding processes while 
emphasizing the interactive dynamics in human relations and how these 
interactions affect the manner in which participants in conflict and peacebuilding 
inter-relate. 
 
I would distinguish between relationships as outcomes of peacebuilding 
intervention, and relationships as intrinsic part of peacebuilding. The first one is 
what peacebuilding aims at achieving in different interventions, whether through 
conflict resolution, reconciliation activities or problem solving workshops. It is a 
consequent result of a process.  The second, relationships as intrinsic part of 
peacebuilding denotes the different levels of interactions that take place in the 
course of multidimensional peacebuilding interventions and practices. It is the 
second level of relationships that I would like to underscore in connection with 
relational constructionism.   
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The aspect of relationships as intrinsic part of peacebuilding is evident in 
peacebuilding practices, and forms a stronger component of relational 
constructionism. Conflict generally occurs when different parties seek to 
mutually influence and protect each other’s interests (Kelman, 2009:173). 
Conflict also emerges when parties pursue their own interests and positions 
while blocking their adversaries from achieving their own interests. 
Peacebuilding, from a dialogical perspective, is based on negotiations and 
focuses on exercising influence on the parties to come to a dialogue table. Thus, 
both the process of conflict creation and conflict intervention are relational and 
ought to be addressed from the perspective of building relationships.  
 
The discussions in this chapter will be divided into four main components: First, 
I will introduce the concept of relational constructionism within the broader 
framework of social constructionism. Second, I will analyse social 
constructionism as a foundational basis for relational constructionism in order to 
put clarity on the different operational concepts.  Third, I will develop the 
concept of relational constructionism, its main tenets, its contribution to the 
social sciences research and the relevance of the framework in the 
microanalysis of human interaction and co-construction of meaning. Fourth, I 
will examine the implications of relational constructionism for peacebuilding in 
post-conflict contexts as a way of setting the ground for my critique of the liberal 
peace critique. Relational constructionism is a relatively new concept, and this 
thesis thus contributes to the limited literature. 
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Part I: Relational Constructionism: An Introduction 
The main focus of relational constructionism is deciphering how interactive 
relationships create new experiences of learning, social action and change. 
Learning or knowledge is understood as an interactive process and not 
something that is simply acquired (Craps et al., 2007; Addleson, 2006; 
Anderson, 1999).  Since Gergen’s influential work on social constructionism 
(Gergen, 1985) there have been attempts to develop different versions and 
interpretations of social constructionism (Shotter, 1984; Gergen, 1994; Shotter 
and Katz, 1996; Burr, 1995). Thus, social reality is generally considered to be a 
product of continuous mutual negotiation of meaning among different 
participants who share their various understanding of contexts. This means that 
people not only have shared cognitions (Weick, 1995), but also mutual 
interactions in relationships that create social reality (Gergen, 1994). However, 
there has recently been a shift towards an emphasis on the ‘relational’ aspects 
of social constructionism processes. Thus, the concept of relational 
constructionism has emerged “to emphasize the relational essence of social 
reality construction” (Lambrechts et al., 2009:42)  
 
Relational constructionism is an attempt to establish dialogue between 
constructionism and social constructionism (Botella and Herrero, 2000:408) by 
emphasizing relationships in processes of meaning-making. Relational 
constructionism is largely influenced by constructivist theories in psychology 
and by philosophical and literary works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Mikhail 
Bakhtin, both of whom are often associated with social constructionism (Botella 
and Herrero, 2000:408). From a research perspective relational orientation puts 
emphasis on the fact that whatever is being studied has an impact on the one 
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studying it, and vice versa (Bouwen, 2010). It thus forms a configuration of 
relationships that interact back and forth (Capra 1976) in an independent and 
inter-subjective manner. 
 
Relational constructionism examines learning processes and studies how 
relations and interactions bring new values. This approach puts accent on 
“theorizing relational processes” (Crossan et al., 1999:130) instead of focusing 
on persons, organizations and relations. It further seeks to bridge different levels 
of learning at individual, group or organizational levels (Hosking and Morley, 
1991).  
 
The emphasis on relationality in research was emphasized by the post-
structuralist approach to studying the subject (human mind) and object (external 
reality), not as independent realities, but as interdependent entities (Bradbury 
and Lichtenstein, 2000:552). The modernist approach to understanding reality 
was based on fixed structuralist ontologies, thus examining individuals, culture, 
society, institutions and systems as fixed entities. The post-modern approach 
has emphasized post-structuralist thinking that emphasizes a transitional and 
weak ontology of becoming, which describes the emerging reality (Chia, 1995).    
Thus, social reality is both mediated by the social context and conceptual 
interpretations (Bartunek et al., 1997).  
 
These perspectives to studying social reality have led to the development of 
theories on interdependence between the self and society, and have neither 
stressed positivist nor constructionist positions (Giddens, 1984; Bourdieu, 1977).  
Further, quantum physicists, in advancing the theory of the composition of the 
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natural world, observed that atomic particles existed more in relation to each 
other than as independent discrete objects (Capra, 1975 cited by Bradbury and 
Lichtenstein (2000:552); Wolf, 1980).   Feminist studies have also pioneered the 
use of the term relationality to emphasize the importance of human relationships 
while highlighting the challenges faced by the marginalized, and underscoring 
how relationships transform human experiences (Hartling, 2008:326).   
 
My primary focus will be on the term relational constructionism, which 
underscores the process of interactive relationship building in co-construction of 
knowledge, new realities and practices, as well as mutual sense-making. This 
approach stresses the “value of relationships and interdependencies” (Bradbury 
and Lichtenstein, 2000:552) that continuously generate a variety of meanings 
and perspectives that contribute to the understanding of our social reality. In 
NGO peacebuilding this framework will decipher the processes of relational 
constructionism of the discourse and practice of peacebuilding through the 
interaction between NGOs, donors and local community.  
 
Relational constructionism is founded on the basic assumptions of social 
constructionism such as: reality and meaning-making are culturally and 
historically situated; and that human beings interact and create new meanings 
(Gergen, 1999b; Burger and Luckmann, 2007; Burr, 1995).  However, relational 
constructionism goes deeper and delves into the complexities and underlying 
assumptions behind meaning creations.  Sense-making lies in encounter with 
the ‘other’ (individual, context, history, environment, discourses) (Cunliffe, 2008; 
Hosking and Bouwen, 2000). Hence the self exists only in so far as it is 
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juxtaposed with the other in an interactive process of mutual influences.  In 
order to have an in-depth understanding of relational constructionism it is 
important to analyze social constructionism as a foundational background. 
 
Part II: Social Constructionism 
One of the major challenges in social sciences is the task of developing a theory 
of human agency within the imperatives of social structure (Houston, 2001:849). 
In an attempt to understand our reality in relation to the human subject, the 
philosophy of science interrogates the popular assumptions and accepts 
“nothing on trust…asks what makes our assumptions rationally defensible” 
(Greetham, 2006:2). This process seeks to understand knowledge systems and 
how we can discover the ‘truth’ within our social structures while at the same 
time acknowledging the role of the social agent (Smith, 1998:27) in this process.   
Subsequently, various epistemological positions have developed in search of 
the ‘truth’ based on a given “theory of knowledge” (Willig, 2001:2) which 
oscillates between discussions on whether the subject or human agency on the 
one hand, and the object or reality on the other, exist independently, 
interactively or dependently.  In order to understand our reality, social research 
develops theories that “reveal the underlying factors, or structure, on which are 
built the complex realities of everyday life” (Crompton and Gubbay, 1977:13).   
 
Social constructionism emerged as an epistemological school of thought in 
reaction to positivists’ assertion that our knowledge of reality is based on an 
observable world. In positivism the predominant idea is that the reality exists out 
there and humans attempt to make sense out of it, based on empirical 
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observations that establish consistency and scientific conclusions. Thus, 
different entities such as individuals, organizations, institutions and different 
systems are studied based on their traits, roles and identities (Cunliffe, 
2008:124). 
 
Social constructionism takes a more social-subjective perspective of 
understanding reality as socially and communally constructed (Gergen and 
Gergen, 2007; Burr, 1995).  It asserts that reality does not exist separately from 
us. Instead we are intimately interwoven with the social reality “as each shapes 
and is shaped by the other in everyday interactions” (Cunliffe, 2008:124).  Social 
constructionism can be traced back to sociology, social philosophy and social 
knowledge. Sociology puts accent on how we understand the social reality, or 
how we experience the world (Garfinkel, 1967) through a continuous process of 
interpretation.  This philosophical perspective underlines that our personal 
experiences are formed and shaped by the daily social interactions and routine 
usage of language, which we often take for granted (Schutz, 1960 cited by 
Cunliffe (2008:124)). This is reflected in the work of Alfred Schutz who worked 
with Thomas Luckmann in discussing this perspective further (Cunliffe, 
2008:124).   
 
The sociology of knowledge, influenced by Berger and Luckmann’s The Social 
Construction of Reality (1966), is taken to be the origin of social constructionism 
(Cunliffe, 2008:124). This perspective observes that the society exists within the 
interaction between the subjective and objective world. As such the social world 
is understood and interpreted within a dialectical interaction between 
externalization, objectification and internalization. The “society is a human 
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product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product” (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1960:61).  Berger and Luckmann (1961) argue that the ongoing 
activities and routines (externalization) humanly produce the social world. But 
this externalized reality is objective because it affects our lives and we therefore 
need to encounter and study it. As we interpret the meaning of events around us 
and other people’s subjectivities we become socialized in the world. This 
process of internalization thus entails situating our identity and that of others in 
the real world. Berger and Luckmann (1960:137 cited by Cunliffe (2008:124)) 
therefore assert that the moment we become conscious of our identity as 
“generalized other” we become “an effective member of society and in 
subjective possession of self and a world.” This perspective thus shows that 
knowledge is socially constructed and that facts are social products.  
 
Social constructionism relies on the assumptions we make about our own 
understanding of society and how knowledge is produced. Creating awareness 
about this knowledge is critical in understanding the process of knowledge 
creation and social practices. In fact understanding our assumptions will help us 
see how these assumptions “affect our focus of study, our research method and 
ways of theorizing...the type of knowledge we generate, and how we engage in 
the learning process” (Cunliffe, 2008: 126-7). 
 
At this juncture it would be important to clarify that there are different, but closely 
related, interpretations of social constructionism.  Gergen (1999: 59-60) 
identifies five versions: radical constructivism largely based on rationalist 
philosophy that puts emphasis on the construction of reality by the individual 
mind; constructivism which asserts that the mind constructs reality in relation to 
127 
 
the external world; social constructivism that refers to mind construction of 
reality, through interaction with reality, and influence of social relationships; 
social constructionism which puts emphasis on the discourse examines 
interactions between the self and world, and how these interactions influence 
social relationships; and lastly, sociological constructionism that examines how 
the understanding of self and world are influenced by the forces of social 
structure.   It is however common to find these terms used interchangeable in 
different literature.  
 
The discussion here will be based on social constructionism, while borrowing 
from other forms of reality-construction.  The primary focus will be on the 
dimension held by Gergen (1999; 2001) and Burr (1995; 2003) which  puts 
emphasis on the discourse that looks at interactions between the self and world, 
and how such interactions impact on social relationships. 
 
Different Aspects of Social Constructionism 
I will critically discuss three different but interrelated concepts within social 
constructionism. First, social constructionism holds that our world is socially 
constructed through human relationships and discourse (language). This is a 
counter argument against the positivists and empiricist who held that the “nature 
of the world can be revealed by observation, and what exists is what we 
perceive to exist” (Burr, 1995: 3).  Second, our social world is culturally and 
historical situated (Burr, 1995:4). This position challenged the positivist notion 
that “scientific claims to knowledge were effectively uncontaminated by culture, 
history and ideology” (Gergen, 2001: 7).  This implies, according to Garfinkel’s 
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(1984) ethnomethodology, which is closely associated with social 
constructionism, that our world is contingent and limited by time and space. 
Third is that language is a critical element in constituting a “socially constructed 
knowledge” (Willig, 2001: 7).   
 
According to Houston (2001), the above categorizations look at social 
constructionism in two perspectives:  the role of human agency in “constructing 
social reality” (Willig, 2001: 7; Giddens, 1991) and the role of discourse and its 
impact on human experience (Foucault, 1972).  I will now take a critical review 
of the three categorizations above.  
 
The first assumption of social constructionism is that human relationships and 
language play a significant role in reality construction. Social constructionism 
maintains the position that knowledge is not limited to scientific theories or 
empirical observations (as held by positivists and realists) that are detached 
from the social reality. Knowledge is instead grounded on relationships and 
social processes (Gergen, 2003:16), and is realized within the community. 
Different individuals, groups and historical events contribute to knowledge. 
However, knowledge perspectives are not fixed. The community can choose to 
abandon a given perspective of knowledge when they question its intelligibility. 
Thus, a community could suggest various interpretations, embrace or abandon 
them as various levels of relationships unfold (Gergen, 2003a:16). This is a 
process of negotiated understanding (Garfinkel, 2003) that constantly connects 
with different activities of social agents.  In other words no particular knowledge 
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claim can be taken to be individually constructed, since its inception comes from 
the interaction with the rest of the community members.  
 
The second assumption of social constructionism is that our social world is 
culturally and historically constructed.   In other words what is considered to be 
real or true is a result of social relationships within historical and cultural setting 
(Gergen, 1999: 237). This approach is relativist and confines reality to the 
historical and cultural contexts.  Social constructionists examine cultures as 
independent monads creating their own truths. Giddens (1984: 97-98), in 
discussing duality of structure, observes that whatever reality a society 
constructs, while particular to that society, is embedded in practices in the past 
or within other societies. This perspective could be seen to fall under ‘strict’ 
constructionist position which discusses social constructionism beyond the 
immediate context and the broader implications of sense-making processes 
(Sarbin and Kitsuse, 1994). From a sociologist’s perspective knowledge is 
socially constructed, thus adapting a contextualist approach to social 
constructionism.  
 
The third component of social constructionism is that language socially 
constructs knowledge.  Knowledge is created through social interaction 
processes in various mediums but particularly through language (Burr, 1995: 4). 
The relationship between language and knowledge in social sciences has 
developed over the years. Empiricists sought to establish the relationship 
between language and the observable world. This school asserts that “sense 
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perception provides the basis for knowledge acquisition” and as such “theory is 
constructed” from the evidence gained from the observable data (Willig, 2001: 
3). Positivists establish that there is a direct correlation between the observable 
and their representation, between our perception and the understanding of the 
world as a continuous process of acquiring objective knowledge (Willig, 2001: 3). 
However, in the new debate beyond philosophy of science, post-empiricists, 
post-structuralist and post-modernist schools of thought posit that knowledge 
can objectively reside in the language (Gergen, 1994: 33).   
 
The different sense-making processes that lead to knowledge claims often 
develop into a discourse. In social constructionism, a ‘discourse’ entails “a set of 
meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on 
that in some way together produce a particular version of event” (Burr, 1995:48). 
Parker (1992:5) adds that a discourse is “a system of statements which 
constructs an object.”  In other words it is a process of meaning-making through 
interpretation and construction of a new reality. Thus, every particular 
“discourse claims to say what the object really is, that is, claims to be the truth” 
(Burr, 1995: 49).  This process is mediated by language which “produces and 
constructs experience of ourselves and each other” (Burr, 1995: 45).40  
                                                 
40
 While social constructionism discusses knowledge as a social process it does not engage in 
the discussion that equally acknowledges that “knowledge transfer is always endogenous to the 
mind and body” (Ringberg and Reihlen, 2008: 2). Besides, it is fundamental to determine 
whether the knowledge transfer or exchange is negotiated, collective, unique or simply 
stereotypical (Ringberg and Reihlen, 2008:2). Critical theorists question this approach and seek 
to deconstruct manipulated realities. They identify ideological assumptions, the influencing 
forces behind them and how such forces can be subdued in order to emancipate an oppressed 
society (Dyzek, 1995:99). RINGBERG, T. & REIHLEN, M. 2008. Towards a Socio-Cognitive 
Approach to Knowledge Transfer. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 912-935; DYZEK, J. S. 
1995. Critical Theory as a Research Program. In: WHITE, S. K. (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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NGO peacebuilding in post-conflict is often in constant tension between, on the 
one hand empirically based organizational culture and values, and on the other 
the latent knowledge that is context specific, innovative, dynamic, deviant, 
always producing “new knowledge where it had not existed before” (Hargadon 
and Fanelli, 2002: 290-291).  NGOs are sometimes constrained by the 
organizational culture that confines new knowledge to the internal “evolution 
and replication of organization’s physical and social artefacts” (Hargadon and 
Fanelli, 2002:291). The contextual experiences on the ground can also 
influence NGOs’ approach to conflict response and develop new knowledge. It 
has been common for the NGOs to refer to the ‘lessons learned’ as a way of 
acknowledging new knowledge and anticipating future events (Salama et al., 
2004). 
 
One of the criticisms against social constructionism is that it limits and almost 
effaces the individual agency and creativity within culture.  Burr (1995:50), for 
example observes that, individual positions on a particular social issue “have 
their origin not in the person’s private experience, but in the discursive culture 
that those people inhabit.” Hence, individual writings and narratives are 
evaluated as “instances of discourses, as occasions where particular discourses 
are given the opportunity to construct an event in this way rather than that” (Burr, 
1995: 50).   Such a process marginalizes the human agency from social 
analysis (Mouzelis, 1991) and processes of social change.  Private experiences 
are valid in themselves and should not be limited to the relational aspect of 
social constructionism.  Besides, constructionism cannot be fully articulated 
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without “reflexivity and active critique” which require subjectivity in return 
(Osbeck, 2001:444).  Similar views have been expressed by others (Halling and 
Lawrence, 1999; Harré and Krausz, 1996; Harré and Robinson, 1997) to 
emphasize the relativist approach of social constructionism. 
 
The question then is whether Gergen and social constructionism proponents of 
his school deny ontological categories of reality such as body or discourse, 
which Halling and Lawrence (1999:83) describe as the “raw materials” used in 
social constructionism argumentation.  Gergen (1999a:113) however responds 
that “there is nothing within social constructionism that aims to abandon or 
destroy the concept of agency…Social constructionism does not provide a first 
philosophy or foundational ontology.”  Instead social constructionism elaborates 
“the importance of discourse in the taken-for-granted realities (such as agency), 
the significance of relationship in generating discursive meaning” (Gergen, 
1999:114).  
 
Although the roots of constructionist thought may be traced to long-standing 
debates between empiricist and rationalist schools of thought, constructionism 
moves beyond the dualism of these traditions and places knowledge within the 
process of social interchange (Gergen, 1985). The challenge for the realist-
social constructionism debate largely lies in the epistemological and ontological 
relationships of their assertions. How do we know what we claim to know? This 
epistemological question entails a method that develops the theory of what we 
know (ontology). Critical realism acknowledges the fact that there is a world out 
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there independent of our minds, even though we cannot fully comprehend its 
existence (Mark, 2000). Bhaskar’s critical realism asserts that the independent 
reality can be understood as experienced and non-experienced, but also as new 
experiences through causal mechanisms (cited by Houston, 2001: 850). It is at 
the causal level that change is generated through various social mechanisms 
which equally recognize the individual role within such dynamics in the society 
(Houston, 2001: 851).   
 
Social constructionism fails to explain the independent reality outside the human 
mind.  Gergen (1999: 222) asserts that social constructionism does not deny the 
existence of the real world out there and that the discourse on what exists and 
what does not exist is confined to cultural and historical experiences.  However, 
social constructionism does not enter into the debate of the validation of the 
knowledge claims.  Instead social constructionism, from a sociological 
perspective, concerns itself with explanations of the knowledge construction, 
that is, how processes of interaction construct new meaning. However, such an 
argument is near-relativist and fails to find “normative theories” which can 
explain the reality of “poverty, diseases and social conflict” (Houston, 2001: 848).  
Gergen (1994a:68) observes that “constructionism makes no denial concerning 
explosions, poverty, death, or the world out there more generally. Neither does it 
make any affirmation...constructionism is ontologically mute. Whatever is simply 
is.”  
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But the ‘what is, simply is’ pronouncement is in itself an ontological statement. 
The only difference is that, from a social constructionism perspective, it is made 
regardless of who is making the claim and whether the assertions can be tested 
to be true or valid. Thus, to question how ‘what is’ came to be is to enter into an 
ontological discourse which does not interest most social constructionists. 
Constructionists are contented by the observation that all methods to sense-
making are valid, and as such all knowledge claims are treated as equal 
(Liebrucks, 2001:373).   
 
However, the ontological discourse on the reality around us can be advanced 
without necessarily jeopardizing the assertions of social constructionism, as 
others have demonstrated (Harré and Robinson, 1997; Martin and Sugarman, 
2000; Liebrucks, 2001).  Liebrucks (2001:372) for example holds that social 
constructionism does not argue that “everything is socially constructed.” Further 
one can assert that there is no significant difference with realism since social 
constructionism holds that “there is a reality existing independently of our beliefs 
about it; and…that it is possible to acquire genuine knowledge about it” 
(Liebrucks, 2001:372). 
 
Another criticism is that social constructionists do not discuss the ethical 
question under the pretext that each society ought to determine its own future 
(Gergen 1999: 233). But suppose the sense-making process is dominated by a 
particular section of the society, wouldn’t the rest of the community feel 
marginalized?  In other words, if social constructionists assume that truth is 
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objectified within a given culture, and that individual constructions form part of 
the dialogue of meaning-making (Burr, 1995), how would one address the 
contradictions, disagreements and competing voices within cultures, particularly 
when dialogue fails?  
 
The development of culture in any society is necessarily a guided process and 
“gets established in forms of authoritative discourse” (Scott, 2003: 101) which in 
some cases could marginalize certain sections of the society.  In the discussion 
about the inter-relations between power and knowledge, Foucault (1983:133) 
underscores the fact that ‘truth’ is generated within systems of power and 
produced to serve and sustain the same power.  In an attempt to reach a more 
acceptable discourse Habermas (1990:65-66) proposes communicative action41 
that details “discourse ethics” which ensures a transparent process of dialogue 
without any forms of imposition.  
 
While social constructionism, as Gergen (1999: 228) puts it, admits that there 
can be inter-cultural dialogue among peoples in a process of seeking “inclusive 
futures together”, it does not however detail how contradictory ‘truths’ can be 
reconciled.  Given that social constructionism generates meaning-making in 
search for truths that are culturally and historically situated (Burr, 1995: 4), it is 
important in NGO peacebuilding to research the extent to which the various 
levels of interactions between the peace actors create new sense-making 
                                                 
41
 Habermas (1990:134) explains that communicative action takes place “when actors are 
prepared to harmonize their plans of action through internal means, committing themselves to 
pursuing their goals only on the condition of an agreement – one that already exists or one to be 
negotiated- about definitions of the situation and prospective outcomes.”  
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perspectives that are important in post-conflict reconstruction. This research 
investigates the possible outcomes of the different world views (NGOs, donors 
and local community), and the new meanings that this relationship generates.    
 
Part III: From Social Constructionism to Relational Constructionism 
There are two related but different notions of social constructionism (Cunliffe, 
2008:127) that emerge from the above discussion. The first is subjective and 
inter-subjective reality which underscores that reality is constantly negotiated by 
individuals who have their own understanding, perceptions and views of reality 
and sense-making within the social context (Schön, 1983; Watzlawick, 1984). 
Reality in return plays back into an encounter with the individual. The second is 
objectified reality and the always emerging in-the-moment realities. This notion 
asserts that while reality is socially produced there is an objective aspect of 
reality that exists independently. Thus, organizations or societies are constantly 
produced through encounters over a stretched period of time.  
 
From the social constructionism perspective above researchers are often 
inclined to study reality from a macro-level angle. Thus, some authors would be 
interested in studying the products of construction such as analyzing objectified 
institutions, practices, strategies and social identities, and how discursive forces 
influence their characterization and existence (Allen, 1998; Kornberger and 
Brown, 2007; Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003).  A similar perspective has 
been taken by the liberal peace critics (Richmond, 2005a; Carey, 2010; Mac 
Ginty, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000) who make generalized assertions 
about western nations’ ‘liberal peace agenda’ and the NGO peacebuilding in the 
137 
 
post-conflict settings. Other authors have studied how different approaches to 
construction of reality compete and resist each other (Boje, 1994; Martin et al., 
1983), hence furthering the discussions on the hegemonic imposition of the 
western nations over states emerging out of conflict; and another group of 
authors have focused on understanding how social facts entailed in stories, 
metaphors and narratives engender and are products of organizational culture, 
conceptualization, characterization and identification (Holstein and Gubrium, 
2000; Martin et al., 1983; Martin, 1982).   
 
Relational constructionism emphasizes that the process of social 
constructionism is continuously created, dialogued upon and changed. The 
process of meaning-making is an interactive process of encounter with the other.  
This is primarily because “we live in a web of relationships” (Cunliffe, 2008:129). 
This perspective to reality construction is complemented by authors who have 
underscore that the “process of sense-making is cognitive” (Cunliffe, 2008:127; 
Weick, 1995) and thus largely influenced by the individual mind construction. 
For example, Weick (1995) observes that organizations are socially constructed 
by their own members who determine, individually and in a group, the sense-
making of their surroundings and interpretation of the reality. The produced 
knowledge in this process examines the “forms of reality that language 
constructs” (Cunliffe, 2008:127).  While there are many varieties of 
organizational studies, there have been recent shifts in studying organizations 
not simply based on learning outcomes and programming, but also on 
processes of interaction (Addleson, 2006). Thus, the learning metaphor has 
emerged as “a substitute for the rational planning paradigm” (Hosking and 
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Bouwen, 2000:130), which has subsequently introduced new ways and 
approaches of examining organizational experience rather than seeking radical 
changes in the practice (Addleson, 2006; Easterby-Smith, 1999; Herriot and 
Pemberton, 1995). 
 
I will discuss the major themes of relational constructionism while relying on a 
number of authors who have influenced this concept (Hosking and Morley, 1991; 
Hosking and Bouwen, 2000; Lambrechts et al., 2009; Botella and Herrero, 2000; 
Crossan et al., 1999; Bakhtin, 1986; Neimeyer, 2000; Sluss and Ashforth, 2008; 
Cunliffe, 2008).  
 
Relational constructionism examines relational premises on what exists 
(ontology) and the discourse on how we know (epistemology). This creates 
room for a critique on our assumptions and knowledge claims, and how they 
influence the way we perceive the reality that surrounds us. Thus, any theory 
development, like liberal peace, ought to be subjected to a critical analysis on 
the underlying assumptions.  
 
From a power relations dimension, relational constructionism shows that groups 
cannot simply be influenced from outside. This is because group processes 
develop “ongoing interaction patterns that emerge from continuous negotiation 
between the different actors involved” (Bouwen and Hovelynck, 2006:128).  The 
encounter in this multiplicity of relationships is contextually and historically 
embedded within a variety of perceptions.  This implies transcending the self 
and embracing mutuality as an experience of joining together for a purpose 
139 
 
(Blustein et al, 2004: 429). In other words the encounters in interactive 
relationships are not meant to subsume the other person’s/group’s identity or 
values, it is based on a mutual exchange of values, ideas, perceptions and 
understandings that are culturally and historically embedded. 
 
Relational constructionism studies the process of construction of different 
discourses (meanings, assertions, metaphors, stories, representations, images) 
that develop through relationships. As such, through a process of “reciprocal 
typification of action” (Burger and Luckmann, 2007:42) the relationships 
generate a process of institutionalization of a new reality (Burger and Luckmann, 
2007:42).  This interactive process creates “institutionally appropriate rules of 
conduct” (Burger and Luckmann, 2007: 49) which harmonize the society 
towards a common future.   
 
The interaction between different entities in reality construction engenders a 
relational practice. Relational practice is “any communicative or task-oriented 
interaction among organizational actors, exchanging goods or services, while 
positioning each other in a mutually inclusive relationship as members of a living 
community” (Bouwen, 2010:22). In NGO peacebuilding this would imply how 
different actors bring their expertise, passions and agendas into the practice of 
peacebuilding. The different actors form communities of practice (CoP) that are 
in a continuous process of dialogical construction of meaning, in both 
harmonious and competitive manner.  
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The term communities of practice (CoP) was first coined by Lave and Wenger 
(1991) in their discussion on situated learning, which refers to how people 
interactively learn skills and work together. They used the term to refer to a set 
of activities that are relationally performed by actors who share a common 
interest. This process can evolve spontaneously from everyday activities or 
within planned projects. Communities of practice can be “a set of relations 
among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation with other 
tangential and overlapping communities of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 
1991:98). The CoP can exist as formal groups with specific objectives, or an 
online discussion group with a social justice, environmental or political agenda.   
 
Lave and Wenger (1991) originally used the term CoP to refer to the 
socialization of new comers who begin by learning skills peripherally as they 
acquire expertise and knowledge in a form of apprenticeship and become active 
participants.  They referred to this process as legitimate peripheral participation 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991). The characteristic ways of belonging to a community 
is defined by legitimation and participation, while peripheriality and participation 
refer to contextual location and identity within the society (Lave and Wenger, 
1991:21). The usage of the term ‘CoP’ has however acquired different 
interpretations over the years. It has sometimes been used as “a conceptual 
lens through which to examine the situated social construction of meaning” but 
also as “a virtual community or informal group sponsored by an organization to 
facilitate knowledge sharing or learning” (Cox, 2005:527). 
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Wenger et al (2004) outline the structural characteristics of communities of 
practice as domain of knowledge, a notion of community and a practice. The 
domain refers to a field of knowledge which engenders a common ground that 
becomes a source of inspiration for community members to participate and 
learn in different social activities. This gives meaning to their commitment to 
social change. The second is the notion of community which bonds everyone 
together for a common purpose, cultivates interactions and encourages 
participation in the sharing of ideas and skills. The third is the practice which 
provides the ground for the development of knowledge through mutual sharing 
and support for emergent initiatives and creative engagement in social issues. 
Communities of practice have to be nurtured in order for them to grow and be 
effective in the community. They however have a life cycle of their own and can 
flourish whether or not they become recognized (Wenger et al., 2007:12). 
 
Communities of practice (CoP) develop transitional spaces (opportunities for 
diverse dialogue) for conversation and dialogue in exploration of a different 
future. Transitional space refers to the space that “facilitates experiment, 
openness and confrontation with others, production of meaning and 
understanding of the Self and the world...” (Dubouloy, 2004:469). Craps et al 
(2007:89) define transitional space as “an open, temporary and dynamic 
meeting ground with no other purpose than creating a space for dealing with 
new issues and new work forms.” Silverman (2001) adds a different perspective 
and defines transitional space as “the power of the space between nothing and 
something, the in-between, which often is silent and powerful...”  The organizing 
principle of transitional spaces differ from case to case and can be 
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characterized by the interaction and interdependency of present or previous 
experiences; the praxis of social action; aspirations for a common future; and 
the sharing of the challenges and experiences of hope and fate (Craps et al., 
2007:89; Cooperider and Whitney, 1999; Conway, 2004:57). This means that 
transitional spaces are characterized by the dynamics of interactions that take 
place in relationships.   
 
Communities of practice also produce knowledge in the process of developing 
their discourse and practice. Scholars in organizing theory (Orlikowski, 2002; 
Gherardi, 2000) following philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Bourdieu, 
have emphasized the importance of organizing based on “the enacted collective 
practices of knowledge and relationships” (Lambrechts et al., 2009:43). 
Relational knowledge emerges in the face-to-face encounters, and as such it 
reflects a “shift from what is between the ears of people to what goes on 
between the noses (Bouwen, 2010:26). In other words, “the intelligence is in 
between noses, not only in between ears” (Bouwen, 2005b cited by Perez 
(2010:304)). The frontier encounters entail the mutual-crossing of boundaries to 
experience each other’s worlds.  Relational constructionism therefore develops 
personalized encounters that cannot simply be generalized into social 
organizing.  
 
Knowledge is intrinsically relational and thus an inter-subjective encounter, 
hence a dialogical process (Cunliffe, 2002).  Dialogical processes are founded 
on interactive conversations that create meaning, bridge discourses and world 
views, and develop mutually influencing encounters. Bouwen (2010:31-32) 
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makes a description of “knowledge-as-participation” to emphasise the relational 
processes of learning and sense-making. This is opposed to knowledge-as-
substance which, according to Bouwen (2010:31) reifies knowledge as a thing 
to be grasped, absorbed and accepted without interrogation or participation. 
Bakhtin (1981) asserts that meaning lies in living conversations with the other in 
dialogical processes based on daily experiences as well as those of the past 
and future. Conversations are constructed through relationship with the other, 
and as Gergen (1999b:98) asserts “meaning lies not within the private mind, but 
in the process of relating.”  Through conversations, language practices of talking 
and writing emphasize relational aspects of talking with and not just about 
(Shotter, 2004). Cunliffe (2008:128) holds that everyday life produces 
“conversational spaces” between interactive participants.   
 
Lave and Wenger (1991: 57-58) affirm that there is always a tension, within 
communities of practice, between different dynamisms that take place in the 
course of learning and social engagement, such as: tensions between new 
comers and old-timers realized in the continuous social production of CoP; 
those who support processes of learning and those that oppose it. NGO 
peacebuilding in post-conflict settings is often faced with similar tensions. These 
tensions demonstrate that: “Learning, transformation, and change are always 
implicated in one another, and the status quo needs as much explanation as 
change” because all parties in CoP work towards producing a common future 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991: 57-58).  
 
144 
 
Bridging Differences in Communities of Practice 
Does the process of relational construction of discourses and practices within 
communities of practice necessarily lead to a consensus?  The purpose of 
relational constructionism is not to develop consensus building, but rather to 
decipher the interactive relationships and how these affect social change 
processes. However, interactive dialogic interactions can lead to a common 
understanding. This is what Gadamer (1976:269) refers to as “fusion of 
horizons.” ‘Horizon’ denotes "the range of possibilities that can be seen from a 
particular vantage point" (Gadamer, 1976:269). A horizon opens up possibilities 
of seeing different perspectives, one’s own cultural and historical experience, in 
relation to the new reality of encounter. This means that a horizon is "something 
into which we move and that moves with us" (Gadamer 1975:271 cited by 
Johnsen and Olsen (1992:430)). We carry our human experiences with us, but 
we also learn from new experiences, encounters with others and contribute to 
our contexts of encounter (Johnsen and Olsen, 1992:430), hence creating a 
continuous process of fusion of horizons.  
 
In order to bridge inter-subjective and group differences Stephenson and Kippax 
(2006) suggest “communicating across difference” through a process of 
“transfiguring relations” which transforms the differences towards a common 
future. Transfiguring social relations “allows us to grapple with the productive 
ambivalences of communication, without imposing moralizing or de-
contextualized imperatives on social action initiatives” (Stephenson and Kippax, 
2006:403). This perspective acknowledges the differences, lack of mutual 
recognition and imbalances in power relations. The emphasis is placed on 
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activation of agency in all levels of social relations.  Agency is seen as 
foundation of personhood (Hare, 2003; Shotter, 1984).   
 
Stephan (2008:35) suggests alliance building and critical self reflection as 
means of facing the differences within a group.  Alliance building entails 
“working through disagreements and building trust” (Stephan, 2008:35). This 
implies that members have to look into their own biases and prejudices against 
others, and dialogue towards a common understanding. Further, in order to 
bridge differences in perspectives, Stephan (2008:31) proposes emotional 
empathy which is “the capacity to feel the same emotions as members of the 
other group” in order to bridge each other’s prejudices and differences. From a 
similar perspective Broome (2009) proposes “relational empathy” as a means of 
bridging differences between parties. He clarifies that relational empathy is a 
process of “co-creation of meaning by participants in an interpersonal or group 
setting” (Broome, 2009:185). This process is interactive and engenders new 
meanings that allow for “new understandings to emerge, creative approaches to 
be developed, and innovative ideas to be proposed” (Broome, 2009:185).   
 
Bouwen (2010:29) underscores that an organization cannot be studied using 
“distant instrumentation” that is disconnected from the researcher. Instead, he 
insists that: “Any study or analysis of organizing is a series of relational activities 
assembled into an ongoing construction of knowledge by all actors involved” 
(Bouwen, 2010:29).   In this process of learning and knowledge creation, 
meaning resides in relationships because it is intrinsically “an emergent property 
of coordinated action” (Gergen, 1999:145). The process of coordination implies 
a movement-towards-the-other, but guided by a common desire for action.   
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I found the above perspectives to research to have been important in 
understanding the context of NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda. Through 
self-reflexivity I was able to identify occasional instances where my identity, 
perspectives and beliefs played into the research.  I have explained these in 
Chapters Five and Six.  
 
Part IV: Relational Constructionism and Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding is intrinsically relational and cannot be understood otherwise. It is 
an encounter with the reality of conflict, conflict parties, affected environment, 
dominant and marginalized discourses, power relations and agents of peace 
and those of conflict. Similarly, conflicts reflect the various oscillating tensions 
within relationships. The relational aspects in human conflicts have been 
articulated in different ways over time. Bion (1948) held that groups are 
interactively faced with different forms of relational aspects that dominate at one 
point or another: fight, which leads to conflict; flight, which drives one to avoid 
conflict; pairing which entails interpersonal interaction, or dependency on 
influential figures in a group.  Homans (1950 cited by Barker (2000:473)) 
underscored the diverse relationships between interaction, which entails 
communication between different subjects; action, which refers to the task to be 
achieved and sentiment, which connotes relational aspects of group behaviour. 
 
The ensemble of peacebuilding components is therefore set within an 
interactional existence.  According to Galtung (Galtung, 2007) “the basic point is 
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that peace is a relation between two or more parties…Peace is not a property of 
one party alone, but a property of the relation between parties.”  Galtung (2007) 
conceptualizes the aspirations of peace as a common ground, a place where 
parties converge. Ontologically peace aspiration becomes the relational space, 
a neutral meeting point. 
 
Lederach (2003:30) is emphatic that conflict transformation views peace as 
grounded in the quality of relationships and mutual interactions that influence 
the way in which we structure our society. Lederach (2003:18) sees conflict as a 
life giving opportunity rather than a threat. Conflict provokes dynamic 
interactions, creativity and relationship building within the process of 
peacebuilding. The dynamism is in both the group of peace practitioners and the 
affected community. In fact, the two groups might share each other’s identity: 
the practitioners could both be victims of conflict and agents of change, or 
external to the actual conflict.  Lederach (2003:17) suggests that it is important 
to understand the ebb and flow of conflict as an event that disrupts relationships 
but at the same time embedded in relationships.  
 
I will discuss relational constructionism in peacebuilding from three closely 
related perspectives. This will add to the above discussion in setting a 
framework for understanding NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda, which I 
discuss in the following chapters. The first is the partnership and networking, 
which refers to how individuals and groups come together and design strategies 
for a common social cause. The second aspect is relational practice of 
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peacebuilding, which describes how the practice of peacebuilding is an 
interactive process of meaning-making, searching for both common action and 
different approaches to bridging differences. The third aspect is communities of 
practice (CoP), which emerge from relational practice and the working 
relationships that develop in the course of peacebuilding practice. Community-
based approaches to peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Haider, 2009) can lead to 
the creation of communities of practice which become active agents of conflict 
transformation.  
 
Partnership and Networking 
NGOs working in post-conflict settings often get into partnership as a means of 
empowerment and mutual support. Such partnerships have sometimes been 
criticized as being tainted by imbalanced power relations. However, in relational 
constructionism partnership and networking facilitate spaces for mutual 
encounters that bring together multiple experiences.  
 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2004: 255-256) assert that organizations enter into 
partnership to increase efficiency, provide a multi-dimensional approach to 
problem solving, move from a no-win situation among multiple actors to win-win 
situation, and lastly, expand decision-making process in the promotion of the 
public good.   Partnership is therefore based on the understanding that partners 
mutually have something to offer in terms of resources, personnel, skills and the 
urgency of the issues to be addressed.  In other words, partners are able to 
keep their identity as well as strengthen it through exchanges of ideas, lessons 
learned and effective means of bringing change to the society.  
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Peacebuilding is often founded on networks of different agents working for 
peace. These networks develop into a social capital that is instrumental to social 
change processes. Thus social capital is relational because it is based on a 
network of relationships that are linked to the need for socialization; 
achievement of a task; family relations; political, religious, economic, cultural or 
ideological affiliations. Relational social capital thus refers to “the ability of 
actors to mobilize their social contacts in order to obtain valued resources” 
(Brunie, 2009:253). This means that relational social capital depends on the 
amount of resources that interactive actors can mobilize, and the social network 
of relationships that facilitate access to these resources (Brunie, 2009:253). 
Groups with strong ties have high expectations of reciprocity and tend to be 
tightly bonded together (Ganovetter, 1973 citedby Brunie (2009:255)). The 
bonding within relationships develops into a bonding social capital, which 
enhances “intra-community ties and provides the foundation for bringing 
individuals together” (Brunie, 2009:255).  On the other hand, groups with low 
ties tend to be disjointed although still well networked for achievement of 
specific objectives (Brunie, 2009:255).   
 
Networked peacebuilding can also be referred to as strategic peacebuilding, 
which Lederach and Scott (2010:36) identify as occurring “when initiatives, 
whether from below, or above, inside, or out, begin to link and coordinate with 
differentiated spaces and processes to effect the wider desired change. In a 
word, constructive transformation unfolds in relational spaces.”  This process 
acknowledges the local as a vital partner of peacebuilding with the realization 
that in most cases the local already exists in both national and international 
arenas (Lederach and Scott, 2010:27).  Hence, “(p)eacebuilding practice is… an 
150 
 
inter-disciplinary, local-global, expertise-driven approach to building sustainable 
peace” (Lederach and Scott, 2010:27). Similarly in NGO peacebuilding the daily 
interactions in the peacebuilding activities engender new relations, provoke 
intuitive ideas, challenge imposing perceptions and develop creativity for a 
different future. In the course of these happenings a common practice of 
peacebuilding emerges that we can refer to as relational practice, since it is 
relationship-induced. 
 
Relational Practice 
Relational practice, as I had earlier noted, is an interactive exchange between 
two or more participants with an impact on their relationship (process) and 
consequent outcome (goal) of the interaction (Bouwen, 2010; Hosking, 2010a; 
John, 2010).  In this section I will link up the concept of relational practice to 
peacebuilding activities. Relational practice takes different dimensions, 
approaches and interpretations in response to conflict. This entails coming 
together in joint practices to achieve a specific goal. These joint practices “are 
considered as the carriers of knowledge, learning, and change rather than the 
reflection or mere ‘talking about’ getting organized” (Lambrechts et al., 2009:43). 
The diverse contributions, challenges and perspectives contribute to the peace 
and conflict discourse, and influence the interpersonal and inter-group 
relationships and outcomes of peace and conflict.  
 
Bouwen (2010:26-29; 2001) distinguishes three approaches to relational 
practices of peace. The first is interaction in processes. Relational 
constructionism tends to emphasise analysis of processes of social 
constructionism and how relationships interplay in the meaning-making 
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processes. The second aspect of Bouwen’s relational practices of peace is the 
quality of relationship:  The quality of relational practice is determined by 
different value-based characteristics. Perez (2010:299) elaborates these as 
interactive characteristics of mutual exchange based on authentic motivations, 
mutual criticisms, comparative approaches and engendering processes of 
learning. The third aspect of Bouwen’s relational practice is con-versational 
relationship: The emphasis here is that conversations build relationships, 
bridges our differences and mediates our world. As I have already discussed 
above, conversations create opportunities for dialogue, mutual respect, 
competitions, trust and mistrust, and a learning experience for social change. 
This is particularly important in conceptualizing the ‘learning community of 
practice’ which struggles with the daily tensions, misconceptions, 
misunderstandings and fears in their peacebuilding practices. 
 
In relational practice, leadership plays an important role in transforming groups, 
societies and organizations. In relational constructionism leadership is viewed 
as relational, hence the term relational leadership. This term is relatively new 
(Uhl-Bien, 2006; Brower et al., 2000), and has gained currency in studies that 
examine organizing in communities and organizations. Relational leadership 
can be defined as “a social influence process through which emergent 
coordination (i.e. involving social order) and change (e.g., new values, attitudes, 
approaches, behaviours, and ideologies) are constructed and produced” (Uhl-
Bien, 2006:655).  This approach to leadership underscores the fact that 
leadership occurs within relational dynamics in the society and gains recognition 
based on the quality of relationships.  
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The dialogical conversations in relationships can produce a transitional space of 
interaction between individuals and groups. In NGO peacebuilding, transitional 
spaces would imply the peacebuilding arena where different parties come 
together to contribute to the conflict impact mitigation. Communities of practice 
(CoP) engage, within transitional spaces, in interactive processes of problem 
solving strategies. In other words, a community of practice develops as a 
‘group-in-the-making’ (Bouwen and Hovelynck, 2006:128) based on internal and 
external diverse conversations, interactions and common social actions.  
 
Transitional spaces generate alternative discourses to dealing with the 
complexities of social reality. Complexity can be double-edged, meaning that it 
“contributes to the perpetuation and intractable nature of conflict” (Senehi, 
2000:98) but at the same time provides opportunities for multiple interventions, 
variety of agents and dynamics of social engagement for change (Kriesberge, 
1999). Oversimplification presents an apparent accessibility to understanding 
whereas in actual fact it fails to achieve a deeper perception of the ‘other’. For 
example, in the critique of the liberal peace the local has been simplified 
through its romanticized characterizations (Richmond, 2009), hybridized 
validations (MacGinty, 2008) and sympathized rhetoric. These characterizations 
over-simplify the complexities of the ‘local’ in order to justify the arguments for or 
against its (local) inclusion. 
 
Communities of Practice (CoP) as Peacebuilding Communities 
In peacebuilding, relational practice entails building communities comprised of 
agents of peace. This process, in post-conflict settings, involves NGOs, local 
community, parties in conflict, donor agencies, governments and independent 
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peace practitioners. These different peace agents can be said to form 
communities of practice (CoP).   
 
In an analysis of the structure of CoP, Wenger (1998:72-73) identifies three 
major characteristics which I will link to NGO peacebuilding. The first is the 
mutual engagement: The participation by community members into different 
social activities evolve into collaborative relationships that eventually establish 
norms that bond the community together. In NGO peacebuilding mutual 
engagement would refer to the different levels of interaction between NGOs and 
community; donors and NGOs; and donors and their governments. These levels 
of engagement contribute to peacebuilding discourse in many different ways. 
 
The second is joint enterprise: the interaction between community members 
creates a common vision that is constantly negotiated in processes of reality 
construction. In NGO peacebuilding the joint enterprise would refer to the 
common desire for peace by engaging in different activities that promote peace 
and mitigate conflict. The joint aspect does not necessarily imply working in 
common but sharing a common aspiration for social change, even when 
working separately.  
 
The third is shared repertoire: The joint practice of the community members 
produces a common narrative that becomes part of the community resources 
(whether literal or symbolic meanings) and forms the shared repertoire.  In NGO 
peacebuilding the shared repertoire would include the resultant manifestation of 
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the different approaches to peacebuilding which can be conglomerated to a 
common resource for peace. The commonality is not necessarily characterized 
by uniformity but a variety of practices that contribute to different perspectives to 
peacebuilding and recovery from conflict. 
 
Gammelgaard (2010:351) proposes ‘virtual communities of practices’ as a 
space where different practitioners can interact and engage in social exchange, 
and where “the communication and coordination of work take place in 
cyberspace through information technology.”  Participants take advantage of the 
virtual space to exchange best practices; facilitate knowledge retrieval; and 
minimize contextual gaps and physical distances.  
 
The above concepts and perspectives in relational constructionism, as I shall 
demonstrate in the subsequent chapters, are important in understanding the 
relational aspects of NGO peacebuilding and the extent to which these 
relationships construct peacebuilding discourse and practice. The interaction of 
different actors in the peacebuilding arena generates a relational practice of 
peacebuilding that renews itself through constant evaluations that become 
‘lessons learned’. Stephan (2008:34) is emphatic that “(m)ediators and 
facilitators need to model the same types of behaviors they wish to have the 
parties to the conflict display.”  In other words, peace practitioners have to 
internalize the values of peace that they project to the community.  
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In my data analysis I applied relational constructionism to study how relational 
transactions, networking, power dynamics, social change process, motivations 
and reciprocities contributed to the process of construction of peacebuilding 
discourse and practice in northern Uganda. I have discussed these perspectives 
in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a framework for understanding interactive processes 
of peacebuilding between NGOs, donors and local community, and thus offered 
a basis for comprehending the underlying processes of NGO peacebuilding in 
the post-conflict setting of northern Uganda.  Given that NGO peacebuilding is 
characterized by multiple actors, different power relations and competing value 
systems, it is important to decipher the complex reality of peacebuilding 
interactions within conflict dynamics. Such an analysis would facilitate the 
understanding of the processes of construction of peacebuilding discourse and 
practice. Failure to engage with the complexity easily leads to the generalized 
over-simplification of the post-conflict reality and the peacebuilding practice.  
 
Given the diversity of actors in NGO peacebuilding, my interest in this chapter 
has been geared towards developing a theoretical framework that facilitates a 
tacit understanding of how heterogeneous groups such as NGOs, local 
community, international communities, donors and other stakeholders in 
peacebuilding relationally interact, work together, communicate, address their 
differences and discover new approaches to peacebuilding. Poole (1999:92) 
suggests that investigating different aspects of diversity in groups tends to 
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clarify “how different types of individuals ‘fit together’ in groups.”  Thus, 
analyzing how individuals and groups (NGOs, donors and local community) fit 
together within dialogical spaces, competitive encounters, mutual recognition 
and misrecognition is important in elucidating the process of peacebuilding.   
 
This chapter has also shown that processes of relational constructionism are 
marked with internal differences and power dynamics. Managing power at 
different levels of group dynamics is important. This entails understanding how 
groups interpret and understand power dynamics; and how in the process, they 
generate relationships amongst themselves. Thus, conflict, power and status 
are closely related (Sell, 2004). A general consensus on the use of power 
facilitates the smooth running of relations within a group, however this can at the 
same time generate different levels of inequality (Sell et al., 2004:48).  
 
Power relations can sometimes be faced with situations of resistance and 
counter-actions. In social power relations, groups can resist socialization of 
power that translates to status and domination (Lovaglia and Houser, 1996; 
Walker et al., 2000). Such could lead to relational conflict between individuals 
and groups, as well as cognitive conflict, which refers to awareness of emerging 
differences in diverse viewpoints and opinions about the tasks (Sell et al, 2004: 
51).  
 
The process of confrontation can either take an affirmative action approach that 
reiterates agency or the negative approach that explores the oppressive 
impositions on the agency.  However, Stephenson and Kippax (2006:403) are 
emphatic that neither of these two approaches are effective, hence their 
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proposal above on transfiguring social relations. Simultaneous interactions of 
different roles within organization can also mediate differences between parties 
in a group. In each organization or society there are complex networks of role-
relationships that determine individual and group actions and the choices that 
are made in developing a common identity.  From an organizational studies 
perspective, relational constructionism framework shades light into 
understanding the dynamics of NGO peacebuilding in post-conflict settings.  
 
I will apply the relational constructionism concept in the next three chapters in 
order to understand NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda. In the next chapter 
I will analyze Ugandan context from historical, social, economic and political 
perspectives while demonstrating how different actors engaged in interactive 
processes of relational constructionism of the reality of nation building, 
peacebuilding and violence. This will set the ground for understanding the 
discourse and practice of peacebuilding between NGOs, community and donor 
agencies in northern Uganda, which I discuss in Chapters Five and Six.   
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Chapter Four: The Northern Uganda Conflict 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of northern Uganda conflict as a contextual 
background to NGO peacebuilding. I analyze the northern Uganda conflict 
within the broader conceptualization of different conflicts in Uganda. In order to 
situate NGO peacebuilding I examine the diverse peacebuilding efforts that 
have taken place in the country from colonial to post independence periods. My 
central argument is that different peacebuilding mechanisms and efforts have 
not fully addressed the root causes of Uganda conflict. The root causes of the 
conflict lie in the management of access to political power and control of political 
institutions that facilitate the power management and distribution of national 
resources.   
 
This analysis is based on the assertion that the Uganda conflict is essentially 
political. Thus, the competition for the control of the state power, from colonial 
period to the present, is the key aspect that weaves different explanations of the 
Uganda conflict. This can be explained by: the tensions between ethnic diversity 
and state power; democratic participation of the mass population and the 
centralized power by the political elite; control of national resources by the 
political elite and the claim to the share of the same resources by the masses; 
and state-controlled mechanisms of conflict resolution through militarized 
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approaches and retaliatory militarized response from the ‘opponents’. These 
political tensions have historically protracted conflicts in Uganda.  
 
Northern Uganda conflict has cost more than 300,000 lives (Kisekka-Ntale, 
2007:422), mass abduction of children, internal displacements (Human Rights 
Watch, 1997, 2003b; Amnesty International, 1997, 1999) and, increase in 
poverty, trauma and insecurity (Brett, 1996a). The most affected area is the 
northern region inhabited by the Acholi people, where the government, 
purportedly for security reasons, had since 1996, herded 1.5 million people into 
displacement camps, under very poor living conditions (Mwenda, 2010:55). The 
former United Nations Secretary for Humanitarian Assistance, Jan Egeland, 
described the situation as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world 
(Dolan, 2009:23; Reliefweb, 2003).42  There have been several conflict 
mediation attempts, and the most recent peace negotiations (2006-2008) led to 
a ceasefire and relative peace but the parties did not sign a peace agreement, 
further increasing the unpredictability of attaining peace.   
 
The major contribution of this chapter to the general literature is the historical 
analysis of the conflict trajectories and perspectives in Uganda, while 
highlighting the contextual complexities and implications to the peacebuilding 
efforts. Most analyses of Uganda conflict, similar to analyses of African conflicts, 
tend to limit themselves to the post independent reality of the conflict or to most 
recent socio-political events.  Such analyses, as I shall demonstrate below, 
                                                 
42
 Egeland made this remark at the end of his fact finding mission in northern Uganda in 2003. 
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have often made reductionist conclusions based on current phenomenon 
without getting into the depth of the analysis. Another important observation is 
that these generalized analyses are often not based on the perceptions of the 
people on the ground. In Chapters Five and Six I will complement the 
discussions in this chapter with the field research findings that reveal the 
people’s perception of the conflict.   
 
I have divided the discussions in this chapter into three main sections: First, I 
seek to demonstrate that the northern Uganda conflict is not simply a sporadic 
conflict between the Acholi people’s LRA and GOU, but reflects much deeper 
historical tensions of control for political power and national resources. This has 
been the case from colonial to post-independence periods. Second, I hold that 
the post-independence period perpetuated the control of state power by political 
elite while relying on militarization of conflicts as means of achieving peace and 
settling differences. The challenge of nation-building, as a peacebuilding effort, 
lay in the capacity to integrate the aspirations of the different ethnic groups into 
a modern state.  Third, I demonstrate that there have been diverse efforts 
towards peacebuilding by the government, NGOs and civil society, and 
international community through the ICC. I apply relational constructionism in 
peacebuilding to demonstrate how varied initiatives constructed a transitional 
space for a dialogical discourse as a means of bridging differences between 
parties in conflict.  
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Part I: The Colonial Government: Maintaining peace through divide and rule 
 
Situating the Uganda Conflict 
Uganda conflict, like many African conflicts, has been explained from different 
perspectives without linking the broad historical factors that are fundamental in 
the understanding of the conflict. The current literature tends to make 
generalized conclusions to explain Uganda conflict, and other African conflicts. 
One would thus read statements like: Uganda conflict has mainly been ethnic in 
characterization (Mazrui, 1969; Mamdani, 1995; Okuku, 2002). This argument 
has been used to demonstrate how the different ethnic groups in Uganda 
cannot live together due to historical conflicts over the years.  
 
The colonial legacy of divide and rule has equally been blamed for the ethnic 
divisions resulting from ethnic conflicts in Uganda (Mazrui, 1969; Mamdani, 
1995; Okuku, 2002). The colonial government mainly recruited the northerners 
into the military (Green, 2009:70; Dunn, 2010:54). Civil servants were mostly 
taken from the South where there were more educational facilities and 
commercialized agriculture (Van Acker, 2004:341). These preferential 
treatments heightened the North-South tension as I shall later explain. However, 
as it is the case in the North, different ethnic groups in the South are not 
homogeneous and have had their own conflicts in pursuit for power. The 
Buganda Kingdom for example, has over the years attempted to wrestle power 
from the central government (Mazrui, 1969; Finnström, 2008; Twaddle, 1993). 
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There were also many conflicts within Buganda Kingdom and the kingdoms 
among themselves (Low, 1971a, 1971b; Twaddle, 1993). 
 
Others have held that “Africa’s civil wars conform to a global pattern that is 
better explained by political and economic factors as well as by the extent of 
ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in the society”(Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002:1). Economic marginalization of the North by President Yoweri Museveni 
has been explained as one of the major points of contention held by the LRA 
(Dunn, 2010).  While Uganda under Museveni made positive economic and 
political progress with the help of financial support from the West, the wealth 
was not distributed to the northern and eastern parts of the country (Buckley-
Zistel, 2008:71; Van Acker, 2004:337).  
 
The lack of integration of different ethnic groups into a cohesive nation has been 
used as one of the explanations for Uganda conflict (Okuku, 2002; Hansen, 
1977). Inadequate mechanisms for conflict resolution have led to militarization 
of conflict as a means of settling differences (Kabwegyere, 1972:303). Similar 
arguments have been used to explain how the nation-building processes in 
Africa were largely determined by the extent to which ethnic groups could co-
exist together (Heynes, 2007; Rothchild, 1997).       
 
The above explanations capture some major aspects of the history of Ugandan 
conflict. However, a more comprehensive analysis needs to take into account 
the different levels of complexities in Uganda conflict, and particularly in the 
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northern Uganda conflict, and the attempts at peacebuilding. It is therefore 
important to note four related levels of complexity in the northern Uganda 
conflict. The first level of complexity lies in the fact that a good number of the 
LRA combatants were children that had been recruited forcefully, and in some 
cases compelled to attack and kill their own family members in the villages. This 
meant that the ex-combatants were both victims and perpetrators. The second 
level is that the Acholi people had been victims of both the LRA and Uganda 
government. Human Rights Focus (HURIFO) (2002c:47), an NGO in Gulu, 
details how the northern population was caught between “two fires”, the 
government and LRA, leading to human rights abuses from both sides.  The 
third level of complexity is linked to the fact that the Acholi population had sons 
both in the LRA and Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) leading to 
divisions, killings, suspicions and victimization (Lino and Baines, 2007). This 
created a moral dilemma leading to a social identity crisis that reiterated the fact 
of the community being caught between the two fires. The fourth level of 
complexity lies in the fact that the shift from relief-development to peacebuilding 
presents the NGOs as the giver and local community as the receiver, hence 
benefactor and dependent, respectively. This is however more of a challenge 
than a complexity, but nevertheless projects an imbalance that, if not well 
handled could affect the achievement of the intended results of peacebuilding.  
 
My analysis demonstrates that there are many historical, social, political and 
cultural factors that can explain the northern Uganda conflict. These factors are 
inter-related. It is therefore important to “interrogate the social totality of the 
conflict, paying respectful attention not only to political and economic factors but 
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to social and religious dimensions as well” (Dunn, 2010:56).  This analysis, in 
light of relational constructionism, will put further clarity into the research 
question of my thesis: To what extent is the NGO peacebuilding in northern 
Uganda informed by the local reality and/or external conceptualizations of 
peacebuilding? 
 
The British colonial government undermined the inspirations for the formation of 
a united Uganda in three different ways: first was the divide and rule legacy that 
set different ethnic communities apart; second was the close collaboration with 
the Buganda Kingdom that led to the Kingdom’s domination much at the 
expense of the grievances of other ethnic groups; third, was that economic and 
political policies of colonial government led to the marginalization of the northern 
regions. 
 
Colonial Legacy of Divide and Rule 
The early British interest in Uganda was mainly to safeguard the Suez-Canal, 
the Nile and the Cairo-Cape corridor which ensured a business link with the 
Cecil Rhodes’ Company in South Africa43 (Kisekka-Ntale, 2007:423-424). This 
was to counter the previous German treaty of friendship44 with the Kabaka45, 
                                                 
43
 Cecil Rhodes Company was one of the most powerful economic enterprises in South Africa 
towards the end of the 19
th
 century (Legassick, 1974:260). The company controlled large 
resources of diamond and gold mines. The British colonial agents hoped to make lucrative 
business by securing links with Cecil Rhodes. LEGASSICK, M. 1974. South Africa: capital 
accumulation and violence. Economy and Society, 3, 253-291. 
44
 In 1889 Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda Kingdom signed a treaty of friendship with the Germans 
(Gray, 1960). This was German’s attempt to extend its influence in East Africa. However in 1890 
Great Britain and Germany signed a treaty that gave Britain the ‘right’ over what was later to 
become Uganda. This was in line with the earlier Anglo-Germany treaty that divided East 
African territories between the Germans and British. GRAY, J. 1960. Anglo-German Relations in 
Uganda, 1890–1892. The Journal of African History, 1, 281-297.    
45
 Kabaka refers to the title given to the kings in Buganda Kingdom. For example, Kabaka 
Mutesa would imply King Mutesa. 
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King of the Buganda Kingdom (Twaddle, 1993:70). Hence, following the Anglo-
Germany agreement in 1886, the British acquired the territory and hurriedly 
“bundled the different ethnic groups together to create a single administrative 
colonial entity that later became Uganda” (Kisseka-Ntale 2007: 424), similar to 
the strategy followed in other British colonies in Africa.  The difference was that 
in this case Buganda was recognized by the British as a ‘kingdom’ and enjoyed 
privileges that I discuss below. Other groups were only recognized as ‘ethnic 
groups’. Thus, from the very beginning the British intention of bringing together 
different ethnic groups into a single territory of governance was not to found a 
country but to govern a colonial protectorate (Wrigley, 1988) for their own 
political and economic interests. 
 
What is today known as Uganda was non-existent in the pre-colonial times. 
Different ethnic groups had their own nations under an independent system of 
governance, either in the form of kingdoms or chiefdoms. The region as we 
know it today was mainly dominated by the Buganda Kingdom, the largest and 
most powerful of the kingdoms. The Buganda constantly sought to expand its 
territory by use of force, often through the support of the colonial government 
(Southhall, 1988:60; Twaddle, 1993:66-87).   The region was largely divided into 
Bantu and Nilotic groups (Gingyera-Pinchwa, 1989:49): in the South, the 
kingdoms of the Buganda, Banyoro, Banyankole and Toro; and in the North 
(and north-western), the Nilotic groups that mainly had chiefdoms - the 
Karamojong, Iteso, Lango, Acholi, Mahdi, Lugbara. The northern and north 
western groups are largely pastoralists and agriculturalists.   
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The British colonial government decentralized its government and introduced 
localized government under chiefs and kings (Mamdani, 1996:62; Low, 
1971:144-145). Ethnic groups were confined to their ethnic boundaries. As a 
result “ethnic groups were politically kept apart from each other. There was no 
struggle to control the centre and the resources involved, because these were 
under the exclusive control of the central colonial government” (Barongo, 
1989:71-72). The colonial government used this decentralized approach to 
power as a means of achieving peace between the central and local 
government, and maintaining stability between different ethnic groups (Barongo, 
1989:71; Mazrui, 1969:155). 
 
The British colonial strategy had three intended and unintended consequences. 
First, the attempt to confine different ethnic groups into independent territories 
latter became a major challenge to nation-building efforts. Without a common 
national language, other than English for those with the opportunity of receiving 
western education, it was impossible to develop features of what might look like 
a constructed nation. Second, the political and economic policies of 
administering the divide and rule colonial territory led to inter-ethnic tensions 
particularly in the special treatment of the Buganda Kingdom, and the North-
South preferential treatments. Third, the colonial government in its efforts to 
form Uganda nation ignored the basic principles of social identity formation that 
demand that externalized identities have to be negotiated and not imposed. 
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The Buganda Factor in the Struggle for Nationalism   
At the time of the arrival of the colonialists in the 19th century, the Buganda 
Kingdom was the most powerful and best organized in the region (Doornbos 
and Mwesigye, 1994:62). Their contacts in 1830s with the Arab traders meant 
that they were advanced in commerce and ammunition, and at one stage had a 
standby army of more than 6000 men who engaged neighbouring ethnic groups 
in constant conflicts in search for slaves and political expansion (Gukiina, 
1972:43). As a result, Buganda dominated the region, increased its wealth 
through trade with Arab countries, as well as raiding smaller ethnic groups. This 
meant that the southern regions under the control of the Buganda had a much 
stronger economy in comparison to the poor northern regions, essentially 
creating a North-South economic disparity. 
 
Predictably, the British chose to govern by use of indirect rule through the 
Buganda and engaged them in negotiations as a strategy to conquer the region 
(Southall, 1988:60).  The privileged status of the Buganda in the colonial system 
led to what Kisekka-Ntale (2009:424) refers to as “Buganda sub-imperialism”. 
The close collaboration between the British colonialists and the Buganda 
kingdom legitimized the rule of the former, increased the political domination of 
the latter, and created animosity from the other ethnic groups.  The Buganda 
became the central administration point, privileging the southern ethnic groups 
against the northern ones, hence leading to the persistent North-South tensions 
(Apter, 1997:19).  
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The issue of the Buganda dominance and their exclusivist politics during the 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods has remained a crucial factor in 
the struggle for nation-building in Uganda (Doornbos and Mwesigye, 1994; 
Hansen and Twaddle, 1994; Mazrui, 1969).  As Low (1962:66) observes, 
whatever happened in Buganda “was bound to influence what was to happen or 
not happen” in other provinces of the Protectorate.  
 
The 1900 Agreement (see Box 1 below) between the British colonialists and the 
Buganda Kingdom gave the latter more privileges to exist as a mini-state within 
the region (Apter, 1997:83).  
Box 1 Buganda Agreement 1900 
 
Buganda Agreement 1900 
The Agreement was between the Buganda Kingdom and British Protectorate government. 
The Buganda Kingdom was accorded partial independence and allowed to own 9,000 
square miles of land under its jurisdiction (Low, 1971a:125). This land was referred to as 
mailo and was directly under the authority of the Kabaka and his chiefs, as opposed to the 
Crown land that was under the British protectorate (Nkurunziza, 2007:511). Some of the 
mailo land was already under the possession of the peasants who automatically became 
tenants of the Buganda Kingdom after the agreement. This led to tensions and power 
struggle between the chiefs and the tenants, particularly because the chiefs took on 
themselves the liberty to heavily tax the residence under their jurisdiction. There were also 
power struggles between the chiefs and provincial commissioners of the Protectorate 
(Okoth, 2006a:62). However, the Agreement stipulated that in case of conflict between 
Buganda and Protectorate, the Agreement took precedence over the laws of the 
Protectorate (Okoth, 2006a:62). Article 5 of the Agreement stated that “The Laws made 
for the general governance of Uganda Protectorate by Her Majesty’s Government be 
equally applicable to the Kingdom of Buganda except in so far as they may in any 
particular way conflict with the terms of this Agreement will constitute a special exception 
in regard to the Kingdom of Buganda” (Low, 1971b:203). The preferential treatment of 
the Buganda in the 1900 Agreement created discontent among different ethnic groups who 
equally claimed for a special recognition, but failed to gain similar concessions as the 
Buganda (Low, 1971a:125). 
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Even though this Agreement was between the Buganda and the British, it had 
ramifications for the rest of Uganda, creating unequal relationships between the 
Buganda and the rest of Uganda (Okoth, 2006:63-64).  The Buganda elite 
involved in the negotiations were favoured in the Agreement to amass wealth 
and political power by encroaching into the territories of other ethnic nations 
(Okoth, 2006:63).  Buganda’s close collaboration with the colonial government 
increased its territorial power and at the same time marginalized the grievances 
of other smaller ethnic groups that did not have a closer collaboration with the 
central colonial government (Okoth, 2006:63). Even though the ethnic groups 
from the North did not have centralized authority like in kingdom systems, they 
too had genuine grievances with the colonial government (Ocaya-Lakidi, 
1982:300).  
 
There was constant competition between the British and the Buganda authority 
for the control of the expansion of the Buganda territories in late 19th century, 
despite their close collaboration (Southhall, 1988:60; Mazrui, 1969:149). When 
the British sought to have a united East African Federation that would put 
together the countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Apter, 1997:276), the 
Buganda and other countries resisted and the British abandoned the idea. The 
British further pursued the idea of a united Uganda, but again the Kabaka and 
the Lukiiko (parliament) resisted the proposal and this time claimed their own 
independence from the British (Mazrui, 1969:149; Gukiina, 1972:105). As a 
result, the British “withdrew their recognition of the Kabaka and his authority” 
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and on November 1st 1953, the Kabaka was deported to England (Gukiina, 
1972:95-96). 46 
 
The position of the Buganda Kingdom within the Uganda nation has continued 
to be a bone of contention to date, sometimes leading to calls for secession 
(Doornbos and Mwesigye, 1994). This has further heightened the North-South 
tensions that have threatened the unity of Uganda as a nation (Ginywera-
Pinchwa, 1989:49). For example, as recently as May 2009, a member of 
parliament and leader of Greater Northern Uganda, Felix Okot-Ogong, in his 
complaint in parliament against the government’s nepotism and ethnicism, is 
quoted in the media to have said: “If the state of Uganda cannot accommodate 
the people of Greater Northern Uganda and treat them as equal citizens, then 
these people will one day find where to belong” (Ladu and Naturinda, May 1 
2009). The dream secession-nation has been referred to by their proponents as 
the Nile Republic.47 
                                                 
46
 In a compromised agreement in 1955, at the return of the Kabaka, the British Protectorate 
granted the Buganda an internal self-governance status with representatives to the Legislative 
Council of Uganda (Gukiina, 1972:97; Apter, 1997: 367, 382).  The traditional Kabaka was 
transformed into a constitutional monarchy, with elected members (Low, 1971:203). However, 
the Buganda Kingdom was to remain an integral part of Uganda. This was a swift turn of events 
that would generate aspirations for independence from the British rule (Wrigley, 1988:33). 
GUKIINA, P. M. 1972. A case Study in African Political development. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press; APTER, D. E. 1997. The political kingdom in Uganda : a study of 
bureaucratic nationalism, London, Frank Cass; LOW, D. A. 1971. Buganda in modern history, 
Berkeley, University of California Press. 
47
 In the same debate in parliament, another MP referred as professor Latigo insisted that the 
people of northern Uganda were ready to form their own Nile Republic (Ladu and Naturinda, 
May 1
st
 2009). LADU, I. L. & NATURINDA, S. May 1 2009. Anger, secession calls follow Onen's 
sacking. The Daily Monitor. Kampala: The Nation Group. 
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Economic and Political Policies: North –South Divide 
The British colonial enterprise was largely motivated by commercial activities to 
support the empire. Kisekka-Ntale (2007:426) maintains that, “increased 
demand for plantation crops and greater supply of labour fuelled the 
considerable expansion of the colonial enterprise in Africa.” The new economy 
introduced employment and money economy, leading to the marginalization of 
subsistence farmers and pre-colonial inter-community traders. For example, 
Sathyamurphy (1986: 30) affirms that by 1963, “The average Ugandan wage-
earner was more than 60 per cent better off than the average self-employed 
African Uganda.”   
 
The economic disparities between the different ethnic groups have contributed 
to the North-South divide over the years (Kisekka-Ntale, 2007:427; Mutibwa, 
1992:157). The South, through the Buganda, had an earlier access to 
commercial activities with the Arabs, besides the introduction of cash crop 
plantations such as coffee, cotton and sugar cane due to favourable climatic 
conditions (Apter, 1997: 181-182, 187). This situation, as I have noted above, 
advantaged the South over the North even before the coming of colonialists. In 
addition, the availability of mineral resources such as limestone, phosphates, 
copper and tin further enriched the region (Kisekka-Ntale, 2007:427).  Further, 
Southhall (1988:61) asserts, the colonial government invested much more in the 
South by training skilled professionals and civil servants, and building 
educational structures.  
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In contrast, the North was impoverished with minimum economic activities, a 
reality that is still present to date (Dunn, 2010:53-54). The British colonial 
government chose to recruit its army from the Acholi who were labelled as 
‘warriors’ given their persistent combat with their neighbours in the East, 
Karamojong, in the South, the Langi, and in the West, the Madi, besides the 
constant conflicts between the Acholi sub-clans (Byarugaba, 1998; Kisekka-
Ntale, 2007). Other northern tribes were also recruited into the army. The British 
found it safer to recruit from the less centralized North which posed no threat to 
its administration in comparison to the more centralized South that had a clear 
chain of command through the kings (Dunn, 2010:54; Finnström, 2008:64).  
 
The imbalanced opportunities for employment and financial facilities further 
marginalized the North. The majority of the population in the North did not have 
reliable source of employment (Dunn, 2010:54). Mazrui (1975: 35-37) affirms 
that for the people of the North, joining the army was the second major source of 
income besides agriculture. For most of these peasants, “a military career was 
their first introduction to Uganda as a national entity” (Mazrui, 1975: 39).  The 
continuous provision of unskilled military labour led to the impoverishment of the 
North during both the colonial and the post independence periods (Kisseka-
Ntale, 2007: 427).  However, one can argue that it was the colonial intervention 
that brought economic development to the northern regions through military 
employment. Latigo ( 1997:1) maintains that at “independence in 1962, the 
Acholi enjoyed among the highest per capita representation in Uganda’s Higher 
Education. This was primarily the result of investment by the many Acholi 
soldiers who served at home in Uganda and abroad in the Colonial 
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Administration.” Nonetheless, the post-independence period has been marked 
with many conflicts and to date northern Uganda is seriously impoverished.   
 
Part II: Post-Independence Uganda: Nation building and militarization of 
conflicts 
The post-independence Uganda was faced with the challenge of peacebuilding 
through nation-building processes. Van Acker (2004:342) notes that this 
challenge was marked by “tensions between a developed centre and 
underdeveloped north, northern dominance of the military, and full or partial 
federal status for a number of southern kingdoms.” This implied that the 
challenge for peacebuilding lay in transforming a state that had inherited a 
colonial system of decentralized power where local governments run their own 
affairs based on ethnic and district demarcations.  
 
Following independence in 1962, the colonial government left behind a 
constitution that was meant to guarantee peace between different ethnic groups 
by granting, to a greater degree certain autonomy and independence to the 
kingdoms, and to a lesser degree to the district authorities (Barongo, 1989:72). 
However, among the kingdoms, Buganda was granted a larger autonomy, 
whereas smaller ones like Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Busoga territory were 
given less autonomy (Jøgensen, 1981:125). The constitution, as a 
peacebuilding tool, contained both the nationalist aspirations and federal 
autonomy as means of holding together the complex ethnic diversity into one 
nation.    
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 The constitution making process was met with several obstacles, mainly linked 
to the tensions between central government and decentralized local government. 
These tensions later led to early post independence crisis. Mazrui (1969) points 
out that the post independence Uganda had two major issues that led to the 
political crisis. First was the latent violence between the different ethnic groups, 
and secondly, the vigorous constitutionalism as a framework for political contest. 
The latent violence was manifested by the persistent calls for Buganda 
autonomy within the new independent nation; the unresolved question of the 
lost counties of the Banyoro Kingdom48; the distrustful relationship between the 
Buganda and other ethnic groups; and the party politics that led to inter-party 
tensions in parliament.  
 
The second factor that Mazrui discusses is vigorous constitutionalism. He 
defines constitutionalism as a “procedural approach to politics; a faith in legal 
solutions to political tensions; a relatively open society with institutionalized 
competition for power in the polity…” (Mazrui, 1969:147). The challenge for the 
post-independence Uganda was to negotiate a constitution that safeguarded 
equal rights of every ethnic group. This proved to be a big challenge to 
overcome. For most Ugandans the 1962 constitution reflected the legal 
independence agreement that was to govern the country, “a form of social 
                                                 
48
 Under the leadership of Fredrick Lugard, one of the major architects of British colonization in 
Africa, five other districts were taken away from the Bunyoro Kingdom and given to Buganda 
Kingdom in a formal treaty in 1900 in return for levies that were to be paid to the British (Low, 
1971:143; Sathyamurthy 1986:106). These came to be known as the lost counties and have led, 
to date, to the persistent claims from the Banyoro to repossess their counties. LOW, D. A. 1971. 
Buganda in modern history, Berkeley, University of California Press; SATHYAMURTHY, T. V. 
1986. The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1986, Hants, UK, Gower Publishing Co. Ltd. 
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contract creating a new society, and the parties to the contract surrendered 
some of their own natural rights for the sake of the compact” (Mazrui, 1969:161). 
 
Post independence Uganda was marked by competition for power and control, 
ethnonationalism and distrust. Rupesinghe (1995) notes that the problem for 
most post-independent African countries like Uganda was how to develop 
political institutions that had the capacity to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts. 
There were tensions between the government of Milton Obote, the first 
president, and the Buganda Kingdom. These tensions led to Obote’s attack of 
the Kabaka palace in 196649 and suspension of the constitution in 1967 leading 
to an autocratic rule; political parties were mainly formed along ethnic and 
political lines; ethnic and political tensions threatened the unity of the country. 
These events created major ethno-political rifts in both the government and 
entire country, and generated a militarized approach to addressing disputes 
(Behrend, 1998:429; Kisekka-Ntale, 2007).  
 
Obote’s suspension of the constitution and assumption of all powers to himself 
marked the beginning of violent history that Uganda was to experience.  The 
interim constitution passed by parliament in 1967 lacked public support 
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 Following the tensions between Obote and the Buganda Kingdom, the Kabaka parliament, the 
Lukiiko, ordered the central government of Obote to leave the Buganda soil by end of May 1966 
(Kasozi, 1994:85).  Obote responded aggressively and attacked the Kabaka residence in what 
came to be known as the ‘Battle of the Palace’ (Mazrui, 1969:161; Kasozi et al, 1994:85). He 
suspended the constitution and parliament, assumed all powers and made himself the president 
and head of state. The Kabaka, Mutesa II, went into exile in 1969, and this marked the end of 
the political kingdom of the Buganda (Kasozi et al, 1994:87). KASOZI, A. B. K., MUSISI, N. & 
SEJJENGO, J. M. 1994. The social origins of violence in Uganda, 1964-1985, Montreal, McGill-
Queen's University Press;  MAZRUI, A. A. 1969. Violence and Thought: Essays on Social 
Tensions in Africa, London, Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd.  
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(Waliggo, 1995). The constitution and the rule of law were the basic 
mechanisms for peacebuilding. Mazrui (1969:152) explains that constitutional 
making processes and implementation was always juxtaposed by threats to 
violence. This constant threat to violence meant that the “immediacy of possible 
violence…compelled antagonists to experiment with other forms of conflict-
resolution” (Mazrui, 1969:152) such as resort to court and other legal 
mechanisms.   
 
In the post 1966-67 crisis there were series of coup d’états and military 
resistances (see Appendix: Table no. 1) that arguably became normal ways of 
expressing grievances and ‘solving’ conflicts (Behrend, 1998:108).  Hence, as 
Brett puts it succinctly: “The gun rather than the vote has dominated political 
change in Uganda since independence” (Brett, 1994:78). This has led to the 
institutionalization of violence as “the main instrument of political control” 
(Kasozi et al., 1994:88). Kabwegyere (1972:303) develops a hypothesis that: 
“any agent of change alien to the people whose way of life this agent is 
determined to change radically, always uses violence as a main means to bring 
about the change.”  Ethnocratic heritage, as Mazrui (1975:51) would refer to it, 
trapped the country into a vicious circle of ethnic-based violence.  Both the 
politicians and the local masses were held hostage by the ideological ethnic 
entrapments that were used to justify the violence. Thus, the above 
disagreements led to socialization of violence that dated back to the colonial 
period. 
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Militarization of Conflict 
Key figures from the northern ethnic groups ruled the country for twenty four 
years, from independence in 1962 to 1985, and in 1986 Museveni, a southerner, 
took over (see Appendix, Table 1).  Obote’s government, mainly identified with 
the Lango ethnic group (Hansen, 1977b:92), became unpopular following 
economic crisis, loss of jobs, civilian repression, controlled political space and 
military oppression (Mamdani, 1984:28-29). Subsequently, Obote was 
overthrown in 1971 by his army general, Idi Amin, a northern Kakwa50. Amin’s 
excessive power led to civilian massacres, oppression of political parties and 
civilians, and economic depression (Mudoola, 1988; Mamdani, 1984; Martin, 
1988).  Mamdani (1984:42) notes that: “As a result of the 1971 coup in Uganda, 
the army became the supreme organ of the state. The cabinet, now under a 
military head of state, was concerned simply with the conduct of day-to-day 
affairs…the predominantly civilian cabinet members were drafted into the army 
cadets.”  Amin was overthrown in 1979 through the aid of Tanzanian troops 
(Mudoola, 1988). The Tanzanian invasion of Amin was provoked by Amin’s 
attempt to annex part of Tanzanian territory (Mudoola, 1988:285). What followed, 
as Apter (1995:162-163) explains, were a series of coups under the watch of 
Tanzanian Military Commission51 (see Appendix, Table 1 for a chronological 
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 The Nilotic Kakwa people belong to an expansive ethnic group that exists in north-western 
Uganda, western side of the River Nile, but they are also in southern Sudan and north-eastern 
part of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).   
51
 Y.K. Lule, a non-Muganda and leader of Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) took over 
power from Amin. Even though he was anti-Obote, the UNLA was pro-Obote; after six months 
he was overthrown and Godfrey Binaisa became the president, dismissed the anti-Obote 
minister of defense, Yoweri Museveni (the current president of Uganda) and subsequently his 
(Museveni’s) supporters in the army (Rupesinghe et al., 1994:152, Kasozi et al., 1994:129). He 
also fired the pro-Obote chief of staff. The Military Commission removed Binaisa and installed 
Obote’s political associate, Paulo Mwanga, who paved way for the return of Obote (Mudoola, 
1989:285-286). This marked the commencing of the Obote II regime. RUPESINGHE, K., RUBIO 
CORREA, M. & UNITED NATIONS, U. 1994. The culture of violence. Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press. Available at: 
http://www.netlibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=21038 (Accessed on 19 
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outline of all insurgencies), that eventually brought back Obote as president, 
marking the Obote II era.   
 
Having returned to power, Obote organized general elections and his UPC party 
won amidst allegations that elections had been rigged in favour of Obote (Brett, 
1994:85; Mudoola, 1988:287; Behrend, 1998:107; Finnström, 2008:67).  
Museveni contested the election results and opted to form a rebel group, the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) (Barongo, 1989:82). As a result between 
1981-1986 civil wars were carried out by “groups which believed that election 
result was fraudulent, that the Obote regime was corrupt and ethnically biased, 
and who were angered by the brutality displayed by the army during the war” 
(Brett, 1994:85). Obote’s regime was accused of massive killings (Schmitz, 
1999:49, Ingham, 1994). The so-called Luwero Triangle massacres, which I 
explain below, have been linked to Obote’s regime (Mutibwa, 1992:157) and 
caused major ethnic rifts. Hence, Museveni’s insurgency gained extensive 
popularity in the South. Subsequently, in yet another coup d’état Obote was 
overthrown in 1985 and Tito Okello, a northerner, took over, before he was also 
driven out by a military insurgency led by Yoweri Museveni (the current 
president) in 1986 (Twaddle, 1988:317).  
 
Museveni’s rule had a stormy start with numerous armed groups opposing his 
rule (see Box 2 below). Most insurgencies were formed by soldiers who had 
                                                                                                                                               
Aug. 2010); KASOZI, A. B. K., MUSISI, N. & SEJJENGO, J. M. 1994. The social origins of 
violence in Uganda, 1964-1985, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press; MUDOOLA, D. 
1988. Political transitions since Idi Amin: a study in political pathology. In: HANSEN, H. B. & 
TWADDLE, M. (eds.) Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development London: James Currey. 
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been defeated and returned to their homes in the north and north-eastern parts 
of the country (Brett, 1996b:206). The longest of the armed resistance has been 
carried out by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
Box 2 Military Insurgencies Since 1987 
Military Insurgencies 
In Finnström’s (2008:69-70) assessment, Museveni’s victory did not mark the end of 
the war. Instead it begun another new era of militarized conflicts through rebel 
insurgencies. In the eastern part of Uganda the regime was faced with opposition from 
Uganda People’s Army (UPA) between 1987 and 1992. This insurgency was crushed 
and some of the rebels joined other rebel groups in northern Uganda (Gingyera-
Pinycwa 1992:22); in the West, the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) that 
opposed Amin got into agreement with Museveni’s new government and ended their 
insurgency; splinter groups from UNRF, West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the Uganda 
National Rescue Front Part II (UNRF II), continued the rebellion; in south-western 
Uganda, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) emerged in 1995, with their bases in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Like the LRA, the ADF were involved in massive 
abduction of children; within the same region, the National Army for the Liberation of 
Uganda (NALU) was started, attacking the westerners from Museveni’s region; in the 
southwest the Hutu militia (Rwandan Hutu) have in recent years attacked Uganda from 
their bases in DRC, giving Uganda regime the justification to pursue the rebels deep 
into the DRC (Finnström, 2008: 69-70). This has further added to the complexity of the 
conflict in DRC; in the south of Acholi another rebel group emerged, Citizens’ Army for 
Multi-party Politics (CAMP), but it lasted only for a short time; the pro-Obote groups that 
were short-lived included the Ninth October Movement (NOM) and Force Obote Back 
Again (FOBA). The government has been suspicious of the formation and operation of 
People’s Redemption Army (PRA) based in DRC. According to the Uganda 
government, the RPA has support from the local politicians in Uganda (Finnström, 
2008:70).  In the northeast, the Karamojong cattle raiders52 are armed and often attack 
their neighbours. 
 
The LRA Insurgency  
The LRA has over the years claimed to be fighting against marginalization of 
northern Uganda, particularly the Acholi people, while on the other hand GOU 
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 According to a study conducted between 1998 and 1999 by anthropologist Sandra Gray from 
the University of Kansas, of the 300 women interviewed among the fighting Karamojong sub-
tribes of Bokora and Matheniko, “virtually every one had lost either a husband or at least one 
male child to intra-tribal violence” (Gray, 2000: 409). Gray (2003) further notes that in 1999 the 
direct and indirect impact of cattle raids accounted for more than 70% of deaths among males 
aged 30-39 in the same ethnic groups above.  Jabs (2007) makes a broader analysis of the 
factors behind cattle raiding and the impact this has had on the community of the Karamojong. 
JABS, L. 2007. Where Two Elephants Meet, the Grass Suffers: A Case Study of Intractable 
Conflict in Karamoja, Uganda. American Behavioral Scientist, 50, 1498-1519; GRAY, B. 2000. A 
memory of loss: Ecological politics, local history, and the evolution of Karimojong violence 
Human Organization, 59, 401-419. 
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has dismissed the rebels as a disorganized group without any political agenda 
(Finnström, 2008). Historically, the conflict is one among many insurgencies 
since Uganda’s independence in 1962.   
 
The LRA maintains that their aim is to overthrow the government and institute a 
system of governance based on the Biblical Ten Commandments (Oola, 
2008:67). They also claim to be fighting for the end to political and economic 
marginalization of the North by the southern government, return to multiparty 
politics, introduction of constitutional federalism, promotion of national and 
regional peace and security (Finnström 2008: 122).   
 
The economic marginalization of the North has increased poverty and affected 
the quality of life in the region. According to a progress report on Uganda’s 
Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2007:12) there is an obvious 
economic imbalance between the North and the rest of the country: “The 
northern region has maintained the highest incidence of poverty of 61 per cent.”  
Van Acker (2004:337) holds that, “The proportion of households below the 
poverty line in the north when compared to the rest of Uganda is not only low, 
but actually increased from 1997 to 2000, in contrast to other regions.” 
 
The GOU’s decision in 1996 to confine the Acholi population into ‘protected 
camps’ made it difficult for the people to cultivate their land and rear their 
animals, while at the same time rendering them vulnerable to rebel attacks 
(Branch, 2007:181).  The camps were typified by “intense government violence 
in the Gulu district” especially in “September 1996, when the government 
instituted its policy of forced displacement and drove hundreds of thousands of 
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Acholi peasants out of their villages into camps through a campaign of murder, 
intimidation, and the bombing and burning of entire villages” (Tom, 2006:181). 
Behrend (1998:117) is emphatic that the ‘protected camps’ had other ulterior 
motives for the government: “purportedly to protect the people from the ‘rebels’ . 
. . these camps served to prevent people from supporting Kony’s soldiers, and 
to punish them for alleged collaboration with the LRA.”   
 
The resistance in northern Uganda was first carried out, in August 1986, by the 
Uganda Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A) that claimed to fight for 
multiparty democracy (Human Rights Watch, 1997:64).  Another resistance was 
led by Alice Lakwena who was acclaimed to be a spiritual and charismatic 
leader with supernatural powers. Alice claimed her mission was to cleanse the 
Acholi people and free Uganda (Behrend, 1991:167, Human Rights Watch, 
1997:67). She started off as a healer and a preacher possessed by the spirit 
that drove her to cleanse the Acholi people of all historical violence (Eichstaedt, 
2009:15). However, with the attack of the Acholiland by Museveni’s UPDF she 
formed the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces 
(HSMF) in late 1986 to counter the government army (Behrend, 1991:165; 
Human Rights Watch, 1997:66). She had a large following in the North and 
advanced her army towards the capital Kampala, in the South, but was defeated 
in 1987 half way through in Jinja town, by the GOU forces (Eichstaedt, 2009:15). 
In the same year, the UPDA/M entered into an agreement with the government 
to end the conflict, but some of the discontented soldiers joined HSM and 
eventually became known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph 
Kony who was also said to posses spiritual powers (Vinci, 2006:83). 
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An analysis of the mystification of the military struggle of the LRA is important in 
unpacking the justifications behind the struggle. The use of cults, spiritual 
citations and other mythical rituals to recruit members and create religious and 
philosophical justifications for the armed struggle is a common practice among a 
number of African militias (Francis, 2005; Omeje, 2005). Francis (2005:17) 
avers that “there is a serious military and security psychology associated with 
the purported belief of the militias in spiritism and occult practice. The use of 
charms and initiation ceremonies has a strategic military and war fighting 
purpose because they make the recruits brave, with a die-hard belief in their 
cause.”   Omeje (2005:72) supports this view and adds that in African 
cosmology “the supernatural realm is the repository of the spiritual powers 
necessary for individual and collective protection and security…”   
 
Even though one cannot solely attribute raison d’être of armed struggle to the 
link between the spiritual powers and armed struggle, one ought to however 
consider the cathartic impact that this link generates in a number of African 
conflicts. Behrend (1991; 1999) explains how both Alice Lakwena and Joseph 
Kony were perceived to posses spiritual powers which drove them to fight 
government forces, hence rationalizing their cause. Kassimeris (2006: 90-91) 
points out that “Kony’s alleged spiritual powers are used to construct an image 
of omnipotence. He has created for himself a cult-like belief in his own spiritual 
powers” generating fear and doubt among his followers and opponents alike. 
Thus, the supernatural beliefs have had spiritual and psychological impact on 
armed groups to the extent of sustaining and prolonging conflicts in several 
parts of Africa. This is evidenced by the LRA protracted conflict, but also in other 
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contexts such as the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria and the Kamajors in Sierra Leone 
(Francis, 2005:17; Omeje, 2005:71).  
 
The spiritual dimension of the conflict has dominated most of the analyses on 
northern Uganda (Baines, 2007; Van Acker, 2004; Behrend, 1999). These 
analyses emphasize the claim to supernatural powers inherited by Kony from 
Lakwena of HSM (Behrend, 1999:114); the institution of the Ten 
Commandments; the claim of possession of the ancestral spirits by the rebels, 
which in turn are said to protect the rebels from harm (Eichstaedt, 2009:79). 
Finnström (2008:115) points out that the emphasis on the religious aspects of 
LRA objective of the conflict has marginalized other important and legitimate 
social, political and economic concerns.  
 
Chabal and Daloz (1999:86) assert that the LRA does not have a strong political 
agenda to justify their cause. They stress that the crisis is much more 
humanitarian than political. Extreme violence on the northern population through 
abductions, killings and stealing has compromised the LRA cause and led, in 
2005, to the indictment order on the rebel leaders by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) (Apuuli, 2008:803).53   I would argue that while the conflict in 
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 Abducted children were abused and threatened by death or injury if they attempted to escape 
(Blattman and Annan, 2010:140). In fact the “LRA has become infamous for massacres, 
maiming, and the forced recruitment of thousands of Acholi, many of them children” (Branch, 
2007:180). The rebels have cut off the hands, ears, lips and limbs of individuals suspected to be 
collaborating with the government. Children have been forced to be soldiers or sexual slaves of 
the LRA commanders in the bush (Tom, 2006).  BLATTMAN, C. & ANNAN, J. 2010. On the 
nature and causes of LRA Aductions: what the abductees say. In: ALLEN, T. & 
VLASSENROOT, K. (eds.) The Lord's Resistance Army : myth and reality, London: Zed Books; 
BRANCH, A. 2007. Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention. Ethics & 
International Affairs 21, 179-198; TOM, P. 2006. The Acholi Traditional Approach to Justice and 
the War in Northern Uganda. Beyond Intractability. Available at: 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/acholi_traditional_approach.jsp?nid=6792 
(Accessed on Nov. 1st 2010). 
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northern Uganda emerged as a resistance to military repression by the GOU 
forces, it gradually developed into a political agenda.  
 
Another factor that is important to consider is how the Acholi and the northern 
regions have maintained a victimhood mentality that portrays the region as one 
that has been neglected by the government, economically impoverished and 
under situations of constant insecurity (Latigo, 1997; Okuku, 2002). The Acholi 
have been portrayed as “‘biological substances’, ‘murderers’, ‘killers’” an 
indication that “the NRM/A did not value the life of the Acholi and wanted the 
‘Northerners’ stereotyped for political gains” (Latigo, 1997:2). In other words, 
Latigo (1997:4) argues that the “Acholi are victims of the war, isolation, and 
circumstance.” Such views have been countered by the southerners’ position 
that the war in Acholiland is much more of a self-inflicted suffering because it is 
the Acholi killing Acholi. Besides, the North is often reminded of the violence it 
inflicted on the South when the northern leaders like Milton Obote and Idi Amin 
were presidents (Brett, 1994:87; Barongo, 1989:76). 
 
The figure below shows how in 2003 and 2005 there were increased killings and 
abductions, however between 2004 and 2005 the LRA began to weaken 
because of intense attacks from GOU. The level of abductions and killings 
diminished between 2005 and 2006 because of the continued attacks on LRA, 
which subsequently pressured the LRA to participate in the peace negotiations 
(Brubacher, 2010: 272). 
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Figure 1 Levels of crimes and killings carried out by the LRA 
 
Source: Brubacher (2010:273) 
 
As I have stated elsewhere changes in events, historical perspectives and 
leadership have engendered new agendas in civil conflicts (Opongo, 2006:76-
77). This is similarly the case for the conflict in northern Uganda. In fact, over 
the years this conflict has taken political, economic and social dimensions and 
hence broadened the conflict agenda beyond the North (Dunn, 2010:54).  The 
rise in the cost of living and unemployment, largely attributed to liberal economic 
policies, has led to the general discontent amongst the population against the 
government (Mugwenyi, 1991:71, Eichstaedt, 2009:238).    
 
186 
 
The northern Uganda conflict has had regional dimensions, affecting mainly 
Sudan and the Great Lakes region. The expansive spread of the LRA into the 
unstable Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and conflict-affected Central 
African Republic (CAR) has raised concerns over the destabilization that the 
rebel movement has had on the region (Dunn, 2010:57; Eichstaedt, 2009:47). 
The LRA has been engaged in mercenary activities, looting and killings 
(Schomerus, 2008). Since 2008 more than 2,300 people in South Sudan, DRC 
and CAR have been killed by the LRA, and 400,000 civilians displaced (Rice, 
2010).  Human Rights Watch (2009:29-30) documented that the “LRA killed at 
least 815 Congolese civilians and at least 50 Sudanese civilians between 
December 24 2008 and January 17 2009.”  Several other villages were attacked 
in northern Congo leading to high numbers of deaths. 
 
In an effort to pursue the LRA in Sudan, the Uganda military carried out several 
operations: in 2002 and 2004, Operation Iron Fist I and II, that both failed 
(Coghlan, 2005:80); and in December 2008 Operation Lightning Thunder which 
had intelligence and financial support from the US (Rice, 2010). The 90 day 
Operation Lightening Thunder failed to end the conflict but left many civilian 
casualties. The US government, in May 2010, signed the LRA Disarmament and 
Northern Uganda Recovery Act which stipulates an expressive commitment of 
the US to eliminate the LRA; and in November 2010 the US government issued 
a strategic plan on how to militarily disarm the LRA (Arieff, 2009).   
 
I contend that militarization of violence as a means of dispute resolution, and 
ascendance or resistance to power has led to enculturation of violence, 
bordering on what Mbembe (2003: 39) refers to as necropolitics, and defines as 
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“contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death.”  On the other 
hand, ethnic characterization of the Uganda conflict poses an insufficient 
analysis. As Doornbos (1978) has demonstrated, the ethnic dimension alone 
cannot capture the deeper roots of the Uganda conflict, rather it is the 
distribution of privilege and power that favours particular ethnic groups against 
others that tend to heighten the conflict. Barnes and Lucima (2002) point out 
that “the war in Acholiland is rooted in Uganda’s challenge of developing a 
legitimate system of governance that promotes the collective aspirations of its 
plural society.”  Similar thoughts are underscored by Van Acker (2004: 336) who 
asserts that: “At the core of the conflict lies the failure of the consecutive 
Ugandan leaders to construct and consolidate a modern state that legitimizes 
and promotes collective aspirations…other than …divide and rule.” 
 
There are complex causes of tension affecting identity so far as existing sources 
allow us to understand, but these accounts do not elaborate on what people 
actually perceive. My analysis of the field research findings in Chapters Five 
and Six will shade light on the various dimensions of the conflict based on the 
people’s perception on the ground. 
 
Part III: Peacebuilding attempts in response to protracted conflicts 
The above discussion highlights the fact that peacebuilding efforts through 
constitutional and political institutions failed to address the longitudinal and 
internecine conflicts in Uganda. Brett (1996c:203) articulates that the roots of 
Uganda conflict “lie deep in a history dominated by regional, ethnic and 
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sectarian exclusion...” As I have noted above, the means to resolving the 
conflicts, especially in the post 1966 period, has mainly been through violence 
(Van Acker, 2004:336). However, in recent years there have been attempts to 
resolve the conflicts through diverse peacebuilding mechanisms such as 
mediation, negotiations, legal mechanisms and use of culturally-based 
approaches to conflict resolution.  
 
I will examine four main approaches to peacebuilding that have been applied by 
different parties in efforts to achieve peace and end the legacy of violence.  First 
are the government supported initiatives for peacebuilding; second, post-conflict 
reconstruction through foreign aid; third, interventions made by the NGOs and 
civil society, particularly in relation to the protection of human rights and 
government accountability; fourth, the ICC intervention on Uganda conflict; fifth, 
culturally-based approaches to peacebuilding. 
 
Government initiatives in Peacebuilding 
The government has carried out several attempts to end conflict and create a 
positive atmosphere of peace and mutual understanding. When the NRM came 
to power it proposed a Ten Point Programme54 as a guiding principle for 
governance and national cohesion (Dicklitch, 2001:183).  The programme cited 
politicized ethnicity as the core of the Uganda conflicts and attributed this to 
political parties (Dolan, 2009:63). Subsequently, Museveni’s NRM temporarily 
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 The Ten Point Programme referred to ten guiding principles, which are: promotion of 
democracy; security of all persons and property; promotion of national unity, and 
bringing an end to sectarianism; consolidation of national independence; economic 
sustainability; improved social services and post-conflict reconstruction; elimination of 
corruption and abuse of power; addressing root-causes of dislocation of different section 
of population; Pan-African cooperation in defence of human and democratic rights; and 
establishing a strategy for a mixed economy (Mutibwa, 1992:180). MUTIBWA, P. M. 
1992. Uganda Since Independence: A story of unfulfilled hope. London: Macmillan. 
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banned political parties' activities (Dicklitch, 2001:183) and instituted a ‘no party 
system’ that favoured the NRM’s monopoly of power (Dolan, 2009:63). However, 
in 2005 multiparty system was reintroduced and political parties were again 
allowed to compete in elections.   
 
The major challenge for the government has been ending insurgencies through 
conflict mediation and institution of peacebuilding processes. Thus, efforts 
towards peacebuilding have included: institution of a constitution-making 
process that brings back the rule of law and citizen participation in the affairs of 
the state; peace negotiations with different armed groups; and introduction of 
the Amnesty Act, Human Rights Commission and National Reconciliation Bill 
2009.  
 
Constitution Making Process 
I have discussed above how the 1962 constitution was the social contract 
between the sate and the people, and a principle means of conflict mediation. 
Barongo (1989:76) summarizes the Uganda crisis and the shift to autocratic rule 
in three different phases: first is the 1966 Buganda crisis that brought an end to 
political pluralism in Uganda, which was enshrined in the 1962 constitution; 
second is the introduction of an interim constitution in 1967 that abolished the 
kingdoms; and third was the government’s imposition of one party state on the 
population which marked “the end of the politics of institutional and legal 
opposition and conferred an authoritarian outlook on the central government” 
(Barongo, 1989:76).  Genuine options for peacebuilding were therefore limited 
to autocratic approaches to governance.  
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In the aftermath of protracted conflict that lasted until 1986, it was evident that 
there was a need for a new constitution in order to correct the political mistakes 
of the past (Hansen and Twaddle, 1995:9) and instil a spirit of nationalism. Kiapi 
(1989:91) is emphatic that constitutions are inherently mediators of national 
conflict because “they are like a peace treaty laying down agreed arrangements 
on how the affairs of the nation are to be managed.”  
 
In order to enshrine a robust and broadly consultative constitution the 
government, in 1989, put in place the Uganda Constitutional Commission (UCC) 
(Hansen and Twaddle, 1995:10). The UCC collected views from the population 
and came out with a comprehensive report with diverse proposal on what the 
Ugandans wanted in the constitution (Hansen and Twaddle, 1995; Waliggo, 
1995). In describing the constitution making process, Waliggo (1995:28) opines 
that the UCC succeeded in laying the ground for democratization process and 
produced a report which was “centred on the aspirations and concerns of the 
Ugandan people and a draft constitution based on principled compromise.”  
Moehler (2008:41) equally confirms that the constitution making process was 
participatory and widely consultative. 
 
In order to promote participatory democracy, the new constitution reiterated the 
support for representative form of government based on decentralization of 
power to the local councils. The councils were initially referred to as ‘resistance 
council’ and in the 1997 Local Council Act they were changed to ‘local council’ 
(Saito, 1999:3).  
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According to the Local Government website (Uganda Local Government, 2011), 
the elected local government councils represent the highest political authority in 
the area under its jurisdiction. The councils are also:  
“corporate bodies having both legislative and executive powers. They have 
powers to make local laws and enforce implementation. On the other hand 
Administrative Unit Councils serve as political units to advise on planning 
and implementation of services. They assist in the resolution of disputes, 
monitor the delivery of services and assist in the maintenance of law, order 
and security” (Uganda Local Government, 2011). 
 
Table 3 Different levels of local councils at the rural level 
Level of Local Council Area of Responsibility 
Local Council – LC 5 District 
Local Council – LC 4 County 
Local Council – LC 3 Sub-county 
Local Council – LC 2 Parish 
Local Council – LC 1  Village 
 
Public service is mainly provided by the sub-county’s Local Council 3 (Saito, 
1999:3) and assisted by the lower ranks of Local Council 1 and 2 (LC1 and LC2).  
At the district level, the highest authority is the LC5, mainly charged with 
implementing the district development plan (Kabwegyere, 2000:103). While the 
local councils have contributed to participatory democracy, they have in the past 
been used as government arms to monitor and control any government 
opposition, especially during the peak of the northern Uganda conflict (Branch, 
2010:39-40). 
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Peace Negotiation Mechanisms 
There have been several attempts to peace negotiations. However, the 
literature on the details of the peace talks is scanty making it difficult to do an 
elaborate analysis. I will limit my analysis to three major peace processes 
between 1985 and 2008, about which there is most information.  These are the 
1985 Nairobi Process; the National Resistance Army (NRA) –Uganda People’s 
Democratic Army (UPDA) Peace Talks; and the LRA-GOU peace negotiation 
attempts between 1993 and 2006.   I have also highlighted the main aspects of 
Gulu Peace Talks and LRA-GOU Talks in the Appendix. 
 
Zartman and Touval (2009:438) define mediation as “a mode of negotiation in 
which a third party helps the parties find a solution that they cannot find by 
themselves.”  They emphasise the importance of the acceptance of the 
mediator by the parties in conflict. In a closely similar perspective, the Centre for 
Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) defines mediation as “a flexible process 
conducted confidentially in which a neutral person actively assists parties in 
working towards a negotiated agreement of a dispute or difference, with the 
parties in ultimate control of the decision to settle and the terms of the 
resolution” (Carroll, 2004). These definitions are however inadequate since the 
mediator can also be a group of persons who are impartial and not necessarily 
neutral. There is value in bringing emotions, bias, and passion in mediation 
processes as I shall discuss below. However, the difference in approaches 
would depend on the type of conflict in question and the internal and external 
dynamics in play.  
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Mediation is therefore a relational constructionism process where different 
parties engage in a dialogical process of mutual construction of a new reality of 
peace.  It is characterized by dialogical conversations that are grounded on 
inter-subjective sense-making process that bridges differences and allows for 
exploration of different possibilities for peace.  
 
The Nairobi Peace Process 
The Nairobi Peace Talks took place in 1985 for four months following General 
Tito Okello’s coup d’état against President Milton Obote (Okuku, 2002:24). 
There were two major parties to the conflict: On the one hand, Yoweri 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M), and on the other, 
the Military Council under the chair of General Tito Okello, which was a coalition 
of former55 rebel groups (Kiplagat, 2002).The peace negotiations resulted in a 
power sharing agreement in a coalition government.  Under this agreement “a 
military council would govern and priority would be given to the reconstruction of 
a national army” (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:9-10). However, the peace 
agreement collapsed within a year when Museveni’s National Resistance Army 
launched an attack on Uganda army in 1986.  
 
In his analysis of the failed peace agreement, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat 
(2002) notes that, the Kenyan negotiation team had not done a prior analysis to 
understand the depth of the Uganda conflict and the issues at hand. Their 
                                                 
55
 These included: the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA); Federal Democratic Movement 
of Uganda (FEDEMU); The Uganda freedom Movement (UFM); the Uganda National rescue 
Front (UNRF) and the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA). 
194 
 
primary concern was to reach an agreement.  Kiplagat also points out that the 
mediation team failed to engage the parties in informal familiarization dialogues 
that would have helped them get a deeper knowledge of the fears and 
aspirations of the parties in conflict. He adds that the team did not incorporate 
secondary parties to the conflict such as, Libya, Burundi and Rwanda who were 
implicated in the support of some of the factions.  
 
Another factor that explains the failure of the peace talks was the lack of trust 
and commitment to peace (Okuku, 2002:23). While the talks were going on both 
sides were arming themselves in preparation for war (Mutibwa, 1992:176; 
Okuku, 2002:23).  Museveni’s NRM felt they were in a stronger position to 
defeat the government forces and on 26 January 1986 NRM marched on to 
Kampala and overthrew the government (Okuku, 2002:23). There was general 
lack of trust, particularly given that the parties had not interacted long enough to 
build trust and work towards a common solution. 
 
The Nairobi peace process could have borrowed a cue from Fisher’s problem 
solving workshops (PSW). In emphasizing the importance of engaging the 
parties in conflict, Fisher (2007:312) discusses the effectiveness of problem 
solving workshops (PSW). These workshops explore non-committal options, 
while weighing possible solutions after a process of mutual diagnosis. Kelman 
and Cohen (1976) underscore the critical contribution of PSW which include the 
following stages: at pre-negotiation the objective is to test the feasibility of the 
talks; during the negotiations the focus is to iron out specific difficult issues that 
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need to be dealt with; at post-peace agreement the aim is to work out long term 
strategy of ensuring that the peace agreement holds.  Hence, PSW helps to 
strengthen the actual peace process by exploring options in a non-threatening 
environment, and further building trust between the negotiators.   
 
The UPDA – NRM Peace Negotiations 
My analysis will mainly rely on the findings by Lamwaka (2002) who details the 
UPDM/A-NRM peace negotiations by highlighting the major points in the 
process.  When President Museveni’s NRM took over power in 1986, the 
strongest rebel group that he had to deal with was the UPDA/M which was 
dominantly Acholi.  With the endorsement of Museveni, a group of civil society 
peace team led by Tiberio Okeny Atwoma, an Acholi elder, went to meet 
UPDA/M in their hideout to invite them for peace talks with Museveni. UPDM/A 
was willing to talk, the peace team recommended amnesty for UPDM/A fighters, 
and the parliament granted it. Lamwaka (2002) ascertains that both parties in 
conflict consulted for four months as a way of building trust, and in March 1988 
agreed to begin the talks. In the first round of talks, the parties appointed their 
military representatives to take part in the talks. The political wings of both sides 
were excluded from the talks. The parties agreed to a ceasefire and modalities 
of integrating former combatants.  
 
However, in the second round of talks the elders were excluded and accused of 
closer links with politicians who could jeopardize the talks. These talks were 
based on a military to military negotiation. The parties eventually reached an 
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agreement in what came to be known as Gulu Peace Accord. The end result of 
the talks was that “the Gulu Peace Accord meant the final end of the armed 
struggle of the UPDA” (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:15). The talks were 
therefore fruitful: the parties made an agreement to end the conflict; provide jobs 
for the former UPDA/M combatants; work out a joint military operation against 
the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM); and disarm the Karamojong cattle rustlers. 
Despite this success, Okuku (2002:34) notes that less than two years after the 
peace agreement some of the UPDA/M generals who had been integrated into 
the army were charged with treason, further raising suspicion over the 
government’s commitment to peace. 
 
To a larger extent these talks were successful, even though splinter groups from 
UPDM/A opted to continue fighting by joining other rebel groups. The success 
behind these negotiations can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the 
failure to build trust between the parties in conflict in order to explore different 
options in place. Burton (1969), while emphasizing the importance of 
understanding the underlying causes of conflict, underscores the pre-
negotiation interaction of the parties in a process of analysis and exploration of 
peace options as a means of setting administrative grounds for the negotiation.  
 
Second, the success of the UPDA/M-GOU negotiation can be attributed to the 
fact that rather than have an external mediator, they opted to have their own 
internally-biased mediator. This means that they did not seek an impartial 
mediator for the process.  In a compelling and extensive analysis of 124 peace 
agreements between 1990-2004, Svensson (2009) makes a strong case 
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indicating that mediation carried out by neutral mediators tend to fail in 
comparison to those conducted by biased mediators. He argues that neutral 
mediators have as primary objective the ending of the conflict, and are thus 
more inclined to hasten the reaching of an agreement. By contrast, biased 
mediators (from parties in conflict) would ensure that the interests of their 
respective parties are met or agreeably compromised in an “elaborated 
institutional peace arrangement” (Svensson, 2009:447). As in the case of 
UPDA/M-GOU negotiation, Svensson asserts that biased mediators would have 
leverage over their respective parties and push them to make heavy 
concessions that would otherwise not be achieved by neutral mediators.  
 
However, Svensson’s analysis is only accurate to some extent since every 
peace negotiation process has its own dynamics, contextual imperatives, and 
internal and external factors. There could be cases where the stakes are so high 
that the biased mediators fail to convince their parties. In such stalemates the 
role of a neutral mediator coupled with external pressures from interested 
groups could be effective in pushing the parties to heed to concessions. 
 
The third important factor of success in UPDA/M-GOU peace negotiations is 
that the mediators ensured that their party gets a fair deal in the agreement. 
Both sides worked out a win-win settlement: for the UPDA/M, demobilization, 
demilitarization and integration (DDR) of UPDA/M forces and job placements in 
the military; as for GOU, the UPDA/M would come in to reinforce the military 
forces against other insurgencies.  This facilitated a power sharing agreement 
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that, according to Licklider (2001:706), is critical for the success of civil conflict 
settlement.  
 
It is important to note that the UPDA/M-GOU negotiations came at the early 
stages of Museveni’s regime, hardly one year after taking over power. He could 
not contain the numerous rebel insurgencies and needed a stronger partner 
(Van Acker, 2004:341). This situation favoured the success of the peace 
negotiations. These Talks however, focused much more on ending the conflict 
and integrating the UPDA/M soldiers, but did not address the historical question 
of inequitable distribution of resources, militarization of conflict, and political 
participation of different ethnic groups in Uganda (Okuku, 2002:37). 
 
LRA-GOU Peace Negotiations  
There are two major peace Talks that have taken place during the LRA-GOU 
peace negotiations. The first one was initiated by the government in 1993, the 
Gulu Peace Talks (see Box 2 in the Appendix), and the second, commonly 
referred to as the Juba Peace Talks, is currently facing a stalemate.  The focus 
of my analysis will be on the Juba Peace Talks. I have discussed more details 
about the talks in Box 1 in the Appendix.  
The Juba Peace Talks  
The Juba Peace Talks started early 2006 under the UN Secretary General 
Special Envoy President Joaquim Alberto Chissano and the Chief Mediator for 
the host Government Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, the Vice President of the 
Government of Southern Sudan (Lucima, 2002).  There were hopes that the 
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talks could lead to an end to conflict, particularly following the signing of the 
cessation of violence agreement by the two sides. The parties also agreed to 
have a clear programme for the demobilization, demilitarization and 
reintegration (DDR) of the former LRA combatants through a process of 
Implementation and Management Mechanisms (IMM); Joint Liaison Group (JIG); 
and an Oversight Forum (see Appendix Box 1 for further explanation on the 
Talks).  
 
The talks went on for two years and made some positive progress, but did not 
culminate into a signing of a peace agreement (Schomerus, 2007:34). Another 
key agenda in the agreement was on accountability and reconciliation, which 
was aimed at seeking ways of addressing human rights violations (both inside 
and outside the country) that took place during the war. The agenda explores 
both judicial and culturally-based forms of justice as well as reconciliation and 
healing in all the affected communities (Oola, 2008:68).  
 
In my analysis, the LRA-GOU peace negotiations have been confronted by 
three major obstacles: the lack of trust between the parties; the international 
pressure for the success of the peace talks; and pressure of the ICC indictment 
orders.  
 
The first aspect of distrust between the parties is attributed to the many years of 
conflict between the two sides. It took extensive regional and international 
lobbying to bring the parties to the negotiation table in Juba. Fisher (2007:313-
315) discusses the contingency model of third party intervention linking the 
various types of interventions to conflict escalation. The rationale for this 
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approach is based on the assumption that conflict often has objective and 
subjective components. Hence, different interventions address different 
objective and subjective needs. The escalation model identifies four stages: 
Discussion, Polarization, Segregation and Destruction. The Ugandan conflict 
has mostly been at the escalation stage despite numerous attempts to explore 
discussions or negotiations. The perceptions between GOU and LRA have been 
characterized by the polarization of the North-South tensions, which have 
created an artificial segregation between the two regions.  These have led to 
stereotyping and attempts to reduce the political differences to identity politics. 
Subsequently, “as conflict escalates, communication moves from direct 
discussion and debate to interpreting deeds rather than words, to threats and 
ultimately to direct attacks…” (Fisher, 2007:314). This leads to violent destruction, 
as in the case of Uganda, subsequently heightening the tension and mistrust, 
making initiatives for peace very difficult. However, Fisher’s lineal approach to 
conflict analysis lacks depth in understanding the contextual complexities. 
 
The LRA came to the peace talks while under enormous pressure. First was 
that several series of events had built up pressure on the LRA to come to the 
negotiation table. Following September 11th 2001 attacks on USA, the GOU 
passed an Anti-terrorist Act against the LRA in 2002, and gained financial and 
military support from the USA (Allen, 2006:74; Finnström, 2008:112). The Anti-
terrorist Act identified three groups as terrorists: The Lord's Resistance 
Army/Movement (LRA/M), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Al-Qaeda.  
The government of Uganda was under the correct assumption that the USA, in 
pursuit for ‘global security’, would support any efforts against groups branded as 
‘terrorists’ (Dolan, 2009: 53).  Dolan (2009:53) is of the opinion that the Anti-
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Terrorist Act limited the chances of any senior LRA officials engaging in peace 
talks. The Act also discouraged civilians lobbying the LRA to come to the 
dialogue table, for the fear of being accused of treason based on contacts with 
the LRA (Dolan, 2009:53).  There was also pressure within the internal 
organization of the LRA itself as well as lack of clear vision on how to approach 
the peace talks. Jackson (2009: 326) asserts that before the beginning of the 
Juba talks the LRA lacked a “clear political strategy” whereas its political wing 
the Lords Resistance Movement (LRM) held divergent opinions on the talks. 
Over the years the LRA has had diverse representations, agendas and 
strategies. The killing of Vincent Otti, second in command to Kony, exposed the 
wrangles and divisions within the LRA. Vincent Otti was murdered when it 
emerged that he “planned to leave the LRA and settle in northern Uganda with 
generous support from the Ugandan government” (Cacaj, 2010).The Acholi 
Diaspora has financed the LRA over the years. However, their position, while 
influential on the LRA, has largely remained divided (Jackson, 2009:326). Vinci 
(2007) argues that part of the problem that the LRA faces is the fact that their 
original objective of fighting for the ‘liberation’ of northern Uganda has shifted: 
they have turned the Acholi population into victims while purporting to be 
fighting for a just cause for the North. This has subsequently led to the 
alienation of the LRA by the northern Uganda population; the LRA has been 
subject to diverse political interests within and outside the Acholi community; 
and their primary objective of the war has lost direction. Sturges (2008:209) 
argues that the disorganization within the LRA structure is manifested through 
“the apparent lack of political programme” and inconsistent communications 
channels. Jackson (2002:40) underscores the fact that: “The LRA is one of the 
most enigmatic of all movements in Sub- Saharan Africa, and it is not clear 
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whether it actually has any final goals.” However, Vinci (205:377) asserts that 
despite the view that the LRA are barbaric and disoriented, they have a clear 
strategy of fighting the war and should therefore not be underestimated.  
 
The above situation has complicated the process of reintegration of the formerly 
abducted persons. The youth that had escaped from the LRA were often afraid 
that if ever the LRA was to attack the villages they would be the primary target 
because of their perceived betrayal of the LRA cause (Annan et al, 2009:649). 
Vinci (2007) thus proposes that before engaging the LRA and GOU into a 
negotiation process, the priority should be placed on developing mechanisms of 
reintegrating the LRA and re-connecting them into the community.  
  
Second was that Southern Sudan had an interest in stabilizing the region 
following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
between South Sudan Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan government, that 
ended the 22 year conflict between the North and South Sudan. CPA 
agreement led to the formation of the Government of South Sudan (GSS) and 
eventual referendum in the South in January 2011, results of which led to the 
secession of the South from the North. Southern Sudan became a recognized 
nation on 9th July 2011. The CPA paved way for peace talks between GOU and 
LRA in order to ensure regional stability. The initiative of the GSS received both 
regional (African Union) and international support.  
 
The third aspect was the pressure of the ICC indictment orders on the LRA 
leaders (Noll, 2009:99; Jackson, 2009:320). As I shall discuss below, the ICC 
indictment cannot directly be attributed to the failure of the Juba Peace Talks, 
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but it can be analysed as a factor that put pressure on the LRA to participate in 
the talks. At the same time the ICC intervention is seen by the LRA as an 
encumbrance to giving in to the outcomes of the peace talks (Nolan, 2009:56-57; 
Eichstaedt, 2009:255). These events have not been favourable to the peace 
attempts. They have rather increased the tensions and broadened the scope of 
the conflict from local to international levels.  
 
The above discussion illustrates the challenge of peacebuilding in Uganda, 
while highlighting the multi-dimensional perspectives of the conflict, historical 
and political impact on the society, and the need for appropriate transitional 
justice mechanisms for sustainable peace.  These circumstances also 
emphasize the diverse challenges to peacebuilding in Uganda.  
 
Government’s Institutional Reforms 
The government has undertaken a number of institutional reforms as a means 
of addressing the challenges of conflict. These include institution of Amnesty 
Act 2000, Human Rights Commission Act and Land Act. The National 
Reconciliation Bill is yet to be passed by the parliament. 
 
In an attempt to create an incentive for peace, in January 2000 the government 
of Uganda, under the Amnesty Act 2000, offered an official pardon to all rebel 
groups (McDonnell and Akallo, 2007:119). The Preamble of the Amnesty Act 
(Government of Uganda 2000) underscored that the objective was to “ provide 
for an Amnesty for Ugandans involved in acts of a war-like nature in various 
parts of the country and for other connected purposes.” The Preamble further 
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adds that the Amnesty Act is seen as “the expressed desire of the people of 
Uganda to end armed hostilities, reconcile with those who have caused 
suffering and rebuild their communities...the desire and determination of the 
Government to genuinely implement its policy of reconciliation” (Government of 
Uganda, 2000). The amnesty was offered for crimes committed after 2000 when 
the Act came into law. Children over12 and adults who had spent more than 
four months of fighting in the bush were eligible to apply (Allen and Schomerus, 
2006:37).  
 
The larger objective of the Amnesty Act was to reconcile Ugandans, particularly 
those in the North, reintegrate the ex-combatants through provision of basic 
needs and prepare the community to receive those who had been pardoned. 
The amnesty was extended to those leaving out of the country as long as they 
renounced any military action again the government.  The amnesty provisions 
indicate that once an ex-combatant has received amnesty, such a person 
cannot be subjected to the prosecution of war crimes unless the person 
commits other crimes. This perspective to the Amnesty Act could clash with the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings in situations where the ICC 
investigations show that some of the people that had been granted amnesty 
might have been among those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes 
against humanity (Eichstaedt, 2009:60). As the ICC cases stand so far the 
arrest warrants have only been issued against the top LRA leadership. 
 
To some extent the Amnesty Act achieved its objectives though it still has many 
challenges such as lack of sufficient funding, hesitance on the part of some ex-
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combatants to present themselves for amnesty and misunderstandings on the 
benefits and implications of the Amnesty Act (Refugee Law Project, 2005, 
Eichstaedt, 2009:168). Allen (2006:122), in his interviews with the people in 
northern Uganda, found that opinions on the Amnesty Act were divided: while 
some people welcomed amnesty for the LRA perpetrators and subsequent 
culturally-based reconciliation rituals, others called for justice against those 
implicated in the killings. 
  
The enactment of the new Constitution in 1995 led to the founding of Uganda 
Human Rights Commission (UHRC) under Constitution Article 51 (Bouckaert, 
1999:43). This was officially ratified under Uganda Human Rights Commission 
Act 1997. Uganda Human Rights Commission has substantial independence 
with similar powers as the judiciary (Schmitz, 1999:69). The Commission has 
been active in advocating against human rights abuses. 56  
 
In response to the challenge of national reconciliation, the Uganda government, 
in collaboration with the civil society and cultural elders, advocated for a national 
reconciliation. This led to the proposal for a National Reconciliation Bill 2009, 
which has been drafted but not yet passed by the parliament. The Bill aims to 
address historical legacy of violence with an ultimate goal of instituting a 
                                                 
56
The Commission has been active in advocating against human rights abuses. For example it 
reported that since 2006 “the right to personal property and freedom from torture” had been 
violated and subsequently topped the list of abuses (Kobusingye, 2010:81). Further between 
January and September 2009 the Commission reported that “there had been about 5000 human 
rights violations reported against the police and 3000 of them had been substantiated. The 
officers involved either faced disciplinary action, or had been handed over for prosecution” 
(Kobusingye, 2010:81). The Commission has thus prosecuted a number of human rights abuse 
cases. KOBUSINGYE, O. 2010. The Correct line? : Uganda under Museven. Central Milton 
Keynes: UK, Authorhouse.  
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national reconciliation process. Given that the final version of the Bill is not yet 
out, it would be premature to speculate possible impact of the initiative. 
 
Another effort towards peacebuilding has been initiatives to resolve land 
conflicts. Uganda has attempted several Land Reform Decrees since 
independence. These have however been faced with a lot of resistance and 
misunderstanding. Post-conflict setting of northern Uganda has had numerous 
land disputes (Rugadya, 2008:7). According to Branch (2007), land justice in 
Acholiland entails, among others, compensation for the lost property, fair land 
policies and integration of the formerly abducted or returnees.  
 
There is generally a high level of distrust amongst the Acholi population about 
the government’s intention to commercialize and privatize Acholi land (Branch, 
2005:3). There have also been suspicions that the government intends to 
displace the Acholi in the North and replace them with the southerners or Tutsis 
from Rwanda (Jackson, 2009: 324). The government’s invitation to private 
investors to purchase Acholi land before all the IDPs return to their ancestral 
land heightened the suspicion on government’s intention over Acholi land 
(Adam, 2005:3).  
 
The 1995 Constitution made clear some of the key provisions on land ownership 
giving right to individuals or groups to own land or property (McAuslan, 2003).57 
The 1998 Land Act took away from the courts the monopoly of settlement of 
                                                 
57
 For example, “Article 26 of the Constitution provides that every person has a right to own 
property either individually or in association with others and further provides limitations on the 
state’s power to compulsorily acquire private property.” MCAUSLAN, P. 2003. A Narrative on 
Land Law Reform in Uganda In: JONES, G. A. (ed.) Urban Land Markets in Transition. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (conference paper). 
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land disputes and made provisions for the land dispute resolutions through 
“District Land Tribunal consisting of a chairperson, who is qualified to be a 
magistrate grade I, and two other members” (McAuslan, 2003:8). Further the 
land disputes can be settled by cultural leaders or a mediator appointed by the 
District Land Tribunal.   
 
In 2009 the government drafted a controversial National Land Policy that was 
hurriedly passed by parliament but failed to resolve the historical problems of 
land tenured ownership, land disputes, women’s right to land ownership and 
uncontrolled state power over land ownership. The National Land Policy has not 
adequately addressed the issue of resettlement of the IDPs and resolution of 
land disputes (Rugadya, 2008:ii). The post-conflict land disputes have mainly 
been attributed to disagreements over land boundaries and perceptions of 
increased value of land (Rugadya, 2008:34). In order to fund these institutional 
reform initiatives the government has relied on external donors who have in turn 
put stringent conditions for accessing the aid.  
 
Post-conflict Reconstruction Aid to Uganda: A liberal peace perspective? 
Ugandan government, in its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction, has 
been a recipient of foreign aid since 1986 when the NRM came to power. For 
many years the country was favoured as a close friend of the West following the 
success of the implementation of the IMF initiated structural adjustment 
programmes in the late 1980s and 1990s (Mutibwa, 1992:193; Oloka-Onyango 
and Barya, 1997:114). As I have already discussed above, Uganda has for 
many years oscillated between peace and conflict, and its post-conflict nature 
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subsequently remains on the borderline between peace and conflict. Museveni’s 
rule has been the most stable despite several insurgencies since 1986.  
  
Uganda’s economic recovery in the post-war period from 1986 has largely been 
attributed to donor funding (Mutibwa, 1992:193; Oloka-Onyango and Barya, 
1997:114). For example, when the NRM came to power in 1986 “official 
development assistance amounted to US$200 million. By 1997…aid from IMF, 
the World Bank, and donor governments had increased to nearly US $850 
million” (Leggett, 2001:193). However, Uganda has been so much dependent 
on aid that since 1987 “the total aid has exceeded the value of the country’s 
exports. Similarly, aid has also exceeded total tax revenues” (Van Donge, 
2003:289). Mutibwa (1992:193) notes that “while in other countries tax revenues 
amount to 20%-30%, in Uganda it is as low as 6%.” 
 
In line with the critique of liberal peace, post-conflict recovery aid has not pulled 
Uganda out of poverty or reliance on foreign aid. It has instead increased 
poverty and widened regional inequalities (Mutibwa, 1992:193; Buckley-Zistel, 
2008:71; Dibie, 2001:180). Post-conflict recovery aid was conditioned on liberal 
peace tenets of institutionalization and liberalization such as constitutional 
review that I have mentioned above, democratic elections, human rights 
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. Leggett (2001:60) argues that 
the economic progress made in Uganda has been based on the transfer of 
development aid and “not on any fundamental improvement in the basic 
structure or capacity of the economy. Uganda is completely dependent on aid, 
and while dependency continues, so does poverty.”   
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Donors have supported economic and political liberalization by funding 
government projects, including parliamentary and presidential elections (Dibie, 
2001:180). Dibie (2001:180) asserts that the western economic support has 
given legitimacy to President Museveni’s government despite its poor 
performance at home. He further cautions that: “As long as the West continues 
to give Uganda aid and support Museveni’s limited political liberalization and 
substantial economic liberalization, Uganda is given external legitimization” 
(Dibie, 2001:180).  The reference to external legitimation alludes to the 
government’s priority to the western liberal peace agenda rather than the socio-
political concerns at home. Buckley-Zistel (2008:71) makes the critique that, by 
providing aid to President Museveni’s government “the international community 
perpetuated the economic imbalance introduced by the colonialists, contributing 
to deepening the fissures between north and south.”  In the same line, Shaw 
and Mbabazi (2009:84) observe that the current system of aid to Uganda 
perpetuates a “‘two speed’ liberal peace” that favours liberalized economies and 
markets in the South against impoverished North.  
 
Uganda’s failure to achieve sustainable peace and economic growth despite 
enormous amounts of aid has mainly been attributed to corruption, partisan and 
ethnicized politics, and lack of accountability mechanisms against those most 
responsible for economic crimes (International Monetary Fund, 2006:25; Dibie, 
2001:178). Le Billon (2008) makes the critique that often in post-conflict settings 
aid is not well managed because of lack of clear structures for accountability. He 
observes that “liberal peacebuilding can exacerbate and transform corruption, to 
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the point of undermining its objectives of democratization and economic 
liberalization” (Le Billon, 2008:345).  Shaw and Mbabazi (2009:82) are of the 
opinion that: “Over the last decade, the Museveni regime has successfully 
privileged economic over political liberalization despite some donor’s 
reservations.” Besides, as I have already stated above, by identifying the LRA 
as terrorists Museveni became a close ally of the War on Terror ideology fronted 
by the western nations, especially the USA, further entrenching the liberal peace 
objective of regional securitization.  
  
It is in response to the government’s failure to provide the basic needs such as 
food, housing, employment, security and human rights protection that NGOs 
have emerged as critical agents of social change in Uganda.  
 
NGO Peacebuilding Interventions 
NGOs have been active in conducting peacebuilding activities in northern 
Uganda. The protracted nature of conflict has led to grievous human rights 
abuses (Khiddu-Mukubuya, 1989:155) and NGOs have subsequently spoken 
strongly against human rights violations by both the LRA and government (De 
Mesquita, 2010: 121).  These interventions have accumulatively contributed to 
the reduction of violence and expansion of democratic space. In explaining the 
role of NGOs in social change, Schmitz (1999:72) underscores that: “processes 
of political change in Uganda...during 1980s and 1990s cannot be understood 
without taking the independent influence of international human rights norms 
and their active promotion by transnational networks of non-governmental 
actors.”   
211 
 
 
Human Rights Focus (HURIFO), one of the human rights NGOs in Gulu, in its 
2002 report, “Between Two Fires”(Human Rights Focus, 2002b), documented 
how the Acholi population had been sandwiched by both the LRA and Uganda 
armed forces.  The report shows evidence of violence by government forces 
through arbitrary arrests, physical abuse and illegal imprisonment.  The 
government failed to provide adequate humanitarian support and security to the 
population. There were regular killings, abductions and maiming by the LRA in 
and around the villages that were said to be protected by the UPDF (Gersony, 
1997:58). The most affected population is the Acholi from Gulu, Pader and 
Kitgum. Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2007) accused the Uganda People’s 
Defence Force (UPDF) of human rights violations during the forced 
disarmament exercise of the Karamojong community. 
  
The NGOs have also advocated against the inhuman conditions in the 
‘protected camps’: the security, health and psychosocial conditions in the camps 
were very bad, with regularly reported cases of rape, forced marriages, 
abduction of children and young adults, as well as physical violence by both the 
government forces and LRA (Human Rights Focus, 2002c). Camps registered 
high mortality rates of up to 1000 per week, mainly caused by malaria, HIV and 
violence (Integrated Regional Information Network, 2005), and half of these 
were children.   
 
The Acholi Religious Leaders for Peace (ARLPI) (2009) who have been very 
active in promoting grassroots peacebuilding, and supporting peace 
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negotiations between the LRA and GOU, have criticized government’s approach 
to conflict resolution through the use of military force. They have cautioned that 
militarization of violence in northern Uganda will not offer a sustainable peace to 
the region (ARLPI, 2009).  Further, the ARLPI (2009) and other NGOs have also 
raised concerns over the ICC intervention on Uganda conflict. The ICC has 
issued warrants of arrests on the LRA leadership leading to the debate on the 
impact of this intervention on the GOU-LRA peace negotiations. 
 
The ICC Intervention: International Mechanisms of Peacebuilding 
Attempts towards peacebuilding in Uganda have also been carried out by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The conflict earned an international 
dimension when in 2005 the ICC issued warrants of arrest on the LRA rebel 
leaders named as Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen (International Criminal Court, 2005). This was consequent to President 
Museveni’s request in 2003 to the ICC prosecutor to investigate the criminal 
activities of the LRA (Allen, 2006:1; Noll, 2009). No arrests have been made 
despite several attempts by the Uganda army. The ICC warrants place 
obligation on regional and international countries to cooperate in the arrest of 
the LRA’s top leadership.  
 
Allen (2010:244-245; 2006:82-85) points out that a number of institutions, 
organizations and individuals raised concern over the negative impact of ICC in 
the Uganda peace process: Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU) pointed out the 
fact that children were both witnesses and victims of the conflict, and could 
become an easy target for the ICC; Anglican Bishop Baker Ocholla, vice 
president of the Acholi Religious Leaders for Peace Initiative (ARLPI), insisted 
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that the ICC indictment would curtail peace efforts on the ground; James Otto, 
the head of the Gulu-based Human Rights Focus (HURIFO) maintained that the 
ICC timing was bad and that the mediation process and integration could be 
dealt with locally.  
 
In a discussion about the possible impact of ICC on the peace talks, Jackson 
(2009:320) argues that “due to the history of the conflict the ICC approach is 
unlikely to achieve peace since there may be a significant group of rebels who 
will reject the involvement of the ICC, and also the ICC’s inability to act beyond 
the purview of the Ugandan state, which has an interest in the outcome of any 
public hearing.” Oola (2008:69) maintains that the LRA leadership refused to 
sign the peace agreement due to the fear over “personal safety and the ICC 
warrants” of arrest as well as lack of clarification on “the operational linkages 
between traditional mato-oput systems, the newly created Special Division of 
the High Court which is to be Uganda’s domestic war crimes court and the 
International Criminal Court.” Apuuli (2008:806) notes that “The Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation (29 June 2007)... was reached against the 
backdrop of LRA demands that the ICC drops its warrants of arrest. In effect, 
the agreement was an attempt to vitiate the effects of the warrants.”  However, 
the LRA was still apprehensive that the ICC warrants of arrest could be brought 
against them (Apuuli, 2008:805). These circumstances have dissipated hopes 
for the signing of the peace agreement, and the LRA has subsequently spread 
out and engaged in attacks in South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic 
(CAR) (Dunn, 2010:57).  
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The extent to which the ICC indictment influenced the process and outcome of 
the Juba Peace Talks is debatable. In a survey conducted in eight districts in 
northern Uganda by Tulane Initiative on Vulnerable Population (2007), 68 per 
cent of the correspondents believed that the ICC contributed to the pressure on 
LRA to participate in the peace talks. The ICC aimed at bringing to justice the 
LRA leaders who were implicated in the war crimes (Allen, 2006:96). However, 
the LRA on the other hand argued that the Government of Uganda equally 
committed similar crimes in the North and should be investigated. The ICC 
confirmed that they would investigate all crimes regardless of whomever 
committed them, though closer collaboration between the ICC and GOU has 
brought this commitment into question (Allen, 2006:96-97).   
 
 
As a complementary measure to the ICC intervention, the Uganda government 
and the LRA signed an agreement in June 2007 that set out general principles 
on how to address accountability and reconciliation in northern Uganda (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009:15).  The agreement allows the government to exercise 
jurisdiction over individuals who are found to bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious crimes committed during the conflict.  Without further specification, the 
agreement provides for alternative penalties for crimes committed by the LRA 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009:15).  The Agreement thus “proposed that justice 
measures drawn from the customs of the Acholi people and their neighbours 
should be officially recognized, and incorporated into Ugandan law” (Allen, 
2010:243).  In the light of this agreement, the Government of Uganda launched 
in July 2011 a war crime tribunal in Gulu (Oola, 2011). The first to be brought 
before a panel of three judges of Uganda’s International Crimes Division (ICD) 
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was the former LRA commander, Thomas Kwoyelo, accused of atrocities 
against civilians during the LRA-GOU conflict. However, on 22nd September 
2011 the judges ruled that Thomas qualified for amnesty under the Amnesty Act. 
 
The ARLPI (2009), in collaboration with other NGOs and community leaders 
have proposed Culturally-based approaches to forgiveness and reconciliation 
as an alternative to the use of violence by GOU, and retributive justice 
advanced by the ICC against the LRA.  
 
Culturally-based Approaches to Reconciliation 
An alternative approach to responding to post-conflict peacebuilding in northern 
Uganda has been through the use of culturally-based mechanisms of 
reconciliation. The mechanisms have focused on the use of rituals in healing the 
wounds of conflict and restoring relationships within communities in the North. It 
is thus important to analyze some of these approaches and determine their 
relevance in the Acholi community today.  
 
There are diverse reconciliation rituals among the Acholi. I will highlight a few 
which include: the mato oput (bitter drink) rite of reconciliation; nyono tong 
gweno (stepping on an egg) that is performed as a cleansing ritual on the 
returnees, especially the formerly abducted and former LRA rebels; tumu kir 
which literally means the act of cleansing against the bad spirits (cen) following 
a commitment of an act considered to be a taboo; gomo tong, the bending of 
spears, which refers to the ritual carried out between fighting ethnic groups or 
clans to mark the end to the conflict (Harlacher et al, 2006). 
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In Traditional Ways of Coping Harlacher et al (2006:59), in reference to northern 
Uganda, attempt to make distinctions between different rituals, especially those 
that involved killing and subsequent cleansing and reconciliation rituals. Killing 
is considered to be a very serious crime not only against an individual but also 
the community as a whole (Carlson and Mazurana, 2010).   If a person has 
killed he/she has to inform the community immediately in order for the cleansing, 
reparation, compensation and reconciliation ceremonies to take place. This 
process is meant to reconcile the affected parties and to appease the spirits of 
the dead referred to as cen or lacen in Acholi. The “Acholi believe that lacen, the 
spirit of a dead person mistreated in the world by family, relatives or society, is 
an evil spirit (gemo) and is the most dangerous and deadly spirit.” Hence, in 
situations where “someone has killed an enemy or a foreigner in a war, the 
cleansing would typically take place in the form of ‘kwero merok’, an elaborate 
ritual for ‘cleansing the enemy.’ If a person has killed someone from a friendly 
clan, the cleansing would be performed in a ‘mato oput’ ritual” (Harlacher et al., 
2006:59). Clarke (2007:145) notes that a range of organizations have been 
working towards integration of these rituals into the reconciliation processes.   
 
In situations where someone had been away from the community for a long 
period of time, there are special cleansing rituals to welcome him/her back. The 
commonly practiced ritual is the stepping on the egg referred to in Acholi as 
nyono tong gweno.  This ritual is performed by a family or clan leader (Carlson 
and Mazurana, 2010:256). In this case the returnee steps on an egg to reclaim 
his/her innocence. The main reason for the cleansing is that those returning 
could have contracted bad spirits or carried out evil acts which if not cleansed 
could bring misfortunes to the entire community (Harlacher et al., 2006:66; Allen, 
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2006:166). If the person had killed, further cleansing ceremonies could take 
place, such as mato oput.  
 
Reconciliation Ritual of Mato Oput 
On 19th June 2002 the Ker Kwaro Acholi (Ker Kwaro acholi, 2002) the supreme 
council of the Acholi, under the leadership of the Paramount Chief, deliberated 
on the procedural customary laws of the Acholi “regarding reconciliation (mato 
oput), reparations (culu kwor) and other related matters.” The law was 
promulgated on 1st January 2002. The declaration affirms that “This law shall be 
binding and apply to the wrongs committed within the jurisdiction of the Ker Kal 
Kwaro Acholi irrespective of whether the person(s) who committed it/them is/are 
Acholi or not” (Art. 3.1).  The law stipulates the various measures of 
compensation for different kinds of crimes. This has changed from the previous 
situation where a council of elders would decide on the compensation.   
  
Mato oput literally means drinking bitter juice from the roots of the oput tree. It 
can be defined as “a concrete ritual marking the peak of a process of conflict 
resolution, specifically referring to a killing that has occurred in the community” 
(Harlacher et al., 2006:76). In the Acholi customary laws (Art.43, no.3), mato 
oput is referred to as blood compensation and is mainly aimed at healing 
wounds of conflict and restoring harmony through forgiveness and reconciliation 
(Art.43 no.3). 
 
Historically, mato oput has not been used in the aftermath of a war as is 
currently the case in northern Uganda. Mato oput was mainly practiced in 
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response to killings between clans during times of peace. The ritual comes at 
the very end after prolonged negotiations between clans. This implies that mato 
oput seals a peace deal. It is a ritual that concludes a successful peaceful 
negotiation. 
 
In my interview with an Acholi Anthropologist, Dr. Okumu, (CM-G28, interviewed 
03/03/10), I learned that once a compromise is reached and compensation 
agreed upon, the offending clan mobilizes its members to contribute towards 
compensation of the affected clan.   In the past, compensation for a person who 
has been killed would involve pledging a girl for marriage from the perpetrator’s 
clan as a way of creating a reconciliatory bond between the two clans (Allen, 
2010:245). However, this is no longer practised.  Once the community has been 
mobilized, a date is set when the two sides would meet and reconcile.  
Members from the two clans assemble at a chosen site. Once at the site the two 
clans are separated and the ritual leaders invite representatives from both sides 
who come ‘armed’ with sticks and perform a mock fight (Harlacher et al., 
2006:84). The mediating elder holds a stick in the middle known as layibi (a long 
stick usually used to open granary).  
 
Dr. Okumu (CM-G28, interviewed 03/03/10) further explained that that once 
compensation has been agreed upon, the mediating elders then invite both 
clans to bring the animals for the cleansing ritual: the offender’s side brings a 
sheep and the victim’s a goat. The animals are cut into two: the offender’s side 
gives the head-side of the sheep to the victim and the victim also gives the 
head-side of the goat to the offender. The animals are then put together facing 
opposite directions. In the meantime the elders prepare a bitter drink made from 
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the extracted juice of the oput tree. The juice is mixed with blood of the 
slaughtered sheep and poured into a calabash. 
 
Once the bitter oput juice is ready, the clans of the two families approach each 
other; the perpetrator and a close relative of the deceased are invited to kneel 
down with their hands tied to their backs; they then bend to drink the bitter juice 
(oput) from the same calabash.  The drinking of the bitter mix signifies the 
willingness to let go of all bitterness, and reconcile. Once this is done, the eldest 
in the group begins to beat the royal drum (bwola) and there is jubilation and 
ululation to celebrate the reconciliation between the two clans. They all share a 
meal and restore their relationships.   
 
Different variations of mato oput have been reported by various sources (Afako, 
2002; Collaborative Transitions Africa, 2009; Harlacher et al., 2006).  This 
poses the challenge of determining the legitimacy of the practice and the extent 
to which it is generally practiced. 
 
Picture: Mato Oput ceremony - the drinking of the bitter juice of oput 
  
Source: The Radio Nederland Worldwide Internet Archive (Oketch, 2008) and 
Centre for New Design in Learning and Scholarship (CNDLS) (Jivani et al., 
2007). 
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At the end of the mato oput process the clans could embark on the ceremony of 
‘bending of spears’ referred to as gomo tong. This ritual was performed in the 
past to mark the end of a bloody war between clans, chiefdoms or different 
ethnic groups and it involved “literally bending the tips of the spears” (Harlacher 
et al., 2006:91-92).  The tip of the spear would be bent towards the person 
holding it, which meant that the failure to observe the agreement would have 
negative repercussions against the violator. 58  To perform the ritual, the elders 
from the parties in conflict would come together, discuss the causes of the 
conflict, stipulate the compensation to be paid by the perpetrator then reconcile. 
In 1984 the Acholi and Madi performed a gomo tong ceremony to end inter-
ethnic animosity and violence that had been sparked off by the fall of Idi Amin in 
1979 (Finnström, 2008 cited by Harlacher et al., (2006:92)).  
 
Mato oput has in recent years been institutionalized by the government, NGOs 
and international community (Dembour and Kelly, 2007:144). Some critics 
observe that the challenge of institutionalization of culturally-based rituals is that 
they can be co-opted into the liberal peace agenda (Andrieu, 2010; Mac Ginty, 
2008; Taylor, 2010).  In his critique, Andrieu (2010:546) asserts that culturally-
based mechanisms of reconciliation are limited on how much impact they can 
exert on the society: the mechanisms are influenced by the local power 
                                                 
58
 From my interview with Dr. Okumu (CM-G28, interviewed 03/03/10) I learned that in situations 
where there was killing against one clan and mediation had failed, leading to sporadic violence 
and killings between two clans, further interventions would be embarked on to end the conflict.  
This would be followed by the mato oput ceremony, and end with the bending of spears. If the 
conflict was between the Acholi community and another ethnic group then the mato oput 
ceremony would not be performed. This is in contrast to the new law that requires that mato oput 
be performed for any crimes committed under the jurisdiction of Ker Kal Kwaro Acholi.  
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dynamics in their claim for legitimacy; and they can be patriarchal and gender-
insensitive.  
 
When applied as a local initiative the culturally-based mechanisms can be 
effective in mitigating the conflict but “they may lose much of their value when 
encouraged and programmed by the state or by international institutions…” 
(Andrieu, 2010:546). However, at the same time reconciliation rituals in 
transitional justice tend to create opportunities for dialogue and exploration of 
possible ways of mitigating the negative impacts of conflict and reconstructing 
relationships.  
 
In making analysis of the role of rituals in conflict resolution, it is important to 
understand their anthropological and sociological impact on relationship building 
and how they create transitional spaces for dialogue and reconciliation. Rituals, 
according to Marshall (2002:360), have two main characteristics, belief and 
belonging. The beliefs within the rituals draw the community to deeper incisive 
comprehension of hitherto mystified and disturbing reality. This creates a sense 
of belonging and integral cohesion that is reinforced beyond identity. It creates a 
sense of: ‘we are in this together and we will sail through it together.’  These 
processes are all based on relational constructionism whereby the community 
takes the responsibility of reconstructing the society together.  However, I would 
add that a discourse on rituals has to make an analysis on the extent to which 
rituals are practiced, hence accepted by the society, as well as whether their 
reinvention have a positive or negative effect.  
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One of the limitations of rituals is that they do not have provisions for crimes 
committed by the government such as, the looting of livestock that largely led to 
the impoverishment of the Acholi community (Weeks, 2002:35); and the 
government attacks and maltreatment of the Acholi population (Human Rights 
Focus, 2002c). These situations call for forgiveness and reconciliation between 
the community and the state.  
 
The discussion above raises major challenges for NGO peacebuilding in 
northern Uganda. The analysis shows that the challenge of peacebuilding 
efforts in Uganda lies in tackling both the protracted aspects of the conflict and 
current post-conflict reconstruction challenges. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the historical background to the Uganda conflict 
while highlighting peacebuilding efforts that have been undertaken in the course 
of the conflict. I have explained how different agents have endeavoured to 
maintain and control power as a means to conflict resolution and how this has 
led to peace or conflict. The discussions have shown that the process of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding in northern Uganda have been faced with the 
challenge of negotiating a broader peace package that takes into account 
historical complexities, social aspirations and plurality of identities. The inter-
ethnic competition, colonial domination and construction of new forms of 
identities on the one hand, and the north-south divide and pursuit of social 
integration of different ethnic groups into a national entity, on the other, 
demonstrate that the 22-year northern Uganda conflict between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and Government of Uganda (GOU) needs to be 
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analysed from historical, social and political perspectives. This conflict has 
therefore to be understood within the broader analysis of the Uganda conflict. 
 
I have examined the colonial period with the interest of understanding the 
current structural, political, social and economic aspects of the Uganda conflict. 
The British colonial government used indirect-rule through ethnic leaders, thus 
assuring themselves of peace and stability with their subjects, and the subjects 
among themselves. The colonialists introduced the boundary system that 
confined ethnic groups to their regions of origin.  However, this strategy of divide 
and rule was inconsistent and contradictory. On the one hand the colonial 
government was attempting to put together a territory that could be governable 
as one entity, and on the other it was instituting a system of governance that did 
not allow for inter-ethnic interaction that could form a cohesive entity. The divide 
and rule policy diminished the prospects for national cohesion in the post-
independence period. There was thus a continuous process of political 
manipulation and ethnic polarization both of which were contradictory to any 
principles of nation-building.  
 
In my discussion of the post-independence period, one of the major highlights 
was the rapid movement towards militarization of conflict that subsequently left 
minimum room for political negotiation. Violence was socialized as a primary 
means of resolving conflicts. Lack of dialogical sense-making based on 
common aspirations for a national narrative contributed to militarization of the 
conflict. Power was equated to the military prowess and state control, optimizing 
violence into what Mazrui (1975) referred to as military ethnocracy.  
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Conflict interventional mechanisms were mainly two-pronged: on the one hand 
the government and opposing groups relied on military power to settle their 
differences, on the other there were efforts toward peacebuilding.  I have 
explained in Table 1 in the Appendix the chronological legacy of violence in 
Uganda since 1966. The LRA is the last major rebel group that has not put down 
its weapons despite several peace attempts. The 2006 peace negotiations led 
to a cease fire agreement that has brought relative peace to northern Uganda. 
However, the LRA and GOU never signed any peace agreement. Other efforts 
towards peacebuilding have included the institution of Human Rights 
Commission Act; Amnesty Commission Act; Land Act and initiatives towards 
national reconciliation through a proposal of National Reconciliation Bill that is 
still pending in parliament.  
 
The ICC’s issuing of warrants of arrest against the LRA leaders in 2005 
arguably raised the stakes for the possibilities of the LRA and GOU reaching a 
peace agreement. Opinions were divided on the extent to which the ICC 
intervention had a positive or a negative impact on the peace process. The ICC 
intervention provoked calls for reintroduction of culturally-based mechanisms of 
peacebuilding. These mechanisms pay attention to reconciliation and 
reintegration of the former combatants and formerly abducted persons. However, 
the complexity of the northern Uganda conflict has raised major challenges for 
reconciliation efforts: the formerly abducted persons-turned-combatants were 
simultaneously victims and perpetrators; some families had children both in the 
government army and LRA rebel group; some of the formerly abducted had 
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been forced to kill members from their own families and village.  These 
contextual complexities raised concern over careful sequencing between 
reconciliation and justice; forgiveness and retribution.    
 
NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda, as I shall demonstrate in Chapters Five 
and Six below, is embedded within the above historical complexities and 
challenges of Uganda conflict. NGOs are faced with the challenge of addressing 
the diverse dimensions of the conflict, both the immediate and historical roots of 
conflict. To a large extent these challenges are beyond the scope of NGOs. 
However, as I shall demonstrate in Chapters Five and Six below, NGOs in 
northern Uganda worked with the local community and donors in a relational 
process of peacebuilding. I was particularly interested in understanding the 
extent to which NGO peacebuilding was informed by the local reality that I have 
explained above and/or external conceptualizations of peacebuilding.  From a 
relational constructionism perspective, I focused on deciphering the various 
peacebuilding processes of relationship building between the NGOs, donors 
and local community, and how this influenced the peacebuilding discourse and 
practice. 
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Chapter Five: NGO Peacebuilding Approaches in Northern Uganda  
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the different approaches to peacebuilding conducted by 
NGOs in northern Uganda. The aim, in line with the research question, is to 
understand to what extent these peacebuilding approaches were informed by 
the local reality conceptualization of peacebuilding. The research seeks to 
establish specific areas of priority selected by NGOs engaged in peacebuilding; 
the approaches used in addressing the post-conflict challenges to peace; and 
the theories of change and impact assessment mechanisms undertaken by the 
NGOs. This analysis will reveal the NGO peacebuilding discourse and practice. 
 
As I have stated in Chapter One, I conducted the research in two different sites. 
The first one was in Gulu where NGOs are active, and the second was in Atiak 
where NGOs are absent.  In the study of the approaches to peacebuilding in 
northern Uganda, I was interested in finding out the extent to which NGO 
presence in Gulu or lack of it in Atiak was a factor in determining the local 
communities’ conceptualization, participation and approach to peacebuilding. 
This was important in understanding the way in which the local people 
perceived peace, their commitment to social change and their approaches to 
peacebuilding.  The analysis of these factors was significant in understanding 
how NGOs collaborated with the local communities in conflict analysis and 
intervention processes in Gulu, and how the local communities in Atiak 
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approached the challenge of peacebuilding despite the limited resources on the 
ground. 
  
The conceptualization of peacebuilding within the framework of militarized 
peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts, have led to the generalized assertions 
that NGO peacebuilding serves the liberal peace agenda (Richmond, 2008; 
Richmond and Carey, 2005; Richmond and Franks, 2007; Paris, 1997). The 
findings from the local people’s perceptions of conflict and peacebuilding 
mechanisms show that the context of northern Uganda is complex and does not 
fit these generalizations.   
 
From the view point of relational constructionism, the study, as I shall 
demonstrate below, shows that peacebuilding is essentially based on 
relationship building as a means of transforming situations of conflict into 
opportunities for dialogue, mutual understanding, and change of negative 
attitudes and perceptions that have perpetuated the conflict. The relational 
aspects are evident in the dynamic levels of interaction between the different 
agents of peace within the local community in both Atiak and Gulu; and between 
the local community, NGOs and donors in Gulu. These interactions have 
generated a broad-based dialogical practice of peacebuilding.  The relational 
component is also manifested in the end objective of peacebuilding activities, 
which entails restoration of broken relationships through reconciliation, conflict 
mediation and institution of a culture of peace.  
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Approach to the Analysis of the Findings 
In this section I explain how I went about the research and outline the key 
findings, which I will elaborate in detail in the rest of the chapter.  In order to 
understand peacebuilding approaches in both Gulu and Atiak, I began by asking 
the participants to explain their understanding of peacebuilding. This was 
important in gauging the different expectations of peacebuilding initiatives. 
These expectations shaped the diverse ways in which participants in both Gulu 
and Atiak perceived peacebuilding. In summary the majority of the respondents 
(36 out of 49) tended to describe peacebuilding as: relationship building that 
facilitates mediation, reconciliation and land dispute resolution; provision of 
basic needs; human rights advocacy; and support of national reconciliation 
efforts. However, the minority (13 out of 49) felt that peacebuilding was 
irrelevant because the war was over and what was now urgent was the 
provision of basic needs.  
 
The above conceptualizations of peacebuilding set the scene for me to explore 
the understanding of peacebuilding approaches among community peace 
agents in Atiak, and NGO and community peacebuilders in Gulu. I asked the 
participants to explain to me the major issues of concern that influenced the 
various approaches to peacebuilding.  The responses in both Gulu and Atiak 
varied but were mainly related to: resettlement of the populations that had been 
displaced during the war; reintegration of the formerly abducted persons; 
provision of basic needs (food, housing, education, health and vocational 
training, self-employment skills); land dispute resolution; reconciliation between 
families and clans; security of persons and property; support to income 
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generating activities (IGAs); advocacy against human rights abuses, and in 
support of peace and reconciliation efforts. 
 
My next step was to study how the NGOs in collaboration with the community in 
Gulu, and the local community in Atiak, were responding to these social issues 
of concern in their various peacebuilding efforts. The study highlights three 
broad categorizations of the NGO and local community approaches to 
peacebuilding. First, third party mediation in land dispute resolution, which 
focused primarily on the resolution of land disputes; second, human rights 
advocacy, which aimed at speaking against human rights abuses by the LRA 
and GOU forces; third, reconciliation and transitional justice, which focused on 
reconciliation, peace education in schools, provision of basic needs, the ICC 
debate and reintegration of formerly abducted persons.   
 
In Gulu, NGOs collaborated with the local community in supporting culturally-
based approaches to peacebuilding, whereas in Atiak community members 
worked closely with the local community and government leaders. This was 
evidenced by the fact that: seven NGOs reported that they were working with 
the local community in conducting cultural rituals of reconciliation in Gulu; two 
community leaders in Atiak and three in Gulu affirmed their participation in 
raising awareness on the importance of reconciliation rituals.  
 
The difference between Gulu and Atiak lay in the number of activities: in Gulu 
there were more peacebuilding activities due to the presence of NGOs. In Atiak 
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the community worked closely with the cultural and government leaders in 
addressing land disputes and other social justice concerns, whereas in Gulu 
there were more peace agents who included: NGOs, local community (cultural 
and government leaders) and donors.  In both locations, there were attempts to 
use culturally-based mechanisms of reconciliation.  
   
One of the significant findings of the study is that culturally-based practices were 
not widely practiced nor fully integrated into local justice systems at both sites. 
This finding was contrary to claims in some of the literature (see Acirokop, 2010; 
Collaborative Transitions Africa, 2009; Oketch, 2008; Murithi, 2008).  However, 
in both Gulu and Atiak there were attempts by the local community to revive 
them especially in addressing the challenges of reconciliation. 
 
In both Gulu and Atiak, opinions were divided on the impact (positive and 
negative) of the ICC intervention on the northern Uganda peace process. This 
led to debates on whether the community should opt for the ICC intervention or 
the culturally-based rituals of reconciliation. These discussions have contributed 
to the exploration of alternative mechanisms to the ICC approach such as 
reconciliation through the use of the cultural rituals of mato oput and other 
culturally-based mechanisms of peacebuilding.  
 
I concluded the analysis by looking at the social theories of change behind 
community peacebuilding in Gulu and Atiak, and NGO approaches to 
peacebuilding and how they (NGOs) were assessed the impact of their activities 
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on the community, and on the peacebuilding discourse and practice. This was 
significant in determining the extent to which NGO peacebuilding was 
sustainable.  I was also interested in understanding how the NGO discourse and 
practice of peacebuilding could be assessed within the challenges of conflict 
dynamics in northern Uganda. This was important in establishing the extent to 
which NGO approaches were informed by the needs of the local context.  I 
linked these perspectives to social change with the local community 
expectations in Gulu. In Atiak my interest was to examine how the community 
perceived the changes realized by the peacebuilding initiatives. 
 
Approaches to Peacebuilding 
Perceptions of Peacebuilding  
The understanding of what entails peacebuilding was divergent among the 
informants. Peacebuilding was conceived as a broadly encompassing 
phenomenon that was embedded in processes that help communities recover 
from conflict. Five broad conceptualizations of peacebuilding emerged: the first 
was that peacebuilding was seen as part of the process of relationship building 
for social cohesion: the primary concern here was that the protracted conflict in 
northern Uganda had led to family and clan conflicts within the Acholi 
community, and between the Acholi and neighbouring ethnic groups. These 
conflicts have resulted in disintegration of the social and cultural fabric.  The 
desire of most informants in both Gulu and Atiak was to address the urgent 
need of reinforcing the current initiatives for peace and exploring other 
possibilities of reconciling communities.   
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The second was the perception of peacebuilding as a component of basic 
needs provision. Both the local community participants and NGOs 
acknowledged the fact that peacebuilding initiatives had to be concerned with 
people’s livelihoods as part of conflict recovery. In Atiak the needs were much 
higher given the impoverished nature of the location. However, participants in 
both Gulu and Atiak underscored basic needs provision as an issue of primary 
concern.   
 
Third was the understanding of the interpretation of peace as absence of war. 
Some participants felt that peace had returned to northern Uganda and NGOs 
should therefore not carry out any peacebuilding activities.  These participants 
were emphatic that the NGOs should instead focus on building schools and 
hospitals, and initiating income generating activities. This view was linked to the 
fact that since the 2006 cease fire agreement between the LRA and GOU, 
northern Uganda had experienced peace. Hence, priority should shift to more 
urgent needs. However, such views were held by a small number of people, but 
I considered them to be important because they expressed the people’s 
preoccupation with what they considered to be the most pressing needs. These 
views also revealed how the population in Gulu had substituted government’s 
responsibility of provision of social services to NGOs. This was attributed to 
many years of NGOs’ role of providing humanitarian assistance in the displaced 
camps. Participants who held this position were mainly from Gulu. In contrast, 
participants in Atiak were emphatic that real peace was yet to be achieved. 
They underlined the fact that past ceasefires had failed. Besides, the proximity 
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of their location to the Sudan border from where the LRA had often attacked 
rendered them vulnerable to future attacks. They were therefore more 
pessimistic about the ‘return of peace’ in northern Uganda.     
 
The fourth was that peacebuilding was understood as advocacy through 
campaigns against human rights abuse and in support of the marginalized 
within the community such as teenage mothers, the old and other vulnerable 
categories. This approach was more strongly held in Gulu than Atiak. The 
presence of NGOs in Gulu intensified the advocacy activities particularly given 
that NGOs had national, regional and international networks to pursue the 
advocacy agenda. In Atiak the community mostly relied on cultural and 
government leaders as well as charismatic individuals to voice their concerns. 
 
The fifth conceptualization was a broader understanding of peacebuilding as 
part of the discourse of national reconciliation. Twelve participants (out of twenty 
seven) from the NGO sample referred to the neglect and impoverishment of the 
North by the central government as one of the root causes of the conflict. 
Similar sentiments were shared by the focus group participants in Gulu and 
Atiak. The rest of the participants referred to other aspects as root causes, such 
as historical militarization of conflict that has led to a culture of violence; 
ethnicized politics that is seen as responsible for the North-South divide; and 
lack of efforts towards a national reconciliation.   A good number of NGOs (12 
out of 20) contributed to the discourse of National Reconciliation Bill 2009, 
which is yet to be passed by parliament. Nineteen out of twenty seven NGO 
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participants emphasized the aspect of reconciliation as key to achieving peace. 
These perceptions were also expressed by community members in both Gulu 
and Atiak, and among government and community leaders. However, other 
participants, in both Gulu and Atiak, were of the opinion that national 
reconciliation should be accompanied by punishment on those who had 
committed heinous crimes during the conflict.  
 
The above perceptions of peacebuilding indicate how NGO and community 
peacebuilding was conducted in a diverse terrain of expectations. These 
conceptualizations influenced the people’s participation and appreciation of 
NGO peacebuilding activities. At the same time these perceptions were not 
mutually exclusive. In many ways they complemented each other and informed 
the different processes of peacebuilding activities. 
 
I will now discuss the broad perspectives of NGO and community peacebuilding 
based on the empirical evidence from Gulu and Atiak. These are: third party 
mediation in land dispute resolution; human rights advocacy; and reconciliation 
and transitional justice. 
 
Part I: Third Party Mediation in Land Dispute Resolution 
The post-conflict setting of northern Uganda experienced new challenges of 
addressing emergent non-militarized conflicts. The conflicts were episodic and 
included land dispute resolution, advocacies against human rights abuses, 
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psychosocial support, provision of basic needs to the vulnerable and 
marginalized, and integration of formerly abducted children. I have already 
discussed most of these issues above and will further expand on them in 
Chapter Six. In this section I will mainly analyze land dispute resolution.  
 
Land dispute resolution 
The problem of land disputes emerged as one of the major concerns in 
peacebuilding efforts in both Gulu and Atiak. Most organizations engaged in 
peacebuilding affirmed that they were conducting land dispute resolution 
through the training of mediators within the community. Both the government 
and cultural leaders played an important role in addressing the land conflicts. 
 
Land disputes were experienced in varying degrees in both Gulu and Atiak. 
Gulu, being a large town and the capital of northern Uganda, had more land 
dispute cases. Its strategic location meant that there were large numbers of 
returnees and individuals interested in either resettling into the region or 
purchasing land. The remoteness of Atiak location meant that the competition 
for land was low. Land dispute cases in Atiak were mainly within or between 
families, and were low in number. There was a positive appreciation of the role 
played by local government and cultural leaders. While in both locations the 
cultural and government leaders were actively involved in addressing the land 
disputes, in Gulu the leaders had the advantage of receiving training in 
mediation and legal interpretation of land laws. This meant that in the Gulu area 
land dispute interventions were expedited because of the large presence of 
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trained mediators. Besides, NGOs had also trained paralegals who became 
fundamental in helping the community interpret land laws.   
 
There are several reasons why land was a major issue of concern in both Gulu 
and Atiak.  The primary cause was the mass displacement during the 22 year 
period of war.  Many families abandoned their ancestral land.  Traditionally 
families and clans used particular types of plants or trees to mark land 
boundaries.  Due to the long periods away from home the boundary 
demarcations had disappeared. Dispute over what should be the correct 
boundary led to conflicts amongst and between families and clans. Even in 
situations where the boundaries were still evident, some of the earlier returnees 
to the ancestral land altered the boundaries (LNGO-PO32, interviewed 25/01/10 
and LNGO-PC50 interviewed 12/03/10). These situations created conflicts 
especially when other families and clans members returned.  
 
Children who had been born in the displacement camps and had lost both 
parents relied on relatives to reveal to them the location and boundary of their 
ancestral land. In some cases, as reported by one community participant in 
Gulu, relatives took advantage of the situation and appropriated sections of the 
land (CM-G51, interviewed 10/03/10). Later on when children came to discover 
the truth from other relatives, there was conflict between the orphans and the 
relatives who had appropriated land.   
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According to a peace coordinator of a local NGO, the illegal practice by the 
Acholi Diaspora and recent returnees of ‘buying’ land in Gulu at a throw away 
price contributed to the land conflicts (LNGO-PC50, interviewed 12/03/10).  In 
reference to a family that had sold out land, a peacebuilding coordinator of a 
local NGO observed, “for a family that has spent most of its life in the camps 
under dire deprivation, facing the reality of acquiring Uganda shillings 2 million 
(£600) from the sale of land is simply overwhelming” (LNGO-PC006, 
interviewed 15/02/10).  The participant added that once the family got the 
payment there were conflicts over how the money should be divided.  
 
In Gulu, competition for the economic value of land, according to a programme 
officer from an international NGO, contributed to land disputes, particularly 
given that land was the main source of food production (INGO-PO34, 
interviewed 10/02/10).  Several families had gradually started using land for 
agricultural farming. Four NGOs involved in agricultural activities affirmed that 
they had supplied inputs to the communities to begin farming.  The harvest from 
the farms increased the wealth of the families that had tilled large portions of 
land. Given the proximity to the Sudan border, some families opted to exploit the 
Sudan market and sell their produce across the border.  This practice however, 
rapidly reduced the local quantities of food supply (INGO-PO36, interviewed 
16/01/10).   
 
There were situations in Gulu where family disputes arose over the control of 
money from the harvest. In most cases women had spent more time working in 
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the farms, but it was the men who looked for the external market in Sudan. In 
these situations women were left empty handed.  A 56 year old community 
participant from Gulu asserted: “I have spent so much time and energy growing 
millet and before it could be fully ready my husband had already found someone 
to buy the harvest. He negotiated the price and sold the whole harvest leaving 
the family with nothing to eat” (CM-G62, interviewed 16/02/2010). In a similar 
perspective a woman from Atiak narrated how her elder brother left her to do all 
the farming and insisted on controlling the sale of the produce (CM-A68, 
interviewed 17/02/10). This participant however reiterated that she would 
involve the police next time this happens.  
 
Some women initiated what Kandiyoti (1988) refers to as “patriarchal 
bargaining” 59 in order to gain access to the income from the harvest. They 
negotiated with their husbands so that they could also sell the harvest in the 
local markets, and have a share of the money. Additionally, they invited their 
husbands to participate in income generating workshops where participants 
were taught how to manage their projects in mutual trust. Four out of nine 
community participants in Gulu claimed that this approach had a positive 
change of perspective on their husbands. The women thus displayed patriarchal 
bargaining as a means of resisting the male dominance and reclaiming control 
over the income from the harvest. The rest of the participants had mixed 
opinions on how to handle the issue. There were those who emphasized that 
                                                 
59
 Kandiyoti (1988) asserts that women are often subjected to the ‘rule of the game’ within 
cultural settings that favour the patriarchy.  In these situations women find ways of resistance, 
actively or passively.  She affirms that: “These patriarchal bargains exert a powerful influence on 
the shaping of women’s gendered subjectivity and determine the nature of gender ideology in 
different contexts” (Kandiyoti, 1988:275). KANDIYOTI, D. 1988. Bargaining With Patriarchy. 
Gender & Society, 2, 274-290. 
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the husband should be the one to give the final decision whereas others 
preferred a more negotiable approach.  
 
The communities in both Gulu and Atiak applied alternative land dispute 
resolution (ADR) to resolve land conflicts.  ADR can generally be defined as 
“informal dispute resolution processes in which the parties meet with a 
professional third party who helps them resolve their dispute in a way that is 
less formal and often more consensual than is done in the courts” (Spangler, 
2003).  The application of ADR in northern Uganda kept the same principles but 
was rather rudimentary. It mainly involved the local government, cultural leaders, 
trained paralegals and NGO peace coordinators. In Atiak, as I have noted above, 
ADR was carried out by the local government and cultural leaders. 
 
As third party mediators, NGO peace coordinators and cultural leaders realized 
that the judicial system in northern Uganda was slow and overwhelmed with 
cases. It was obvious that the courts did not have the capacity to deal with all 
the cases.  Besides, the court system approach led to intensified rivalries 
between families, and by the time the case was over, relationships between the 
parties in dispute were fractured. A participant from a local NGO observed: 
 “We have established, in collaboration with the local council, land conflict 
committees. These are people that have been selected from five major 
categories: cultural leaders who include clan elders, clan chiefs, and 
respectable personalities within the community; sub-county land committee; 
sub-county land authority; land registration office; and local councillors” 
(LNGO – PC 32, interviewed 25/01/10).   
Those trained in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) acted as bridges between 
the disputants, as well as between the legal systems and alternative dispute 
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resolution approaches. For cases that the trainees could not handle, the NGOs 
consulted legal experts for professional advice. In Atiak, there were no legal 
experts in situations where the local government and cultural leaders failed to 
resolve land conflicts. The parties in conflict had a choice to reach a 
compromise or refer the case to the local tribunal. In fact, the above three cases 
were referred to the local tribunal after the parties failed to reach a compromise 
in an ADR session. 
 
The findings show a remarkable success in the application of ADR in land 
disputes. For example, a peace coordinator from an international NGO affirmed 
that:  
“In Pader we have registered a lot of success. When we went there to 
intervene in land conflicts, there were 228 land dispute cases in court. After 
our community intervention and proposal for settlement of the conflict out of 
court, most of the cases were withdrawn and only two were still in court. 
People began to trust in our approach because we focused on bringing the 
people together to talk and find a common solution that was good for their 
families and community at large” (INGO-PC48, interviewed 19/03/10).   
In Atiak similar success was noted particularly in appreciation of the local 
government and cultural leaders’ role in mediating land disputes. A community 
participant from Atiak asserted that: 
 “...we often refer to the local council and elders to resolve our land disputes. 
For example last month we had a case of three children who had returned 
here in Atiak, both parents were killed during the war. Their uncle had sold 
part of the land and they had nowhere to stay. The community informed the 
local government, and with the elders they resolved to allocate the children 
part of the family land” (CM-A64, interviewed 17/02/10). 
The observation by this participant gave an indication that without the 
intervention of the local government and cultural leaders some of the returnees 
would be left without any land. At a focus group discussion in Atiak the 
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participants observed that the majority of land dispute cases were resolved 
amicably and that there were only three cases in the local tribunal.  
 
The success of ADR in both Gulu and Atiak was mainly attributed to the fact that 
it promoted relationship building as opposed to the court system that was 
retributive and adversarial. The ADR approach reduced differences between the 
parties in conflict and invested in creating inter-family and inter-clan harmony for 
the sake of peace in the community. The approach was mainly integrative, 
meaning it focused on relationship building while relying on both cultural and 
legal values. This restorative component paved the way for other community 
peacebuilding activities such as integration of formerly abducted persons, 
reconciliation and psychosocial support.  
 
In highlighting the lessons learned from ADR processes, six out of nine NGOs 
involved in ADR reported that they had initially taken upon themselves the 
responsibility of mediating the conflicts rather than mediating the process of 
land dispute resolution. They later opted to work closely with the sub-county 
land committee and Local Council (LC) 1, 2 and 3.60 They trained paralegals, 
community leaders, government officials and cultural leaders. They also formed 
and trained peace committees in land dispute resolution.  
 
                                                 
60
 I have explained the structures of local councils in Chapter Four. 
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The ADR approach to land dispute resolution had a number of limitations that 
curtailed the maximization of the expected results. There were no official means 
of enforcement of the decision other than mutual consensus. Hence, 
dissatisfaction with the ADR ruling, as one local NGO programme officer noted, 
meant that the parties could resort to court, further heightening tensions 
between the families and clans (LNGO-PO005, interviewed 14/02/10). The 
involvement of the community in ADR however put moral pressure on the 
parties to adhere to the decisions reached. Failure to adhere to the ruling could 
result in negative repercussions on other social transactions such negotiations 
for marriage or sale of property.  Thus, the ADR verdict was seen by most 
community participants, both in Gulu and Atiak, as strongly binding.  
 
Another limitation was the fact that the institutional leaders, as third party 
mediators, were not necessarily neutral (LNGO-PO32, interviewed 25/01/10). 
Interviews showed that there were cases where cultural leaders had sometimes 
been biased in their ruling, favouring particular clans or families against the 
other.  One elder from Gulu observed:  
“The boundary of my land has always been clear. Unfortunately the tree 
demarcations we had here 15 years ago are no longer there. But everyone 
knows where they were, yet the mediating elders decided to push the 
boundary against my side. They obviously favoured the Payeera clan because 
most of these elders belong to that clan” (CM – G71, interviewed 2/02/10).  
Another participant from Gulu observed that “I am still torn between going to 
court and accepting the mediation by the elders. I don’t trust two of the elders in 
the committee, they could make a biased decision. So I may end up going to 
court” (CM-G69, interviewed 10/03/10). There were also reported cases of 
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corrupt cultural and government leaders who took bribes in favour of one 
individual against the other. 
 
Part II: Human Rights Advocacy 
Human rights advocacy emerged as an important component of peacebuilding 
both in Gulu. In Atiak the community did not have the resources to conduct 
human rights advocacy except in very limited and localized manner. Most NGO 
participants (19 out of 27) observed that human rights advocacy was at its peak 
during the conflict. This was mainly due to high levels of violent activities by the 
LRA and the increasing numbers of casualties among the populations. NGOs 
carried out human rights advocacy at the grassroots level as well as at tracks 
two (middle range leadership within the government and inter-governmental 
NGOs) and track one (top government officials, influential organizations 
nationally and internationally).  These processes were based on collaboration 
between the NGOs, government organs and community.   
 
However, in Atiak region where there were no NGOs, the residents liaised with 
their cultural and local council leaders to conduct human rights advocacy. The 
community also worked with the association of parents to lobby the local 
government to consider creating employment for the youth. In the focus group 
discussions in Atiak there was a general concern that the region of Atiak had 
been neglected for many years and that the community needed to upscale its 
advocacy efforts on the government in order to bring development to the region 
(FG-A008, interviewed 14/03/10). However, advocacy activities were not as 
widespread as in Gulu. This was because in Gulu NGOs used their resources to 
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increase the number of advocacy activities. NGOs also had international 
networks to put pressure on the government and LRA to stop military abuse and 
consider peace negotiation. Another factor was that Gulu had a higher 
population level in both urban and rural areas, as a result there were many 
advocacy needs. 
 
The main strategies applied by the NGOs in human rights advocacy included 
naming and shaming, public protests, mass education, local and international 
mobilization. Advocacy for human rights exposed the level of abuse by both the 
LRA and Uganda government. A programme officer from a local NGO stated 
that the government had gained political mileage by claiming that it was fighting 
a ‘terrorist’ group that had committed atrocious acts against an innocent 
population (LNGO-PC31, interviewed 18/01/10). He added that paradoxically 
the same government was oblivious to its own human rights abuses and instead 
opted to advance a discourse on protection and defence of the innocent.  
 
One of the programme officers from a local human rights NGO observed that 
when her organization was founded in 1996 there were many cases of human 
rights abuse by both the LRA and Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) 
(LNGO-PO33, interviewed 22/03/10).  Everyone was afraid to speak out. The 
government forces carried out all kinds of abuses with impunity. The informant 
added that as an organization they felt they had an obligation to speak out in 
order to stop the inhumane treatment of the Acholi people.  In collaboration with 
other organizations they spoke out strongly against these abuses and after 
some time the government began to listen.  
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A programme officer from a local human rights NGO observed that her 
organization gathered evidence of abuse by the government and LRA (LNGO-
PO33, interviewed 22/03/10).  The organization made their findings public and 
used them for advocacy against human rights abuses. At the same time the 
local community perceived the government discourse on human security as 
false and manipulative. A 52 year old woman from the control population of 
Atiak said that the abducted children were sandwiched between the LRA and 
government fire, and that the population was constantly under attack (CM-A57, 
interviewed 26/02/10). She retorted that:  
“For many years we suffered from constant attacks. When the government 
forces came they would tell us that we are harbouring and feeding the LRA, 
and when the LRA attacked they would accuse us of betraying their cause. 
The LRA claimed that our community was disclosing their hideouts and 
operations to the government. They would also attack us because some of our 
sons had defected from their forces” (CM-A57, interviewed 26/02/10). 
In a reaction to the way in which the government observed double standards 
during the conflict, a programme officer of a local NGO in Gulu asserted that, 
“when the government killed the abducted child soldiers in combat they would 
say that they have killed rebels, but when they rescued them they would say 
that they have rescued formerly abducted children” (LNGO-PO31, interviewed 
18/01/10).    
 
Most NGOs conducted grassroots advocacy although there was no evidence of 
organized sophisticated networks as there were during the conflict period. One 
of the NGO informants explained that there is a sense of fulfilment amongst the 
NGOs based on the impression that advocacy contributed to the end of conflict 
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and subsequent relative peace.     Grassroots advocacy, though limited in its 
expansiveness, had mainly focused on raising awareness on the need for a 
more participative approach to social change, such as the use of alternative 
dispute resolution to solve land conflict; participation in reconciliation rituals as a 
means of bringing the community together to work towards a different future; 
and encouraging people to till their land in order to increase the food basket and 
minimize reliance on humanitarian aid. To achieve these objectives NGOs 
worked with peace committees, paralegals, cultural and local government 
leaders, religious leaders and other influential individuals within the community.  
The interviews in both Gulu and Atiak demonstrated that conflict impact 
mitigation activities could not be fully effective if there was not collaborative 
grassroots mobilization.  There were thus concerted efforts to drum up support 
for the change of attitudes and perceptions amongst the population in order to 
bring about a more peaceful society.   
 
One of the major concerns for some NGOs in Gulu and peace agents in Atiak 
was the abuse of alcohol among men.  The high unemployment rates coupled 
with the dependency culture acquired during the period of humanitarian 
assistance were among the primary causes of these tendencies.  Campaigns 
against alcohol abuse did not seem to have borne much success. The 
frustrations of the delay of the peace dividend, the high levels of expectations on 
government assistance and the pressure of providing basic needs became 
serious challenges to grassroots advocacy. 
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A culture of violence and impunity had developed during the period of conflict, 
making human rights advocacy a risky endeavour.  One of the human rights 
advocates working for an international organization as programme coordinator 
observed that she was once threatened by a military man following a broadcast 
by her organization against human rights abuses by the UPDF (INGO-PC48, 
interviewed 19/03/10). She got a phone call from someone who claimed to be 
from the military. The person said: “if you don’t stop talking on the radio against 
us you will see. In fact, I want to see you tomorrow at the military barracks; you 
have to come and see me and sort this out otherwise I will deal with you.” She 
defied these threats and affirmed that she would not stop talking against human 
rights abuses. Similar threats were issued to her colleagues in other 
organizations but they did not stop speaking against the injustices.   A renowned 
religious leader, Archbishop Odama, head of Acholi Religious Leaders for 
Peace Initiative (ARLPI), asserted that he was equally threatened by different 
individuals for making contacts with the rebels (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 
19/01/10).  He claimed that some people felt that through his mediation efforts in 
the LRA-GOU conflict, he was giving unnecessary importance to the LRA who 
had already inflicted so much suffering on the population. He however refused 
to be intimidated by such threats and continued his work for peace.  There were 
no cases of threats reported in Atiak. I attributed this to the fact that there was a 
close collaboration between the government and cultural leaders, and that the 
two groups preferred a consultative, rather than a confrontational approach.  
 
In Gulu, the use of privately owned media became an effective strategy of 
deconstructing the state power by naming and shaming the perpetrators of 
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violence. Two factors contributed to this strategy: first was that the government 
media would not expose the cases of human rights abuse by its own forces, the 
UPDF. On the contrary, the private media within and outside Uganda were 
willing to publicize human rights abuses. Second was that the use of media 
exposed to the rest of the world the fact that the northern Uganda population 
was a victim of both the LRA and government of Uganda. This put pressure on 
the government to improve its human rights record and augment its efforts for 
peace.   
 
Human rights campaigns created a social consciousness which generated an 
internal force among NGOs to exert pressure on the government and LRA, 
hence calling for an end to impunity.  The findings show that human rights 
campaigns raised awareness on the rights and responsibilities of individuals, 
government institutions and community. For example, a human rights activist 
affirmed that: 
 “While initially the military were against our work and even threatened to stop 
us, later on they realized that we did not discriminate whose rights we were 
defending. Interestingly, after several years of our work,  officers in the army 
came to us to report cases of abuse by their senior officials” (LNGO-PO33, 
interviewed 22/03/10). 
Through the Uganda Human Rights Commission, the government investigated 
human rights abuses by the government forces. A government official from the 
Commission asserted that:  
“We carry out investigations of abuses by government agents to ensure that 
they observe the work ethics of respect of human dignity; we educate 
government forces and the public on human rights and responsibilities as 
means of establishing good relationship between the two (government and 
public); we also do an audit of reported cases of human rights abuses and 
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document them in an annual human rights report” (UG-PO007, interviewed 
18/02/10).  
Four other NGOs affirmed that they now had a good working relationship with 
the government armed forces following extensive training on human rights 
observance and how to handle the public with respect. 
 
The congested conditions within the IDP camps had rendered women 
vulnerable to abuse by men. Some of the women who had resettled back to 
their villages continued to face similar kinds of violence as those experienced in 
the IDP camps. Early pregnancies which were rampant in the camps became a 
matter of concern among the returnees since some girls had become pregnant 
after their return to the villages. In response to this challenge two NGOs became 
active in lobbying against women abuse. In Atiak the association of parents 
focused their activities on speaking against the tendency of the youth to prey on 
girls, and in some cases make them pregnant. The women worked closely with 
the local government authorities in protecting the girls against these kinds of 
abuses.  
 
In an interview with the director of an NGO running a support programme for 
girl-mothers, it emerged that the level of violence against women was 
undocumented (LNGO-PC73, interviewed 14/02/10). The director observed that 
more than half the number of girl-mothers became pregnant from violent abuse. 
I could not, however, verify these estimations. This informant underscored that 
besides learning professional skills that empowered them to earn a living, the 
girls received psycho-social support to build their self-esteem.  The respondent 
was also emphatic that girls, and women in general, were much more 
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vulnerable to abuses during and after the war, hence her priority to the girl-
mothers.  
 
Five out of nine community participants in Gulu raised concern over the general 
assumption that young women were more vulnerable than young men.  They 
argued that the young men, especially the formerly abducted, were in need of 
as much support as the young women. However, a programme coordinator of a 
local NGO taking care of young women refuted such claims (LNGO-PC73, 
14/02/10). She was emphatic that under normal and peaceful circumstances 
women were already culturally and socially marginalized within the Acholi 
community. They had no right to inherit land or property of their husbands; they 
did not have the freedom to choose who to get married to; those who happened 
to fall pregnant before marriage could end up never getting married. She 
underscored that the war situation had further disadvantaged women and her 
choice to only help young women was a deliberate one. This was because 
these women had undergone traumatic experiences while under captivity by the 
rebels, and at the same time faced rejection in the villages. The respondent 
emphasized that her aim was to empower the girl-mothers with basic skills that 
could make them economically independent and regain their respect in the 
community.    
 
The above analysis shows that understanding how gender perceptions and 
socializations impacted conflict trends was important in the designing of 
peacebuilding programmes. The continuation of women violence, from the 
camps to the villages, indicated that certain abuses had been tolerated despite 
their adverse effects on the individuals concerned.  
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The majority of the NGOs adapted the practice of mainstreaming gender into 
their peacebuilding activities as an attempt to attain sustainable realization of 
the peace dividend. While some NGO participants reported that mainstreaming 
was mainly attributed to the contextual imperatives, others related it to funding 
conditionalities imposed by the donors.61  
 
The local community in both Gulu and Atiak was active in advocating against 
human rights abuses even though they did not have similar resources and 
networks as the NGOs. I have already highlighted above how the community in 
Atiak liaised with the local leadership in lobbying against human rights abuse 
cases. In Gulu, the Acholi Religious Leaders for Peace Initiative (ARLPI) was 
founded as a local initiative before NGOs came to the scene of peacebuilding. 
According to Archbishop Odama, one of the co-founders of ARLPI, the religious 
leaders had for a long time committed themselves to speaking out against 
human rights abuse by both the LRA and GOU (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 
19/01/10). Both the community and NGO narratives against human rights abuse 
deconstructed the government monopoly of power and knowledge, and sought 
to decipher the complexities behind the conflict.  
 
                                                 
61
 The principle of gender mainstreaming is developed from feminist theory but refers to both 
men and women. This principle “recognizes that gender relations are an essential aspect of any 
(conflict) situation, and that conflict, particularly violent conflict, changes gender relations in 
profound ways” SANDOLE-STAROSTE, I. 2009. Gender mainstreaming: A valuable tool in 
building sustainable peace. In: SANDOLE, D. J. D., BYRNE, S., SANDOLE-STAROSTE, I. & 
SENEHI, J. (eds.) Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. London: Routeledge.    
252 
 
Part III: Reconciliation and Transitional Justice 
In this section I will discuss the findings on reconciliation and transitional justice 
and demonstrate how the NGOs, local government and community worked 
together in promoting healing and reconciliation.  This reflects the joint 
enterprise approach in relational constructionism, particularly in reference to 
how different transitional justice discourses developed through interactions, 
confrontations, advocacy and community exploration of the possible ways out of 
the complex challenges.  
 
One of the main tasks for NGOs and local community was to put in place 
mechanisms for mediating conflicts, promoting reconciliation and devising the 
best approaches to transitional justice. These interventions aimed at increasing 
people’s capacity to participate and own the structural and cultural 
transformation processes. The structural transformation referred to changes in 
policies and mechanisms of justice in order to facilitate post-conflict recovery 
through execution of justice, healing, reconciliation and social-economic 
empowerment. Cultural transformation referred to the resort to cultural 
resources that were fundamental to the enhancement of conflict resolution 
mechanisms, strengthening of local agency and development of a critical mass 
that could exponentially multiply the peacebuilding initiatives in the community.  
 
I did not notice major differences between Atiak and Gulu in the way in which 
the community and NGOs addressed the challenges of reconciliation and 
transitional justice. For both locations reintegration of the formerly abducted; 
mediation between families and clans; and exploration of culturally-based 
approaches to reconciliation stood out as primary concerns. The difference was 
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in the scale and capacity: whereas the NGOs had the capacity to internationally 
lobby against the ICC’s retributive approach, the Atiak community relied on 
lobbying the local government officials to raise their concerns. However, one of 
the community participants in Atiak observed that the community used the local 
church network to raise awareness over issues of concern (CM-A66, 
interviewed 5/5/10). He added that occasionally, through liaison with religious 
leaders in ARLPI, they were able to channel their concerns to higher 
government authorities. 
 
I will now discuss reconciliation and transitional justice challenges from three 
different perspectives: the ICC debate, cultural approaches to reconciliation and 
reintegration of the formerly abducted. 
 
The ICC Debate 
The extent to which the ICC warrants of arrest contributed to the failure of the 
signing of the peace agreement between the Government of Uganda and LRA 
was debatable. There were mixed opinions both in Gulu and Atiak (see the Box 
3 below). While some respondents were of the view that the ICC intervention 
derailed the peace process, others argued that the ICC put pressure on the LRA 
leaders to take part in the peace process.  
Box 3: Participant perceptions on ICC intervention 
- “the ICC came at the wrong time and interfered with the peace process” (CM-
55, interviewed 09/05/10) 
- “it is because of the fear of the arrest by the ICC that the LRA agreed to the 
peace process” (LNGO-PO53, interviewed 6/05/10) 
- “we have our own cultural rituals of reconciliation, so we don’t need the ICC 
interference” (CM-A68, interviewed 17/02/10) 
- “it is good that the ICC is here, these criminals in the LRA have to be tried and 
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imprisoned” (CM-A61, interviewed 14/03/10) 
 
In order to get a broader understanding of the community perceptions on the 
ICC arrest warrants, I sampled the views of the participants in focus group 
discussions. The focus groups, as I have indicated above, were composed of a 
diverse mixture of participants, male and female, young and old. About 40 per 
cent of the focus group participants were elders between the ages of 60-80 
years, and the rest ranged between 18-50 years. In both Gulu and Atiak the 
consensus opinion in these groups was that the ICC derailed the peace process 
because of their poor timing.  The participants argued that the warrants of 
arrests cast a cloud of suspicion on the peace negotiation.  
 
In a similar line of thought, a peacebuilding coordinator from an international 
organization opined that the LRA leadership could not trust any offers of 
amnesty as incentive to the signing of the peace agreement (INGO-PO43, 
interviewed 16/02/10). Archbishop Odama noted that the LRA leadership was 
afraid that the signing of the peace talks would have left them with no option but 
imprisonment (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 19/01/10). 
  
A programme officer from a local NGO observed that: 
“The ICC seems to be an imperial culture that imposes itself on smaller 
countries. Justice systems should have their foundations on fairness. There 
are many contentious issues against the ICC, mainly in regard to their 
approach to justice and how they address the issue of victim-perpetrator. 
There is need to investigate all cases – giving all an equal opportunity.  It is 
also important to consider prioritization of activities. The ICC came in when the 
priority was peace. They ignored the demands for peace by the community” 
(LNGO-PO45, interviewed 12/04/10). 
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The view held by the above participant seems to indicate an imposition of 
‘liberal peace’ by the ICC on northern Uganda community. The participant is 
emphatic that the understanding of justice should not only be based on 
international regimes of justice within the conceptualization of international law. 
The local context has to be taken into consideration in order to achieve fair 
balance between justice, reparation, compensation and sustainable peace.   
 
There was a concern that the ICC had not consulted the local people on the way 
forward. Archbishop Odama protested that: 
“The ICC never talked to us before their intervention, they simply issued 
warrants of arrest – all we heard was the arrest warrants had been issued and 
that Uganda, the DRC and Sudan should arrest them. When we went with 
other religious leaders from ARLPI to the ICC at The Hague we told them – ‘if 
the government of Uganda, which wanted to kill Kony could not get him, how 
will it arrest him? Similarly, the LRA has been in Sudan and Congo for many 
years - do you expect them to arrest them (LRA) – do you expect these 
countries to change and all of a sudden take sides?’” (LNGO-PC001, 
interviewed 19/01/10). 
This participant insinuated that dialogue with the community would have led to a 
different strategy in dealing with the issue of the arrest of the LRA leaders.  Four 
religious leaders and twelve NGOs were emphatic that by the time the ICC 
issued its arrest warrants the urgency for peace was at its peak and the 
opportunity for dialogue was ripe. Through persuasive engagement by the 
NGOs, the LRA had been convinced to come to the negotiation table, paving 
way for the eventual ending of conflict. Thus, persistence by the ICC to issue 
the arrest warrants before the completion of the peace talks, jeopardized the 
success of the mediation process.  
 
However, there were participants in support of the ICC intervention because 
they expected that it would bring justice against the suffering that the community 
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had endured under the LRA. Four out of nine local participants from Gulu, and 
two out of six from the control population of Atiak were of the opinion that the 
ICC intervention put pressure on the LRA to come to the peace negotiations. 
There were participants who were concerned about the culture of impunity that 
had permeated the society during the conflict. They therefore called for the 
arrest and trial of the culprits. In a similar perspective, one participant from a 
local NGO was emphatic that comprehensive justice demands that the 
perpetrators of the crimes be held accountable, and victims of these heinous 
acts resettled and compensated (LNGO-PC73, interviewed 14/02/10). 
 
A local resident in Gulu was emphatic that: “My father was killed by the LRA, my 
two brothers were killed by the LRA, do you expect me to simply forgive and 
move on? These people have to pay back for the pain and harm they caused” 
(CM-G55, interviewed 09/05/10).  A participant from Atiak reiterated that the 
government forces, Uganda People’s Democratic Forces (UPDF), should also 
be held accountable because of their past atrocities. She said that: “The 
government forces tortured and killed some of our people for suspicion of 
supporting the LRA. The suspects should have been arrested, interrogated and 
tried in court. Both UPDF and LRA have to be tried in court” (CM-A57, 
interviewed 26/02/10). Sentiments like these were common particularly among 
those who had lost family members during the conflict period. These 
expressions of frustration evidenced the perception that no justice had been 
done to punish the UPDF and former LRA rebels nor had the victims been 
compensated for the crimes committed against them.  
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Despite the diverse opinions above, the majority of the participants (34 out of 49) 
preferred a reconciliatory and compensatory approach to transitional justice. 
Similar views were shared by religious and community leaders in the informal 
interviews in Gulu and Atiak.  
 
Cultural Approaches to Forgiveness and Reconciliation  
As an alternative to the ICC intervention, there were calls from politicians, 
religious and cultural leaders for the community to resort to the Acholi 
reconciliation rituals. My primary interest in investigating reconciliation initiatives 
was to find out the extent to which NGOs and local communities in both Gulu 
and Atiak developed new narratives for mutual acceptance and reconstruction 
of a new future.  The complexity of the conflict in northern Uganda, as I have 
already stated above, lay in the fact that there is no clear distinction between the 
victim and perpetrator. One of the local NGO participants strongly asserted this 
point in response to the question about the approach being used for 
reconciliation with the former combatants:  
“We are all victims of this war. Whether you have lost a friend, a relative or 
close family member, even if you have not lost anyone that you know – we are 
all victims. We have had more than twenty years, not just of war, but of 
isolation, fear, mourning and hunger. We have no choice but to find a 
reconcilable way of living together” (LNGO-PC53, interviewed 06/05/10).  
 
A 52 year old woman from Atiak retorted:  
“Who do you forgive? Who do you hold accountable, the LRA, the government 
or the formerly abducted children? In any case the one who did the killings 
around here is the child of my neighbour, and one of us could have a child who 
did similar killings elsewhere. If we start revenging on each other, where do 
you start and where do you end. We have to do a ritual that cleanses all of us 
from this catastrophe” (CM-A57, interviewed 26/02/10).  
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I noticed that it was this complexity of the reality of conflict and the double 
jeopardy of victim-perpetrator that made the work of forgiveness and 
reconciliation very difficult in both Gulu and Atiak.   
 
One of the reconciliation rituals was mato oput which I have described in 
Chapter Four. The majority of the participants acknowledged that they had 
never witnessed mato oput. In a focus group discussions in Gulu (FG-G0018, 
interviewed 23/02/10), out of eight participants there were four elders aged 
between 60-80 years who, to my surprise, admitted that mato oput was a rare 
practice. Only one of them had actually witnessed it. In the focus group in Atiak 
only two elders confirmed that they had witnessed a mato oput ritual (FG-A008, 
interviewed 4/03/10). I learned from these discussions that mato oput was much 
more talked about than practiced. NGOs had attempted to institutionalize and 
expand the use of rituals but this approach did not find a strong grounding in the 
community.  
 
There were participants who held the opinion that the mato oput was a creation 
of the NGOs. However, Dr. Okumu, an Acholi anthropologist, strongly opposed 
the assertion that mato oput was a creation of the NGOs. He underscored that: 
 “Already way back in 1930s when the missionaries were taking ethnological 
notes here, and writing dictionaries, we find mato oput as a common ritual of 
reconciliation. It is not a new invention, what is happening is that we are 
bringing it back to reconcile our people, but there are those, like NGOs, who 
are not doing it as it should be done” (CM-G28, interviewed 03/03/10). 
Most participants (7 out of 9) from the community in Gulu agreed that mato oput 
was re-introduced by the community and not by the NGOs. Similar views were 
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shared by people I had talked to in informal interviews. In Atiak participants 
affirmed that the community resorted to the re-introduction of the past rituals of 
reconciliation in order to respond to the challenge of reconciling families and 
clans. In Gulu, NGOs joined the community in the use of the rituals of 
reconciliation as a means of resolving conflict. However, these initiatives were 
still at early stages and limited in practice.   
 
Archbishop Odama, in explaining the central value of reconciliation rites 
amongst different ethnic communities in northern Uganda, asserted that it was 
important to re-introduce the cultural values that united people and facilitated 
the spaces for dialogue (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 19/01/10). He identified 
reconciliation as a common value in most ethnic groups in northern Uganda and 
underscored that it had the capacity to bridge differences and bring people into 
dialogue: 
“We have looked at the different tribes here, for example Alur, Acholi, 
Lughbara, Jonam, and we discovered that in all these groups they have 
reconciliation rites, even though they may call them by different names and 
their approaches vary. Basically they all have reconciliation rights which bring 
parties that had been in conflict to a mediation process and reconciliation. 
Some of them have done reconciliation rites in the past; it’s now a matter of 
making them known to the people. For example, the Mahdi and Lugbara had a 
reconciliation ceremony with the people of Acholi in a place known as Palar in 
1983. This year during our national peace week celebrations in Arua, the 
cultural leader of Lughbara said: ‘What went on between us in the past (that is 
the recurrent conflicts between Lughbara, Acholi and Mahdi), we resolved it 
right here where we are today. On that day we experienced peace and 
reconciliation and we bent spears as a gesture of an end to war, and today the 
bent spears are still here as you can see them’” (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 
19/01/10). 
The binding nature of rituals such as the bending of spears described above 
denotes transcendence from debilitating experiences of conflict to renewal of 
relationships. In other words, reconciliation provided a new opportunity for the 
community to have a new beginning and re-construct a different reality.  
260 
 
 
The participant interviews revealed four main characteristics of the Acholi rituals 
of reconciliation emerged: the rituals were communal; they aimed at reconciling 
with the spirit of the dead; they were restorative, and they sought union with the 
god of the clan.  The restoration of communal harmony was fundamental in 
every reconciliation process. An offense committed by an individual is owned up 
by the whole clan and an emerging conflict is communally addressed. This also 
implies that compensation is paid for by the perpetrator’s clan.  
 
Reconciliation with the spirits was one the most important aspects of 
reconciliation. Even though I was familiar with the concept of reconciliation with 
the dead, I did not realize the depth of such a ritual until I interviewed the 
participants in Gulu and Atiak. Both population samples reiterated the union 
between the living and the dead.  One participant from a local NGO observed 
that: “the dead are never dead. Their spirits are with us, and we have to 
reconcile with them too” (LNGO-PO53, interviewed 6/05/10). Hence, every act 
of reconciliation is meant to harmonize the entire community, both the living and 
the dead.  
 
A local government leader from Gulu observed that there were families in the 
IDP camps that were hesitant in returning to their villages because the bones of 
the dead (those killed during the war) had never been properly buried. The 
spirits of the dead, according to one of the informants in Gulu, were angry and 
could be heard wailing at night (CM-G30, interviewed 11/02/10). In further 
interrogations through informal interviews, two community participants from 
Gulu asserted that the spirits wanted a decent burial. In order to calm the spirits, 
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specific Acholi rituals of collecting the bones of the abandoned dead, and re-
burying them had to be performed. These rituals were meant to cleanse the 
villages from any misfortunes.   
 
I sought to understand the significance of the fear of the spirits of the dead. As I 
have already stated in Chapter Four, a bad spirit was referred to in Acholi as 
cen. There was a constant reference to this term. In my Luo language we refer 
to the bad spirit as chien and, like the Acholi, we believe in having a good 
relationship with the spirits of the dead. This perspective broadened my 
understanding of the implication of the role of spirits in peacebuilding. 
 
The elders from the focus group in Gulu emphasized the fact that the spirits of 
the dead were always present in their lives (FG-G0018, interviewed 23/02/10). 
There were ‘medicine men’ who had spiritual powers to communicate with the 
spirits of the dead. These were referred to as ajuoga.62  According to a 
community participant in Atiak, an ajuoga is consulted when the community or a 
family is facing calamities such as unexplained deaths (CM-A61, interviewed 
14/03/11). The ajuoga had warned that unless the community organized a 
decent burial for the dead there would not be peace. The conversations in the 
focus groups in both Atiak and Gulu demonstrated that communication with the 
spirits of the dead was an experience of transcendence.  
 
In the Acholi society, similar to many other African societies, communion with 
the dead is very strong and often projects mythical mysticism aimed at restoring 
                                                 
62
 In my Kenyan Luo we use the same term. The term ‘medicine men’ does not quite capture the 
meaning of ajuoga. An ajuoga does more than administering traditional medicine since he also 
communicates with the spirits of the dead. 
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harmony within the community. Faure (2000:155) posits that: “By definition, the 
myth has a structuring function and can lead to position the global approach in a 
specific context that would be difficult to put into question by rational means.”  In 
my interviews with the community informants I learned that the ‘mystery’ behind 
a myth is such that, as an outsider to the cultural context, it is difficult to 
comprehend it, and as an insider it is not easy to give a logical and satisfactory 
explanation of the meaning it carries. For the Acholi community the mythical 
mysticism behind reconciliation with the dead offered a significant meaning for 
recovery from conflict and enhancement of communal harmony. Hence, these 
myths and beliefs about the dead mediated human experiences in search for full 
harmony with the dead and between community members.   
 
The restorative nature of reconciliation lay in the fact that the primary focus of 
reconciliation rituals was to rebuild relationships within the community through 
forgiveness. This implied building relationships between the offender and the 
victim, at both individual and family levels, as well as at clan and ethnic group 
levels.  The entire process of reconciliation was deeply spiritual. Dr. Okumu, in 
response to the question about the meaning of reconciliation in the Acholi 
culture, observed that:  
“The Acholi justice system presupposes belief. This is very strong in people’s 
conviction. It is a restorative process that is expressed ritually. These 
processes function to keep the society together. Therefore the restoration of 
the social structure is part and parcel of the reconciliation ritual” (CM-G28, 
interviewed 30/03/10)   
 
This observation indicates that the belief component in the rituals is at a much 
higher level than the mechanical and detailed reconciliation process. In other 
words, what is binding is the spiritual belief in the effect that rituals have on 
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one’s life. Thus, violating commitments made during the ritual processes could 
result in one’s death or misfortunes. 
  
Union with the god of the clan was equally important because the Acholi 
believed that their physical world is connected to the spiritual world of the divine. 
The recognition of the god of the clan bound the community to observe certain 
values, such as forgiveness and reconciliation.  
 
Like in the case of reintegration rituals, there were diverse opinions and 
controversies about the effectiveness and understanding of the reconciliation 
rituals.  For example, there were those who noted that the mato oput ritual could 
only be used in inter-clan conflicts whereas others claimed that it ought to be 
limited to inter-family conflicts. Dr. Okumu, an Acholi anthropologist in Gulu, 
questioned the practice of the performance of the rituals by the paramount chief 
(CM-G28, interviewed 3/03/10). He was insistent that the conceptualization of a 
paramount chief for the whole of Acholi was a colonial creation and thus, as a 
result, the authority of such a chief cannot be considered to be valid. He further 
added that: “The current paramount chief is the anointed chief of the Payeera 
clan, but he is not the anointed chief of my Poran clan. So whatever rituals he 
performs would not be valid in my clan” (CM-G28, interviewed 3/03/10).  A 
community member in Gulu observed that rituals of reconciliation with the dead 
are sacred; ought to be performed in a shrine while following stipulated rubrics; 
and are binding to the family and clan involved (CM-G69, interviewed 10/03/10).   
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There were other participants who considered the use of rituals to be against 
Christian teachings and out of date. A peacebuilding officer from an 
international NGO elaborated that: 
“When we started we combined values of reconciliation from two cultures: 
religious and traditional. There were certain Christian communities that were 
opposed to the use of traditional rituals. These were mainly Pentecostals. 
They insisted that these practices went against the Christian teachings. But we 
didn’t get any resistance from Anglicans and Catholics, only the Pentecostals. 
Both the Anglicans and Catholics believed that the two approaches, religious 
and traditional, were complementary” (INGO-PO47, interviewed 11/0210). 
 
This observation showed that the Acholi rituals could not be assumed to be 
accepted by everyone or practised in the same way among different clans.  At 
the same time, reconciliation rituals were perceived as inadequate in addressing 
past crimes. A peacebuilding coordinator from an international NGO narrated 
how one of the clans refused to reconcile with another because the former felt 
the crime was too grave to be forgiven (INGO-PC46, interviewed 25/02/10). 
While some informants in Gulu believed that mato oput could be used to 
reconcile communities in conflict, others in the control population of Atiak 
observed that some incidences of killings like the 1995 Atiak massacre could 
not be cleansed using the mato oput.   
 
A woman from Atiak was emphatic that “we need to address this issue now as a 
community otherwise the snake will continue to live in the water pot” (CM-A57, 
interviewed 26/02/10). In a further clarification on her statement it emerged that 
the reference to a ‘snake in the water pot’ meant that if the issue of 
reconciliation was not addressed, it would become too difficult to handle. Once 
the snake was in the pot the family would not only be denied access to the 
water, but also faced the risk of breaking the pot in order to get rid of the snake. 
This was a powerful image that expressed the dilemma in reconciliation since, 
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as I have already noted above, some of the former combatants were both 
victims and perpetrators. Community leaders underscored the recourse to 
dialogue as a means of addressing the dilemma of reconciliation.  
 
From a relational constructionism perspective the dilemma offered an 
opportunity to explore ideas within a transitional space.  The transitional space 
could be identified as a place for the testing of ideas, exchange of emotions, 
disagreements and a search for what best responds to the challenge of 
reconciliation. For example, the depth and authenticity of the reconciliation 
rituals were questioned by a few informants. Several participants observed that 
the NGOs had taken a very simplistic approach to undertaking reconciliation 
rituals. Dr. Okumu reiterated that:  
“It is blasphemous for the NGOs to ignore the solemnity of the rituals. They do 
not ensure that the rightly anointed chief of the clan carries out the 
reconciliation ritual. They do the rituals secretly, there and there, and drive off 
in their Pajeros, then write reports that they have done the cleansing - and 
proceed to request for more funds: ‘USA send us more money.’ This is a 
mockery of the Acholi rituals” (CM-G28, interviewed 3/03/10).   
 
I found this to be a harsh critique of the NGOs particularly given that they 
worked closely with the local community in the administering of the rituals. The 
critique is however an expression of the frustration at how the performance of 
the rituals had been institutionalized to the extent that some important 
components of the rituals were watered down. 
 
I was curious to understand the community perception towards participation in 
reconciliation rituals. Five out of nine community participants from Gulu noted a 
lack of interest in the reconciliation rituals by some community members. In the 
focus group discussion in Atiak the participants observed that when cultural 
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leaders first re-introduced reconciliation rituals there was enthusiasm within the 
community and people attended in large number (FG-A008, interviewed 
4/03/10). However, that enthusiasm had died out and very few people attended 
the ceremonies. In both Gulu and Atiak reasons for the lack of enthusiasm in 
participating in reconciliation rituals included: doubts on the effect of the rituals; 
lack of an understanding of the rituals; negative perceptions on reconciliation as 
a means of attaining peace; preference for a legal recourse as a means of 
dealing with the past crimes.  There were also community members in Gulu who 
felt that NGOs had used a wrong approach to reconciliation with the spirits. For 
example, in an effort to persuade the villages to reconcile with the spirits of the 
dead, one NGO decided to compensate the villages for volunteering to collect 
and bury the bones of the dead. Each person collecting the bones was awarded 
one sheep.  Such a practice incapacitated genuine spontaneity and entrenched 
a dependency culture that had already been adopted in the IDP camps.  
However, this did not necessarily discourage the community motivation to 
participate in peacebuilding activities. 
 
 An NGO peace coordinator emphasized that there cannot be genuine 
reconciliation if the perpetrators do not own up to their offenses (LNGO-PO40, 
interviewed 20/01/10). She added that the desperation for peace should not 
push the community to ignore the genuine process of reconciliation: “people are 
living in their shadows. There is a sense of desperation for peace. It’s as though, 
if we say we all forgive each other peace will come just like that. Mato oput has 
to have a deeper meaning than that.”  
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There were also calls for genuine remorse and compensatory reparations. A 
peace coordinator from a local NGO retorted: 
“The reconciliation ritual of mato oput has been misinterpreted. People think 
mato oput is a matter of saying ‘I have forgiven you so let’s go on with life’.  
Mato oput ritual is not enough. People have to come forward and own up their 
crimes, then ask for forgiveness and pay compensation according to Acholi 
culture” (LNGO-PO40, interviewed 20/01/10). 
This participant was emphatic that reconciliation has to be genuinely undertaken 
by both the victim and perpetrator. The emphasis on establishing facts and 
knowing the truth about the crimes committed was generally expressed by many 
participants. The willingness to forgive and reconcile, on the part of the victims, 
was juxtaposed with the willingness, on the part of the perpetrators and their 
clans, to tell the truth, express remorse and commit themselves to reparation.  
 
While these criticisms could be valid, there was a general appreciation that 
rituals, if well conducted, offered a great opportunity for communal reconciliation. 
The interviews equally acknowledge the need to strengthen and train 
institutional leaders in understanding the deeper meaning of the rituals and how 
to increase their potential for peace and reconciliation. The debate about 
reconciliation rituals provided transitional space for dialogue in envisioning a 
different future. 
 
Reintegration of formerly abducted persons and Ex-Combatants 
Respondents from three NGOs running reintegration programmes perceived the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) to be informal and lacking 
in proper structures for implementation. The DDR operated under the broader 
government programme of Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for 
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northern Uganda. The NGOs placed their priority on reintegrating the ex-
combatants because of the latter’s vulnerability levels from the consequences of 
war. One of the NGO peace coordinators informed me that his organization 
received thousands of formerly abducted persons and ex-combatants (LNGO-
PC50, interviewed 12/03/2010).  They offered them psycho-social support such 
as counselling and skill training that gave them an opportunity to get 
employment.  
 
Reintegration in Atiak was mainly conducted by the local government and 
cultural leaders, as well as the parents’ association. Initiatives taken by the 
youth were aimed at taking girls back to school in order to avoid early marriages. 
The leaders and parents’ association arranged for the reintegration of formerly 
abducted persons by raising awareness in the community of the importance of 
accepting back the formerly abducted.  Reintegration was however hampered 
by the fact that Atiak did not have an elaborate network of receiving and 
reintegrating the formerly abducted and former combatants, as was the case in 
Gulu where NGOs had put in a lot of resources. The local government officials 
arranged for reception centres where formerly abducted and former combatants 
could first report but these were not frequently used. Another major challenge in 
Atiak was that there were low levels of employment opportunities in comparison 
to Gulu. Hence, most returnees were unemployed and demoralized. 
 
Two NGOs (one local and the other international) carried out family tracing 
exercise in order to identify family members of the former combatants. The 
NGOs prepared the respective families to receive and integrate into the 
community the ex-combatants, formerly abducted persons and other returnees.  
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Asked to what extent the community was prepared to receive and integrate the 
ex-combatants and formerly abducted persons, participants from the two NGOs 
observed that, generally there was a good reception but in some cases it was 
difficult. In both Gulu and Atiak formerly abducted women who came back with 
babies were often not well received. Their children were perceived by some 
community members as a reminiscence of the atrocities of war infringed on the 
society by the LRA. Others believed that these children belonged to the ‘bad’ 
blood of the rebels and would bring a curse to the community.  
 
One of the programme coordinators of a local NGO running a project for young 
mothers, mostly formerly abducted, described their traumatic experiences: 
 “These young women already have enormous trauma from the abuse in 
captivity. They were abducted when they were still very young, some as young 
as 11 years old. They were used as sex slaves and had children with different 
men, some of them are infected with HIV virus and so are their children. 
Besides they face rejection in their communities” (LNGO-PC73, interviewed 
14/02/10). 
 
I came across such observations in Gulu among four local community 
participants and three NGO respondents. Similar perceptions were expressed in 
Atiak. Hence, there were concerted campaigns by NGOs and community 
leaders to conscientize the communities to accept the ‘girl-mothers’ (a term the 
programme coordinator above used to describe mothers below 18 years), and 
their children. Six out of nine local participants from Gulu concurred that, due to 
community and NGO efforts, there were improvements in the manner in which 
the community received the formerly abducted persons. However, in Atiak the 
community did not have the resources to rescue the ‘girl-mothers’ and they were 
left exposed to abuse and rejection by the community, which regularly took 
place.  
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The trauma levels, according to a programme coordinator of a local NGO 
(LNGO-PC50, interviewed 12/03/10), were high particularly among boys who 
had been involved in direct combat or killings of the villagers. A 63 year old man 
from Gulu (CM-G65, interviewed 18/02/10) pointed out that his son had 
disappeared and the family did not know whether he was alive or dead.  The 
village had known several abductions and massacres. The man affirmed that 
often the LRA forced the newly abducted persons to attack the villages and kill 
their own relatives and neighbours, as a way of binding the abductees to the 
rebel group.  Similar views were expressed in Atiak by participants in the focus 
group discussion who observed that some of the formerly abducted persons 
never came back; and that there were tensions between families who had their 
children in the UPDF and those who had them in the LRA. These tensions led to 
accusations and counter accusations that made reconciliation efforts very 
difficult; and the trauma levels were still high given a series of attacks and 
massacres that the community had endured over the years (FG-A008, 
interviewed 4/03/10). 
 
In both Gulu and Atiak, there were attempts to use cultural rituals of 
reconciliation to integrate the formerly abducted persons and former combatants. 
The use of rituals for reintegration was mainly applied as a means of culturally 
transcending the victim-perpetrator differences, reconciling with the past and 
facilitating communal ownership of the reintegration of ex-combatants.   One of 
the common rituals for reintegration was the practice of Nyono Tong Gweno,63 
                                                 
63
 I have explained this ritual in Chapter Four. 
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which in Acholi literally means ‘stepping on an egg’. This ritual was used to 
welcome, cleanse and forgive those who had returned. The assumption was 
that the person could have committed some crime or simply been away for too 
long that he or she needed to be purified and return to the community. The ritual 
is believed to send away the bad spirits known as cen in Acholi.  
Dr. Okumu, an Acholi anthropologist affirmed that: 
 “The egg represents the innocence, which means the one stepping on it is 
cleansed to reclaim his or her innocence back to the community. When the 
Acholi people speak of innocence it means that normally we don’t defend 
ourselves in courts with strong arguments. If an accusation is brought against 
me and I know that I haven’t done anything wrong, I would simply say I did not 
do it, and if the accuser insists that I did it, I will remain silent without 
defending myself – I remain silent because my innocence means that I have no 
mouth, I can’t speak. Similarly an egg has no mouth – it expresses innocence” 
(CM-G28, interviewed 3/03/10). 
A peace coordinator of an international NGO narrated how, in collaboration with 
the community leadership and the local government, they organized a grand 
ceremony of welcoming former LRA combatants, as well as the formerly 
abducted: 
“With the local chiefs and paralegals we normally help returnees in the 
reception centres. We organize cleansing ceremonies before we hand them 
over to the parents. This ceremony is carried out by the traditional chiefs and 
elders. One day in Amuru District we had 800 people to be reintegrated into 
the community. We asked them to step on an egg, there was only one egg64 to 
step on for 800 hundred people – it was however a symbolic gesture because 
the egg finally disappeared and the rest of the people simply stepped on the 
original spot where the egg had been placed. They were all asked by the 
elders to beg for forgiveness from the community and in turn, the community 
was also asked by the religious and political leaders to forgive them. We then 
ate together and celebrated” (INGO-PC48, 19/03/10).  
The gesture of 800 people symbolically stepping on an egg demonstrates the 
poverty in the community and desperation for creative approaches to 
                                                 
64
 The NGO participant explained to me that her organization could not afford to do the full ritual 
of providing 800 eggs. They instead opted for a symbolic gesture of placing an egg for everyone 
to step on. 
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reintegration of formerly abducted persons. The above participant reiterated that 
the gesture was meant to raise awareness in the community on the need for 
reconciliation through acceptance of the formerly abducted and former 
combatants. Five community participants from Gulu were critical of this 
approach. They observed that institutionalization of reconciliation rituals by the 
government and NGOs had limited the extent to which its cultural foundations 
and values could be realized.  One of them was emphatic that the mass 
stepping of an egg like the one above did not fully capture the rubrics of the 
reconciliation ritual (CM-G51, interviewed 10/03/10). My analysis is that this 
process of reintegration was limited by how much it could achieve in terms of 
reconciliation, particularly given its institutionalized nature and the 
overwhelming numbers of returnees. 
 
In the focus group discussions in Gulu it was generally acknowledged that both 
the community and NGOs could not cope with the large number of returnees 
(FG-G0018, interviewed 23/02/10). In Atiak four out of six community members 
noted that the community could no longer cope with the pressure of 
reintegrating the returnees. The participants at the focus group discussion in 
Gulu asserted that since the return of peace in 2006 many people have come 
from the LRA captivity, others have left the IDP camps and many more have 
returned from the diasporas. The psychosocial cases were many and the NGOs 
and community did not have adequate skills to respond. Thus, the needs were 
overwhelming.  The interviews showed that there was need to re-conceptualize 
reintegration, post-conflict reconstruction and DDR from multidimensional 
perspectives. 
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In Atiak, the action of stepping on an egg and claiming one’s innocence was 
explained by two out of six community participants as fundamental to giving a 
deeper meaning to the cleansing ceremony. Four other participants in Atiak 
were of the opinion that such reconciliation rituals can only be undertaken when 
the community has been instructed about the significance of the rituals; the 
meaning of each gesture; and the responsibility of the community after the 
rituals.  
 
A community participant from Gulu was emphatic that the stepping of an egg 
ceremony should normally be carried out at home with the family and clan 
members and not in public (CM-G67, interviewed 13/03/10). He accused the 
NGOs and government officials of watering down such an important ritual. 
However, there was a general expression of urgency among both the local 
government and NGOs. They were faced with the challenge of reintegrating the 
returnees through reconciliation rituals, which facilitated a space for interaction, 
acceptance and forgiveness.  A director of one the NGOs admitted that rituals 
were simply symbolic and that the community had a bigger role to play in 
reintegrating the returnees (INGO-PC35, interviewed 10/04/10).  
 
As a means of reintegrating the youth into the community, the practice of Wang 
O was also re-introduced. This was an old practice whereby elders sat with the 
youth around the fire to teach them various customs and moral values.  One of 
the NGO programme officers affirmed that her organization introduced Wang O 
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into a village in the northern side of Gulu, and that initially there were 
enthusiastic responses (INGO-PO34, interviewed 10/02/10). However, the 
community could not continue with the practice because the elders claimed they 
did not have time to carry it on. On further investigation the participant confirmed 
that there was lack of motivation amongst the elders, and the young people did 
not seem interested to maintain Wang O as a regular practice. 
 
In responding to the question about the challenges of reintegration, a 
community participant volunteering with a local NGO from Gulu (CM-G63, 
interviewed 16/02/10) observed that a number of times she had been confronted 
by the villagers to reconsider the conditions for assisting ex-combatants or 
formerly abducted. She said: 
“Several times I have been told that ‘some of these people killed yet you are 
giving them assistance…what about us who suffered in their hands?’ Do you 
realize that you are dividing this community further by helping people who do 
not deserve to be helped?’ I ignored such comments because people who say 
such things do not understand how traumatized these formerly abducted 
persons are, and how much they need help in order to integrate into a normal 
life in our community” (LNGO-PC73, interviewed 14/02//10)  
 
The challenge that the above participant faced was shared by several others. 
There was a general feeling within the community in Gulu that the formerly 
abducted persons were being given undeserved attention despite the fact that 
some of them had been involved in heinous crimes. The community suggested 
that resources should be channelled towards assisting families to resettle, 
create jobs for the youth and offer financial support for income generating 
activities. 
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To accelerate the reintegration programme of the former combatants and 
formerly abducted persons the government offered amnesty under the Amnesty 
Act 2000.65 This led to the surrender of some of the former LRA rebels.  There 
were mixed reactions, both in Gulu and Atiak, about reintegrating the former 
rebels under the Amnesty Act. There were those who felt that some form of 
punishment or community service should have been imposed on the former 
combatants whereas others called for understanding and reconciliation. Some 
members of the community felt that as victims they were never consulted before 
the Amnesty Law was put in place. There were also those who appreciated the 
fact that since most ex-combatants had been abducted they should be forgiven 
and allowed back into the community. Others argued that in order to heal the 
wounds of the community the ex-combatants should be made to go through the 
rituals, while some were of the opinion that they should be imprisoned. 
 
It is important to note that NGOs and religious leaders were at the forefront of 
pushing the government to introduce the Amnesty Act. Archbishop Odama 
asserted that when his organization (ARLPI) and other NGOs first proposed to 
the government to offer amnesty in order to encourage the LRA rebels to stop 
fighting, the government  found the idea repugnant  (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 
19/01/10). However, further lobbying eventually put pressure on the government 
to pass the Amnesty Act. This allowed for the formation of Amnesty Commission 
charged with the reintegration of ex-combatants, who are officially referred to as 
‘reporters’ in the Amnesty Act.   
 
                                                 
65
 I have discussed the Amnesty Act in Chapter Four. 
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In order to enforce the Amnesty Act, Demobilization and Resettlement Teams 
(DRTs) were formed to operate in different northern districts including Gulu, 
Arua and Kitgum but also in Kampala and Kasese. In an interview with one of 
the government officials working in the Amnesty Commission, she affirmed that:   
 “The Commission provides certificates for those who are given amnesty. The 
condition is that they must be Ugandan citizen and an adult, must have 
returned before the year 2000, and confirmed to be genuine reporter. We have 
a reintegration programme whereby we provide them with utensils, beddings, 
farming tools and about Uganda shillings 263,000. We carry out follow up 
activities such as ensuring that the community is prepared to receive them, 
financing social economic activities; taking them to school. So far 28,800 
combatants have received amnesty” (UG-P041, interviewed 12/03/10).   
 
The certificate protected the returnees from any kinds of prosecution over the 
acts that they might have committed in the past. This was a good incentive in 
encouraging the former combatants (reporters) to take the amnesty opportunity.   
 
The Amnesty Commission integrated the cleansing ceremony of nyono tong 
gueno as a way of reintegrating back to the community those who had been 
offered amnesty. One of the government officials from the Amnesty Commission 
described the cleansing and reintegration process as follows:  
“The communities take 16 reporters per sub-county for cleansing. After the 
cleansing, psychosocial support programmes follow, mainly counselling and 
trauma healing.  There are community focal points for persons affected, for 
example child protection units in the community” (UG-PO41, interviewed 
12/03/10).   
The government also had its own ‘community volunteer care givers’ that 
monitored reintegration activities. Reintegration based on government 
assistance offered many a chance to begin a new life. For example, the little 
assistance offered by the Amnesty Commission was well appreciated by the 
beneficiaries. However, the Commission did not have sufficient funds to assist 
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everyone, while at the same time due to high poverty levels some adults falsely 
presented themselves for amnesty in order to access the assistance package.  
 
The DDR programmes were faced with a number of obstacles. There were no 
reliable records of the actual number of returnees, particularly the former 
combatants. A government official from the Amnesty Commission observed that 
“Some ex-combatants are still afraid that they might be arrested whereas others 
do not have the correct information of what amnesty is about. This is why they 
don’t come here to report” (UG-PO41, interviewed 12/03/10).  Most programmes 
were poorly funded considering the number of requests for assistance. In 
addition, the post-conflict setting posed the challenge of high levels of poverty, 
and any assistance offered was seen within the echelons of competing social 
needs. A peace analyst from a government peace education institution 
observed that lack of provision of basic employment made former combatants 
susceptible to recruitment by other armed forces within the region (UG-PO54, 
interviewed 15/05/10).   
 
Balancing between mechanisms of reintegrating former combatants and taking 
into account the basic needs of the community, was a difficult task both in Gulu 
and Atiak. At the same time the moral dilemma of victim-perpetrator that 
characterized most former LRA combatants meant that the Amnesty Act was an 
attempt to prioritize harmonious co-existence over retributive application of the 
law.  From the cultural point of view such a process would not be complete if it 
did not include the cleansing ritual that ensured that the past acts of atrocities 
were done away with, both for the perpetrator and community. 
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Peace Education and Reintegration of the Youth 
One of the major concerns for both NGOs and community peace agents was the 
fact that the majority of the children below 21years had been born in the IDP 
camps; had experienced LRA attacks; and in some cases had been abducted 
and subjected to violent acts. They therefore needed a secure space to express 
themselves and heal as they interactively learned a new culture of peace based 
on dialogue, tolerance, understanding and mutual respect.  NGOs relied mostly 
on peace education programmes to reach out to the youth and engage them in 
discussions about community integration and participation in peacebuilding.   In 
Atiak the schools used the government curriculum on peace education.  
 
The institution of a culture of peace through peace education emerged as one of 
the main reintegration activities in NGO peacebuilding. Peace education was 
undertaken by four international and two local NGOs, mainly targeting the youth 
in schools. Peace education was generally viewed by NGOs as a learning 
process aimed at helping the youth reintegrate into the community by acquiring 
a culture of peace. An assistant headmaster of a primary school in Atiak 
asserted that peace education was considered to be an integral part of student 
formation (CM-A66, interviewed5/05/10). Students were encouraged to perform 
community services such as cleaning the streets, helping the old repair their 
houses and encouraging other youths to adapt a peace culture.  A programme 
officer of an international NGO in Gulu said that: “We use peace education to 
change the violent attitudes of some of our students. We encourage them to talk 
about their differences” (INGO-PO52, interviewed 7/05/10).  Two NGOs viewed 
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peace education as part of the school curriculum that should be taught like any 
other subject.   
 
All NGOs engaged in peace education affirmed that conducting peace 
education in schools after 22 years of conflict was a difficult challenge. As one 
peacebuilding coordinator of a local NGO elaborated “children born in these 
areas have never known peace...we try to educate them to be peace builders by 
inculcating in them the idea of peace and how they can be peace builders” 
(LNGO-PO40, interviewed 20/01/10).   
 
In Gulu, NGOs initiated peace clubs, sports competition, cultural music, dance 
and drama as means of instituting a culture of peace in primary and secondary 
schools. Similar activities, according to the assistant headmaster in Atiak, were 
undertaken as part of peace education (CM-A66, interviewed5/05/10). In the 
peace debates the students discussed different social issues facing their 
communities.   One of the NGO informants claimed that peace club debates 
turned out to be one of their most successful projects (LNGO-PO40, interviewed 
20/01/10). This is because the debates increased youth involvement in the 
community; introduced youth agency in peacebuilding; and created an 
increased awareness of self-reliance contrary to the acquired NGO dependency 
in the IDP camps. For example, the use of debates in schools created a forum 
for mutual exchange among the youth.  A local peacebuilding coordinator 
observed that: 
“We have been carrying out peacebuilding in schools. The method that we 
have used and has become popular is the debate system. We encourage 
students to debate on different social issues of conflict in order to analyse the 
various sides to the conflict.  The students learn to listen to different views, 
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respect opinions that are different from theirs and conduct the debate with 
patience and understanding. Despite the fact that our students have known 
violence all their lives, I still think they can learn a culture of peace – we want 
them to know that the best way to solve their conflicts is not through violence” 
(LNGO-PO40, interviewed 20/01/10). 
Reintegration of the youth in post-conflict settings was crucial for the 
sustainability of peace. A peacebuilding analyst from a government peace 
education institution asserted that the youth were an easy prey to rebel 
recruitment (UG-PO54, interviewed 15/05/10). Hence training the youth to learn 
how to dialogue and manage their conflicts was important for their reintegration 
into the community.  
 
NGOs, in conducting peace education, applied a transformative approach to 
learning which puts emphasis on self-formation and relationship building.  This 
was evidenced by the explanations that the participants gave in reference to the 
impact of peace education. For example, a community participant to peace 
activities in Gulu asserted that: “You cannot just talk about peace without being 
convinced about it. I think that we need to learn to acquire a way of peace, and 
how we should live peacefully” (CM-G62, interviewed 16/02/10). Four NGOs, 
two local and two international, affirmed that they have a strong religious 
orientation: they pray together as staff; they pray with their participants; and they 
embed religious values to their approach to peacebuilding.  
 
As part of community integration through peace education the youth, mostly 
formerly abducted, performed cultural dances in the community. A 
peacebuilding coordinator from a local NGO opined that the use of cultural 
dances rejuvenated the youth to play and work together, as well as learn about 
their culture and take pride in it (LNGO-PO40, interviewed 20/01/10). This sense 
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of belonging, according to one of the peacebuilding coordinators of an 
international NGO not only led to mutual recognition among the youth, but also 
between the youth and the community (LNGO-PO48, 19/03/10). Cultural dances 
by the youth had become popular in both Gulu and Atiak. The dances were 
performed in public places and created a transitional space for the formerly 
abducted persons and former combatants to be accepted by the community. 
These peace initiatives increased the bonding amongst the youth and 
community members, and encouraged innovation and participation in common 
activities for peace.  
 
Participants cited several examples to demonstrate how the youth had been 
transformed: there were cases of students intervening to stop fighting between 
their colleagues; the girl education movement (GEM) in Gulu, which was a 
student initiative to support girl education, created a good opportunity for 
students to participate in peacebuilding. In one of the schools, for example, 
students took the initiative of bringing back to school a girl who had been 
married at an early age of 11; GEM also raised awareness among the girls not 
to accept early marriages. As I have noted in reference to Atiak above, some 
students helped the old and vulnerable in the community by constructing their 
houses.  
 
One of the youth participants in peace education activities in Atiak affirmed that 
the sessions offered him an opportunity to discuss the different challenges of 
building peace, such as forgiveness and reconciliation, land dispute and mutual 
acceptance (CM-A64, interviewed 17/02/10). Peace education thus created a 
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transitional space for integration and relationship building for the youth. The 
transitional space offered an opportunity to move from conflict to learning a 
culture of peace as well as discussing viable means of earning a living. The 
above participant was emphatic that most youth felt that they had been 
neglected and left without any jobs or competitive education. Hence peace 
education programmes helped them to feel part and parcel of the community.   
 
A peacebuilding coordinator from a local NGO confirmed that peace education 
programmes were part of building the safety nets for the youth in the community 
(LNGO-PO40, interviewed 20/01/10). She observed that “the cultural, social and 
political safety nets of our society were destroyed during the war. We now have 
to create new ones to support our youth.” On further interrogation, the creation 
of ‘new safety nets’ mainly referred to peace education programmes aimed at 
fully integrating the youth into the community; encouraging the elders to teach 
the youth moral values for social cohesion; and educating the communities to be 
aware of the needs of the youth.   
 
One of the major challenges for peace education both in Gulu and Atiak lay in 
the implementation process of the learned skills. While schools were the first 
milieus of learning, the acquired skills needed to be realized in the community. 
Thus, as one peace coordinator from an international NGO asserted: “If the 
community does not portray a culture of peace and demonstrate efforts towards 
a culture of peace, students will find it difficult to be agents of change” (INGO-
PO52, interviewed 2/05/10).  In Atiak an assistant headmaster of a local primary 
school observed that the region had witnessed a lot of violence and that it was 
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an uphill task to change the community’s attitudes and perceptions (CM-A66, 
5/05/10). 
 
Part IV: Theories of Change: Impact Assessment 
I was interested in finding out what theories of change drove the NGOs and 
local communities in Gulu and Atiak in their peacebuilding activities. By theories 
of change I mean the conceptualization of sociological frameworks of change 
based on individual, group, cultural, religious and political values. These 
theories define the kinds of social change that people would like to see and how 
they would like to achieve them.  Interrogations with the NGOs and the local 
community gave me the impression that they did not posses clear theories of 
change. However, further examination of the NGO and local community 
peacebuilding practice demonstrated that theories of change were embedded 
and not explicit. 
 
The research findings show that the general expectation of all NGOs 
interviewed was that it was important to assess the impact of peacebuilding 
programmes on the community (see Box 4 below). This entailed an assessment 
of programme implementation and beneficiary satisfaction.  
Box 4 Participants’ perceptions on programme assessment  
- “in my organization we conduct bi-annual evaluation of our peacebuilding 
programmes in order to understand the community’s expectations” (INGO-
PO37, interviewed 14/02/10) 
- “if you don’t assess your programmes it would be very difficult to plan your 
activities more effectively” (LNGO-PO32, interviewed 25/01/10) 
- “the community resource persons that we have trained have been critical in 
helping us understand the relevance of our peace activities in the community” 
(LNGO-PO40, interviewed 20/01/10) 
- “it is very important to have a clear strategy of programme evaluation” (INGO-
PC46, interviewed 25/02/10) 
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On the other hand the community members in both Gulu and Atiak were keen 
on peacebuilding interventions that changed the social status of their lives, 
whether through conflict mediation or provision of basic needs. Hence, the 
communities in Gulu and Atiak did not have a systematic methodology of impact 
assessment of peacebuilding interventions. The community tended to assess 
the peacebuilding activities based on the extent to which these activities were 
changing their lives through: provision of basic needs; income generating 
activities; support of education and health institutions; vocational training for the 
formerly abducted persons; and land dispute resolution. The success of such 
interventions gave a positive evaluation to peacebuilding activities both in Gulu 
and Atiak. I will now discuss the NGO approaches to peacebuilding and 
community responses in Gulu while comparing these with some of the peace 
initiatives in Atiak. 
 
Most organizations (14 out of 20) referred to the assessment exercise as 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E).  However, the understanding of what M&E 
referred to varied from organization to organization. One participant from an 
international organization asserted that in order to make the process more 
transparent, some NGOs invited an external consultant to evaluate the 
programmes: “our donors send a consultant every year to evaluate our 
programmes and make recommendations for the future” (INGO-PO36, 
16/01/10); another confirmed that “we conduct regular evaluation by asking the 
community about their expectations and whether these were being met” (LNGO-
PO32, interviewed 25/01/10); a programme officer of a government institution 
observed that her organization relied on the prescribed Logical Framework 
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Approach (LFA)66, also known as log-frames, to determine whether the original 
project proposal was meeting its objectives (UG-PO41, interviewed 12/03/10). 
Hence, the approaches used for impact assessment were not standardized, and 
some organizations gave the impression that the methodological design of 
evaluations was not consistent within the organization and depended on the 
person in-charge of the M&E. 
 
The majority (18 out of 27) of the NGO participants used log-frame methods 
which place targeted objectives against expected outcomes.  An examination of 
a log-frame approach applied by the NGOs in their project design, monitoring 
and evaluation gave me a clear indication of the targeted changes; the 
indicators to look for in evaluating the success of the project; and the monitoring 
mechanisms used to ensure that the goals were being met. However, when I 
posed the question - what theory of change was behind the log-frame 
formulation - I could not get a straight forward answer.  
 
It is however understandable that the programme coordinators could not fully 
articulate the theories of change since their focus was mainly on addressing the 
challenging issues at hand. In fact, they were able to explain the means and 
processes used to get to the desired changes, but not a refined theory of 
change with which they were working.  
 
                                                 
66
 Logical Framework Approach (LFA) is a management tool that was first used by United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). The tool was developed by Practical Concepts 
Incorporated in 1969, and has since been adapted by many NGOs and organization. It facilitates 
the process of design, monitoring and evaluation of projects.  ROSENBERG, L. J. & POSNER, 
L. D. 1979. The logical framework: A manager’s guide to a scientific approach to design and 
evaluation (USAID Document PN-ABN963 82060), Washington, DC, Practical Concepts. 
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The different approaches to social change and evaluation on the impact of NGO 
interventions can generally be categorized under peace and conflict impact 
assessment (PCIA). This tool was critical in identifying the changes realized and 
mitigating unintended consequences of conflict intervention. The tool was also 
important in adjusting the peacebuilding programmes to respond to the 
changing contextual dynamics. There was a general convergence, in concept 
and language, of what PCIA should entail.  Hence, most NGOs (13 out of 20) 
observed that PCIA was characterized by an evaluation format which was 
helpful in determining: how an organization is implementing the project; whether 
the general goals and objectives are being met; existing divergences between 
goals and outcomes; the impact of conflict dynamics on the peace programme; 
and perceptions of the beneficiaries about the program.  However, the majority 
of the NGOs (15 out of 20) were faced with the challenge of undertaking a 
thorough contextual analysis that could better inform their interventions. For 
these NGOs ‘analysis’ was limited to baseline survey.  The NGOs confirmed 
that they did not have the capacity and time to undertake in-depth analysis due 
to limited funds and the urgency to respond to the immediate social needs. 
However, bigger inter-governmental NGOs were able to afford a thorough social 
analysis undertaken by a professional researcher. 
 
The Peace, Conflict and Impact Assessment (PCIA) was often undertaken 
under four main indicators. First was quantitative change assessment that 
looked at the number of people that had been reached through training, peace 
committees, community resource persons and income generating activities; and 
new peace groups that had emerged as a result of the NGO peace interventions. 
For peace agents in Atiak, local participation was an important indicator for 
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genuine motivation for participating in peacebuilding. An elder in Atiak observed: 
“when the community members attend our peace meetings, we know they are 
interested” (CM-A61, interviewed 14/03/10).  This approach to assessment was 
important because it reflected the extent to which the community was interested 
in participating in peacebuilding activities and how this was changing their lives. 
The analysis of the NGO approach to PCIA further revealed that assessment 
was carried out based on the achievement of the programming objectives and 
goals according to stipulations provided in the agreement with the donors.   
 
The second was qualitative change that touched on people’s behaviour. The 
focus here was on changing people’s attitudes on violence, and assessing the 
extent to which this had changed the quality of life in the community. Thus, the 
main objective was to build a culture of peace that could replace the culture of 
violence acquired from the protracted conflicts.  In this category the focus was 
on how people’s lives had changed; the level of commitment to peacebuilding 
activities; and the emerging new peacebuilding discourse and practice. This 
approach to assessment, as I have noted above, was important to communities 
both in Gulu and Atiak. For example, a community participant in Atiak asserted 
that “efforts by the elders and LC3 to mediate on land disputes have calmed 
down some of the inter-family tensions we used to have” (CM-A68, interviewed 
17/02/10). I got similar responses from informal interviews in both Gulu and 
Atiak. One of the peace coordinators from a local NGO confirmed that he was 
contented that since their primary objective was to empower women through 
income generating activities, most women had attained economic independence 
and could support their own families (LNGO-PC006, interviewed 15/02/10). 
Such an impact could be evaluated further to examine secondary achievements 
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such as education of the children through the earned income, improved diet for 
the family and better living conditions.  Hence, in the general assessment, it was 
important to consider the ripple effects such as: increased social capital within 
the community; improved opportunities for the education of children; and 
improved community participation in peacebuilding activities by parents and 
children.   
 
Qualitative change was also linked to the empowerment of the local community 
and assessment on the extent to which individuals and groups took initiatives to 
engage in peace activities. The dialogue of action between the NGOs and 
community facilitated processes of empowerment and ownership of the 
peacebuilding programmes. The empowerment discourse varied among 
participants. Most interviews showed that the aim of empowerment programmes 
was to increase the capacity of the local participants to the extent that the 
activities were self-sustaining. Coupled with this were efforts towards enhancing 
the knowledge, skills and confidence of participants involved in different 
activities of community peace building. Empowerment was also used to refer to 
increasing levels of awareness about human rights abuses, poverty, substance 
abuse, insecurity, income generating activities and hygiene, all with the intention 
of countering the negative factors that reduce human dignity.  For example, one 
of the programme officers of an international NGO observed that due to the 
intensive intervention by NGOs in the education sector, there was a tremendous 
improvement in education performance: whereas in 2008 there was only one 
student at secondary school level who got a first grade mark in the national 
exams, in 2009 there were 23 (INGO-PO52, interviewed 7/05/10).  Income 
generating activities (IGA) were also initiated as a means of helping individuals 
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and groups meet their daily economic needs. This approach to peacebuilding 
was not pronounced in Atiak due to limited resources and poverty in the area.  
 
Some community participants (6 out of 9 from Gulu) argued that NGOs had pre-
tailored activities based on what they had identified as the primary needs of the 
community.  They said that some NGOs had put emphasis on improving food 
production by supplying farming inputs.  Three community participants from 
Gulu complained that two NGOs were distributing genetically modified seeds 
which could not be re-planted once harvested. This practice increased 
dependency rates and made farming expensive since new seeds had to be 
bought for every planting season. The inconsistencies in the implementation of 
some of the NGO programmes limited the success of NGO-driven 
empowerment. The trial and error indicated above, fast-track solutions such as 
the use of genetically modified seeds, and limitations of funding, made these 
interventions unsustainable in some cases.  
 
In a contrasting case narrated by a resident from Atiak, a group of women 
attempted to farm but the crops failed (CM-A61, interviewed 14/03/10). They 
subsequently opted to take a bank loan in order to start a chicken farm that 
would provide eggs for their families and generate income from the sale of eggs.  
The project turned out to be successful. This observation reveals the fact that, 
unlike in Gulu where NGOs supported income generating activities, in Atiak the 
only option the community had was to take a bank loan. However, because of 
the impoverished nature of Atiak, the banks would only give loans to groups that 
had viable income generating activities. Besides, there were no banks in Atiak 
and interested groups could only access them in Gulu.  
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The third indicator to social change was evidenced by the people’s motivation to 
participating in peacebuilding activities. Increased number of popular 
participation in peacebuilding activities was an indication of commitment to 
social change. Personal conviction and motivation were key factors for 
individual and group participation in peace activities both in Gulu and Atiak, as 
shown in Box 5 below. 
Box 5 Participants’ motivation for participation in peacebuilding 
- “I feel that we all have a duty to change our society and address our 
differences” (CM-A003, interviewed 17/02/10) 
- “This war is not our war, but the impact it has left on us is now a matter of 
concern for all of us. This is why I work for peace” (LC3-A39, interviewed 
22/02/10) 
- “Without commitment to peace we cannot expect to see a different Acholi 
land” (LNGO-PO42, interviewed 14/03/10) 
- “I have been in community peace committee for the last 8 years because I 
believe it is important to work for peace” (CM-G55, interviewed 09/05/10) 
 
Community participants in Gulu observed that they had peacebuilding activities 
in place even before the involvement of NGOs in peacebuilding activities. 
Similar observations were made in Atiak. The fact of suffering together over 
many years of conflict motivated some community members to participate in 
peacebuilding activities as a way of bringing change. The coming of the NGOs 
in Gulu boosted the number of peacebuilding activities and encouraged popular 
participation in peacebuilding, but it did not become the ultimate determining 
factor in community participation.  
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Five out of twenty seven NGO participants affirmed that their conviction to work 
for peace was motivated by personal experiences or conflict related incidences 
that had led to personal injury or death of a family member.  A participant from 
Atiak (control population) narrated his difficult journey to working for peace: 
“I saw it happen even though I was only seven years old. The day the LRA 
rebels attacked Atiak all the adults and youth were rounded together early 
morning at 5am. My parents hid themselves and remained safe. The rest of us, 
with my brothers and sisters and other neighbours were all bundled together 
and taken to a large playing field. At the play field, they separated some of us 
(mostly women and children) from the rest, and then opened fire on more than 
250 people, killing most of them. My two elder brothers were among those 
who were killed that morning. I have grown up with this pain and fear in me. 
But I am more convinced than ever that as young people we have a big role to 
play in bringing peace to this land. I am in a ‘youth group for peace’ and we 
work together to help our community” (CM-A64, interviewed 17/02/10). 
I was particularly moved by this experience. It brought closer to me the reality of 
the atrocities that were committed during the war. To listen to this young woman 
speak was one of the most emotional moments of my research. Her difficult 
reality of conflict retrospectively became for her a moment of self transformation.  
The experience was personalized and provoked the conviction to work for 
peace.  
 
Archbishop Odama, the leader of ARLPI expressed how an incident of meeting 
a starving child on a road became a transformative experience. He says: 
 “One day when I was walking along the road I was disturbed by the pathetic 
situation of the children. One particular child struck me. She was about 11-12 
years –the legs were swollen, she was with other children walking to town for 
safety. They had walked for many kilometres. I said to myself this innocent 
child is suffering for nothing. We must do something to reverse this situation. 
This has to change. That experience hit me so hard” (LNGO-PC001, 
interviewed 19/01/10).   
The inter-subjective encounter with the suffering children became a moment of 
dialogue with the reality. The pathetic condition of the children communicated 
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the reality of the repercussions of war. In that brief encounter Archbishop 
Odama experienced an internal conversion that later became a fundamental 
motivation to work for peace. There was no verbal communication, instead the 
inter-subjective encounter between the noses revealed an enriched 
communication that transformed into social action against the impact of violence. 
 
A programme officer from a local NGO affirmed that her organization was 
founded in response to the abduction of one hundred and thirty nine girls from 
St Mary's College in northern Uganda (LNGO-PO37, interviewed14/02/11). 
Temmerman (2001) narrates in details how the girls were abducted, and how 
Sister Rachelle and Angelina, in collaboration with the school administration, the 
community and international networks managed to secure the release of most of 
the girls.  Angelina, who had one of her daughters abducted, relentlessly 
advocated for the release of the remaining girls in the bush, and in 1998 she 
won a UN Prize for Peace (Temmerman, 2001:152). She founded an advocacy 
NGO known as Concerned Parents Association (CPA). A programme officer in 
the same organization explained to me in an interview that when most of the 
girls were released the NGO focused on reconciling the parents with the former 
LRA commanders who had returned into the villages (LNGO-PO37, interviewed 
14/02/10). The NGO has since expanded its activities to include broader issues 
of community peacebuilding such as land dispute resolution and inter-family and 
clan reconciliation. 
 
The community had for a long time been motivated by the urgency of reconciling 
estranged families and individuals; and the desire to work together in solidarity 
in addressing the impact of the protracted conflict on the community. In Atiak the 
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community participation in peacebuilding activities, as I have noted above, was 
mainly driven by the conviction that peacebuilding was everyone’s responsibility. 
Both local government and cultural leaders played an important role in raising 
awareness about participation in peacebuilding activities.  
 
Remuneration was also highlighted as a motivating factor, particularly in Gulu. 
Some participants (4 from NGOs and 3 from local community) affirmed that their 
participation in peacebuilding activities was motivated by the remuneration they 
were receiving. This group sample expressed the fact that working for peace 
was a good opportunity to access NGO jobs and earn income particularly given 
that job opportunities were limited. One participant from a local NGO in Gulu 
argued that despite working for financial remuneration he was still convinced 
that northern Uganda needed peace and that his work was an important 
contribution (LNGO-PO40, interviewed 20/01/10).  The NGO practice of 
financially rewarding participants for attending peacebuilding workshops, to 
some extent, distracted the spontaneous community participation. The above 
participant from Gulu added that some community members had developed the 
habit of attending multiple workshops to earn money referred to as ‘seating 
allowance’.67  A local government official in Gulu working as an LC3 stated that:  
“We do not need a seating allowance to work for peace. In the previous years, 
NGOs created this incentive which subsequently affected the spontaneous 
participation of our community members. We have been discouraging this 
practice and we now see that some NGOs have stopped paying participants, 
except in special cases where they would reimburse transport money” (LC3-
G29, interviewed 28/01/10). 
                                                 
67
 Seating allowance refers to the stipend paid to participants at a workshop. There has been a 
tradition over the years especially among NGOs in Eastern Africa to pay a stipend to 
participants attending a workshop.   
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This observation is important in understanding the extent of the impact of NGO 
incentives on community participation in peacebuilding activities. The above 
participant added that while the stopping of ‘seating allowance’ discouraged a 
few individuals from participating in peacebuilding activities, the general 
community participation was not affected. 
 
I made a distinction between salaried persons working with NGOs and 
community participants receiving incentives for their participation in 
peacebuilding activities. The salaried participants worked for a living or out of 
conviction for peace, and in some cases for both reasons. Community 
participants, as I shall demonstrate below, were strongly motivated to participate 
in peacebuilding activities even before the coming of the NGOs.   
 
However, while there was motivation for peacebuilding activities in Atiak, peace 
agents did not have external support to increase their community mobilization 
for peace. Informal interviews with religious and community leaders in Atiak 
demonstrated that participation in peacebuilding activities was generally low and 
that the population was preoccupied with the provision of basic needs. One of 
the participants from the control population of Atiak noted that due to high 
poverty levels, the success of peace activities “depends on how the stomach is 
feeling…lack of enough food to eat affects any kind of listening or participation to 
our peace programmes” (CM-A61, interviewed 14/03/10).  This analogy of the 
stomach vividly captured the daunting task of provision of the basic needs in the 
course of conducting peacebuilding activities.  
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However, despite NGOs’ provision of basic needs and social services in Gulu, 
six out of nine community participants from Gulu confirmed that for most people, 
attainment of peace was equated to the provision of basic needs. Most 
community respondents (6 out of 9) from Gulu felt that while NGOs had tried 
their best to bring peace and provide basic needs, there were still big gaps 
particularly in supporting the youth. The high rates of unemployment and 
poverty limited the extent to which NGO peacebuilding activities could be 
assessed as successful. There was need to increase aid especially to the most 
vulnerable. However, these challenges could not be compared to Atiak that was 
highly impoverished. 
 
The fourth indicator to impact assessment was linked to sustainability of 
peacebuilding activities. In Gulu, this was related to the fact that NGOs did not 
have sufficient funding to get the peace programmes running for a prolonged 
period of time. I found it interesting that in most NGO discourse, sustainability 
was linked to the support of the community motivation for peace and not 
necessarily to the financial resources. This meant that it was crucial to increase 
the capacity of the local peace agents so that they can continue the peace work 
without the NGO support. Thus, discussions about sustainability often evoked 
the empowerment discourse. For example, in response to the questions – How 
do you ensure that your programmes are sustainable? - The answers pointed 
towards capacity building of the community by increasing agents of peace. 
These agents were referred to by some organizations as community resource 
persons (CRPs). In relational constructionism the CRPs would be associated 
with communities of practice (CoP). One of the peacebuilding coordinators of a 
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local NGO in Gulu observed that “CRPs are our ears on the ground. They 
participate in our programme evaluation and hence help us respond to the 
needs of the community more effectively” (LNGO-PO37, interviewed 14/02/10).  
 
The expectation was that once the CRPs had been trained in workshops they 
could become catalysts for peace, hence developing peace constituencies 
within the community. This view was expressed by participants from three 
international and five local NGOs. Lederach (2005:90) posits that a critical mass 
of peacebuilders can operate as peace catalyst to initiate a self-sustaining 
process that reproduces itself exponentially, independent of its original cause.  
In other words, the critical mass concept is founded on the principle that 
conscientization processes should reach a level where people feel they are 
ready to take on the peacebuilding process by themselves without depending on 
external agents, such as NGOs.  Freire (1973) calls this level of self awareness 
critical conscientization. He views this in terms of empowerment for self-initiated 
action that counters structures of oppression. Conscientization and critical mass 
creation were reinforced through interactive exchanges between community 
members and relational responses to knowledge that were critical to social 
action.  
 
In Atiak, as in Gulu, the concern was how to maintain people’s motivation in 
peacebuilding activities. Community leaders were particularly concerned about 
accompanying the youth to ensure that they embrace a peace culture. While 
there were support structures in the school and to some extent in the community, 
the challenge, as I have stated above, lay in the lack of employment 
opportunities. As a result, the main concern about sustainability of peace 
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initiatives was linked to the reintegration of the youth with the hope that they 
may not fall prey to a culture of violence. Similar sentiments were shared in 
Gulu by a community participant who underscored that: “the future of our 
peacebuilding work is the youth. If they are not interested in participating in what 
we are doing, then our efforts would be fruitless” (CM-G59, interviewed 
13/03/10).  
 
While in Gulu there was a common community appreciation of NGO peace 
interventions, in the control population of Atiak, the perceptions were different. 
There was a general sense of desperation for real peace. In the focus group 
discussions in Atiak the participants observed that the population was 
concerned about the fact that peace had not been fully realized (FG-A008, 
interviewed 14/03/10). They held the opinion that despite the general perception 
in the North that the war was over, most people in Atiak maintained a ‘wait and 
see’ attitude.  This is because there was no assurance yet that the LRA had 
been defeated.  
 
Similarly in Gulu, most NGOs (14 out of 20) struggled with the idea that the war 
was over and yet not over. The LRA was still at large in the DRC, Sudan and 
Central African Republic. There was a general fear amongst some parts of the 
population that the LRA could come back to attack the villages. A programme 
officer from a local NGO observed that: 
“The bigger challenge is that political dynamics have changed – for example 
right now we don’t have war, yet the war is still there; the fighting grounds 
have shifted to other countries where the LRA is operating...The transitional 
challenge is the bigger issue of concern – not many NGOs conceptually 
understand transitional justice issues” (LNGO-PO45, interviewed12/01/10). 
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Conceptualizing a post-conflict reconstruction while conflict lingered became a 
daunting task for NGO peacebuilding.    
 
Hence, NGOs’ strategy of social change was based on the theory that catalyst 
interventions can stir processes of change. Thus, the majority of the NGO 
respondents (17 out of 27), both local and international, relied on mediated-
change processes as a means of effecting change. This was effected through 
trained peace agents who became ‘critical yeast’ in mobilizing the community 
for change. This meant that NGOs saw themselves as process-mediators or 
catalysts whose primary objective was to facilitate processes of change. On the 
other hand the communities in both Gulu and Atiak evaluated peacebuilding 
activities based on the extent to which their lives had changed through the 
provision of basic needs, income generating activities and vocational training. 
However, these communities also embraced qualitative change in people’s 
attitude and perceptions.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at analyzing NGO peacebuilding approaches and the extent 
to which NGO conflict interventions were informed by the local reality of 
northern Uganda. This study, as I have indicated above, was conducted in Gulu, 
where there is NGO presence, and in the control population of Atiak where there 
was no NGO presence. The fact that there were peacebuilding activities going 
on in both Gulu and Atiak before the coming of the NGOs meant that the 
presence of NGOs was not the determinant factor for the continuation of 
peacebuilding activities in the region. However, the presence or lack of 
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presence of NGOs was an important factor in the approach to peacebuilding 
between Atiak and Gulu. 
 
The presence of the NGOs in Gulu increased peacebuilding activities in 
comparison to Atiak where NGOs were absent. This was attributed to several 
factors such as NGOs’ financial resources; competition and multiplication of 
peacebuilding activities between NGOs; provision of social services by NGOs, 
financial and logistic support of income generating groups (IGA); and support 
programmes for the integration of the youth. Atiak on the other hand was 
generally neglected, both politically and economically.  It is located on the 
border with South Sudan and a common entry point for the LRA into Uganda. 
This meant that for many years there were high levels of insecurity and neither 
the government nor NGOs dared to make substantial investment in the area.  
Given the frequent attacks on the population by the LRA in the past and the 
general neglect of the area, the motivation for peace was not as high as in Gulu 
which had experienced relative peace for several years. Hence, while the 
community in Atiak had the motivation for working for peace, they did not have 
external support and similar levels of resources as in Gulu. As a result, 
undertaking peacebuilding activities was a more difficult task in comparison to 
the NGO-assisted Gulu. 
 
The communities in both Gulu and Atiak were faced with five major challenges 
in peacebuilding: land disputes; the need for reconciliation of parties in conflict; 
lack of basic needs; human rights abuses; and reintegration of the formerly 
abducted persons and former LRA rebels. The community in Atiak responded to 
four of the above challenges by carrying out: mediation on land disputes through 
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application of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR); integration of the formerly 
abducted persons and former combatants; and reconciliation of individuals, 
groups and clans in conflict; and limited provision of basic needs such as repair 
and construction of houses for the old and vulnerable, and support to the 
homeless. NGOs on the other hand responded in varying degrees to all the 
challenges, given that they had more resources. While human rights advocacy 
could be interpreted as part of a liberal peace agenda it was also in line with the 
perceived needs of the community on the ground. The need to support 
marginalized women in Gulu, and to speak against the violence against the 
community by the LRA and GOU, showed that an external intervention in these 
particular cases was responding to the urgent need to address human suffering. 
This was done in collaboration with the community. The fact that communities in 
Atiak and Gulu generally responded to similar challenges and in more or less 
similar ways as the NGOs, meant that NGO peacebuilding to a great extent 
responded to issues that resonated with the needs of the community on the 
ground. 
 
Peacebuilding initiatives in the community engendered communities of 
peacebuilding (peace practitioners, peace committees, community resource 
persons, income generating groups, cultural and political leaders), also referred 
to as communities of practice (CoP) in relational constructionism. The analysis 
demonstrates that NGOs used an interactive approach to creating communities 
of peace and developing peacebuilding discourse and practice.  These 
communities generated into catalysts for change, mobilizing more people to 
become peace agents committed to transforming the community from a 
protracted culture of violence to one of peace and reconciliation. In light of 
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relational constructionism this approach aimed at relationship building and 
sense-making through dialogical encounters that bridged differences between 
diverse parties and individuals.   
 
NGOs and local communities (in Gulu and Atiak) were confronted with the 
challenge of competing needs on the ground. Poverty and unemployment posed 
a real threat to participation in peacebuilding activities especially among the 
youth.  Thus, initiation of income generating activities (IGA) as a means of 
economically supporting families and vulnerable individuals was a positive 
strategy. The IGA provided an avenue for participation in peacebuilding and 
conflict intervention.  Hence, some of the members participating in IGA were 
encouraged to initiate peacebuilding activities in the community. However, the 
communities in Atiak did not have external support for IGA, making it difficult for 
the marginalized members of the community. 
 
I was interested in finding out the theories of change used by NGOs and 
communities in Gulu and Atiak. As I have demonstrated in Chapters Five and 
Six social change was based on visible outcomes. This was based on the fact 
that NGOs used as indicators of change: quantifiable numbers of people 
reached, groups formed, activities of peace initiated and innovative 
interventions carried out. For both the community in Gulu and Atiak, change was 
assessed based on how people’s lives had changed through provision of basic 
needs, vocational training, income generating activities and educational facilities. 
However, the communities in Gulu and Atiak also evaluated peacebuilding 
activities based on qualitative experiences of change in people’s lives and how 
people had been transformed internally through change of attitudes and 
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perceptions; reduced incidences of conflict; embracing of a more relational and 
dialogical approach to conflict resolution; and relationship building through 
reconciliation, alternative dispute resolution especially in land conflicts. 
 
The main theory of change applied by the NGOs can be said to be based on 
mediated change processes. This meant that NGOs acted as catalysts to 
change and not guarantors of change. They trained and relied on individuals 
and groups to act as ‘critical yeast’ or catalysts to social change. This process 
produced a peace constituency composed of individuals and groups such as 
community leaders, income generating groups and community resource 
persons (CRPs) for peacebuilding activities.  
 
The discussions in this chapter have shown that culturally-based approaches to 
reconciliation were not as widely practised as purported by the existing 
peacebuilding literature on northern Uganda. These approaches were still at 
nascent stages despite having been executed in some of the villages. There 
were a lot of discussions in the community on how to use the reconciliation 
rituals in manner that would bring positive change in the community. NGOs 
institutionalized the practice of reconciliation through cultural rituals, despite the 
fact that the community was not quite ready for it. This demonstrated how the 
NGOs interventions, in some cases, were not well grounded in the needs of the 
people. However, at same time this manifests the complex nature of the Uganda 
conflict and how the exploration of mechanisms of peacebuilding by both the 
local community and NGOs was a daunting task.   
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This chapter has provided a foundation for understanding the strategies of 
peacebuilding applied by the NGOs and local communities which I discuss in 
the next chapter.  Peacebuilding approaches explained in this chapter relied on 
relationship building as a means of constructing new reality of peace. Hence, 
relational constructionism emerged as an important strategy in peacebuilding 
approaches. 
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Chapter Six: Relational Constructionism in NGO Peacebuilding 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the different levels of relational 
constructionism between the NGOs, donors and community. I will also examine 
how the community in Atiak applied relational constructionism in its 
peacebuilding activities. While in the previous chapter I examined the NGO and 
community approaches to peacebuilding,68 in this chapter I will look at the 
strategies behind those approaches. I will therefore discuss the embedded 
processes of relational constructionism between different agents of 
peacebuilding, and how they influenced the peacebuilding discourse and 
practice in northern Uganda. I will re-visit the research question, and assess the 
extent to which NGO peacebuilding in northern Uganda was informed by the 
local reality and/or external influences.    
 
In order to demonstrate the levels of relational constructionism between NGOs, 
donors and community, I will apply Lederach’s (1997) pyramid framework that 
depicts multi-level interactions in peacebuilding processes. My analysis will 
show strengths and limitations of Lederach’s pyramid framework.  
 
Lederach explains that peacebuilding practice is realized at three interrelated 
leadership levels. The top level refers to the decision-makers who are 
                                                 
68
 In the preceding chapter I outlined three main approaches to NGO peacebuilding: third party 
mediation in land dispute resolution; human rights advocacy (mainly in Gulu); and transitional 
justice and the challenge of reintegration in both Gulu and Atiak. 
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represented by government, political, and inter-regional leaders.  In this 
discussion, the top level represents donor agencies and their governments, as 
well as the local government. NGOs operate at this high level in order to 
influence policies and social political actions; the second is the middle range 
leadership that includes NGOs, civil society, religious leaders and other 
influential individuals; the third is the grassroots leadership that includes cultural 
leaders, NGOs, and peace communities. Lederach (1997:43) notes that while 
conflict is often experienced horizontally at the grassroots level, the implications 
of conflict have far reaching vertical implications between the three levels.  
 
It is important to note that Lederach’s pyramid model does not fully capture the 
interactive relationship between different levels of the pyramid. He limits the top-
level to political and military leaders, but adds religious leaders as well.  
Lederach observes that the top level operates under a top-down model. 
Similarly, the middle and grassroots levels are focused on peacebuilding 
approaches that do not deliberately interact with the top level leadership except 
when the grassroots experiences exert pressure on top leadership by 
clamouring for change or when the problem solving workshops lead to 
processes of change. Lederach refers to the grassroots approach as bottom-up 
(1997:52). 
 
From a relational constructionism approach I demonstrate how NGOs operated 
not just in the grassroots and middle-range leadership, but also in the top level 
leadership. As I shall elaborate, NGOs undertook a deliberate approach to 
conflict intervention at all the three levels by building relationships and 
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influencing peacebuilding decisions between different peace agents. Thus, 
while I apply Lederach’s pyramid framework to analyse NGO interactive 
peacebuilding in relational constructionism, my analysis goes further than the 
pyramid portrays. In Atiak relational constructionism within the pyramid model 
was mainly experienced at the grassroots level. Hence, Atiak will not feature in 
the discussions on the top and middle range leadership. 
 
I use the pyramid framework to articulate three main points of NGO 
peacebuilding within the discourse of relational constructionism: first is the top 
leadership level where I discuss the perceptions on conceptualization of 
peacebuilding and the interactions that ensued between the NGOs and donor 
agencies. The NGO-donor interaction is a complex process of co-construction of 
peacebuilding discourse and practice. The discussion evaluates the extent to 
which NGOs implement externally conceptualized construction of peacebuilding 
under the influence of liberal peace, and/or take into account the contextual 
imperatives of peacebuilding.  The second is the middle-range leadership which 
networks to mediate issues of concern between the top level and grassroots 
leadership. This level of leadership has mainly been active in creating dynamic 
interactions between initiatives for conflict mitigation on the ground and decision 
making at the top level. This process has mainly been relational hence applying 
the principles of relational constructionism that I have explained in Chapter 
Three. Networking and advocacy have also been used in achieving relational 
constructionism at this level.  The third is grassroots leadership undertaken 
mainly through networking with peacebuilding communities in collaboration with 
the NGOs. In Atiak the interactions were mainly between cultural and 
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government leaders, peace agents as well as the general community. The 
interactions in both Gulu and Atiak aimed at building a peace constituency 
through diverse levels of interactions and dialogical encounters. 
 
Approach to the Analysis of the Findings 
My primary focus was to examine the levels of NGO interactions and networked 
collaboration in peacebuilding activities. I realized that I needed to understand 
the strategy and dynamism behind the different approaches to peacebuilding 
undertaken by the NGOs and the community in Gulu, as well as by the 
community peace agents in Atiak. I have elaborated these approaches in 
Chapter Five. The peacebuilding approaches showed that there was a high 
level of collaboration and networking that influenced the peacebuilding 
discourse and practice.  In this section I focus on understanding the different co-
constructions of peace at the grassroots, middle and top levels, and how the 
three interconnected in peacebuilding processes. This will highlight the 
strategies behind the peacebuilding approaches. 
 
At the top leadership level my main interest was to understand how NGOs 
related with the donors, and how this influenced NGO peacebuilding discourse 
and practice. I interrogated NGO participants about their relationship with the 
donors (and their governments) and how this impacted the process of 
peacebuilding in project conceptualization, implementation and evaluation.  I 
also interrogated the donor agencies on their approach to relating with their 
NGO beneficiaries and the diverse levels of dialogue in project 
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conceptualization, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. I mainly wanted 
to establish the extent to which the conceptualization and implementation of 
NGO peacebuilding programmes were influenced by the donors. The 
investigations equally demonstrated how contextual imperatives played in the 
conceptualization of peacebuilding. I was also interested in understanding the 
different levels of perception of NGO peacebuilding: the donor and NGO 
perceptions of peacebuilding, respectively; and the NGO perception on the 
impact of NGO-donor relationship on peacebuilding discourse and practice.    
 
I demonstrate in the analysis that, contrary to the liberal peace critics who assert 
that NGO peacebuilding in post-conflict was mainly influenced by the liberal 
peace agenda, there were diverse levels of dialogue between NGOs and donors 
that positively influenced the peacebuilding discourse and practice. NGOs, in 
negotiating for funding with the donors, experienced three levels of interaction. 
First, constrained dialogue which hampered the influencing role of the NGOs in 
project conceptualization and implementation. There were tensions between the 
actual needs on the ground and what the donors were pushing for. These cases 
were however isolated. Second, negotiated agreements which offered 
opportunities for mutual understanding. In this category NGOs engaged the 
donors in dialogical encounters in order to reach an agreed standard of 
operation. Third, dialogical partnership which was based on joint actions 
between the NGOs and donors. The concept of partnership was emphasized to 
bridge the donor-NGO relationship beyond the giver-receiver characterization.  
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My findings further show that NGOs that had consistently worked with the same 
donors for an extended period of time had built trust and confidence in each 
other. This was evidenced by the fact that some NGOs had worked with the 
same donors for many years and established a good working relationship. In 
addition 14 NGOs reported that their relationship with the respective donors was 
based on mutual understanding, trust and a common exploration for best 
approaches in peacebuilding. This approach influenced the way in which 
projects were negotiated, designed and implemented. It would however be 
naive to assume that NGOs that experienced a positive relationship with donors 
had equal power relations. The two constantly engaged each other in dialogical 
negotiations within the tensions of power relations. In situations where 
partnership, dialogue and consultations had developed through trust-building, 
there was an interactive exchange between the community-NGO relationships 
and NGO-donor relationships, respectively. 
 
The community emerged as the interacting agent in the middle, mediating 
conversations between NGOs and donors. In other words, contextual 
imperatives from the community, in most cases, guided the course of dialogue 
(between NGOs and donors) and influenced the conceptualization and 
implementation of the peacebuilding programmes. NGOs on the other hand 
emerged as the interlinking mediators of peacebuilding processes, as I had 
noted in Chapter Five. In fact, the majority of the NGOs were of the opinion that 
their approach to peacebuilding was based on the assessment of the needs on 
the ground. Thus, trust-building went hand in hand with relationship building, 
which in turn led to a co-constructed peacebuilding discourse and practice.   
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At the middle range leadership I focused on understanding how NGOs 
influenced the discourse and practice of peacebuilding in their interactions with 
different agents in conflict. The agents were mainly the government, rebels, 
International Criminal Court (ICC), international and local community. I 
interrogated the NGOs on their approaches to networking for social change; 
their strategy in constructing, with different agents, alternatives-to-violence 
discourse; and how the needs in the community influenced and interacted with 
their approach to peacebuilding in the middle-range leadership level. I also 
interrogated the NGOs about their understanding on the role of the ICC and how 
this had impacted on the peacebuilding activities. I extended the question to the 
local community in order to establish the general perception of the role of ICC.  I 
further examined how NGO coordination and networking influenced the 
peacebuilding discourse and practice. 
 
 Strategies in relational constructionism such as dialogical conversations, 
mutual recognition, negotiations on co-construction of new realities of peace, 
and interactive sense-making were applied as a means of conflict intervention. 
Networking and advocacy were also applied by the NGOs in developing 
alternatives-to-violence discourse. The analysis, as I have highlighted in 
Chapter Five, illustrates that during the conflict period advocacy activities 
increased international awareness on the conflict in northern Uganda. NGOs 
also dialogued amongst themselves through coordination meetings that were 
critical in establishing a strategy for community service provision, conflict 
mediation and dialogue with the donors.  
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In the post-conflict advocacy period activities were dominated by calls for 
forgiveness and reconciliation, and reconsideration of the ICC indictment on the 
LRA in order to facilitate the peace process.  The strategy applied by the NGOs 
in addressing the discordant views was mainly through dialogical conversations, 
persuasive engagements and lobbying.  
 
At the grassroots leadership level my interrogation with the participants aimed at 
finding out how NGOs were developing a peacebuilding community amongst 
the local population and between the NGOs and the local community. I 
interrogated both NGOs and local community in order to establish how these 
different sectors interacted in undertaking peacebuilding activities; community 
participation in diverse formation and training activities conducted by the NGOs; 
peacebuilding groups and networks that emerged and how they formed spaces 
for dialogue and interaction; and the extent to which community peacebuilding 
was appreciated by the local population.    
 
The common thread in the three levels of peacebuilding above is that the 
community was at the centre of the various interventions both in Gulu and Atiak. 
The diverse levels of interaction allowed for dialogue and exchange, and 
construction of a new reality of peace. Unlike in Lederach’s pyramid framework 
that limits the role of NGOs to the grassroots and middle-range levels, NGOs 
worked at all the three levels.  
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The Pyramid Framework 
The pyramid framework provides the lenses through which one can understand, 
in more general terms, how the various peacebuilding interventions and 
processes interact. In explaining the pyramid concept Lederach (1997:38) 
observes that the broader base at the bottom (grassroots) represents the 
majority of the population (refer to Figure 2 below); the pinnacle corresponds to 
a handful of leaders or top institutions; and the middle range leadership has a 
sizeable number of institutions, organizations and individuals.  Similar concept 
has been used in multi-track diplomacy to explain how different conflicting 
parties interact at different levels of conflict.  
 
The term Track 1 has been used to refer to the top leadership or the decision 
makers at government level (Fisher, 2006, Chigas, 2007:554). Here the 
traditional inter-state diplomacy is observed and interests of nations are 
guarded. Others have identified Track 1.5 which refers to unofficial mediators 
operating with top level leadership or official diplomacy in conflict mediation 
(Mapendere, 2000:76, Chigas, 2007:555). The mediation is often carried out by 
organizations or individuals who do not represent any government.  
 
Track 2 refers to the middle range leadership that concerns itself with diplomacy 
at the top leadership level and the grassroots concerns. The term track-two 
diplomacy was coined by the former U.S. Foreign Service officer, Joseph 
Montville who used it to denote ‘‘unofficial, informal interaction between 
members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing 
strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material 
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resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict’’ (Montville, 1991:262). 
Montville broadened his definition to include “interactions that develop strategies, 
affect public opinion, or mobilize resources to support conflict resolution” (Fisher, 
1997a:117).  Track 2 also refers to peacebuilding processes that engage both 
leaders at the top level and the grassroots population (Pearson, 2001:281).  
 
In addition, Track 3 has recently emerged to refer to peace initiatives at the 
grassroots level, but with both national and international impact on finding 
solutions to the problems on the ground. The agents at this level engage in 
activities that bypass diplomatic channels, are national and transnational in 
nature and operate within a network of different individuals and organizations 
(Kraft, 2002:49).   NGOs fall into this category. 
 
Figure 2: Pyramid Framework (Adapted from John Paul Lederach, 1997) 
Tracks of Diplomacy      Peacebuilding approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Track I: Top leadership 
Government 
representatives, donors 
and diplomats  
Track II: Middle-Range 
Leadership. 
 NGOs, civil society, religious 
leaders and influential personalities 
Track III: Grassroots 
Leadership 
NGOs, cultural and religious 
leaders, local government leaders, 
influential individuals 
This level is mainly concerned with 
policies and diplomatic relations. 
Donor agencies, in some cases 
represent their respective 
governments; in others they have a 
flexible autonomy 
NGOs and civil society networks 
represent the grassroots populations 
by advocating for solutions to social 
issues of concern from the 
grassroots.  
NGOs undertake peacebuilding 
activities, develop communities 
of practice, and create spaces 
for conversations, dialogue and 
co-construction of a new reality 
of peace. 
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Böhmelt (2010:167) uses the term ‘Tracks of Diplomacy’ (ToD) to refer to multi-
level approach to conflict resolution.  He defines ToD as “as diplomatic 
initiatives by outside state or non-state parties to transform a dispute by 
communicating information, proposing new solutions, and directly influencing 
the crisis using carrots and sticks that can help generate movement towards 
potentially overlapping bargaining positions.”  He underscores that the 
interactive process between Tracks 1-3 is critical in the facilitation of peace 
processes and activities. Thus, in situations where Track 1 diplomacy is 
facilitated by unofficial approaches there would be higher chances of reaching 
success and ensuring grassroots support for the conflict resolution (Böhmelt, 
2010:168).   
 
My main focus was on the multi-track approach applied by NGOs in 
peacebuilding activities at different levels. The multi-track denotes a ‘multi-track 
diplomacy’ (Sewak and Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005), which 
facilitates “a complex web of approaches, roles, strategies and activities 
employed by diverse actors at different stages of conflict development, conflict 
resolution and post-conflict peace-building” (Sewak and Regional Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2005:11). Multi-track diplomacy also implies ‘field diplomacy’ 
(Reychler, 2001; Opongo, 2006).   As I have explained elsewhere (Opongo, 
2006), the term field diplomacy was coined by R. Moreels, a former president of 
the Médicins Sans Frontières in Belgium, while working as a surgeon in conflict 
zones. He came to the realization that the official and non-official diplomacy was 
absent in the field or grassroots contexts. He subsequently proposed that NGOs 
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could have an active role in transforming situations of conflict in which they work 
by linking grassroots experiences to decision making structures (Opongo, 
2006).  
 
Reychler (2001:92-93) observes that field diplomacy is characterized by: 
credible presence in the field – this means being in contact with the dynamics of 
conflict as well as building trust among the people in conflict;  commitment to 
sustainable peace which entails staying long enough in the field to accompany 
the peace initiatives;  engagement of the people in the peace process in order 
for them to be part and parcel of the conflict intervention processes; initiation of 
cost-effective peace-building activities that can continue for a long time; lastly, 
development of a coherent peace architecture that is grounded on good 
analysis, realizable plan and clear implementation process.  
 
NGOs applied relational constructionism in multi-track approach to 
peacebuilding. This approach increased dialogue and interaction between 
different agencies: donor agencies and governments, NGOs, different leaders 
(religious, community, cultural and political) and the community in general.  
Peacebuilding activities, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, have been 
experienced at different levels of the society.  
 
I will now discuss how relational constructionism has been embedded in the 
different levels of peacebuilding practice (NGO-donor-community) in northern 
Uganda in order to establish the extent to which NGO peacebuilding is informed 
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by the local reality and/or external influences. I will also discuss relational 
constructionism at grassroots level in Atiak. 
 
Part I: Top Level Leadership: Liberal Peace Dynamics in NGO Peacebuilding 
Relational Constructionism in NGO-Donor-Community Relationship  
The interviews revealed that one of the major concerns for the NGOs was 
sustainable funding. As a result, funding negotiations and discussions provided 
spaces for dialogue, mutual interaction, interpretation of the contextual 
challenges, prioritization of peacebuilding activities and assessment of the 
impact on the ground. Even in situations where there seem to have been 
coercive processes to get the NGOs to respect the demands of the donors the 
embedded levels of dialogue revealed how funding constraints occasioned 
spaces for dialogue. 
 
The shift in funding cycle occurred after the 2006 peace talks which achieved 
relative peace in the region.   Northern Uganda has since been seen as a stable 
region that is out of the emergency aid bracket. This led to funding cuts. For 
example the UNOCHA (2010:6) reports that in 2009 funding for northern 
Uganda dropped considerably: “There was…a significant decrease in the 
humanitarian appeal ($247 million for 2009, down from $374 million for 2008 
and $350 million for 2007) amid anticipated increased presence and impact of 
recovery and developmental programming to benefit returning IDPs.”  This 
meant that there were programmes that never met their targeted objectives or 
were cancelled for lack of funding 
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All the organizations interviewed relied on external funding for their activities. 
There were two levels of funding sources: first was direct funding from a funding 
agency (mostly Europe or USA) to the organization on the ground; second was 
subcontracted funding from an international organization which had direct 
government funding.  There were different layers of interactive relationships that 
made funding processes much more complex than apparently perceived. The 
major donors were often governments or externally based agencies who offered 
funds directly to larger NGOs that had multi-national operations. The recipient 
NGO subsequently became a secondary donor by funding a third level smaller 
organization in the field.  The third level organizations occasionally 
subcontracted activities to other organizations in a partnership agreement.   
 
This kind of chain funding demonstrated a high degree of interaction between 
the organizations, but at the same time displayed the various levels of power-
play that would require a deeper analysis which I will develop below. There was 
a chain reaction at different levels of funding. Pressure exerted from the primary 
donor generated its ripple effect all the way to the lowest levels of the project 
implementation.  One of the administrators of a funding NGO in Gulu observed 
that there was a mutual dialogue between the implementing NGO in the field 
and themselves as a funding agency (INGO-P47, interviewed 11/02/10). Similar 
positive relations were also realized by the major funding organizations with 
headquarters outside Uganda.  The funding agencies expressed their 
contentment with the levels of dialogue experienced on the ground.  
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All the three major funding agencies had offices locally or regionally, making it 
easier to negotiate with the partners on the ground from a more informed point 
of view. There was evidence from 18 out of 27 NGO participants that over a 
period of about 8 years relationship with the donors had improved from less 
consultation to more consultation and mutual dialogue. The interviews showed 
that there had been constant consultations between the donors and NGOs on 
how peace projects should be run.  This was evidenced by the use of the words 
such as, “partner”, “collaboration”, “dialogue”, “understanding” and 
“participation”, to denote the levels of interactive exchanges and consultations 
that took place between the NGOs, donors and local community. 
 
The question of continuity and sustainability of NGO peacebuilding activities 
emerged as an obvious challenge for all the NGO informants. Twelve out of 
twenty seven NGO participants linked the issue of relationship with the donor to 
sustainability of the projects. One of the local NGO peace coordinators 
observed that “when you are talking about donor funding, you are talking about 
sustainability of the projects.  We have discussed this issue many times, and it 
is one that we’ll have to deal with. But we need to keep talking to our donors so 
that we come to a common understanding” (LNGO-PC006, interviewed 
15/02/10). The opinions of the rest of the participants varied. There were those 
who put emphasis on encouraging local mechanisms of resource mobilization; 
spontaneous community participation; and cultural education. Others focused 
on inculcating peacebuilding values in the community, especially amongst the 
young generation. 
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From the data analysis, I classified funding negotiations into three categories: 
constrained dialogue; negotiated agreements and dialogical partnership, which I 
explain below. 
  
Constrained dialogue in NGO-Donor Relationship 
Constrained dialogue was mainly experienced among NGOs that had been 
under restricted funding. In these circumstances the donor agency had specific 
objectives to realize, whether human rights, reconciliation or integration of the 
formerly abducted children. While initial perceptions of constrained funding gave 
the impression of lack of dialogue, further investigation showed that there was 
room for dialogue and re-negotiation of the project implementation. These 
activities were carried out through subcontracting of NGOs. Three out of nine 
international NGOs preferred subcontracting their activities to local and smaller 
international organizations.  The others preferred carrying out activities by 
themselves or collaborating with others. The subcontracting approach to funding 
was contract-based and was often done through ‘a call for proposals.’ This 
meant that the funding agencies requested NGOs to submit proposals on 
specific activities with outlined objectives, time frame, target group and location.  
An administrator of a funding NGO articulated that in contract funding the NGO 
applying for the funds had to explain how it hoped to implement the project by 
demonstrating its local resources and capacity on the ground (INGO-PC47, 
interviewed 11/02/10). 
 
In this process there is minimum dialogue on the negotiation over the direction 
the project should take. A programme director from an international funding 
agency underscored the conditionality of funding by stating that:  
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“We come up with an idea and say we would like interested organizations to 
implement it – interested organizations apply, and the winning bidder gets the 
contract to implement our idea. We purposely retain the right of certain 
approvals to ensure that our interests are taken into account: expenditures, 
financial procurement, accountability, and programming. We want them to fall 
into the framework of what we are thinking…” (INGO-PC49, interviewed 
12/02/10).  
 
A few organizations were under this kind of contract and faced the challenge of 
maintaining a good relationship with the funding organization while at the same 
time responding to the needs of the people on the ground. The fact that the 
funding agencies interviewed had offices locally, meant that there was close 
monitoring of the recipient NGOs, thus putting pressure on the latter to deliver.  
In some cases NGO participants noted that there was incongruence between 
what the donors demanded and what the NGOs really wanted to do.   
 
The balance between the needs on the ground and the ‘current funding on sale’ 
meant that the recipient NGOs had to either comply,  negotiate further to reach 
a compromise or seek alternative funding that responded to the needs on the 
ground. One of the peace coordinators affirmed that most NGO activities were 
donor-driven (INGO-PO43, interviewed 26/02/10): 
“It is obvious that most of the NGO programmes are donor-driven. We have 
relied on external funding for a long time, primarily from the governments of 
Norway and Sweden. So the donor situation has been good. But given that the 
two-year period of funding ends this year, we will need to show to our donors 
why the programmes should continue. It’s more like you dance to the tune of 
the donor” (INGO-PO43, interviewed 26/02/10). 
By ‘donor-driven’ she meant that the donors often had an upper hand in 
determining the conceptualization and implementation of the peace 
programmes.  
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The discourse on donor-NGO relations prompted me to interrogate the bigger 
international NGOs that had internal mechanisms for funding from their 
headquarters. I wanted to find out how relationships between the demands in 
the field were internally processed within the broader conceptualization of 
peacebuilding at the national, regional and international level. Three 
organizations matched this category of informants. In these organizations 
funding proposals from the field had to fit the broader budget lines from the 
headquarters. While the participants acknowledged that there was dialogue 
between the field staff and the headquarters, they also highlighted the existing 
tensions. 
 
The participants from the three NGOs above expressed concern over the level 
of tension in negotiating for a common understanding on the needs from the 
ground. The tensions were linked to the fact that the fund raising strategies were 
centralized within the administrative structures of the headquarters. A peace 
coordinator of an international NGO observed how she struggled to get funds 
from the headquarters of her own organization:  
“Sometimes there is tension between my office in the field and the 
headquarters in the US. There are cases where you see the need on the 
ground, you consult on the ground, you forward the proposal and they say ‘no’ 
because they do not have the designated funds, or they tell you that 
peacebuilding is no longer our priority and that I have to send a proposal on 
HIV/AIDS, because that is where money is currently designated” (INGO-PC48, 
interviewed 19/03/10). 
This approach to funding negotiations led to frustration on the part of the NGOs 
concerned. The balance between the needs on the ground and the ‘current 
funding on sale’ meant that the recipient NGOs had to comply or negotiate 
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further in order to reach a compromise. Another option would be seeking 
alternative funding that responded to the needs on the ground.   
 
Five out of twenty NGOs confirmed that they had to seek alternative funding in 
situations where they had fallen out with the demands of the donors. Other 
participants gave varied responses: they tended to diversify their funding 
options by partnering with different donors; they explored local resources; and 
they faced difficulties with funding activities. However, while NGOs with less 
capacity in resource mobilization struggled to maintain independence in the 
selection and management of their activities, established NGOs with diversified 
sources of funding had more leverage in negotiation for funding.  
 
There were two out of three donor agencies that took a hard stand against 
NGOs applying for funds. One of the regional peace coordinators of a funding 
NGO put it bluntly:  
“This is US government money, so the first thing you have to know is that you 
have to take into account the US interest. Your interest is secondary, 
whatsoever – you have to fit your rigidity into the US interests. It’s a kind of 
government that doesn’t want embarrassment. We have had certain 
exceptions or a few cases such as in the time of Bush – funding organizations 
that promoted abortion or homosexuality, which Obama has reversed.”  
(INGO-PC46, 25/02/10). 
The attitude of the above participant indicated that there was limited dialogue 
between the donor agency and recipient organization. In other words, the 
project was tailored towards the primary interest of the funding agency. Such 
funding conditions drove some NGOs to adjust their programme activities in 
order to access funding from the donors, hence undermining the response to 
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the real needs on the ground. The above participant’s statement highlighted the 
overt and covert power relations that existed within donor-recipient relations.  
These situations, though isolated, reflected the external influence on NGO 
peacebuilding by the donor agencies.   
 
In a further discussion, I interrogated the above participant on what he meant by 
‘US interest’ and he clarified that this referred to the US commitment to peace 
and stability in Eastern Africa. Hence, the US support for peace and 
reconciliation activities was geared towards achieving this objective. In fact, the 
above US organization was supporting programmes on culturally-based 
reconciliation activities; local leadership formation and institutional 
strengthening of the cultural institution. The regional coordinator for these 
programmes was a man from northern Uganda who knew the area very well and 
spoke the local language. This was an added value to the organization because 
my interviews with this regional coordinator revealed the he had a good 
understanding of the northern Uganda context and had previous experience of 
working with the local organizations. Thus, one notes, on the one hand, that it 
would appear as though the US interests were totally disengaged from the local 
reality whereas on the other, there were indications that they worked with the 
local community in responding to the needs for culturally-based reconciliation 
process. However, the power relations were still in play. 
 
I also interviewed a senior advisor to the US government based in Uganda. The 
participant was linked to the above organization and underscored the fact that 
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the US government, through the funding of organizations, was always interested 
in consulting the host governments and local community on the best way to end 
the Uganda conflict.  He further said that there are policy makers, like himself, 
who have worked in humanitarian settings and understand the fact that funding 
interests have to be reasonably negotiated within the broader framework of local 
imperatives. He thus stated that:  
“People who work for NGOs sometimes get into governments and can 
internally influence the policies. For example, the “Resolve Uganda” 69  
initiative was started by individuals who had worked or done their research in 
Uganda and felt the need to be part of the wider campaign for change in 
Uganda” (INGO-PC49, interviewed 14/01/10). 
The argument advanced by this participant demonstrates that it is important to 
understand the underlying factors and interactions that develop in the process of 
negotiation of interests which could be perceived as promoting liberal peace.  
The fact of working closely with the community showed recognition of the local 
potential. The challenge however lay in how these relationships worked though 
the power imbalances and determined the peacebuilding discourse and practice.  
In addressing the question of sensitivity to local power dynamics in 
peacebuilding, the above participant reiterated that:  
“Our primary interest is to support peace initiatives in the region. We do not 
impose our agenda, we dialogue with our partners. However, leadership is a 
value that we ought to maintain, and the US has played this role over the 
years. For example, we have funded local organizations like ARLPI, Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, North Uganda Transitional Initiative (NUTI), Amnesty 
Commission, and trained peace negotiators for the LRA-GOU peace talks...” 
(INGO-PC49, interviewed 14/01/10) 
This participant was emphatic that the US interests should not be interpreted 
narrowly. The primary concern is peace in Uganda and the US contribution is 
                                                 
69
 According to the official website, Resolve Uganda “works with activists, policy experts, and 
civil society leaders to identify and build support for policy measures that can help end LRA 
atrocities and enable affected families and communities to survive and rebuild their lives” 
(http://www.theresolve.org/who-we-are cited 12/12/10) 
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one among many others. However, the participant’s reference to the US taking 
the leadership role insinuated a power-play where the most powerful shouts 
loudest. The leadership role, if not well managed can lead to tensions between 
the donor agency and local community.  
 
Fourteen out of twenty seven NGO participants confirmed that, over the years, 
consultations between the donors and NGOs had improved. These informants 
however acknowledged that negotiating through different levels of tensions 
between the needs on the ground and the demands of the donors was not an 
easy task. In the end, funding negotiations paid off. For example, one of the 
programme coordinators from an international funding agency observed that 
four funding agencies supported cultural approaches to reconciliation (INGO-
PO47, interviewed 11/02/10).  This emerged from the dialogue between the 
donor agencies, NGOs concerned and the community. Such a process 
developed what I can call the dialogical discourse between zones of power. This 
implies establishing dialogue between, on the one hand, the NGO leverage in 
the contextual experience, and on the other, the donor’s control of the funds. 
 
It would thus be inaccurate to entirely dismiss the donor-NGO relations as 
hegemonic in favour of the donors. It is important to analyze the embedded 
interactive processes of dialogue, discussions and negotiations that influence 
the construction of peacebuilding discourse and practice.  
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Negotiated Agreement  
This second approach to funding was based on continuous negotiation between 
the NGOs and donor agencies. Six NGO participants reported that some of their 
donors had revised the principles of cooperation with their beneficiaries, and 
were now more receptive to negotiating terms of funding. There was therefore a 
general recognition that dialogue and participation were critical to the success of 
any funded projects in the post-conflict setting.  A programme coordinator from 
a funding agency confirmed that:  
“Our approach has been to work with the partners, so ideas come from 
partners then to our organization, after which we negotiate and discuss with 
our partners.  If it is something we are interested in – we would not say ‘we 
have this money for this, can you write a proposal.’ No, we let the 
organizations come up with their ideas, describe their needs then we see if we 
can fund the project. It is the partner who is on the ground, not us. So we rely 
on these partners to identify what is important for them” (INGO-PO004, 
interviewed 22/01/10). 
This donor’s recognition of the NGO knowledge on the ground increased the 
level of dialogue and understanding. Thus, rather than constructing a 
peacebuilding concept that NGOs had to fit themselves into, as in the case of 
liberal peace, the donor agency above expected the interested NGOs to 
conceptualize their own peacebuilding approach and response strategy.  In this 
way the peacebuilding initiative was based on the needs arising from the local 
experiences, hence engendering a negotiated partnership. 
 
Dialogical Partnership 
Dialogical partnership was mainly reached through cooperative agreement. One 
of the programme coordinators from a funding NGO put it simply:  
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“When we make a ‘call for proposal’ the contracted NGO implements our idea, 
but when we partner with an NGO in a ‘cooperative agreement’ then the 
respective NGO give us their ideas, we discuss them, agree on the common 
standards and principles, we give them the money- the NGO implements the 
project in their own style - We only maintain minimum rights of approval” 
(LNGO-PO46, interviewed 25/02/10).  
This flexible approach gives leverage to the implementing NGO to negotiate the 
project implementation process.   Partnership emphasized the mutual 
relationships between the donors and NGOs, and subsequently between the 
two and the community; a shared level of understanding between the donors, 
NGOs and community; a desire to work together in a joint enterprise.  
 
The above observations demonstrate how the use of the term ‘partnership’ 
denoted a shift in the conceptualization of donor-NGO-community relationship: 
the donor was not simply viewed as the giver or provider of funds, nor the NGO 
simply an implementer, and the community a recipient – they had all come 
together in a relational construction of a new reality of peace. The interactive 
dialogue between them aimed at addressing the contextual demands and 
challenges, hence ensuring that peace programmes responded to the needs on 
the ground. Partnerships also enhanced dialogue and understanding between 
NGOs and donors. Another observation is that partnership was enhanced in 
situations where donor agencies jointly run peacebuilding activities with their 
partners rather than simply subcontracting the latter. This approach exposed the 
donor agencies to the real situation on the ground and increased interaction 
between them.  
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Partnership was also used to denote networking across organizations. An 
informant from the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
(UNOCHA) confirmed that as a means of resolving incongruent approaches to 
funding, and competitive attitude in programme activities, they regularly met 
with different organizations to prioritize activities and funding strategies:  
“We regularly meet to coordinate our activities in the field. We also meet with 
different representatives of the organizations working in the field in order to set 
funding priorities for the different activities. Once we are clear which activities 
need priority funding we categorize them and publish them for a funding 
appeal. For example, in the 2010 ‘Consolidated Appeal for Northern Uganda’ 
the major priority for funding was ‘food security and agricultural livelihoods’ 
because the majority of the population was returning home for resettlement” 
(INGO-PO56, 12/04/10). 
 
The above approach transformed power relations between NGOs; between 
NGOs and donors; and between NGOs and the community. The power relations 
developed into arenas of dialogue, mutual understanding and relational inter-
subjective encounters with the reality of conflict and peacebuilding strategies.  
The common funding strategy improved the relationships between different 
NGOs, reduced competition and developed a fusion of different perspectives in 
peacebuilding.  The meetings became a place for re-conceptualisation of 
funding strategies, and development of a common understanding of 
peacebuilding in response to contextual challenges. This approach gave the 
NGOs more leverage in negotiating with the donors as a block, hence exerting 
pressure for a more dialogical approach to funding. The community played an 
important role in the design and implementation of peacebuilding discourse and 
practice. In other words, NGO peacebuilding was informed by the contextual 
reality. 
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NGO respondents also confirmed that the networking and coordination 
meetings strategically developed into a transitional space for the exploration of 
common actions for response to social challenges. This approach influenced 
the peacebuilding discourse and practice by developing an interpretive 
perspective to analyzing and understanding the reality of conflict and possible 
responses. This was evidenced by the fact that NGOs exchanged ideas on their 
peacebuilding practices during the networking meetings, evaluated these 
approaches and formed new alliances in responding to social challenges. 
Besides, the interaction in the coordination meetings developed a common 
language that was consistent with the persuasive discourse of peacebuilding 
and its implementation process.    
 
NGO informants who had received money through negotiated partnership 
appreciated the various levels of consultation, mutual understanding and 
commitment to genuine peace for the region. The process of conceptualization 
of the project and implementation was based on mutual dialogue. The research 
shows that in the process of implementation the partners (NGOs and donors) 
were in constant communication through exchange and discussions on project 
impact assessments as well as development of new proposals based on the 
changing contextual dynamics. 
 
Seven NGO participants expressed satisfaction that they had room for 
negotiation in the implementation of the projects, as this informant observed:  
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“The donors come with their own music, but you have a choice not dance to it. 
We often feel the donor pressure, but after working with many donor agencies 
over the years, we can now make our stand known, and in some cases we 
have refused donor money that comes with stringent conditions. We have 
learned to negotiate with the donors – but you also have to understand that 
donors are equally often under pressure to disburse their funds to credible 
guys, so we know that” (LNGO-PO45, interviewed 12/01/10).   
This participant’s perspective can be interpreted as emphasizing the importance 
of learning from dialogue and exchanges within daily experiences. Eight NGO 
participants were emphatic that constant negotiations with their funding 
agencies had increased dialogue, mutual consultation and respect between 
them and their donors. The building of trust strengthened relationships over the 
years. 
  
Hence, contrary to the assumptions of the critics of liberal peace, different 
channels of dialogue improved relationships between the NGOs and donors. 
The relationships and conversations between the two generated a process of 
institutionalization of standards and approaches to funding negotiation as well 
as implementation of peacebuilding activities.  
   
Part II: Middle Range Leadership: Networking and Social Action 
In the middle range leadership NGOs liaised their experiences at the grassroots 
level with the advocacy initiatives at the top level leadership. NGOs generally 
used five different strategies in relational constructionism as a means of conflict 
intervention. These approaches were relational and as such founded on 
principles of relational constructionism such as mutual encounter and 
recognition, dialogical conversations, persuasive language, co-construction of 
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new understandings and realities, and interactive sense-making. The NGOs 
applied the following five strategies: First, through international awareness-
raising in order to expose the level of violence in the northern Uganda conflict, 
subsequently putting pressure on the Ugandan government to be assertive to 
the peace process; second, through direct engagement with the government 
authorities particularly in raising concerns about human rights abuses; third, 
engaging with the LRA leaders to participate in peacebuilding process; fourth, 
involving the community in policy formulation; and fifth, addressing the 
challenge of the ICC intervention and transitional justice and linking this with 
community perceptions and expectations.   
 
The first strategy was undertaken through international awareness campaigns 
which brought the Ugandan conflict to the attention of public media. There was 
a general appreciation, from both the local community and NGO participants 
that the presence of NGOs had contributed immensely to putting the northern 
Uganda conflict on the world map. One of the active NGO participants 
networking for advocacy posited very succinctly:  
“Civil society, including NGOs, organized advocacy tours all over the world, 
especially in the UK and US.  We allied with NGOs in other countries; used 
politics to make inroads in decision making processes; and lobbied 
embassies, in some cases, against their own governments. We contacted 
foreign development arms of different countries. We supported other 
structures such as religious leaders, conducted public actions such as the 
Gulu Walk70; Annual Peace Week71. Civil society also conducted community 
based training. These activities raised awareness on the need for peace in 
northern Uganda” (LNGO-PC31, interviewed 18/01/10).  
                                                 
70
 Gulu Walk is an annual event in Gulu and other parts of the world that is used by human rights 
activists to raise awareness about the atrocities of the LRA-GOU conflict, and to call for national 
and international support for initiatives for peace and reconciliation. 
71
 Annual Peace Week was an annual event that brought together different religious leaders and 
peace agents to raise awareness on the need for peace and reconciliation.  
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Archbishop Odama asserted that he had been to different parts of the world 
including the UN Security Council to lobby for a more concerted effort towards 
peace in northern Uganda (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 19/01/10). Other 
religious and civil society leaders did the same. Eleven NGO participants (six 
international and five local), affirmed that different countries, agencies and 
associations worldwide were very supportive of the middle range leadership 
interventions in the conflict, and as a result pressure mounted on the Uganda 
government to commit itself to the peace process. 
 
A participant from the Atiak control population observed that, despite the 
absence of NGOs in the area, there was generally a positive appreciation of the 
NGOs: 
“Since the LRA attack on Atiak, when more than 250 people were killed, we 
have struggled to pull things together. This place was abandoned for many 
years. We felt that the government never really cared about us. It is the 
continuous lobbying of the NGOs that has brought us peace” (CM-A68, 
interviewed17/02/10). 
There was constant internal consultation amongst the NGOs in northern 
Uganda, as well as a show of solidarity between these NGOs and others in 
Europe and USA. Sadly though, as one NGO peace coordinator observed, there 
was no evidence of similar show of solidarity within Uganda (INGO-PC31, 
interviewed 18/01/10). The ethnic polarization had played into the social 
processes of change. As a result many people in southern Uganda ignored or 
were oblivious to the plight of the people in the North.  The government was 
also viewed with suspicion in the North for failing to expeditiously bring the war 
to an end. This perception was generally shared by the majority of the 
participants interviewed. A local resident in Gulu wondered: “If the Uganda 
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government could send its army to fight in Rwanda, Congo and now Somalia, 
why couldn’t they stop this war? There was an obvious complacency in their 
failure to end the war” (CM-G69, interviewed10/03/10).   
 
The second strategy was through direct engagement with the government 
authorities.  A participant from one of the human rights organization narrated 
how they had often raised issues of human rights abuse with the government 
(LNGO-PO33, interviewed 22/03/10). These abuses mainly included beatings, 
harassment and extortion of civilians by the military.  The NGO talked to the 
commander in-charge and also contacted the headquarters in Kampala.  Four 
out of twenty NGOs trained the military on civilian rights and minimum use of 
force. The other NGOs, as I have explained above, were involved in diverse 
community peacebuilding activities such as mediation, reconciliation and IGA 
activities. 
 
The training and workshops were sometimes mixed (civilians and military) thus 
facilitating dialogue between the two sectors.  NGOs also invited government 
representatives from the district to participate in the NGO coordination meetings 
as a way of expanding the dialogue between the two sectors.  These situations 
of mutual conversations improved relations between the NGOs, civilians, 
government and community. They also created opportunities to work together 
for a social change. However, in situations where the government had been 
accused of human rights abuses by the NGOs, there were tensions between the 
two (NGO and government officials), as I have explained in Chapter Five. 
Eventually the tension turned out to be positive because, according to four NGO 
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participants, there were reduced cases of human rights abuse and improved 
understanding and collaboration between the government and NGOs. 
 
The third strategy involved engaging with the LRA leaders in advocating for 
peace. This was a daunting task and only one local NGO reported how they had 
been actively engaged in negotiating for peace between the rebels and the 
government.  Archbishop Odama, the leader of the Acholi Religious Leaders for 
Peace Initiative (ARLPI), asserted that his organization risked the lives of their 
members in lobbying the rebel leaders. In narrating the encounter with the 
rebels, the archbishop said: 
“I remember the first time we met the rebels, it was on 14th of July 2002, and 
this was in a place known as Otichi in the mountains of Kilak. We met Vincent 
Otti (the second in command to Kony) with the high ranking officers of the 
LRA. From this first meeting, we became peace emissaries between the 
rebels and the government. We called ourselves ‘a bridge’. We would take 
messages between the LRA and government. We avoided any interpretation 
since we realized our task was very delicate, and also that as peace 
emissaries we should never interpret the mind of the other. We always asked 
them to write down the message. Yes, always – we went with a pen and paper 
to the rebels and asked them to write their message to the president, and in 
the same way we would ask the president to write his message” (LNGO-
PC001, interviewed 19/01/10). 
This approach to bridging different discourses and conversations was vital to 
constructing perceptions of peace between the rebels and the government. 
Through ARLPI the two opponents began to talk. From relational 
constructionism viewpoint ARLPI were active participants in a coordinated 
process of reality re-construction despite their emissary role. They were not only 
engaged in taking messages between the two parties, they also persuaded 
them to talk. The ARLPI put emphasis on facilitating conversations on peace. In 
his persuasive appeal to the rebels, Archbishop Odama explains how they 
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(ARLPI delegates) applied relational empathy in bringing the rebels to the 
negotiation table: 
“We arrived at the location of the rebels in the bush around 4pm. They 
welcomed us, but sat at a distance from us. The most interesting thing is that 
there were no chairs there, only logs, and the distance between us was about 
two meters. I took the initiative to tell them that before we start we should pray, 
and Vincent Otti said ‘you start’ – we prayed, then we introduced ourselves and 
we started the conversation. I said, ‘we have come here because the two of 
you are like elephants fighting, and you are stepping on the grass.72 And the 
grass is suffering. So we have come here to tell you the voice of the grass – 
who are in the camp, who have nothing, they have lost their education, they 
have lost their lives, and become very poor.  And they are all miserable. So 
they are asking you – can’t you talk peace with the government because this 
war has dragged for too long, more than ten years, you have not finished it 
and we don’t know when it would finish. We have come here to seek your own 
opinion and stand about this’” (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 19/01/10). 
This form of persuasive speech aimed at pricking the conscience of the rebels 
by relating the experiences of the victims of conflict. The approach became a 
valuable technique in mediation. In the process of conversations, the religious 
mediators engaged the rebels in a mediatory discourse that clarified the rebels’ 
position and options for peace. Archbishop Odama narrates how after their 
(ARLPI delegates) persuasive speech, the LRA second in command, Vincent 
Otti, agreed to a conditional peace dialogue. Odama said:  
“I remember Otti saying that ‘you people are from the government and you 
have come here simply to inspect us and know where we are so that you can 
go and tell the government who will in turn come and finish us.’ We just stayed 
there listening, some of us wanted to reply but I told them to wait. I told them 
that ‘we are not here to speak for the government but for the people because 
they are suffering in your hands, you are mistreating them, and sometimes 
suffering in the hands of the government forces when they refuse to reveal to 
the government forces where you are hiding. So please our interest is not to 
side with the government or LRA, but to ask you to talk.’ Then some of them 
begun to argue with us - but we insisted ‘we have come to seek for dialogue.’ 
Then in the end Otti said as long as the government is willing to talk with us we 
shall talk, if they want to fight, we shall fight. We tried to dissuade him from 
fighting” (Archbishop Odama, interviewed 19/01/10).  
                                                 
72
 Odama is making reference to a common proverb in most parts of Africa: “When two 
elephants fight it is the grass that suffers.”  In this case the ‘two elephants’ referred to the LRA 
and GOU, while the ‘grass’ to the general population of northern Uganda. 
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The ARLPI realized, in the conversations above, that they had to win the trust of 
the rebels in order to effectively carry out their mediation responsibility. Through 
persuasion they managed to get the rebels to accept their (ARLPI) emissary 
role. The two sides worked on trust-building in order to mutually accept each 
other.  Archbishop Odama admitted that it took them quite some time to win the 
trust the LRA and convince them that the main interest of ARLPI was to mediate 
the reality of the suffering masses on the ground by bringing the two opponents 
to a negotiation table. The process of inter-subjective encounters improved 
mutual recognition, from suspicion and fear, to understanding and 
accommodation. Thus, conversations, dialogue and consultations became 
crucial values in the construction of a new reality of peace based on relationship 
building exercises. A programme officer from a local NGO reiterated that:  
“Peace processes are never uni-lineal like a marathon race, they are 
fragmented. There could be cases where the opponents are talking and in 
some cases one of the parties pulls out. So peace conversations are not 
necessarily peaceful conversations. The most important thing is that the 
opponents are talking. The problem is when they don’t talk. As long as the 
channels of communication are open, then the process is on” (LNGO45-PO45, 
interviewed 12/01/10). 
This analysis confirms that while in most cases peace processes are 
fragmented, the fact that parties in conflict are talking is much more important. 
In relational constructionism conversation are important in bridging differences 
and creating a common space for interaction. Similarly, peace conversations 
create opportunities for perceiving the objective reality of conflict from different 
perspectives represented by the parties in dialogue. The NGOs played the role 
of facilitators in conversations ensuring that the momentum for participation in 
peace activities intensified. In Atiak, the government and cultural leaders played 
a similar role by mobilizing the community to dialogue about the various social 
challenges they were confronted with. 
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The fourth strategy was policy formulation through community engagement. 
This was carried out by creating avenues for dialogue in the community and 
subsequently influencing government policies on reconciliation and education. 
One of the participants from a local NGO conducted a nationwide research on 
the local people’s perception on transitional justice (LNGO-PO45, interviewed 
12/01/10). The research was mainly conducted in regions of northern and 
eastern Uganda which have known many years of conflict. The perceptions from 
the findings informed the formulation of the National Reconciliation Bill 2009. 
The participant further elaborated that: 
“At my organization we seek to infuse the stuff we do into policy alternatives 
that could help the government in its own work.  For example, we came up 
with practical propositions for a National Reconciliation Bill that addresses the 
transitional justice issues of Agenda 373. We have used the documents for 
grassroots training which were focused on transitional justice. We have 
worked around that document with parliamentarians, the executive and 
judiciary. And since actualizing the most important aspects of Agenda 3 fall on 
the judiciary, we have passed it on to the Judiciary as a Transitional Justice 
Working Document. In the document, we made some proposals for 
reparations based on the national research that we had conducted” (LNGO-
PO45, interviewed 12/01/10). 
The above approach links social research, conversations with the people and 
policy formulation. Understanding how people comprehend and interpret their 
reality, their major grievances, and expectations on how to construct a new 
future, were critical in creating meaningful conversations for change. These 
kinds of conversations that lead to social actions are important aspects in 
relational constructionism. The fact of bringing experiences of the population 
into policy formulation broadened the level of dialogue and increased 
                                                 
73
 Agenda 3 refers to the Juba Peace Talks that I have explained about in Chapter Four and in 
the Appendix. The agenda, known as Accountability and Reconciliation, focused mainly on 
addressing human rights violations during the different periods of the conflict in Uganda. 
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participation in governance structure. The main desire of the people was related 
to transitional justice concerns and how they could be part of constructing a 
different future.  
 
The fifth strategy referred to addressing the challenge of the ICC intervention 
and transitional justice. Thirteen NGO participants (8 local and 5 international) 
reported that they had lobbied against the ICC intervention because it would 
derail the peace process. These participants were concerned that the LRA rebel 
leaders could refuse participating in the peace process because of the ICC 
arrest warrants. However, five NGO participants (three international and two 
local) were of the opinion that it was important to convict the LRA in order to 
bring an end to the culture of impunity. I have discussed the diversity of opinions 
in Chapter Five. 
 
As a strategy, NGOs undertook extensive community dialogue on how to deal 
with the past atrocities.  Archbishop Odama observed that his organization 
(ARLPI) made a visit to the ICC in The Hague and appealed for the withdrawal 
of arrest warrants in order to give peace a chance, but the ICC did not change 
their position.  The ARLPI leaders and several other NGOs thus, put emphasis 
on dialogue and mutual understanding as a means of achieving a more 
sustainable peace. From a relational constructionism perspective the debate on 
how to deal with perpetrators created an opportunity for conversation and 
dialogue on the way forward.  
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Part III: Grassroots Leadership Level 
Peacebuilding Communities and Relationship Building for Social Change  
The different levels of interaction between peacebuilding agents in the 
community developed what I may call peacebuilding communities in both Gulu 
and Atiak. In these communities there were different levels of interaction: In 
Gulu, NGOs interacted amongst themselves; NGOs and local community 
worked together for peace; and different peace agents such as the paralegals, 
peace coordinators, and peace groups liaised with each other for common 
peace activities. The inter-group and inter-subjective encounters generated 
mutual sense-making, negotiations of different approaches and understanding 
of social reality with the aim of finding agreeable solutions to the contextual 
challenges.  
 
At the grassroots level in Atiak the various agents of peace worked closely 
together in addressing the challenges of peace and conflict. For example, the 
council of elders met regularly to discuss issues of concern and the challenges 
they were facing, as this elder observed: “we have our meetings as elders once 
a month to look at the various issues facing our community. We try to do what 
we can and we know that the people respect what we do” (CM-A61, interviewed 
14/03/10). In an informal interview with two residents in Atiak I learned that the 
elders often consulted with the local government leaders before they took a 
major decision. The two participants observed that this was important in 
ensuring that decisions in land dispute resolution, reconciliation or reintegration 
of the formerly abducted persons were carried out in harmony. Hence, relational 
340 
 
constructionism in peacebuilding was strongly experienced at the grassroots 
level in Atiak. 
 
There were four predominant strategies that NGOs and communities in Gulu 
and Atiak applied in developing peacebuilding communities. These strategies 
were more pronounced when applied by the NGOs and local community in Gulu 
than Atiak with its limited resources. First, the use of relationship building as a 
means of strengthening the activities of peacebuilding communities; second, 
encouragement of inter-subjective and group encounters in peacebuilding as a 
means of creating opportunities for mutual recognition, dialogical conversations 
and interactive sense-making; third, efforts towards community mobilization and 
networking in order to increase the constituency of peace practitioners, 
subsequently influencing peacebuilding discourse and practice; and fourth, the 
development of relational leadership as a means of sustaining peacebuilding 
initiatives.  
 
Relationship Building 
I have already indicated that relationship building emerged both within the 
process of carrying out peacebuilding activities, and as a result of peace 
intervention. On the one hand, networking and joint enterprise approaches 
undertaken by NGOs meant that peace agents built relationships among 
themselves. In Atiak community peace agents networked among themselves in 
response to peacebuilding challenges. The subsequent result of relationship 
building between the peace agents was that they were able to develop a 
341 
 
relational practice based on lessons learned, exchange of ideas, conversations 
and dialogues. On the other hand, peace interventions focused on improving 
relationships between parties in conflict and among communities dealing with 
different post-conflict challenges. Peace interventions produced communities of 
peacebuilding, which in relational constructionism are referred to as 
communities of practice.  This interactive process of relationship building was 
therefore based on encounters for social change. 
 
The communities in Atiak and Gulu, as well as the NGOs, accentuated 
relationship building in most of their peacebuilding activities. This strategy 
developed and strengthened communities of peacebuilding. Sixteen participants 
from both Gulu and Atiak expressed the opinion that in order to initiate and 
strengthen peacebuilding communities they were constantly involved in 
facilitating relationships within and between peacebuilding communities. A 
peace coordinator of an international NGO, in discussing repercussions of 
conflict on society, elaborated succinctly that: 
“One of the primary casualties of conflict is relationship. When conflict occurs it 
breaks relationship, the family system, clan system and social support 
networks collapse; the relationship with the environment collapses, 
relationship with institutions collapses. In conflict people cease to trust the 
government, the law, judicial systems, and leadership. So what you need to do 
in post-conflict contexts is to reconstruct the relationship with people, 
institution, and all those things that affect people’s lives. This will give you a 
basis upon which people can begin to move on” (INGO-PO45, interviewed 
25/02/10). 
The above participant’s analysis points to the fact that conflict can sever 
relations at four different levels: between individuals; between individuals and 
communities; between community and the environment; and between 
community, leadership and institutional structures of governance. The 
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participant reiterated that peace interventions have to consider relationship 
building as key to the success of such interventions. This strategy was evident 
in the approaches taken by most NGOs. 
 
A local peacebuilding coordinator expressed how her organization has been 
active in building relationships between different ethnic groups: 
“We do cross-border peacebuilding to improve relations between neighbours. 
You see, the Acholi as an ethnic group was isolated, even before the LRA 
case. We had issues with all our neighbours, the Iteso, West Nile, in Southern 
Sudan – they were all saying you people send your sons to kill us... There have 
been tensions between the Acholi and Karamojong, especially in the Pader 
region. The main problem is cattle rustling - The Karamojong often attack the 
Acholi and take their animals. This has led to tensions and conflict between 
the two communities. We have therefore initiated cross-border dialogues to 
improve the relationships in these communities” (LNGO-PO40, interviewed 
20/01/10). 
Relationship building thus became the core of peacebuilding activities in both 
Gulu and Atiak. This was undertaken, as I have noted in Chapter Five, through 
creating transitional spaces such as workshops, ritual performances, mediation, 
awareness-raising, and institution of a culture of peace. These interactive 
experiences generated peacebuilding communities committed to changing the 
society towards mutual understanding, reconciliation and peace. Dr. Okumu 
stressed that reconciliation rituals brought people together to bridge their 
differences and create new friendships:  
“Reconciliation is about coming together to solve a common problem. This 
coming together is considered sacred according to the Acholi people, in the 
sense that once you have been reconciled you become a friendly people and 
everything you do expresses friendship and love and excludes hate, jealousy 
and whatever. This is in the backbone of the reconciliation process” (CM-G28, 
interviewed 03/03/10) 
The concept of ‘coming together’ as explained by this participant creates an 
opportunity for rebuilding broken relationships. In Atiak two community leaders 
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observed in an informal interview that the community was committed to 
reconciling different families. Reconciliation created a space for mutual 
acceptance and trust building. Lederach (1999:27) observes that reconciliation 
“envisions protracted conflict as a system and focuses its attention on 
relationships within that system.”  The system is complex and has different 
levels of interactions between social agents. In other words, it is important to 
understand the fact that the problems that the community faces are inter-
connected within different systems and networks in the society.  
 
Inter-subjective and Group Encounters in Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding activities created opportunities for inter-subjective and group 
encounters as a means of developing communities of peacebuilding in both 
Atiak and Gulu. The strong community ties in the Acholi community meant that 
inter-subjectivity could not be interpreted in a western individualistic perspective 
as I have explained in Chapter Three. Relational constructionism acquired a 
different characterization as far as inter-subjectivity was concerned. As I have 
explained in Chapter Four and Five, individuals were not entirely viewed as 
single entities. They were conceptualized within a relational framework, which 
meant in association with their families, clans and ethnic group identifications. 
Hence, inter-subjective encounters were embedded within these communitarian 
characterizations.  
 
In both Gulu and Atiak, community participants’ comments to me highlighted the 
ways in which diverse inter-subjective encounters opened up new horizons 
where different parties found a common space for dialogue and reconstruction 
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of a new reality. This was evident from some of the narrations on reconciliation 
which explained how the coming together of the affected families and clans was 
preceded by elaborate negotiation meetings. One of the community participants 
in Gulu was emphatic that preparing the people for dialogue and reconciliation 
was important in realizing the fruits of reconciliation (CM-G16, interviewed 
10/03/10).  The participant underlined that the preparations were particularly 
vital in situations where the families of the victim and that of the perpetrator 
were to meet in a mato oput process. She added in one incident the emotions 
were high before, during and after the mato oput process. The families needed 
adequate preparation on what the process of reconciliation entailed, the 
challenge of meeting with the perpetrator or victim and the community’s desire 
for peace. An elder from Atiak observed that the mato oput process was hardly 
practiced because the community was not ready for it and it was far too 
expensive for most families (CM-A61, interviewed 14/03/10). Many families 
could neither afford a sheep nor the payment for compensation which were both 
required by the ritual. 
 
Two peace coordinators from local NGOs affirmed that offering opportunities for 
dialogical conversations between people in conflict helped in changing negative 
attitudes and perceptions into mutual understanding within the community. A 
peacebuilding coordinator of a local NGO narrated how the promotion of 
dialogue and understanding diminished levels of animosity and inter-subjective 
differences in land disputes: 
“Initially there was a problem – a lot of tension between people involved in land 
boundary disputes. So we initiated dialogue meetings, provided free legal aid 
with the hope that most people would opt for dialogue, which would normally 
lead to a win-win situation. After a lot of campaigning and awareness raising, 
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the majority of the people opted for the dialogue. However, some cases had to 
be decided by the court of law. We feel that we somehow succeeded in 
promoting reconciliation through dialogue and later the use of the Acholi 
rituals” (LNGO-PO32, interviewed 25/01/10).  
The above narration demonstrates how inter-subjective encounters were 
characterized by community persuasions on individuals, families and clans to 
embrace a peace culture. To some extent the pursuit of community harmony 
took precedence over individual positions, even though as I have discussed in 
Chapter Five, the individual was expected to show remorse and commit 
him/herself to the agreed resolution. 
 
The above discussion shows how conversational dialogue was applied as a vital 
strategy in facilitating inter-subjective relationships and developing communities 
of peacebuilding. The process of interactive sense-making was evidenced by 
the different dialogical encounters between parties in conflict. These encounters 
aimed at propagating a peace culture as an alternative to the culture of violence, 
especially among the youth. Reconciliation rituals facilitated the bonding of 
relationships which were ritualized to become fundamental means of 
transforming broken relationships and beginning life anew. From the viewpoint 
of relational constructionism, dialogue and rituals provided a transitional space 
where different parties could express their desires, seek healing and reconcile 
with each other. In other words, reconciliation provided new opportunities for the 
community to begin again and re-construct a different reality. 
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Community Mobilization and Networking 
Community mobilization as a strategy for relationship building and commitment 
to peace increased the peace constituency and interaction between the 
peacebuilders. For example, the ARLPI mobilized the population to be aware of 
the need for peace and reconciliation. The organization rallied different religious 
leaders and came up with an idea of holding an Annual Peace Week for the 
northern region. Archbishop Odama narrated that:  
“In 2006 January, we started provincial peace week which we referred to as 
GANAL - Gulu Archdiocese-Nebbi Diocese-Arua Diocese-Lira Diocese. Within 
this acronym we also have our mission: Grow All New Alive in Love. You see 
the war had distorted us; we had broken into small pieces within our regions 
and nation at large, so when this started I felt that my role was to unite all 
these dioceses and the people that live in them. Then I realized we are not 
only Catholics, other religions, churches, cultural leaders are also there and 
we need to include them. Our peace weeks have become special days of 
expressing our commitment to peace” (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 19/01/10).  
The Annual Peace Week had become a great cultural experience where 
different people came to talk about peace and express their concerns. The 
involvement of diverse groups (religious, cultural and political leaders) had 
meant that a variety of discourses for peace were brought together in a common 
space for dialogue and exchange.  
 
A representative of a government human rights organization confirmed that her 
organization had been active in raising awareness about civic engagement of 
civilians by training the populations about their democratic responsibilities such 
as, participation in the 2011 general elections74, human rights awareness and 
the importance of maintaining sustainable environment (UG-PO007, interviewed 
18/02/10).  The general appreciation from the majority (7 out of 9) of the 
                                                 
74
 This is in reference to General Elections held in Uganda in February 2011. 
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community participants in Gulu was that training provided them with a common 
space for dialogue and exchange on fundamental rights and responsibilities as 
citizens.  These also presented opportunities for citizens to engage in 
conversations with government officials as well as raise their concerns about 
different arms of government. 
 
Community mobilization for peace was also experienced in campaigns against 
environmental degradation. A community resident from Gulu asserted that a 
threat to the environment was a threat to commonly shared resources and if not 
well managed could lead to conflict (CM-G67, interviewed 10/05/10). The 
interviews further showed that consciousness of communal inter-dependence 
and connectedness was crucial to sustainability of peace.  
 
However, in Atiak community mobilization for peace was not as successful as in 
Gulu where NGOs had put in resources and logistical facilities to reach out to 
people in different villages. It was common for NGOs in Gulu to provide bicycles 
for their peace agents. In contrast, in Atiak peace agents could not afford 
bicycles to cover the distances between villages. Besides, in some cases there 
was a general apathy for peacebuilding activities in Atiak. In my informal 
interviews with a religious leader and a community member, it was evident that 
the people preferred activities that would bring them some income. For example, 
one of the LC3 leaders pointed out that the youth were less interested in 
participating in peacebuilding activities (LC3-A39, interviewed 22/02/10). He 
spearheaded a campaign to get the youth to participate in community 
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peacebuilding events and after five months he noticed some positive changes. 
More youth began to participate in peace programmes.   
 
From a relational constructionism perspective, awareness raising leads to a co-
construction of a shared reality. The process of mutual influencing develops 
what Gadamer (1976) refers to as a fusion of horizon, which I have explained in 
Chapter Three.  The fusion of horizons does not simply occur, it has to be 
undertaken through an interactive process. Hence, as a strategy to community 
mobilization and empowerment NGOs used workshops which became 
transitional spaces for bringing together different participants to dialogue on 
possible solutions to challenges facing the community. This meant that 
workshops created an opportunity for the testing of ideas and how they could be 
applied in real life.  
 
Workshops provided a transitional space for relationship building and dreaming 
of a different future. The dream of the envisioned future became a fundamental 
source of motivation for the community peacebuilders.  Twelve out of twenty 
seven NGO participants used story telling as a means of capturing the reality on 
the ground. For some participants story telling became a therapeutic experience, 
especially those that had experienced trauma from the conflict. In relational 
constructionism, storytelling can be interpreted as a medium of engagement 
with the reality of the story teller. Stories brought closer to the community the 
individual experiences. They developed into a shared repertoire of different 
experiences which became important in deliberating ways of responding to the 
social challenges highlighted in the stories. 
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A peace coordinator of an international NGO affirmed that: “We use role plays to 
enact our daily lives and seek solutions to the emerging challenges. The 
workshops offer us an opportunity to imagine a new future - a peaceful society” 
(INGO-PO34, interviewed 10/02/10). A community participant from Gulu 
affirmed that: “workshops have provided me with a wonderful place to meet 
people and make friends. I didn’t know people here since my family was 
displaced when I was 12, and now 15 years later I feel like I belong to a new 
family of peacebuilders” (CM-G62, interviewed 16/02/10).  Workshops therefore 
provided a transitional space for interactive learning that eventually contributed 
to community mobilization for peace. 
 
Relational Leadership  
Relational leadership was at the centre of most peacebuilding activities both in 
Gulu and Atiak. As I have noted above, NGOs engaged communities and 
donors in building a culture of peace. It is therefore important to highlight the 
relational leadership feature that integrated peacebuilding activities in different 
sectors of the community. Relational leadership was mainly undertaken by 
institutional leaders such as local councilors, religious, cultural and political 
leaders both in Gulu and Atiak. There were also individuals who emerged as 
leaders based on their passion in addressing the social issues of concern. I 
have cited in Chapter Five the example of the parents association in Atiak that 
advocated against abuse of girls. In Gulu the religious leaders in ARLPI used 
their positions to mobilize the community towards a peace culture. 
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In relational constructionism, leadership is vital for the development of values, 
decision making processes and conflict resolution mechanisms. To a larger 
extent leadership was identified with its capacity to build relationships through: 
conflict mediation aimed at bridging broken relationships; administering of 
cultural rituals of reconciliation as a means of dealing with the wounds of the 
past; and establishment of a common code of conduct based on cultural, social, 
political and economic values. These activities contributed to social cohesion.   
 
Relational leadership was based on: the value of leadership as ‘connectors of 
peace’; characterization of leadership in relation to collective identity; depiction 
of leadership as charismatic initiatives of individual.   The majority of the 
community participants (12 out of 16), both in Gulu and Atiak, asserted that 
leaders were expected to be connectors of peace.  To enhance their capacity, 
NGOs trained the leaders in Gulu, as I have noted in Chapter Five. A 
programme officer from an international NGO referred to the leadership training 
as a process of building local capacities for peace75 (INGO-PO34, interviewed 
10/02/10).  The expectation was that the leaders would become connectors of 
peace through their commitment to the promotion of values that generate 
mutual respect, understanding, forgiveness and reconciliation.  
 
I found the idea of identifying the leaders as ‘connectors’ to be an important one 
in the analysis of how relational leadership became fundamental to social 
change processes within the community. The concept of ‘connecting’ should 
however not be simply understood as bridging relations. It should instead be 
                                                 
75
 This concept of ‘local capacities for peace’ is borrowed from Anderson (1999). ANDERSON, 
H. 1999. Collaborative Learning Communities. In: MCNAMEE, S. & GERGEN, K. J. (eds.) 
Relational Responsibility: Resources for Sustainable Dialogue. London: Sage Publications. 
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viewed as depicting the influential role of leadership in getting the communities 
to embrace a peace culture.  Such a process is interactive in the sense that 
leaders are in constant conversation with the community in order to develop 
new attitudes, perceptions and approaches to social change.  
 
Both cultural and local government leaders were elected and censored by the 
people. Government leaders worked closely with the cultural leaders in 
facilitating mediation processes between individuals, families and clans, 
especially on land disputes. However, there were a few cases where both 
categories of leaders were seen as inhibitors to social change, particularly those 
who demanded bribes for the services rendered. This raised the question of the 
importance of the ethics of leadership. In other words, credibility was a crucial 
value in relational leadership. I have noted in Chapter Five a case of a 
community participant who was hesitant to let his land dispute case be mediated 
by an elder who was obviously biased in his judgments. This meant that 
unethical leaders were not appreciated in the same way as ethical ones.  
 
Cultural leaders were considered to be instrumental in facilitating harmonious 
co-existence between individuals, families and clans both in Gulu and Atiak. 
These leaders, as I have noted in Chapters Four and Five, performed important 
acts such as reconciliation and reintegration rituals.  The symbolic 
interactionism behind reconciliation rituals was fundamental in bridging 
relationships. Cultural leaders ensured that the values behind symbolic rituals 
were respected and observed in order to safeguard the effects they (values) 
were meant to attain. A peace analyst from a local NGO observed that cultural 
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values were critical connectors to peace in all communities in Uganda. He 
underscored that: 
“What we have seen nationally, based on the research carried out by my 
organization, is that there are some common values in each culture which may 
act as common principles to unite different communities. I can name three: 
first, death is not sanctioned in all cultures, and so there is no death penalty - 
which demonstrates the fact that the respect for life is paramount.  Second is 
the respect for Women – In many cultures in Uganda you don’t touch women 
during war. Women have always been protected in situations of war. For 
example, during the war in S. Sudan, women protected the men by sitting in 
front of the houses to prevent any of the armed rebels from accessing the men 
hidden in the house - they were never touched. The Kakwa people of northern 
Uganda had laws of war that protected women. Third is the protection of 
children – they are considered to be innocent, and among the Acholi they are 
as delicate as an egg” (LNGO-P0005, interviewed 14/02/10). 
The return to these connectors that had been weakened during the many years 
of the legacy of violence was emphasized by most NGO participants as a 
strategy of strengthening commitment to peace. The primary focus was to 
mobilize the community to return to the connectors based on commonly held 
values of peace and reconciliation. The majority of the participants had a high 
regard for the Acholi cultural values while acknowledging that they had been 
eroded over the years.  These participants also expressed the concern that 
most people did not know the Acholi cultural values and that it would be 
important to encourage the communities to re-learn the values. 
 
However, the participant’s comment about the protection of women and children 
in war lacked evidence in the northern Uganda conflict. For example, a woman 
running a local NGO that takes care of formerly abducted women confirmed that 
the majority of her beneficiaries had been raped, physically abused and 
traumatized by the experiences of war (LNGO-PC73, interviewed 14/02/10). A 
human rights activist from a local NGO pointed out that they had documented 
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systematic abuse of women and children during the war (LNGO-PO33, 
interviewed 22/03/10).76 
 
Relational leadership was characterized by collective identity. For example, 
leadership among women emerged as a positive source of social change. 
Unlike institutional leadership that was based on prescribed roles, women 
leadership was a result of the urgency for change and commitment to changing 
social perceptions. Women in both Gulu and Atiak were instrumental in 
engaging men to consider the needs of young women, especially young 
mothers and returnees from the LRA captivity. These women activists 
contributed to the deconstruction of perceptions that view women only as 
victims and not active agents for peace, hence masking their potential for 
conflict resolution. For example, in Gulu, women leaders involved in income 
generating activities (IGA) and girl education movement (GEM) were influential 
in mobilizing other women to be part of community peacebuilding activities.  A 
woman from one of the IGA groups in Gulu asserted that: “It is our responsibility 
to change our society. We invite everyone, and we accept anyone who wants to 
join our group. It is not just a group for making money it is also a group for 
building peace together” (CM-G67, interviewed 10/05/10). In Atiak women took 
                                                 
76
 The documented violence against women by the human rights NGOs include: 1. HUMAN 
RIGHTS FOCUS 2003. Film - Between Two Fires: Torture and displacement in northern 
Uganda. Gulu: Human Rights Focus. This is a documentary about torture of displaced persons 
living in the IDP camps in Acholiland; HUMAN RIGHTS FOCUS. 2002a. Between Two Fires: 
The Human Rights Situation in Protected Camps in Gulu District. Available at: 
http://www.hurifo.org/Publications/Between%20Two%20Fires%20-%20Internet%20Version.pdf 
(Accessed 10 August 2010). This document explains how the persons in IDP camps were 
caught in the middle experiencing attacks from both the LRA and Government of Uganda. Other 
documentations depicting systematic abuses on girls and women are documented in: HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH 2003. Abducted and abused: Renewed conflict in northern Uganda. New York: 
Human Rights Watch; WORLD VISION 2004 Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in 
Northern Uganda. Washington: World Vision.    
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leadership in the parents’ association that was instrumental in lobbying girls’ 
rights. 
 
Women whose daughters and sons had been abducted by the LRA or had been 
attacked during the conflict were much more vocal in campaigning for a culture 
of peace.  These women emerged as community leaders who were well 
respected and appreciated in the society. Most of them became part of a lobby 
organization such as the Concerned Parents Association (CPA) and other 
human rights organizations. Relationship building and bonding at this level 
engendered a strong solidarity for peace. This phenomenon fits within the 
spectrum of social identity theory which asserts that leadership emerges based 
on “the degree to which a person fits with the identity of the group as a whole” 
(Northouse, 2007:5). The identity traits of women leaders were characterized by 
both the experiences of war and subsequent commitment to transform those 
experiences into life giving opportunities. This contributed immensely to the 
sustainability of the peacebuilding communities.    
  
Relational leadership was also characterized by individual initiatives. 
Charismatic characteristics of individual leaders emerged as an influencing 
factor in organizational and community commitment to peace. A peace 
coordinator from a local NGO narrated how the national leader of her 
organization had been a source of influence and encouragement to her work for 
peace (LNGO-PO040, interviewed 20/01/10). She observed that: “His 
charismatic commitment to peace drove him to risk his life by talking to the 
355 
 
rebels in their hideouts.” This leadership example depicts what Gerstbauer 
(2009:10) refers to as agency leadership, which means the capacity for an 
individual to influence his/her organization to maintain its core values while 
responding to the urgent needs of the society. These acts of commitment and 
conviction became a source of motivation, particularly for those who were 
apprehensive about commitment to peacebuilding.   
 
Thus, peacebuilding at the top level leadership put emphasis on the embedded 
dialogical processes between the donors, NGOs and communities. The middle 
and grassroots levels of leadership put emphasis on relational leadership that 
sought to balance individual initiative with collective identity.  
 
Conclusion 
My primary objective in this chapter was to demonstrate how relational 
constructionism was at the core of the strategies applied by the NGOs, donors 
and communities in the various peacebuilding activities. I used Lederach’s 
(1997) pyramid framework to demonstrate how different peace agents worked 
closely together within multiple levels of interactions at the top (NGO-donor 
relations), middle and grassroots (community) levels. NGOs operated at all 
levels and were crucial in relationship building vertically, between the decision 
makers and the community, and horizontally between the different sectors of the 
community. In Atiak, I have already described how the community mainly 
operated at the grassroots level through peacebuilding initiatives. 
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Unlike in Lederach’s pyramid framework where NGOs operate at grassroots and 
middle level, this study has demonstrated that NGOs were active in all the three 
levels and played a very active role in connecting different peace agents. The 
three levels of conflict intervention (top, middle and grassroots leadership) 
emphasized relational constructionism through dialogue, conversation, 
relationship building, interactive sense-making and fusion of different horizons 
(attitudes, perception, values, positions and expectations) as a means of 
envisioning a new reality of peace. This process is relational because it results 
in co-construction of knowledge, new reality, perceptions, attitudes and desires 
for a different future.   
 
In both Gulu and Atiak, community peacebuilding developed a shared repertoire 
that contributed to a common peacebuilding discourse and practice, and 
increased the number of peace agents in the community. In Gulu, NGOs worked 
with the local community, donors, governments, leaders and civil society in 
responding to the different peacebuilding challenges, and in the process 
generated a peacebuilding discourse and practice. In Atiak, the peace agents 
operated at the grassroots level and generally struggled to mobilize the 
community to participate in peacebuilding activities. Hence, in Atiak participation 
in peacebuilding activities was lower compared to Gulu that had a much higher 
number of participants. This, as I have stated above, was mainly attributed to 
the fact that NGOs had put in a lot of resources to support peace programmes in 
Gulu. 
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This study has revealed that it is important to examine the different strategies 
undertaken by both NGOs and donors in mutually influencing each other within 
a power-play that is facilitated by continuous conversations and dialogue. This 
dialogical process became important in relationship building and prioritization of 
contextual demands. NGOs, as I have discussed above, organized regular 
coordination and networking meetings in order to solidify their peacebuilding 
practice and develop a common strategy to dialoguing with the donors. On the 
other hand, donors developed principles of operation that were vital in creating 
spaces for dialogue, exchange and mutual respect between them and the 
beneficiaries.  The mantra of the ‘lessons learned’ among NGOs and community 
peacebuilders showed that experiences of community peacebuilding contributed 
to the general discourse and practice of peacebuilding. However, it is important 
to note that in the category of ‘constrained funding’ NGOs responded to the 
demands of the donors which in some cases were not congruent to the needs 
on the ground.  
 
Mutual appreciation through community mobilization, change of attitudes and 
perceptions contributed to relationship building and increased the peace 
dividend within the community. Communitarian approach to conflict resolution 
facilitated the different levels of dialogue within the community, between 
individual, families and clans.  In both Gulu and Atiak community leaders 
cooperated with different peace agents in creating transitional spaces for 
dialogue through meetings, workshops, advocacy and reconciliation encounters. 
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In Gulu, these strategies led to interactive influences between the NGOs and 
donors; NGOs and local community; and local community amongst themselves. 
In Atiak the community leaders liaised with different group leaders (women, 
youth, religious) and government leaders in building a community spirit for 
peace. In both Gulu and Atiak peace agents engaged in mutual negotiations of 
different positions, as well as a common exploration of solutions to diverse 
challenges facing the society. 
 
The common thread to the peacebuilding strategies between Gulu and Atiak 
was that they both relied on relationship building as a means to constructing a 
new reality of peace. The control population of Atiak demonstrated that with or 
without the presence of NGOs, peacebuilding was a relational process that 
required the presence of different agents. The fact that in both Gulu and Atiak 
there were community members who stood out as the ‘critical yeast’ for 
peacebuilding meant that these communities would be willing to continue with 
peacebuilding activities with or without the presence of NGOs. Hence, the 
liberal peace critique that peacebuilding is externally influenced ignores the 
contextual evidence of relational constructionism displayed in this chapter.  
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Chapter Seven: General Conclusion 
 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to revisit the research question and draw 
together major conclusions which combine to answer the question. The main 
research question was: To what extent is NGO peacebuilding in northern 
Uganda informed by the local reality and/or external conceptualizations of 
peacebuilding?  This question focuses on understanding the relationship 
between NGOs, donors and local community in peacebuilding, and the resulting 
tensions between external liberal peace influences and local peacebuilding 
approaches in northern Uganda. Thus, in order to answer the research question 
I carried out research in three main phases. First was an analysis of the 
secondary data on NGOs, liberal peace and peacebuilding efforts in Uganda as 
a means of establishing the foundational background to the study. Second was 
the process of data collection that led to the investigation of NGOs, community, 
donor agencies, government and cultural leaders, as well as government 
institutions of peacebuilding. The representative samples were drawn from both 
Gulu and the control population of Atiak. The third was data analysis of the 
gathered information. I relied on grounded theory for the process of data 
collection and analysis. These three phases were iterative and contributed to 
the understanding of the practice and discourse of NGO peacebuilding in 
northern Uganda. 
 
In the first phase, I carried out secondary data analysis on NGO peacebuilding 
and Uganda conflict. I examined the claims of the liberal peace critics that NGO 
peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts implements a western agenda of liberal 
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peace. My study of the Uganda conflict, based on the secondary data, gave me 
a broader view of the conflict. Before going to the field I concurred with most of 
the critiques of liberal peace. However, after my field experience I was much 
more enlightened to make a critical review of the liberal peace critique. Both 
sets of literature (on liberal peace critique and Uganda conflict) had a common 
characteristic: they made generalized assertions that overlooked the contextual 
complexities and at the same time failed to include the voices of the people on 
the ground.  
 
The secondary data highlighted the major tenets of NGO peacebuilding and the 
claim of liberal peace critics that NGO peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts 
implements a western agenda of liberal peace, and that this is intrinsically 
wrong. The liberal peace critics assert that liberal peace focuses on promoting 
democracy, human rights, economic liberalization and the rule of law (Paris, 
1997; Sørensen, 2007; Richmond, 2010b). Liberal peace has also been 
conceived as part of state building within strategies of post-conflict 
reconstruction (Chandler, 2004; Heathershaw, 2008). Further liberal peace 
discourse has developed in the line of human security and responsibility to 
protect civilians from gross human rights violations (Bellamy, 2009; Chandler, 
2004). These have raised questions on the effectiveness of humanitarian 
intervention, the moral justifications, assessment of its success and failures and 
the responsibility for global governance under international standards set by the 
UN (Jentleson, 2007; Ignatieff, 2003; Welsh, 2004; Chandler, 2009).  
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NGOs have therefore been viewed as continuing the liberal peace agenda 
through their peacebuilding and development programmes (Carey, 2010; 
Duffield, 2002; Chigas, 2007; Goodhand, 2006). The above literature holds that 
the overreliance by the NGOs on western donor funds for their operations has 
meant that NGOs have lacked the freedom to conduct their peacebuilding 
activities independently. These conditions have raised concerns about NGO 
legitimacy, the relevance of their peacebuilding activities to the local context and 
persistent tensions between internal and external mechanisms of peacebuilding 
(Mac Ginty, 2008; Lister, 2003; Linda Mayoux, 2005).  This has led to 
suggestions for a hybrid form of peacebuilding that combines both the local and 
external approaches to peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2010; Brown et al., 2010; 
Richmond, 2010b). 
 
The above liberal peace critiques tend to rely on anecdotal evidence without 
talking to the people on the ground to find out their own perceptions of the 
critiques being made.  The critique has often been undertaken at a macro level 
while ignoring the interactive peacebuilding processes at the micro level and 
how these shape the discourse and practice of peacebuilding at the middle and 
top level structures of the society.  Post-conflict contexts are complex and 
diverse and ought to be analyzed from a localized perspective with a clear 
understanding of the historical trajectories, major grievances, key agents of 
peace and conflict, internal and external dynamism of peacebuilding, and 
interactive encounters at the grassroots, middle and top level structures of the 
society. Besides, there are such diverse identity boundaries among NGOs, 
donors and local community that they cannot all be discussed as single entities.  
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In my analysis of the Uganda conflict, I have argued that the post-independence 
period in Uganda has been characterized by identity politics in competition for 
the national cake. Identity politics is based on the principle that identity, whether 
individual or collective, “would be central to both the vision and practice of 
radical politics” (Ryan, 2001:23). This view holds that political practice should 
fundamentally be focused on identity. Identity politics can be emancipatory 
through social movement groups that call for the rights of the marginalized, 
minorities or oppressed groups. However, it can also be alienating especially 
when it focuses on perpetuating the interests of a specific group at the expense 
of the rest of the population. The colonial and post independence Uganda 
enforced the second aspect of alienation of identities for the interest of those in 
power.  
 
From a relational constructionism perspective, meaning resides in relationships. 
Thus, the fact that ethnic balkanization has been institutionalized in Uganda, 
both in the pre-colonial and post-independence periods, has meant that the co-
construction of a common narrative of nation building, has been hampered. The 
divisive ethnic discourse has influenced the definition and understanding of the 
state, power and governance. The state is privatized by a few individuals who 
favour their ethnic groups and impose their power on the rest of the nation. The 
LRA and the rest of the population in the North come from the same ethnic 
groups leading to perceptions that the LRA conflict was a North-South conflict. 
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The perception of ‘victimhood’ is common amongst the residents of northern 
Uganda. The population feels that they have been marginalized right from 
independence and that underdevelopment, insecurity, poverty, poor 
infrastructure and high mortality rates have been common features in the region. 
In fact, one can argue that the North has become much more impoverished 
during the post-independence period. The region had much better economic 
conditions during the colonial period because of the colonial government’s 
recruitment of the northerners into the army which in return brought economic 
development into the region. However, the claims to ‘victimhood’ by the North 
have often been countered by arguments that the northern leaders like Milton 
Obote and Idi Amin were brutal against the southerners, creating a deep rift 
between the two regions. Besides, the LRA-GOU conflict is seen by many 
southerners as a self-inflicted victimization in which ‘the Acholi are killing 
Acholi.’ 
 
The 22 year conflict between the LRA-GOU has gone through different phases. 
To a large extent the conflict has been militarized and the few attempts on 
peace negotiations have failed to bear much fruit. The spiritual and theological 
dimensions of both Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement/Army (HSM/A) and 
Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) ought to be analyzed within the 
framework of authentication and justification of the armed struggle. With the 
departure of Uganda People’s Democratic Army/Movement (UPDA/M) following 
its signing of a peace agreement with GOU there was no formidable force in the 
North to fight against Museveni’s Uganda People’s Democratic Force (UPDF). 
Hence, the HSM to some extent and the LRA to a greater extent had to fill the 
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resistance vacuum. However, the diverse characterizations and representations 
of the LRA have meant that the group has been so fragmented, unclear about 
its objectives and contradictory in its purported intention of protecting the North 
from the Southern domination.  The LRA’s peace negotiations have also been 
subjected to diverse political and social interests leading to the failure of peace 
talks.    
  
In the second phase I conducted field research in northern Uganda to further 
interrogate the above generalized assertions of liberal peace critics. I identified 
two locations: Gulu where a variety of NGOs have been very active in 
conducting peacebuilding, and Atiak, the control population, where there has 
not been active involvement of NGOs in peacebuilding. The selection of these 
two locations was to determine the extent to which the presence or lack of 
presence of NGOs was a factor in the conceptualization of and approach to 
peacebuilding by the local community. The data samples included NGO 
personnel involved in peacebuilding activities, donor agencies, and leaders from 
community, cultural, government and religious sectors. I chose the participants 
based on their active participation in peacebuilding activities, their capacity to 
positively or negatively influence community participation in peacebuilding, and 
by virtue of their social status, as far as it had implications for peacebuilding 
activities. I have elaborated these aspects in detail, in Chapter One. 
 
In the data analysis I carried out a micro analysis of the post-conflict context of 
these sites in northern Uganda in order to understand the peacebuilding 
processes and interactions between NGOs, donors and local community. The 
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study has demonstrated that NGO peacebuilding was based on complex 
interactive relationships between the NGOs, donors and local community.  I 
have demonstrated these aspects in Chapters Five and Six. Internal and 
external influences on NGO peacebuilding have been conceptualized within 
relational constructionism as part of a continuous process of co-construction of 
the peace reality in the interaction between different peace agents in Atiak, and 
in Gulu between NGOs, donors and local community. This has been manifested 
through joint practices in community peacebuilding, such as networking, 
advocacy, workshops and training of peace agents in the community, schools 
and government institutions. These interactive interventions have engendered a 
peace culture.  
 
Dialogue emerged as an important approach to peacebuilding. Each level of 
interaction, whether between NGOs and donors, or NGOs and community, 
entailed inter-subjective encounters that were dialogical in character and aimed 
at co-constructing a new reality of peace founded on the aspiration of the people. 
This phenomenon manifested itself at different points during the research. In 
fact most participants (32 out of 49) referred to dialogue, discussions and 
regular encounters as a general practice. This showed how relationship-building 
was embedded in the different peacebuilding processes. I was particularly 
struck by the manner in which there had been efforts, through the use of 
dialogue, to bridge relationships and understanding between NGOs and local 
community, and between NGOs and donors. In Atiak relationship building was 
evident in the peacebuilding activities carried out by the community and 
government leaders. For example, I have discussed how the parents’ 
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association was concerned about the abuse of girls and reintegration of the 
formerly abducted and worked with the local government and community 
leaders in addressing these social challenges.  
 
I have reiterated the fact that language is an important element in constituting a 
“socially constructed knowledge” (Willig, 2001: 7). As such the different sense-
making and interactive processes within the communities in Gulu and Atiak led 
to knowledge claims that developed into peacebuilding discourse and practice. 
These knowledge claims were grounded on relationships between NGOs and 
community, NGOs and donors, community members amongst themselves as 
well as community members and government leaders. Hence, instituting a 
culture of peace, in contrast to a culture of violence, meant that different peace 
agents engaged the community in dialogical conversations that sought to 
incorporate the victims and perpetrators of the conflict in a relational encounter. 
Peacebuilding was therefore based on a discourse that emphasized relational 
terms like forgiveness, reconciliation, mediation, working together, integration, 
tolerance, acceptance, understanding, group encounters, etc. 
 
I indicated at the beginning of this thesis that my initial understanding before 
going to the field was that NGOs were responding to external conceptualizations 
of peacebuilding, mainly perpetuated by the western donors. However, my field 
research experience unveiled intricate levels of interactions within a very 
complex terrain of northern Uganda. Lack of appreciation of these levels of 
relational interactions would be a major hindsight in any analysis of 
367 
 
peacebuilding in northern Uganda.  The setting of NGO peacebuilding in 
northern Uganda was complex and could not be generalized under the 
characteristic categorization of post-conflict contexts, as purported by the liberal 
peace critics.  
 
The complexity was evidenced by several realities: the victim-perpetrator duality 
that most ex-combatants had to carry with them meant that the majority of the 
LRA combatants had been abducted (and were therefore victims) and forced to 
commit various forms of atrocities (and were therefore perpetrators) in their own 
community; the internalized nature of the conflict was evidenced by the fact of 
the ‘Acholi-killing-Acholi’ which led to intense divisions, hatred and acts of 
revenge between individuals, families and clans; the population was further 
divided by the fact that families had children in both the UPDF and LRA; the 
protracted nature of the conflict, spanning 22 years, implied that there was a 
whole generation of youth that had never known peace, and therefore needed to 
adopt new attitudes, perceptions and understanding in embracing a culture of 
peace.  
 
The above contextual complexity posed a number of challenges to 
peacebuilding in both Gulu and Atiak: there were diverse understandings of 
what constitutes peace and how it manifests itself. Some participants were of 
the opinion that peace had to be concretely experienced in their lives for them to 
appreciate it. Others in Gulu held the view that the failure to realize the peace 
dividend in economic terms had a negative impact on the community members’ 
enthusiasm to participate in peacebuilding activities. Peace agents in both Gulu 
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and Atiak were therefore faced with the challenge of balancing the internal and 
external needs of peacebuilding: on the one hand, the recognition of the 
individual identity, aspirations in life, dignity and freedoms, and on the other, the 
provision of the basic needs for social, economic and political well-being. In 
Gulu NGOs helped the community to address basic needs provision whereas in 
Atiak the community struggled on its own. A few participants (3 out of 6) in Atiak 
did not feel motivated to take part in the peacebuilding initiatives because they 
believed that the region was peaceful following the 2006 ceasefire agreement 
between the LRA and government. I came across similar sentiments during 
informal interviews with community and religious leaders in Atiak. Another 
challenge to peacebuilding was that many people were still uncertain about the 
future of peace in northern Uganda. This concern was more pronounced in Atiak, 
which as I have already stated, is on the Sudan border regions where the LRA 
attacked from. This situation of uncertainty made it difficult for the people to fully 
participate in the peace programmes. The issue of reintegration of the formerly 
abducted persons, while a challenge to both Gulu and Atiak communities, was 
more articulated in Atiak. In Gulu the NGOs assisted the formerly abducted 
persons: they were received in organized reception camps where they had 
counselling, trauma healing, vocational training and a systematic process of 
reintegration into the community. In Atiak, due to limited resources, the 
community struggled to integrate the formerly abducted persons. 
 
I was struck by the high level of resilience among the Acholi community despite 
the many challenges related to the impact of the conflict. The memories of war 
were fresh in participants’ minds. The 22 year conflict had left a big scar in 
people’s lives. However, despite these fresh memories of painful experiences, 
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the community members committed themselves to start life again and rebuild 
their lives. This resilience was demonstrated by their refusal to be paralyzed by 
the complexities of conflict. They instead engaged in joint peacebuilding efforts 
that generated relational constructionism approaches to conflict intervention. 
This process of exploration of a different future for the community was grounded 
on encounters in which participants challenged each other to creatively design 
ways in which they could respond to the impact of conflict. This process of 
diverse encounters was important in changing people’s attitude from a culture of 
violence to a culture of peace. 
 
The communities in both Gulu and Atiak were confronted by five main 
challenges in peacebuilding: land disputes; the need for reconciliation of parties 
in conflict; human rights abuses; lack of basic needs; and the need for 
reintegration of the formerly abducted persons and former LRA rebels. In Gulu, 
NGOs in collaboration with the local community responded to all the five 
challenges through alternative dispute resolution in land disputes; provision of 
basic needs through social services and initiation of income generating activities; 
human rights advocacy and support programmes for the formerly abducted 
persons and former LRA rebels.  
 
The extent to which liberal peace is relevant to the local context has to be 
considered in relation to the complexities of the issues on the ground. There are 
values promoted by the liberal peace that are intrinsically good such as 
protection of human dignity through human rights advocacy; political 
participation at different levels of the society to ensure that different groups feel 
represented as part and parcel of the larger society; and, security and the rule of 
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law as a means of establishing order and protecting the most vulnerable 
members of the society. For example, human rights advocacy by NGOs in Gulu 
led to the provision of safety nets for the vulnerable women in the community, 
and at the same time put pressure on the government military and police to stop 
physical abuse of citizens.  
 
In Atiak, due to lack of sufficient resources the community struggled to meet the 
above challenges. They responded to four of them by: conducting alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) through mediation on land conflicts; carrying out 
reconciliation sessions; putting efforts towards reintegration of the formerly 
abducted and ex-combatants; and assisted the old and vulnerable by repairing 
and constructing their houses, and accommodating the homeless. The 
community did not possess an extensive network like NGOs to conduct 
advocacy activities against human rights abuses. They however carried out 
localized advocacy on the need to protect vulnerable girls and young mothers 
and to reintegrate the youth. These observations demonstrate how NGO 
presence in Gulu improved the quality of peacebuilding responses to the local 
needs. However, the fact that NGOs responded to similar needs as those in 
Atiak demonstrated the fact that NGO peacebuilding activities were to a great 
extent grounded on the genuine needs of the people.   
 
The northern Uganda community was faced with the moral dilemma of 
addressing the ‘victim-perpetrator’ phenomenon. On the one hand, the grievous 
nature of the atrocities committed by the LRA rebels was such that the law 
should have been meted out on the perpetrators. On the other hand, the fact 
that some of the so called ‘rebels’ were also victims of abduction meant that the 
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requisite measure of justice needed to be balanced against the victimhood of 
abduction.  The communities both in Gulu and Atiak engaged in conversations 
about how to address the challenge of forgiveness, reconciliation and 
reintegration. One of the propositions was to explore the cultural mechanisms of 
reconciliation as a means of bringing harmony to the community. The 
communities in both Gulu and Atiak thus applied, in limited ways, cultural 
mechanisms of reconciliation like mato oput which referred to the drinking of the 
bitter juice of oput  tree as a gesture of ending all bitterness between the parties 
in conflict. Another ritual was nyono tong gueno which was performed by 
stepping an egg in order to reclaim one’s innocence. While in Atiak the 
community was at the very early stages of implementing these rituals, in Gulu 
the NGOs put in financial and logistic resources and enthusiastically begun the 
process of performing these rituals in collaboration with the community. Even 
though the cultural practices of reconciliation were still at nascent stages, they 
provided a potential platform for transcending the difficult situations of northern 
Uganda conflict. The exploration of the rituals also demonstrated the depth of 
the search for solution towards reconciliation. In a sense, rituals opened up a 
new window for demystification of the disabling effect of the complexity of 
reconciliation.   
 
However, in both Gulu and Atiak there were disagreements among the 
participants on the value, procedure and execution of the rituals. There were 
those who held the view that the rituals could be a better compromise for 
reconciliation and harmony; others observed that the rubrics of the rituals had 
been ignored, hence violating the essence and value of reconciliation; others 
emphasized that the perpetrators should be treated as criminals, tried and 
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imprisoned.  Community leaders as well as members of the peacebuilding 
committees reiterated the importance of reconciliation but did not agree on its 
potential to bring peace in northern Uganda. My interview conversations with Dr. 
Okumu, an Acholi anthropologist, enlightened me as to how deeply the desire 
for reconciliation was enshrined in the attempts to bring back rituals as a means 
of reconciliation. He was against the perception that NGOs were responsible for 
bringing back the reconciliation rituals. His view was that the Acholi have always 
valued reconciliation as a medium for maintaining good relationships between 
individuals, families, clans and other ethnic communities. Informal interviews 
with religious leaders and elders in both Gulu and Atiak indicated that the 
decision to bring back the rituals was mainly initiated by the Acholi elders but 
the challenge lay with how to proceed with the rituals.  Archbishop Odama, the 
leader of the Acholi Religious for Peace Initiative (ARLPI), was emphatic that 
the communities in northern Uganda were ready and willing to engage in a 
reconciliation process (LNGO-PC001, interviewed 19/01/10). As I have 
indicated in Chapter Five, Odama reiterated the fact that different communities 
had their own reconciliation rituals which could be reintroduced to address the 
challenges posed by the conflict. This approach emphasized restorative justice 
that was centred on restoring broken relationships.   
 
In my analysis, the full potential of the rituals of reconciliation had not been 
attained and there was still need for a more widespread awareness-raising 
within the community. Besides, the culturally-based rituals of reconciliation had 
never been meant to address crimes as those that had been witnessed in 
Uganda. The rituals as I have explained in Chapters Four, Five and Six often 
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addressed inter-personal, inter-family or inter-clan conflicts and not mass 
killings and abductions, as was the case in the LRA-GOU conflict. 
 
Contrary to some of the literature on northern Uganda, I argue that the 
culturally-based rituals of forgiveness and reconciliation were not widely 
practiced.  The use of rituals of reconciliation and reintegration were promoted 
by the NGOs and cultural leaders but had not become popular. For example, I 
came across very few people who had actually witnessed the mato oput  ritual. 
The ritual was held in high esteem by most participants, from the NGOs (17 out 
of 27) and communities (9 out of 15) in both Gulu and Atiak, but it was hardly 
practiced, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Five. There were also debates on 
the appropriateness and effectiveness of reconciliation rituals in providing 
transitional space for innovative ways of healing the community. Hence, I would 
argue that NGOs attempted to institutionalize the cultural rituals of reconciliation 
and in the process watered down their enshrined values.   
 
One of the main contributions of this study to the general peacebuilding 
literature is the discourse on reconciliation with the spirits of the dead, which 
remains an under-researched area in the peacebuilding literature. The general 
trend in peace studies is to analyse the cause and effect based on the material 
world. However, in some cultural settings like the Acholi community, the cause 
and effect goes beyond the material world into the realm of the spirits. Thus, a 
cosmological analysis of the cultural and anthropological perceptions of the 
local reality of the Acholi was important in understanding the practice of 
reconciliation with the dead.  
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The ICC intervention impacted peacebuilding processes, both at the grassroots 
and at the protagonists’ levels. The ICC issued warrants of arrests against the 
LRA leaders bearing greatest responsibility. The ICC held the position that if 
these leaders were not arrested and tried in court, it would be an indication that 
such criminal acts could in future be committed with impunity. On the other hand 
some of the participants were of the opinion that the ICC intervention came at 
the wrong time and as a result derailed the peace process.  There were also 
participants who were convinced that the ICC intervention put pressure on the 
LRA to come to the negotiation table, subsequently leading to relative peace 
since 2006.  I have expounded on this debate in Chapter Five.  
 
I have emphasized the fact that peacebuilding is essentially a relational process. 
The constant references by participants to ‘partnership’, ‘collaboration’ and 
‘coordination’ underscored the fact that there had been a gradual shift towards a 
relational constructionism of peacebuilding through joint enterprises. I used 
theoretical sampling to deepen these concepts to the point of theoretical 
saturation. These methods of grounded theory were particularly important in 
helping me understand how people valued ‘working together’, ‘relationships’ and 
‘collaboration’ in their peacebuilding activities.  
 
The views of most community participants (12 out of 15), both from Gulu and 
Atiak, reflected the fact that peacebuilding was a communitarian affair that 
needed to be experienced within a communitarian space. As I have noted in 
chapters 3-6, in relational constructionism this space is referred to as 
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‘transitional space’ and was mainly experienced in workshops, reconciliation 
rituals, mediation processes and networking meetings. These activities and 
processes produced creative imagination of the desired future by using 
dialogical encounters, relational leadership and cultural heritage. Relationships 
produced social capital at the grassroots level, which became what Peirce and 
Stubbs (2000:173) would refer to as “vital sources of ‘peace capital.’ In other 
words, the solidarity network within the peacebuilding practice spread into 
building up a wider constituency of peace practitioners. The attitude of 
‘togetherness’ developed into a strong solidarity tool that helped the people to 
engage with the complexities of the northern Uganda conflict. The attitude of 
‘togetherness’ manifested itself in the complexities of victim-perpetrator 
perceptions; shared experiences of suffering the brutality of the war; personal 
encounters with the victims of conflict; the struggle to reconstruct new life; and 
the challenge of forgiveness and reconciliation. Peacebuilding initiatives 
facilitated diverse processes of relationship building through interactions that led 
to the construction of new knowledge of peace, mutual respect and 
compromises for peaceful coexistence.  
 
The findings on relationship building were significant because they contradicted 
the liberal peace assertion that NGOs peacebuilding simply implement the top-
down agenda of the donor agencies and their governments. This was evidenced 
by the fact that on the one hand, relationship building emerged spontaneously 
as a result of the shared communitarian attitude to social issues, and on the 
other, it was pursued as a value through conflict mediation and reconciliation 
efforts.  My analysis demonstrated that it is important to appreciate the diverse 
levels of interaction and how participants evaluated their experiences of relating 
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with each other; the changes in attitudes and perceptions; and the positive 
progress in peacebuilding activities. Further, mutual recognition and joint 
enterprises were key components in relationship building. It was therefore vital 
to understand the embedded co-construction of peacebuilding discourse and 
practice in the course of this continuous interaction.  Relationship building was 
reinforced by participatory approach to NGO peacebuilding. 
 
Peacebuilding approaches in both Gulu and Atiak applied participatory 
approach to peacebuilding in order to encourage community ownership of 
peacebuilding activities.  In Gulu this was done at different levels: NGOs joined 
the community in supporting peacebuilding initiatives; consulted with the 
community on the lessons learned and best practices in peacebuilding; trained 
peacebuilding coordinators, paralegals, teachers, students, youth, and 
community and group leaders that were engaged in income generating activities 
(IGA). In Atiak community leaders mobilized the community to participate in 
peacebuilding activities. This was sometimes met with resistance particularly 
among the youth who strongly felt that the community should put priority in 
creating opportunities for education, vocational training and employment. In 
Gulu, besides individual or group motivation to participate in peacebuilding, 
NGOs often gave remunerations to peacebuilding participants as reward for 
their involvement. This practice, as I have stated in Chapter Five, increased 
community participation but blurred the distinction between genuine motivation 
for peacebuilding and mere participation for remuneration.  
 
Peacebuilding meetings between different agents in both Gulu and Atiak 
provided a transitional space for exploration of a different future. Lederach 
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(1995:55) notes that conflict intervention, whether in form of training workshops, 
mediation or dialogue, provides opportunities “aimed primarily at discovery, 
creation, and solidification of models that emerge from the resources present in 
a particular setting…”   Hence, the community is not just a beneficiary but an 
active participant to change. Interventions of the peace agents in Gulu and Atiak 
generated community peace agents that became a critical mass and formed 
peacebuilding communities, also known in relational constructionism as 
‘communities of practice’ (CoP). These peace agents contributed to the 
sustainability of the peacebuilding programmes.   
 
In Gulu, NGOs worked in partnership with the donors and negotiated for funding 
in three interrelated dimensions: first, constrained dialogue  that limited the 
extent to which NGOs had a decisive role in the project conceptualization and 
implementation. NGOs that had been in this kind of dialogue with the donors 
experienced tensions between the needs on the ground and demands of the 
donors. In most cases NGOs gave in to the demands of the donors to access 
funding. The second was negotiated agreements which were based on mutual 
exchange, conversations and dialogue between the NGOs and donors. In this 
category there were efforts to meet the needs on the ground. The third was 
dialogical partnership, which emphasized joint enterprises between the NGOs 
and donors. These joint activities reinforced relationship building and an 
interactive approach to peacebuilding. 
 
In Atiak, as I have already stated above, peacebuilding activities were not 
funded and the community made contributions from their meagre resources in 
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terms of providing meeting venues, food, furniture, infrastructure and volunteers 
who would implement the peacebuilding propositions. Hence, peacebuilding 
design and implementation were carried out within the limited means available. 
This point partly explains the low numbers of peacebuilding activities in Atiak. 
 
I was also interested in understanding how the grassroots level of relationship 
building could filter into systems of governance. I did this by looking at the 
advocacy activities carried out by NGOs and local community. As I have 
demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, advocacy processes were sophisticated, 
in some cases putting at risk the lives of those advocating against the 
perpetrators of violence. However, tensions generated by advocacy activities 
were sometimes transformed into opportunities for awareness raising, mutual 
understanding and relationship building. I cited in Chapter Five the example of 
an NGO that spoke against human rights abuses carried out by the government 
army. One of the army officials involved retaliated by issuing threats to the 
human rights advocates. However, with time junior members of the army began 
reporting cases of abuse by senior military personnel. As a result, the advocacy 
activities created an opportunity for encounter of values based on human dignity 
and mutual respect. The study therefore shows that engaging institutions of 
governance through advocacy, negotiations and dialogue enhanced relationship 
building and increased the probability of sustainability of the culture of peace.  
 
This study has emphasized that the core of community participation in 
peacebuilding lay in the internal motivation for social change based on the 
commonly shared experiences of conflict. As I have elaborated in Chapter Five, 
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I realized in the early stages of my field research that it was important to 
understand participants’ motivation for participating in peace activities. This 
turned out to be an important factor and one that elaborated on the individual’s 
deeper conviction for the work they were doing for peace. The degree to which 
this motivational drive was manifested and expressed varied between Gulu and 
Atiak, as I have previously discussed.  
 
I linked the issue of motivational drive to sustainability of peacebuilding activities. 
At first I had the difficulty of assessing sustainability of peacebuilding activities 
because it implied speculating into the future. However, in the course of field 
research I realized that rather than undertake speculative research that would 
have no immediate empirical backing, it was more reasonable to link the 
sustainability of peacebuilding activities to both individual and group 
motivational drive on the one hand, and community and NGO theories of social 
change, on the other. Since I had already established that there was a high 
motivation for participation in peacebuilding activities with or without the 
presence of NGOs, I assessed how NGO initiatives were contributing to the 
peacebuilding discourse and practice, and related this to sustainability of 
peacebuilding activities in both Gulu and Atiak. In order to do this I looked at 
NGOs’ theories of change. 
 
I learned in this study that while NGOs did not have clear theories of change, 
they nevertheless developed mechanisms of assessing change based on the 
impact they were having on the community. Change was assessed based on 
quantitative and qualitative outcomes. Quantitative aspects of change were 
manifested by the number of peacebuilding activities (workshops, mediation 
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processes, meetings, rituals and celebrations), people participating in these 
activities and locations reached. In both Gulu and Atiak the community, similar 
to NGOs, assessed qualitative outcomes based on changes in attitudes and 
perceptions, embracing of a culture of peace and positive results of mediation 
and reconciliation initiatives. Thus, relationship building that resulted from IGA 
encounters and human rights advocacy in Gulu or dialogical conversations that 
developed from workshops and community meetings in both Gulu and Atiak 
were all part of the broader change processes. This meant that assessing social 
change linked to the broader perspectives of peace processes. 
 
In the course of interrogations of the data I realized that it was indeed difficult to 
assess the impact NGOs were having on their peace initiatives in Gulu. The 
assessment methods presupposed that the expected outcomes and their 
indicators were identifiable and co-relational. The research shows that peace 
and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) was an essential tool in evaluating the 
extent to which the peacebuilding practice was informed by the local reality.  I 
was therefore interested in understanding both the approach to PCIA and key 
indicators that NGOs used in evaluating the changes on the ground. The 
approaches applied by the NGOs included looking at the aimed objectives; the 
impact of the intervention on the conflict as well as that of the conflict on the 
project; and the process of social change triggered by the peace initiatives. 
However, the question that most NGO participants found difficult to answer was 
how they came to identify the key indicators for change. In fact, most NGO 
participants (23 out of 27) did not a have a common set of indicators to monitor 
social change. To some extent, this was understandable because it would 
generally have been difficult to measure a social change phenomenon, 
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especially within a constrained time frame (based on the funding cycle) and 
unpredictable post-conflict situations. Besides, in most cases processes of 
social change were longitudinal, often lasting beyond the span of the peace 
project.  
 
The view of the community members both in Gulu and Atiak was that 
sustainability of peacebuilding initiatives should be linked to the provision of 
basic needs and communitarian ownership of the peace building process. I 
noted a sense of – ‘we are in this together’ – among community participants, 
indicating a common ownership of the peacebuilding process. At the same time, 
the social changes that people had experienced became incentives for a strong 
motivation to achieve the desired changes. 
 
In my view, the assessment of the impact of NGO peacebuilding was important 
in understanding the extent to which NGOs influenced the peacebuilding 
discourse and practice. This revealed the extent to which peacebuilding 
practices in Gulu were different from Atiak; whether NGOs were serving a liberal 
peace agenda blindly or were closely responding to the needs of the community 
on the ground whether or not this fitted with the liberal peace agenda; and lastly, 
whether the departure of NGOs would impact on peacebuilding processes in 
northern Uganda. It is important to remember that prior to the coming of the 
NGOs in Gulu there were peacebuilding activities in existence in both Gulu and 
Atiak, mainly led by the religious and community leaders.  
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The presence of NGOs in Gulu facilitated the peacebuilding activities through 
financial, logistic and personnel resources. NGOs cushioned the negative 
impact of conflict on the population in Gulu by working with the community in 
organizing peacebuilding activities, availing resources to realize peace 
initiatives, support income generating activities and provide technical skills to 
the youth. NGOs in Gulu equally assisted the government in the provision of 
social services. The presence of NGOs in Gulu also increased the number of 
peacebuilding activities in comparison to Atiak that had limited activities.   
 
I have noted in Chapters Five and Six that NGOs, in an attempt to popularize 
culturally-based mechanisms of reconciliation, decided to institutionalize these 
practices without fully engaging in a dialogical process with the community. 
Institutionalization of the rituals of reconciliation such as mato oput was largely 
attributed to NGOs’ initiative of funding such activities.  NGOs were oblivious to 
the fact that while the Acholi community was in the process of searching for the 
best ways to deal with the complexities of the conflict, they were not necessarily 
ready for a speedy and institutionalized process of reconciliation. This approach 
was counterproductive and exposed the fact that there were instances where 
NGOs were not grounded in the social-cultural dynamics of the local community.  
 
NGOs’ lack of grounding was also exposed by the fact that some NGOs gave in 
to the demands of the donors and compromised the needs of the community. As 
I have explained in Chapter Six, NGOs that operated under the category of 
‘constrained funding’ had limited choices on what they could or could not do. In 
these situations, NGOs served the demands of the donors, whether these were 
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meeting the demands of the needs on the ground or not. As a result, there were 
NGOs that adjusted their programmes to attract donor funding and in the 
process served a different agenda, such as liberal peace, which in some cases 
was unrelated to peacebuilding needs on the ground. This was evident in cases 
where NGOs rushed ahead with the culturally-based mechanisms of 
reconciliation while the community was not yet ready; or where donors had 
shifted their funding priority from peacebuilding to HIV/AIDS programmes, as I 
have indicated in Chapter Six. Dialogical tensions between these NGOs and 
their donors reflected dynamism of power-relations. In fact, the relationship 
between the donors and NGOs intrinsically reflected power-relations between 
the giver and the recipient, respectively. Hence, the giver became the generous, 
and the recipient, the grateful.   
 
The practice of paying remunerations to peacebuilding participants as a way of 
rewarding their participation set a wrong precedence on peacebuilding 
processes. NGOs that carried out this practice perpetuated the dependency 
syndrome that had been acquired in the IDP camps; undermined spontaneous 
participation to peacebuilding activities; and marginalized smaller NGOs that 
could not afford to reward their participants.   
 
Another important observation for the assessment of NGOs is that there were 
instances where NGOs’ external intervention showed that liberal peace agenda, 
when undertaken in consultation with the community, could lead to positive 
results. For example, while human rights advocacy is generally associated with 
liberal peace, NGOs carried out human rights advocacy to assist the vulnerable 
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members of the community. The interventions were particularly important in 
situations where the vulnerable section of the population was exposed to further 
negative impact of post-conflict repercussions. For example, women that had 
returned from captivity with children were often despised as bringing up children 
possessed by the bad spirits of the LRA combatants. NGOs intervened to give 
this group of women special assistance that shielded them from suffering further 
rejection. They subsequently acquired skills such as tailoring and baking that 
gave them self-confidence and created opportunity for them to be inserted into 
the community once again.  
 
The situation in Atiak was different. While the motivation for peacebuilding and 
networking between different agents for peace was evident, the community was 
faced with numerous obstacles without external assistance other than meagre 
government interventions. Peacebuilding activities in Atiak did not have the 
capacity and resources to mobilize the community in a similar manner to NGOs 
did in Gulu. Besides, vulnerable members of the community like the youth, 
formerly abducted persons (especially women), the old and the sick did not 
receive the same level of assistance in social services. This meant that the 
youth could easily be lured to join the LRA and acquire arms for power, control, 
self-assertion and acquisition of basic needs. The lack of NGOs in Atiak also 
indicated that in situations where the population had been grievously affected by 
the conflict, it is important for external actors to intervene in order to work with 
the community in post-conflict recovery. Going by the evidence in Gulu, the 
presence of NGOs in Atiak would have increased peacebuilding activities as 
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well as boosted the community motivation for participating in peacebuilding 
activities.    
 
On the other hand, the fact that there were local peacebuilding initiatives in 
Atiak despite the NGO absence, and similar participation in Gulu before the 
NGOs got involved in peacebuilding activities, meant that the people’s 
motivation for peace was the major driving force behind community 
peacebuilding. In other words, while the departure of NGOs would impact on 
peacebuilding activities, it would probably not take away the people’s desire to 
find solutions for their own conflict, a process they had begun before the 
involvement of NGOs. Thus, NGOs could be viewed as one of the key partners 
in peacebuilding, but not the primary leaders of the process. The community 
took the lead in keeping the passionate drive for peace. In this sense, NGOs 
emerged as process-mediators and not the primary drivers of the peacebuilding 
agenda despite their strong influence in Gulu.   
 
Thus, in conclusion I would assert that assessment of the extent to which NGO 
peacebuilding was informed by the local reality and/or external 
conceptualizations of peacebuilding ought to be undertaken within an elaborate 
analysis that captures the complexities, convergences and divergences of the 
reality of peacebuilding on the ground. In other words, while to a great extent 
NGO peacebuilding was informed by the local reality, the contextual dynamics 
and complexities in northern Uganda meant that there were instances where the 
work of NGOs was not grounded. There were also situations where the NGO 
adaptation of liberal peace values, such as human rights, was congruent to the 
needs of the community. The post-conflict context of northern Uganda 
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represents the complexities of most post-conflict contexts and demonstrates 
how conflict interventions in these situations need to be analyzed from both 
micro and macro perspectives.  
 
Peacebuilding processes in northern Uganda display different characterizations 
of NGO, donors and local communities. Whereas there were NGOs that 
constantly engaged with the donors in dialogical encounters to attain the needs 
of the community, there were others that attuned their activities to the demands 
of the donors, hence missing out on the genuine needs of the community. 
Similarly, not all donors propagated a liberal peace agenda. There were some 
that genuinely engaged with the NGOs and the community in response to 
contextual challenges and others that held to their positions and interests 
regardless of whether the needs of the community were being met or not. Lastly, 
the local community both in Gulu and Atiak had different facets and could not be 
evaluated as single units. The challenging situation of poverty, unemployment 
and trauma meant that NGO intervention cushioned the Gulu community to 
actively participate in peacebuilding activities. There were some within the 
community who appreciated these NGO interventions whereas others were 
sceptical about their sustainability. In Atiak the peace agents worked under 
more difficult and frustrating conditions than in Gulu where NGOs supported 
peacebuilding activities. As a result, in Atiak there was a general apathy towards 
peacebuilding among some community members, whereas others felt 
determined to hold the community together through peacebuilding initiatives. In 
both Atiak and Gulu there were members of the community that were positive 
about initiatives for reconciliation and land conflict mediation, whereas others 
held the opinion that the major priority for the community was provision of basic 
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needs, security and employment. In short, peacebuilding in post-conflict 
contexts is a complex process and ought to be analysed within the complex 
dynamics of conflict, diverse perceptions and interpretations of the conflict, 
multiple attempts to conflict resolution and local capacities to effect change. 
 
Future Research 
The study of liberal peace has mainly been based on the critique of post-conflict 
approaches to statebuilding, largely funded by western nations.  My research 
has shown that there is need to carry out micro level analysis of post-conflict 
reconstruction in order to identify the existent peacebuilding discourse and 
practice on the ground.  This study can be enriched further by other future 
research that could examine different perspectives in NGO peacebuilding and 
post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
One area for future research would be the study of NGO peacebuilding in post-
conflict contexts in Africa, particularly those that have had a heavy presence of 
UN peacekeeping forces based on the funding from western nations. These 
contexts could include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has the 
largest UN peace keeping force in the world and Darfur which is under both the 
African Union (AU) and UN peace keeping forces. So far most liberal peace 
critics have largely limited their critiques to post-conflict reconstruction in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, East Timor, among others.  Besides 
Sierra Leone and Somalia, most post-conflict settings in Africa have not been 
adequately researched to examine the extent to which liberal peace has been 
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imposed on the peacebuilding practices. The study of liberal peace in Africa 
would further put to test the assertions of liberal peace critiques. 
 
The second area that needs to be researched is the contribution of culturally-
based mechanisms of peacebuilding in northern Uganda. In the discussions in 
Chapters Five and Six, it is evident that these mechanisms have recently been 
re-introduced and are not as widely practiced as generally purported by the 
literature on northern Uganda.  It would be important to conduct research after 
5-7 years to examine how culturally-based mechanisms contributed to 
reconciliation and peace in northern Uganda. Such a study would analyse the 
extent to which these mechanisms were an invention of the NGOs or a genuine 
desire for peace by the local community. The findings would also inform the 
practice of peacebuilding in other post-conflict contexts in Africa and elsewhere. 
 
In conjunction with the proposed research above, it would be important to 
undertake a study of community peacebuilding in the post-NGO era in northern 
Uganda. The study would examine the extent to which peacebuilding 
approaches supported by the NGOs were grounded in the people’s desire to 
effect social change. Such a study would assess the long term impact of NGO 
approaches to peacebuilding in the post-conflict setting of northern Uganda.  
 
The third possibility for future research in northern Uganda could be the study of 
reintegration of the formerly abducted persons as well as ex-combatants. This 
study would be much more appropriate after the signing of the peace agreement 
between the LRA-GOU. The study would examine the relationship between the 
signing of the peace agreement and the extent of the success of the 
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reintegration programmes; the implications of the agreement in responding to 
the North-South grievances, democratic processes, and sustainability of peace. 
The study would also examine the impact of peace agreement on regional 
peace, particularly given that currently the LRA continues its rebel activities in 
Sudan, Central African Republic and DRC.  
 
The fourth area for future research would be the study of the ICC interventions 
in African conflicts and the extent to which such interventions impact on conflict 
dynamics and peacebuilding discourse and practice. Such a study would 
examine the extent to which the ICC interventions fall under the liberal peace 
agenda. The African Union has refused to cooperate with the ICC on the ground 
that the latter maintains a double standard in its approach to addressing crimes 
against humanity. For example, since its inception in 2002, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has mainly focused on Africa, with six out of seven cases 
coming from the continent. Statistics show that all the 26 individuals wanted for 
crimes against humanity are from Africa: Uganda (4), Darfur (6), DR Congo (5), 
Central Africa Republic (1), Kenya (6) and recently Libya (4). Out of these, 16 
individuals have been indicted in the first four countries (International Criminal 
Court, 2010). Two of the arrest warrants have been issued on seating heads of 
states: against Presidents Omar El Bashir of Sudan in 2008 and Muammar 
Gaddafi of Libya in 2011. There are other investigations under way in Colombia, 
Afghanistan and Georgia.  Thus, future study would examine the relevance of 
the ICC interventions on peace processes in Africa; alternative approaches to 
humanitarian military interventions particularly in situations of gross violation of 
human rights; diverse local and international mechanisms to transitional justice. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: List of insurgencies in Uganda since independence 
Year Events 
1962 Uganda gains its independence from the British Colonialists. Milton 
Obote becomes the first Prime Minister and Buganda’s Kabaka Mutesa 
II the first President 
1966 A dispute emerges between Obote and Mutesa II over the constitutional 
status of the Buganda Kingdom. Following the differences between the 
two, the Kabaka parliament, the Lukiiko, orders central government of 
Obote to leave the Buganda soil by end of May 1966. In retaliation 
Obote makes a military attack against Kabaka’s palace, suspends the 
constitution and parliament, assumes all powers and makes himself the 
president and head of state. The Kabaka Mutesa II goes on exile in 
1969, marking the end of the political kingdom of the Buganda.   
1971 Major General Idi Amin overthrows Obote who was out of the country 
attending a Common Wealth meeting in Singapore. During his eight 
year rule many civilians are killed, the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups 
are particularly targeted. 
1973 Yoweri Museveni forms the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), a 
rebel group against Amin’s regime. FRONASA has mainly members 
from Museveni’s western region and others from the southern regions. 
1979 The Tanzanian People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) and rebel armed 
groups formed by Ugandan exiles known as Kikosi Maalum, in 
conjunction with FRONASA, attack Amin’s army. The different 
opposition groups, while in Arusha, Tanzania, come together under one 
umbrella and form the Uganda National Liberation Front / Army (UNLF/ 
UNLA), and Yusuf Lule becomes the first Chairman. The TDPF and 
UNLA succeed in toppling Idi Amin, appoints Lule as President to run a 
Unity Government, but under the watch of the Tanzanian Military 
Commission and National Consultative Council (NCC) of the UNLF. The 
Military Commission eventually fires Lule and installs as president 
Godfrey Binaisa, former Obote’s Attorney General.  
1980 In the December General Election Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC) party is declared the winner and Obote becomes the President, 
marking the beginning of Obote II regime. The Democratic Party (DP) 
contests against the elections results, but eventually accepts to 
participate in parliament as an opposition party. Yoweri Museveni, who 
runs the election under his new party, Uganda Patriotic Movement 
(UPM), refuses to accept the elections and decides to organized armed 
insurgencies against Obote’s regime.  
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1981-1985 – 
Insurgencies 
 
 
 
 
  
Museveni fights Obote under Popular Revolutionary Army (PRA). Obote 
is also under attack in the West Nile region by Uganda National Rescue 
Front (UNRF). In the meantime Tanzania withdraws its forces in June 
1981 
1982 – Different armed groups come together under Uganda Popular 
Front (UPF) to fight Obote. These included: Armed opposition groups, 
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) from the Buganda region; National 
Rescue Front (UNRF) with members mainly from Amin’s region in the 
northwest; and Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
dominated by people from western Uganda.  The NRM becomes the 
dominant group, particularly around the Luwero area. This prompts 
Obote’s UNLA to make attacks on Luwero leading to the massacres of 
civilians in what came to be known as ‘Luwero Triangle Massacres’. 
Other groups fighting Obote included: Former Uganda National Army 
(FUNA), whose members had been in Amin’s army; and the Federal 
Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), which was based within 
Buganda region. In retaliation Obote’s UNLA led counterinsurgency 
operations in different parts of the country, mainly: Karamoja in the 
northeast, Arua and Moyo in the northwest, and Luwero region in the 
north of Kampala. Thousands of civilians lost their lives in these 
operations and UN estimates in its 1983 report that more than 260,000 
refugees had fled to Sudan and Zaire (now DRC). 
 
 
1985 
 
 
  
 
Obote is overthrown by Brigadier Bazilio Olara Okello who becomes 
president and invites the different rebel groups that had been fighting 
Obote to join him. As a result the following armed groups join Okello’s 
government: FUNA, UFM, FEDEMU and UNRF. However, Museveni’s 
NRM decline to join the new government, but agrees to peace talks.  
Following peace talks in Nairobi between the Okello government and the 
NRM, the two sign a peace agreement in December 1985, but weeks 
later the NRM withdraws from the peace agreement and leads 
insurgencies against Okello. 
1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 January: NRM defeats Okello’s army and takes over, marking the 
beginning of Museveni’s rule. 
July: The defeated government army (ex-UNLA) forms Uganda People’s 
Democratic Army / Movement (UPDA/M) to fight Museveni. 
August: NRA / FEDEMU / UFM are said to have executed a large 
number of civilians at Namokora, Akilok, Oryang and Padibe areas. 
September: Alice Auma ‘Lakwena’ forms a rebel group known as the 
Holy Spirit Mobile Force (HSMF) and later HSMF join forces with UPDA 
to fight Museveni’s government.  
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1987 Joseph Kony fights along the HSMF with his small group of rebels. 
August: ‘Karamojong’ cattle raiders, suspected to be sponsored by 
Museveni’s government, attack Kitgum and eastern Gulu looting more 
than 300,000 livestock of the Acholi community, subsequently 
impoverishing the whole Acholi region.  
November The HSMF spirited insurgency against the government is 
defeated by the NRA at Jinja. Subsequently, Alice Lakwena flees to 
Kenya. 
1988 Joseph Kony’s rebel group, United Holy Salvation Army (UHSA), 
emerges following the defeat of HSMF and integrates some of the 
latter’s members.  
June: NRA and UPDA sign a peace agreement and UPDA members are 
integrated into the national army. A similar peace agreement is signed 
with a political wing of the rebels, the UPDM.   
1989 April: Government orders populations in Acholi land out of their villages 
into ‘protected’ camps while Joseph Kony intensifies his insurgencies, 
and renames his group United Democratic Christian Movement /Army 
(UDCM/A). 
1992 August: Joseph Kony changes the name of UDCM/A to Lord’s 
Resistance Army/ Movement (LRA/M).   
The LRA attacks civilians and kidnaps thousands of people, especially 
children who are forced into joining the army. The Acholi population 
suffers atrocities from both the rebel LRA and government forces. 
The conflict between LRA and Uganda military intensifies between 1992 
-2006, and again 2007 to date. 
1999 The Carter Centre facilitates a peace agreement between Uganda and 
Sudanese government. This follows counter accusations that the 
Sudanese government was militarily supporting the LRA against 
Uganda government, while the latter was supporting Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) against the Sudanese government.  
2002-2004 Government of Uganda (GOU) launches military offensive against the 
LRA bases in Sudan: in 2002 and 2004, Operation Iron Fist I and II, 
respectively. 
2003 Museveni requests the ICC prosecutor to investigate the criminal 
activities of the LRA. 
2005 The ICC issues warrants of arrest on the LRA rebel leaders named as 
Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. 
2006 Following a cease-fire agreement, peace talks are initiated in Juba, 
Southern Sudan, between the LRA and GOU. However, the two fail to 
reach an agreement. The LRA scatters into Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Sudan and Central African republic (CAR). 
2008 GOU forces launch Operation Lighting Thunder against the LRA in 
Sudan, but fail to defeat the rebels. The LRA are still at large to date. 
 
Major references used for the compilation the table include: (Conciliation Resources, 
2002; Karugire, 1996; Kasozi et al., 1994; Mutibwa, 1992; Finnström, 2008) 
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Box 1 Juba Peace Talks 
Juba Peace Talks between the GOU and LRA 2006 
Juba peace talks between the Government of Uganda (GOU) and Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) took place in Southern Sudan in 2006 and continued with a series of 
negotiations until 2008. The GOU was represented by a delegation led by the Internal 
Affairs Minister Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, while the LRA had its own delegates without 
Joseph Kony, their leader. The talks received both the support of the United Nations, 
African Union (AU), with its representative from Kenya, Tanzania, DRC and 
Mozambique attending the talks, as well as United States and other Western donor 
countries.   
 
At the end of the formal negotiations in March 2008, the parties agreed to the following 
five major agendas (Oola, 2008:68):  
i) cessation of hostilities by both sides: The LRA combatants had to gather in the 
designated Assembly Area of Ri-Kwang-Ba. The Agenda endorsed the establishment 
of an impartial Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT). This team was made 
of representatives from Kenya, Tanzania, DRC, Mozambique and South Africa.  
ii) comprehensive solutions: This entailed addressing the root causes of the conflict, 
mainly, the political and economic marginalization of the North;  
iii) Accountability and Reconciliation: this focused on seeking ways of addressing 
human rights violations during the war within and out of Uganda. The agenda explores 
both judicial and culturally-based forms of justice as well as reconciliation and healing 
in all the affected communities.  
iv) Permanent Ceasefire: This was to be observed by all parties in conflict 
v) Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR) of the former LRA 
combatants through a process of Implementation and Management Mechanisms 
(IMM); Joint Liaison Group (JIG); and an Oversight Forum.  
 
The peace agreement was to be signed in Sudan on 10th April 2008 but only President 
Museveni showed up while the LRA leader, Kony, could not be traced.  On 13th August 
2009 the LRA's chief negotiator David Nyerokach-Matsanga and Justine Labeja 
resigned, and accused President Museveni and the LRA leader Kony, of lack of 
commitment (Juma, 14 August 2009). 
 
Box 2 Gulu Peace Talks 
In the preparation to the 1993 talks, the government created a new position known as 
Minister of State in the Office of the Prime Minister, Resident in Northern Uganda. The 
office was headed by Betty Bigombe. For five years Betty Bigombe engaged the people 
of Northern Uganda in grassroots peace mobilization and made several contacts with 
Joseph Kony, the LRA leader (Dolan, 2009:307-310). However, her attempts to bring 
Kony to the negotiation table run parallel to the military operations on the ground. 
Initially Betty Bigombe worked on building the confidence and trust of the LRA and 
GOU, and by October 1993 the two sides had agreed on modalities for mutual security.  
 
In November of 1993, the LRA – GOU peace meeting begun at Pagik, in the Aswa 
region of Gulu. The Talks brought several Acholi elders and LRA representatives 
(Dolan, 2009:307). The LRA demanded a ceasefire in order to bring all its combatants 
to the peace negotiations; amnesty for its combatants as well as treatment of the 
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wounded; and exclusion of former UPDA/M rebels, now in the government, from the 
talks, since the UPDA/M had  fought the LRA before signing a peace agreement with 
the GOU; a traditional cleansing ritual that would purify the combatants from the blood 
that had been shed in the conflict (O'kadameri, 2002, Dolan, 2009:307-315).  
 
These talks never bore much fruit due to increased suspicion between the two sides 
and on 2nd February 1994 the LRA called off the negotiations, and four days later 
Museveni gave a four day ultimatum for the LRA to surrender (O’Kadameri, 2002). 
Animosity escalated leading to the collapse of the talks (O’Kadameri, 2002). Further 
peace negotiation attempts in 1988 also failed leading to more violence and attacks 
(Branch, 2005:15). 
 
Data Collection Instruments 
Research Information Sheet 
I would like to invite you to participate in my research project examining the extent to 
which NGO peacebuilding is informed by the local reality in Gulu, northern Uganda. 
The research is part of the requirement for my PHD degree at University of Bradford, 
United Kingdom (U.K).   
I am requesting you to participate in the marked interview category below: 
 
a) Individual Interview      
b) Focus Group       
c) Participant observation        
 
In order for you to decide whether or not to participate in this research, please read the 
detailed information below, and feel free to contact me for further clarification. I would 
appreciate if you can let me know about your decision within three days or if you need 
more time please do not hesitate to contact me.  
Information on the Researcher 
Researcher’s name:  
Elias Omondi Opongo,  
Contact:  
Address: 40 Pakington St. BD5 7LD, Bradford, U.K.                 
Telephone: U.K. 447501893995  Uganda: 254720836944  
Affiliation:  
Doctoral student, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. 
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Information on the Research 
Title: NGO Theoretical and Practical Approach to NGO Peacebuilding in Northern 
Uganda: An Analysis of Interactive Perspectives between NGO Peacebuilding and the 
Local Reality of Peacebuilding 
Introduction: 
This research seeks to understand the factors that influence NGO peacebuilding in 
northern Uganda. The major focus is to investigate the extent to which NGO theoretical 
and practical approaches to peacebuilding are informed by the local reality in Gulu. 
Location of the Research: Gulu, northern Uganda 
Period of data collection: Dec 5th 2009 – May 30 2010 
Primary aim: To understand the extent to which NGO peacebuilding is informed by the 
local reality in Gulu, northern Uganda. 
Major Objectives: 
1. To investigate how the theory and practice of NGO peacebuilding are influenced by the 
local reality and/or external conceptualizations of peacebuilding   
2. To study the social attitudes of the local population towards NGO peacebuilding 
Method and Target Participants: Data collection will mainly be carried out through 
interviews with individuals or in focus groups among selected NGOs, and local 
communities, both where NGOs are present and absent, respectively. Participant 
observation will be used to collect data. For NGO data, five international and three local 
NGOs will be interviewed, primarily focusing on peace coordinators and administrative 
personnel as principle participants. For the local community where NGOs are present, 
data collection will focus on local peace coordinators, sampled local community 
members who have directly participated in NGO peacebuilding activities and those that 
have not, community leaders, direct beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of NGO 
peacebuilding. Where NGOs are absent the focus will be on local leaders and sampled 
community members, as well as groups engaged in peacebuilding, if any.   
Expectation on the participants: Each participant will be provided with this research 
information sheet. Once the participant is satisfied that he/she has understood what the 
research is about and is willing to participate in it, he/she will be requested to sign the 
consent form below.  Confidentiality and anonymity will be observed during and after 
the interview. This means that all the contents of the interview will be treated 
confidentially and that the interviewee’s identity will not be revealed to any other party. 
In the course of the interview the participant will be free to abandon an interview at 
anytime without giving any explanation to the researcher. The interviewees will be 
given the option of reading through the interview transcripts in order for them to edit, 
comment, correct, add or subtract their comments, and then return them to the 
researcher after three days. At the end of all the interviews, the interviewees will have 
the option of receiving a summary of the findings for comments, before the final 
publication. The participants will have two weeks to put their respective comments 
together and send them to the researcher. A form will be provided for the participants to 
confirm that they have read the transcript and agreed to its use.  While the researcher 
will make the effort of taking into account the suggestions from the participants, he will 
retain the discretion of determining how the final document will read.    
Types of questions to be asked: The participants will be asked questions on their 
perceptions on NGO peacebuilding; the approaches to peacebuilding by the NGOs and 
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local community, respectively; the external and internal influences on the practice of 
peacebuilding; values and theories that inform NGO peacebuilding; the points of 
convergence and divergence in NGO peacebuilding  
Individual Interviews: Selected individuals from the NGOs and local communities where 
NGOs are active and non-active, respectively, will take part in individual interviews. 
These include peace coordinators of the respective NGOs and communities, 
participants in peacebuilding activities by the NGO and community. Every individual will 
be provided with this information sheet in order to decide whether or not to participate. 
Anonymity and confidentiality will be observed during and after the interview. The 
individual will be free to withdraw from the interview at any stage without giving any 
explanation.  Individual interviews will last for up to two hours.   
 
Focus Groups: A sampled group of participants (an average of 8 individuals) from the 
community where NGOs are active and where they (NGOs) are not, will be interviewed 
separately.  The participants will be selected through consultation with the gatekeepers.  
Each participant will receive this information sheet in advance and his/her consent 
sought before the interview. The participants will be free to withdraw at anytime during 
the interview. However, while a participant can withdraw from the focus group 
discussion, he or she cannot retract the information already given. This is because 
focus group discussion entails a common process of construction of meaning through 
interactive discussion. Hence, individual contributions cannot stand alone. Even though 
the group will be aware of the contributions made by each individual, the researcher will 
observe anonymity and confidentiality as far as the identity and contributions of the 
participants are concerned.  The focus group participants will also be expected to keep 
the discussions anonymous and confidential.  The meeting will last between two to four 
hours.77 
Participant observation: This will mainly take place during peacebuilding workshops 
conducted by NGO peace coordinators or community leaders. The researcher will first 
obtain permission for observation from the group leader or spokesperson who will then 
share with each participant the identity of the researcher and details about the research 
project.  Individual consent of each participant will be sought with an assurance of 
anonymity and confidentiality. The participants will be informed that every interaction 
with the researcher will be considered to be part of the data collection. The participants 
will be free not to interact with the researcher or withdraw from the observation at any 
stage. The time limit for participant observation will depend on the duration of the peace 
activity being examined.   
 
Anonymity and confidentiality: The identity of the interviewee will be treated with 
anonymity. Where there are attributes that could make the identity of the interviewee 
obvious, these will be coded and remain known only to the interviewer. The identity of 
the participants will be treated confidentially in the publications and will only be 
disclosed at the request or with the permission of the respective participant. The names 
of NGOs will only be mentioned with the express permission of the relevant authorities, 
or when in reference to published documents (in websites, books or journals).  The 
recorded responses from the interview as well as secondary data from the 
organizations will be treated confidentially by the researcher (or interviewer) and stored 
in a safe. The data from the interviews and peace activities will only be accessed by the 
researcher and his supervisor, if requested. 
                                                 
77
 The suggested duration of the focus group discussions include the time it will take for all the 
participants to arrive, and any logistical delays such as discovering that the room is not well 
prepared or double booked for some reason or another. However, my hope is that the 
discussions will not take more than two hours.  
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Archiving: The collected data from the interview will be kept in a safe for a period of 5 
years, after which they will be destroyed. 
Expected Outcomes: The information collected will be part of the researcher’s PHD 
thesis.  
 
Researcher’s signature:..................................... 
Date:..................................................... 
 
Consent Form 
Title of Project:  NGO Theoretical and Practical Approach to NGO Peacebuilding in 
Northern Uganda: An Analysis of Interactive Perspectives between NGO Peacebuilding 
and the Local Reality of Peacebuilding 
Researcher: Elias Omondi Opongo,  
Contact:  
Address: 40 Pakington St. BD5 7LD, Bradford, U.K.                Telephone: 
447501893995 or 254-730836944 
Affiliation: Doctoral student, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. 
 Please mark X in the 
box 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the research information 
sheet above – and sought clarifications whenever necessary. 
I agree to (choose one): 
a) Be interviewed individually 
 
b) Be interviewed in a Focus group 
 
c) Be part of a group observed by the researcher 
 
 
  
 
 
I understand that my participation to this research is voluntary and I 
have the right to withdraw at anytime without giving any 
reason for my decision 
I agree that the information collected could be used for publication as 
long as anonymity is observed, and that my name could only 
be used at my own request.  
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I would like to receive the transcripts from the interview for editing, 
correction or additional comments 
 
 
I therefore consent to taking part in this study. 
 
 
  
 
  
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    Signature 
 
For Oral Consent 
Declaration by researcher: I have given to the participant a verbal explanation of the 
research project, its aims, objectives and expectations, and I believe that the participant 
has understood that explanation. 
Researcher’s name: …………………………………………………… 
Signature …………………………………………. 
Date…………………………………………………….. 
Interpreter and Translator Confidentiality Agreement 
Research Title: NGO Theoretical and Practical Approach to NGO Peacebuilding in 
Northern Uganda: An Analysis of Interactive Perspectives between NGO Peacebuilding 
and the Local Reality of Peacebuilding 
I (full name)……………………………………………….. 
Of (address)………………………………………………… 
__________________________________________________________ 
acknowledge that I will treat all information translated by me for the research project 
above with strict confidence and anonymity. I will ensure that all translated material, 
while in my possession, will be treated with the same level of confidentiality. I will 
further ensure that I store them safely. All material relating to the above project, while in 
my possession, will only be accessible to the researcher. 
Signature:………………………… 
Date:………………………………. 
YES NO 
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Witnessed by: (name of the Researcher) 
Signature:…………………………….  
Date:…………………………………. 
Declaration of the Review of the Interview Transcript 
Research Project Title: NGO Theoretical and Practical Approach to NGO 
Peacebuilding in Northern Uganda: An Analysis of Interactive Perspectives between 
NGO Peacebuilding and the Local Reality of Peacebuilding 
I (full name)……………………………………………….. 
Of (address)………………………………………………… 
 acknowledge that I have read and revised where necessary the transcript of the 
interview and sent my comments to the researcher. I agree that the information 
collected could be used for publication as long as anonymity is observed and that my 
name could only be used at my own request.  
Signature:………………………… 
Date:………………………………. 
Witnessed by: (name of the Researcher)…………………… 
Signature:…………………………….  
Date:…………………………………. 
 
Interview Schedule 
Research title: NGO Theoretical and Practical Approach to NGO Peacebuilding in 
Northern Uganda: An Analysis of Interactive Perspectives between NGO Peacebuilding 
and the Local Reality of Peacebuilding 
There are three sections to this schedule: i) Perceptions, Influences (internal and 
External) and Assessment of Peacebuilding; ii) Extent of the Relevance of International 
NGO Peacebuilding to Local (NGO) Community Peacebuilding; iii) NGO 
External/Internal Influence Assessment. 
 
Table 2 International and Local NGOs 
The questions below were asked to both international and local NGOs with variation in 
emphasis. Both category of participants were asked about the levels of collaboration 
between local and international NGOs; points of convergences and divergences. 
 
No Questions Prompts/Instructions Concepts &Variables 
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1 What in your opinion 
constitutes peace? 
Focus in relation to 
northern Uganda 
General perception of 
peacebuilding (positive 
& negative) 
2.  In your opinion, what are 
some of the indicators that 
evidence the presence of 
peace? 
Focus in relation to 
northern Uganda 
Assessment of 
peacebuilding (positive 
& negative 
appreciations) 
3. What are some of the 
peacebuilding activities 
carried out by your 
organization? 
In your opinion, which among 
the named activities are the 
most important for peace to 
last in northern Uganda?  
Why do you consider them 
important? 
Prompt for examples 
 
Encourage to identify one 
particular activity 
 
 
Probe in relation to 
values, desired changes 
Perception of 
peacebuilding activities 
Prioritization of the 
peacebuilding activities 
(factors influencing 
prioritization) 
4. Is peacebuilding the primary 
activity of your organization? 
If yes, why? 
 
Prompt for explanation 
 
 
 
Prioritization of the 
peacebuilding activities 
(factors influencing 
prioritization) 
5. 
 
 
 
6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What factors, in your 
assessment, influence your 
organization’s choice of 
activities?   
 
Where do you get your 
funding? 
Is most of the funding from 
local support or international? 
Explain the implication of 
your choice. 
Do you think your 
peacebuilding activities are 
sustainable without external 
funding? Explain 
What are some of the 
challenges in funding your 
activities? 
Prompt reasons that 
justify the choices such 
as: financial constraints; 
donor directives; needs in 
the community. 
 
Probe for explanation if 
the participant is willing to 
talk about this 
Prompt for explanation; if 
not sustainable what 
needs to be done; if 
sustainable what are the 
factors behind the 
sustainability 
 
Probe for explanation; 
discuss the extent to 
which donors influence 
External influence of 
the choice of peace 
activities (factors 
behind external 
influence) 
 
Approach to funding 
(Internal and external 
influence) 
 
Sustainability of local 
peacebuilding (factors 
influencing 
sustainability) 
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7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the major 
conditions put by your donor 
agencies for the funding of 
your activities? 
What is your relationship with 
your headquarters in 
determining your choice of 
activities and funding? 
How would you assess the 
conditions of life (provision of 
basic needs) of your 
participants? 
Do the concerns for poor 
living conditions affect your 
peacebuilding activities? 
 
Explain your answer 
 
Have you heard of the 
International Criminal Court’s 
(ICC) warrant of arrest on 
LRA leaders? 
  
How has the warrant of arrest 
on LRA leaders affected your 
peacebuilding activities? 
If Yes, give examples 
 
What, in your opinion, is the 
best way forward in 
addressing this issue 
(warrant of arrest and impact 
on peace activities)? 
 
What is your opinion on 
culturally-based approaches 
to reconciliation? 
 Explain your answer 
 
What are the strengths of 
culturally-based mechanisms 
approaches to 
peacebuilding 
 
 
 
 
Probe on access to 
housing, water, food, 
education 
Prompt for concrete 
explanations e.g. 
relationship between 
peacebuilding and IGA 
 
 
Probe on the 
understanding of ICC 
 
 
Prompt for explanation on 
how it has affected 
peacebuilding such as 
increased pessimism; 
reduced participation; 
divided opinions 
 
Probe the way forward for 
peace in Uganda; how to 
bridge the divided 
opinions;  
 
Probe on the 
understanding of cultural 
approaches and why it is 
significant or ineffective 
 
Prompt for a detailed 
explanation on the use of 
culturally-based (e.g. 
mato oput) and ICC 
approaches to 
 
Internal mechanisms of 
dialogue (determining 
factors) 
 
 
 
Impact of basic needs 
on peacebuilding 
(positive and negative 
impact; factors 
influencing 
peacebuilding 
approach) 
 
 
 
 
Perception on ICC 
(positive & negative 
perceptions) 
 
 
Perception on ICC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perception on 
culturally-based 
peacebuilding 
approaches (positive & 
negative indicators) 
 
Assessment of 
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10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. 
 
 
 
 
 
of reconciliation? 
What are its limitations? 
What other alternative 
culturally-based 
peacebuilding practices 
would you propose? Why? 
 
 
What is the level of 
collaboration between local 
and international NGOs? 
What are the points of 
convergence between your 
peacebuilding approaches? 
What are the points of 
divergence? 
What are the challenges of 
this collaboration? 
Have you heard of the Juba 
Peace Talks? 
What impact has the Juba 
peace talks had on your 
approach to peacebuilding? 
  Please explain 
 
What are your hopes over the 
Talks? 
What are your concerns? 
 
peacebuilding  
 
Probe for examples and 
why? 
 
 
 
Probe on concrete 
examples of collaboration 
 
Ask for concrete 
examples 
Probe on the levels of 
collaboration with the 
local community initiatives 
for peace 
Differences in 
approaches 
 
 
Probe on the 
understanding of Juba 
Peace Talks 
 
Probe on the reactions of 
peace participants; 
increased or reduced 
pessimism and 
enthusiasm 
 
Prompt for examples 
culturally-based 
approaches to 
reconciliation 
Perceptions on Juba 
Peace Talks (positive & 
negative; influencing 
indicators) 
 
 
Levels of collaboration 
 
Convergence and 
divergent approaches 
(determining factors) 
 
Challenges of 
collaboration 
(determining factors) 
 
Perceptions over Juba 
Peace Talks 
(influencing factors) 
 
Perceptions over Juba 
Peace Talks 
(influencing factors) 
12. 
 
 
 
 
Do you use a peace manual 
for your peacebuilding 
activities? 
Who designed the manual? 
How was the local 
community involved in 
designing the manual? 
When was the manual first 
Use the initial question as 
a filter for the subsequent 
question 
 
 
Probe whether the 
process was internally or 
Approach/methodology  
to peacebuilding 
(reasons for choice of 
different 
methodologies) 
 
Internal and external 
influence (responsible 
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published? 
Were you ever consulted in 
the writing of the manual? 
How many times has the 
manual been revised? 
How has the local situation of 
conflict influenced the 
revision of the manual? 
In your assessment, what are 
the major achievements of 
using the manual? 
What are the constraints? 
 
externally generated 
 
 
 
Probe the reasons behind 
the revision: local needs 
or external pressure; 
availability of new funding 
 
Prompt on for examples 
factors) 
Local participation 
(responsible factors) 
 
Period of usage 
(responsible factors) 
Internal and external 
influences (responsible 
factors) 
Effect of conflict on the 
manual/peace 
approaches 
Assessment of the 
manual (responsible 
factors) 
13. In your assessment what are 
some of the achievements of 
NGO peacebuilding?  
How do you assess your 
activities? 
What hasn’t been achieved 
yet? 
Which of these (not yet 
achieved) would you 
consider undertaking to 
increase the impact of your 
work? 
Prompt examples: 
concrete changes; 
people’s perception; new 
activities for peace  
Probe on conflict/peace 
impact assessment 
mechanisms 
Probe on the means and 
the need for the pursuit of 
the unachieved objectives 
Assessment of 
peacebuilding 
 
Assessment of peace 
interventions (indicators 
for evaluation) 
Prioritization and 
planning (influencing 
factors) 
14. What are some of the 
challenges that NGOs have 
faced?  
Among these, what would 
you consider to be the major 
challenge? 
Why? 
Prompt for examples: 
financial; participation; 
relevance to local needs; 
basic needs priority 
 
Prompt for examples 
Constraints on 
peacebuilding (use 
prompts) 
 
Table 3 Perceptions on NGO Peacebuilding by Gulu Community Participants 
The local community in Gulu were asked the questions below in addition to questions 
8-14 above posed to the international and local NGOs  
No Questions Prompts/Instructions Concepts &Variables 
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1 What in your opinion constitutes 
peace? 
Focus in relation to 
northern Uganda 
General perception of 
peacebuilding 
2.  In your opinion, what are some 
of the indicators that evidence 
the presence of peace? 
Focus in relation to 
northern Uganda 
Assessment of 
peacebuilding 
(indicators) 
3. What would you identify as 
some of the peacebuilding 
activities carried out by the 
international NGOs? 
Which activities would you 
consider to be the most 
relevant? 
Why? 
How long have you participated 
in these activities? 
What has been your role? 
Prompt for examples 
Encourage to identity 
one particular activity 
 
Probe in relation to 
values, desired changes 
 
Probe period and 
frequency 
Probe on the 
significance of the role 
Perception of 
peacebuilding 
activities (influencing 
factors) 
 
(factors determining 
evaluation of 
relevance) 
 
Participation in NGO 
peacebuilding 
4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
 
 
 
What factors, in your 
assessment, influence NGOs’ 
choice of activities?   
 
Do you think NGO activities 
integrate local approaches to 
peacebuilding? Explain your 
answer 
What are the reasons for 
integration or lack of 
integration? 
What is the level of 
collaboration between your 
organizations (if any), other 
NGOs and community? 
 
How would you assess the 
conditions of life (provision of 
basic needs) of your fellow 
participants in NGO 
peacebuilding? 
Do concerns for food, housing 
and clothing (good living 
conditions) affect your 
participation in NGO 
peacebuilding activities? 
Prompt reasons that 
justify the choices such 
as: financial constraints; 
donor directives; needs 
in the community 
Probe for explanation on 
the reasons given 
Examples 
 
 
 
Probe for access to 
housing, water, food, 
education 
 
Prompt for clarification 
on concrete examples, 
such as: different 
motivations for 
participation in 
peacebuilding 
workshops; relationship 
between peacebuilding 
and income generating 
activities 
Perceptions on choice 
of peace activities 
(Internal/External 
influences ) 
 
Perception on the 
integration of local 
peacebuilding 
approach 
 
Assessment of 
collaboration and joint 
activities 
 
 
 
Impact of basic needs 
on peacebuilding 
(determining factors) 
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Table 4 Perceptions of Local Participants in Atiak (no NGO peacebuilding) 
The local participants in Atiak were asked the questions below in addition to in addition 
to questions 8-14 above posed to the international and local NGOs.  
 
No Questions Prompt Variable 
1. What would you generally 
understand by peace? 
Prompt 
personal/communal 
understanding 
Perception of 
peacebuilding 
2. What are some of the local 
initiatives for peace? 
Prompt examples Evidence of 
peacebuilding 
activities 
3. How does the local population 
appreciate these local initiatives? 
 
Prompt for 
examples 
Assessment of 
peace initiative 
4. Who organizes and sponsors the 
local initiatives for peace? 
Prompt specific 
references of 
persons, authorities 
or organization 
Patterns of 
leadership 
5. In your opinion what are some of 
the achievements of the local 
initiatives for peacebuilding? 
And what hasn’t been achieved? 
Prompt examples Assessment of 
local initiatives 
 
 
 
Table 5 Focus Group in Gulu and Atiak: Local Community Participants  
The focus groups were asked the question below in addition to questions 8-14 above 
posed to the international and local NGOs 
 Please explain your answer 
In your opinion, to what extent 
do donors influence NGO 
approaches to peacebuilding? 
 
Probe on explanations 
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No Question Prompts Concepts & Variables 
1 What are the main peacebuilding 
NGOs that you are familiar with? 
What peacebuilding activities of 
the NGOs have you participated 
in? 
    
Seek specific 
examples 
Local community 
perception on NGO 
peacebuilding 
(influencing factors) 
2 
 
What has been your role in these 
activities?  
What would you consider to be 
the most important peace 
activity? 
Prompt examples Community 
participation in NGO 
peacebuilding 
3 In your assessment, what are 
some of the achievements of the 
international and local NGO 
peacebuilding? 
Prompt examples 
of success and 
reasons 
Assessment  
international NGO 
peacebuilding 
4 What would you have wished to 
see achieved that has not yet 
been achieved? 
What in your opinion are the 
reasons behind the unachieved 
desires/hopes? 
Prompt personal 
desire/aspiration 
Evaluation NGO 
peacebuilding 
5 Do you think NGOs integrate 
local peacebuilding practices? 
Explain your answer  
 Prompt for 
example such as: 
working with the 
elders; use of 
traditional 
methods; 
supporting local 
initiatives; 
Integration of local 
mechanisms of 
peacebuilding 
(influencing factors) 
6 
 
 
 
 
7. 
In your opinion, what would you 
identify as outstanding 
differences between NGO 
approaches to peacebuilding and 
your local community?  
 
What factors, in your 
assessment, influence NGOs’ 
choice of activities?   
 
Probe explanation 
on the differences 
of approaches 
 
 
Prompt reasons 
that justify the 
choices such as: 
financial 
constraints; donor 
directives; needs in 
the community 
Difference in 
perception of 
peacebuilding 
approach (influencing 
factors) 
 
Perceptions on choice 
of peace activities 
(Internal/External 
influences ) 
 
407 
 
 
Table 6 Personal Characteristics   
Let me ask you personal questions which you are free to answer or not, although your 
response would be helpful for statistical purposes of this study.  
No.  Question  Prompts  Notes  
1.  What is your current occupation?   Position  
3.  Would you mind telling me in 
which year you were born?  
 Age  
4.  What professional training did 
you receive?  
Check for:  
-peacebuilding 
training  
-other specialized 
training  
-levels of university 
education  
Training  
 
About the Interviewee and the Interview  
To be filled in by interviewer  
1. Name of interviewee  
2. Organization  
3. Sex  
4. Date/time of interview  
5. Duration  
6. Location  
Any comments on the interview situation  
Please note any non-verbal reactions such as body movement, irritation, eye contact 
including interview interruptions as they occur.  
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Samples of Categories and Themes 
Relational context of Conflict 
Table 7 Emerging categories/themes 
Narratives on the nature and 
causes of conflict 
Historical patterns of 
marginalization 
Conflict dynamics and its 
impact 
- Political conflict 
- Polarized social groups 
- Inter-ethnic conflicts 
- Deficit in political 
governance 
- Displaced persons 
- Militarization of conflicts 
- Institutional leadership 
- Domination 
- Grievances over Acholi 
isolation 
- economic and political 
marginalization of the North 
- North-South divide 
- inequitable distribution of 
resources 
- inter-ethnic conflicts in the 
North 
- polarized social groups 
-  
- cultural identity 
- Confused identities 
- Culture of violence 
- Continuity and discontinuity 
in culture 
- Transcending violence 
- Cleansing the past 
- Coping mechanisms 
- Reconstructing a common 
identity 
 
Relational Context of Conflict 
Table 8 Properties 
Narratives of the nature 
and causes of conflict 
Historical patterns of 
marginalization 
Conflict dynamics and its 
impact 
- Poverty 
- Separation 
- Prejudice 
- Power 
- Control 
- Child soldiers 
- Rebel groups 
-  
- Poor infrastructure 
- Power control prejudice  
- Ethicized politics 
- Intolerance 
- Victims of war 
- Political struggle 
- Liberation war  
- Revenge 
- Frustration 
- Separated families 
- Desperation 
- Use of rituals 
- Reconciliation 
-  
 
NGO Approaches to Peacebuilding 
Table 9 Conflict Resolution Approaches 
Interventions at personal level Inter-personal relational change 
- Psycho-social support - Reconciliation 
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- Peace education 
- Skill building 
- Remembering 
- Forgetting 
- Internalization of violence 
- Change of attitude 
- land dispute resolution 
- education 
- awareness raising 
- shared identity 
- common future 
- common history 
 
Table 10 Properties for Conflict Resolution 
Interventions at personal level Inter-personal relational change 
- Trauma 
- Emotions 
- Confusion 
- Fear 
- Cleansing 
- Integration 
- Acceptance 
- Forgiven/forgive 
-  
- Reconciliation rites 
- Rituals 
- Union 
- Togetherness 
- Acceptance 
- Peace 
- Hope 
-  
 
Table 11 Conflict Transformation Approach 
Structural transformation Cultural Transformation 
- capacity building 
- basic needs provision 
- governance values 
- recreation of institutions of governance 
- supporting peace initiatives 
- political leadership 
- trusted leadership 
- accountability 
- role of media 
- Transformation of cultural  
- institutional leadership 
- Social representation of rituals 
- Socialization of rituals 
- Land mediation 
- Conflict mediation 
- Cultural institutions of peace 
- Accountability in cultural leadership 
- Cultural resources 
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Table 12 Conflict Transformation Properties 
Structural Transformation Cultural Transformation 
- Reconciliation 
- Training workshops 
- Acceptance 
- Tolerance 
- Accountability 
- Forgiveness relief 
- Unity 
- Harmony 
- Integration  
- Acceptance 
- Youth change 
- Elders’ participation 
- Interest 
- Participation 
 
Local Perceptions of peacebuilding 
Table 13 Categories/Themes on Local Perceptions of Peacebuilding 
Narratives of Positive 
Appreciation 
Negative Perceptions Narratives of desired 
changes in the NGO 
approach 
- presence of peace 
- basic needs provision 
- forgetting the past 
- stopping violence 
- peacebuilding 
- unity of community 
- Invisible gains of peace 
activities 
- Lack of genuine 
commitment 
- Donor-driven activities vs. 
community driven 
- NGO programme 
implementation vs Local 
consultation 
- Do no harm 
- Adoption of lessons learned 
- Strengthening institutional 
leadership 
- Basic needs provision 
- Recovery from war takes 
long 
 
Local Perceptions of peacebuilding 
Table 14 Properties on Local Perceptions of Peacebuilding 
Narratives of Positive 
appreciation 
Negative perceptions Narratives of desired 
changes in the NGO 
approach 
- Recovery 
- Employment 
- Happiness 
- Reconciliation 
- Collaboration 
- Dependency 
- Disinterested 
- Evidence 
- Integration 
- Injustice  
- Unemployment 
- Meaningful rituals 
- Culture 
- Participation 
- Funding 
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Relational Construction in NGO Peacebuilding 
Table 15 Categories/Themes on Relational Construction in NGO Peacebuilding 
Narratives of NGO-local 
community meaning 
creation 
Narratives of NGO-Donor 
meaning creation 
Narratives of 
convergence/divergence in 
peacebuilding and tradition 
- mutual consultation 
- common approach to 
programme design 
- working together 
- visibility of northern 
Uganda 
- sustainability 
- donor perspective 
- NGO perspective 
- Input-output differentiation  
- Power 
- Memorization of cultural 
symbols 
- Rituals of peace 
- Socialization of rituals 
- Continuities and 
discontinuities 
 
Relational Construction in NGO Peacebuilding 
Table 16 Properties on Relational Construction in NGO Peacebuilding 
Narratives of NGO-local 
community meaning 
creation 
Narratives of NGO-Donor 
meaning creation 
Narratives of 
convergence/divergence in 
peacebuilding and tradition 
- Appreciation 
- Dialogue 
- Negotiation 
- Understanding 
- Income 
- Collaboration 
- Common objective 
- master-subject 
- giver-receiver 
- negotiation 
- consultation 
- good results 
- appreciation 
- listened to 
- values and rituals 
- self-esteem 
- at peace with self 
- being at peace 
- overcoming fear 
- integration and acceptance 
 
Table 17 Interviewee Codes 
INGO – International Non-governmental organization 
LNGO – Local Non-governmental organization 
PO – Programme Officer 
PC – Peacebuilding Coordinator 
INGO-PC46 – This implies: A Peacebuilding Coordinator of an International Non-
governmental organization, interviewee’s coded no. 46 
LNGO-PC47 – This implies: A Peacebuilding Coordinator of an International Non-
governmental organization, interviewee’s coded no. 47 
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CM – Community Member 
CM-G – Community Member from Gulu 
CM-A – Community Member from Atiak (control population) 
CM – G44 – Implies Community Member from Gulu, interview code 44 
CM-A62 – Implies Community Member from Atiak, interview code 62 
FG – Focus Group 
FG – G  - Focus Group in Gulu 
FG – A – Focus Group in Atiak 
UG- Uganda Government 
UG-PO Uganda Government Programme Officer - refers to programme officers of 
the three government institutions for peacebuilding.  
LC3 – Local Council 3 
LC3 –G29 – Refers to the LC3 for Gulu, coded interview number 29 
LC3 – A20 - Refers to the LC3 for Atiak, coded interview number 20  
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